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<!DOCTYPE html>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<title></title>
<body style="text-align:justify;font-family:Arial">
<blockquote>
<p style="text-align: center;font-size: 60pt">1
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr style="text-align:center">
<td><b>Lectio 1</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 1</b>
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td style="font-family: palatino">
<blockquote>
1 ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος,<br>
καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν,<br>
καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.<br>
2 οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.
</blockquote>
<td>
<blockquote>
1 In the beginning was the Word;<br>
and the Word was with God;<br>
and the Word was God.
</blockquote>
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>Evangelista Ioannes, sicut dictum est, intendit principaliter ostendere divinitatem verbi incarnati; et ideo dividitur istud Evangelium in partes duas. Primo enim insinuat Christi divinitatem; secundo manifestat eam per ea quae Christus in carne fecit, et hoc II cap. <i>et die tertia</i>. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit Christi divinitatem; secundo ponit modum, quo Christi divinitas nobis innotuit, ibi <i>et vidimus gloriam eius</i> et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo agit de divinitate Christi; secundo de verbi Dei incarnatione, ibi <i>fuit homo missus a Deo</i>.
<td>23 John the Evangelist, as already indicated, makes it his principal object to show the divinity of the Incarnate Word. Accordingly, his Gospel is divided into two parts. In the first he states the divinity of Christ; in the second he shows it by the things Christ did in the flesh (2:1). In regard to the first, he does two things. First he shows the divinity of Christ; secondly he sets forth the manner in which Christ’s divinity is made known to us (1:14). Concerning the first he does two things. First he treats of the divinity of Christ; secondly of the incarnation of the Word of God (1:6).
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>Quia vero in unaquaque re sunt consideranda duo, scilicet esse et operatio, sive virtus ipsius, ideo primo agit de esse verbi quantum ad naturam divinam; secundo de virtute, seu operatione ipsius, ibi <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>. Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo ostendit quando erat verbum, quia <i>in principio erat verbum</i>; secundo ubi erat, quia <i>apud Deum</i>; unde dicit <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>; tertio quid erat, quia Deus; unde subiungit <i>et Deus erat verbum</i>; quarto quomodo erat, quia <i>hoc erat in principio apud Deum</i>. Prima duo pertinent ad quaestionem, an est: secunda vero duo pertinent ad quaestionem quid est.
<td>Because there are two items to be considered in each thing, namely, its existence and its operation or power, first he treats the existence of the Word as to his divine nature; secondly of his power or operation (1:3). In regard to the first he does four things. First he shows when the Word was: <b>In the beginning was the Word;</b> secondly where he was: <b>and the Word was with God;</b> thirdly what he was: <b>and the Word was God;</b> fourthly, in what way he was: <b>He was in the beginning with God.</b> The first two pertain to the inquiry “whether something exists”; the second two pertain to the inquiry “what something is.”
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>Circa primum autem videndum est quid sit hoc quod dicitur <i>in principio erat verbum</i>. Ubi tria diligenter inquirenda concurrunt, secundum tres dictiones huius orationis. Et primo quid sit hoc quod dicitur <i>verbum</i>; secundo quid sit hoc quod dicitur <i>in principio</i>; tertio quid sit hoc quod dicitur <i>verbum erat in principio</i>.
<td>24 With respect to the first of these four we must examine the meaning of the statement, <b>In the beginning was the Word.</b> And here three things present themselves for careful study according to the three parts of this statement. First it is necessary to investigate the name Word; secondly the phrase <b>in the beginning;</b> thirdly the meaning of the Word <b>was in the beginning.</b>
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>Ad intellectum autem huius nominis <i>verbum</i>, sciendum est quod, secundum philosophum ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa earum, quae sunt in anima, passionum. Consuetum est autem in Scriptura quod significata nominantur nominibus signorum, sicut illud I Cor. X, 4: <i>petra autem erat Christus</i>. De necessitate autem oportet quod illud intrinsecum animae nostrae, quod significatur exteriori verbo nostro, verbum vocetur. Utrum autem per prius conveniat nomen verbi rei exteriori voce prolatae, vel ipsi conceptioni mentis, nihil refert ad praesens. Planum est tamen quod illud quod voce significatur, interius existens in anima, prius est quam ipsum verbum exteriori voce prolatum, utpote causa eius existens. Si ergo volumus scire quid est interius verbum mentis, videamus quid significat quod exteriori voce profertur.
<td>25 To understand the name <b>Word</b> we should note that according to the Philosopher [ <i>On Interpretation</i> 16a3] vocal sounds are signs of the affections that exist in our soul. It is customary in Scripture for the things signified to be themselves called by the names of their signs, as in the statement, “And the rock was Christ” (1 Cor 10:4). It is fitting that what is within our soul, and which is signified by our external word, be called a “word.” But whether the name “word” belongs first to the exterior vocal sound or to the conception in our mind, is not our concern at present. However, it is obvious that what is signified by the vocal sound, as existing interiorly in the soul, exists prior to the vocal expression inasmuch as it is its actual cause. Therefore if we wish to grasp the meaning of the interior word, we must first look at the meaning of that which is exteriorly expressed in words.
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>In intellectu autem nostro sunt tria: scilicet ipsa potentia intellectus; species rei intellectae, quae est forma eius, se habens ad ipsum intellectum, sicut species coloris ad pupillam; et, tertio, ipsa operatio intellectus quae est intelligere. Nullum autem istorum significatur verbo exteriori voce prolato. Nam hoc nomen lapis non significat substantiam intellectus, quia hoc non intendit dicere nominans; nec significat speciem, quae est qua intellectus intelligit, cum etiam hoc non sit intentio nominantis; non significat etiam ipsum intelligere, cum intelligere non sit actio exterius progrediens ab intelligente, sed in ipso manens. Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius, quod intelligens intelligendo format.
<td>Now there are three things in our intellect: the intellectual power itself, the species of the thing understood (and this species is its form, being to the intellect what the species of a color is to the eye), and thirdly the very activity of the intellect, which is to understand. But none of these is what is signified by the exterior vocal word: for the name “stone” does not signify the substance of the intellect because this is not what the one naming intends; nor does it signify the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this also is not the intention of the one naming; nor does it signify the act itself of understanding since to understand is not an action proceeding to the exterior from the one understanding, but an action remaining within. Therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms when understanding.
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas eius operationes. Nam secundum operationem suam, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam, qua componit et dividit, format enunciationem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Et ideo, illud sic formatum et expressum per operationem intellectus, vel definientis vel enunciantis, exteriori voce significatur. Unde dicit philosophus quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio. Istud ergo sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius; et ideo comparatur ad intellectum, non sicut quo intellectus intelligit, sed sicut in quo intelligit; quia in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae. Sic ergo habemus significationem huius nominis <i>verbum</i>.
<td>Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its operation which is called “the understanding of indivisibles,” it forms a definition; while according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that sort. Hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, whether by defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. So the Philosopher says that the notion (ratio) which a name signifies is a definition. Hence, what is thus expressed, i.e., formed in the soul, is called an interior word. Consequently it is compared to the intellect, not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it understands, because it is in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of the thing understood. Thus we have the meaning of the name “word.”
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<td>Secundo, ex his quae dicta sunt, concipere possumus, quod verbum semper est aliquid procedens ab intellectu in actu existente. Iterum quod verbum semper est ratio et similitudo rei intellectae. Et si quidem eadem res sit intelligens et intellecta, tunc verbum est ratio et similitudo intellectus, a quo procedit; si autem sit aliud intelligens et intellectum, tunc verbum non est similitudo et ratio intelligentis, sed rei intellectae: sicut conceptio quam aliquis habet de lapide, est similitudo lapidis tantum, sed quando intellectus intelligit se, tunc huiusmodi verbum est similitudo et ratio intellectus. Et ideo Augustinus ponit similitudinem Trinitatis in anima, secundum quod mens intelligit seipsam, non autem secundum quod intelligit alia.
<td>Secondly, from what has been said we are able to understand that a word is always something that proceeds from an intellect existing in act; and furthermore, that a word is always a notion (ratio) and likeness of the thing understood. So if the one understanding and the thing understood are the same, then the word is a notion and likeness of the intellect from which it proceeds. On the other hand, if the one understanding is other than the thing understood, then the word is not a likeness and notion of the one understanding but of the thing understood, as the conception which one has of a stone is a likeness of only the stone. But when the intellect understands itself, its word is a likeness and notion of the intellect. And so Augustine (<i>On the Trinity</i> IX, 5) sees a likeness of the Trinity in the Soul insofar as the mind understands itself, but not insofar as it understands other things.
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>Patet ergo quod in qualibet natura intellectuali necesse est ponere verbum: quia de ratione intelligendi est quod intellectus intelligendo aliquid formet; huius autem formatio dicitur verbum; et ideo in omni intelligente oportet ponere verbum.
<td>It is clear then that it is necessary to have a word in any intellectual nature, for it is of the very nature of understanding that the intellect in understanding should form something. Now what is formed is called a word, and so it follows that in every being which understands there must be a word.
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<td>Natura autem intellectualis est triplex, scilicet humana, angelica et divina: et ideo triplex est verbum. Scilicet humanum, de quo in Ps. XIII, 1: <i>dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus</i>. Est et angelicum, de quo Zac. I, 9 et in multis locis sacrae Scripturae dicitur: <i>dixit Angelus</i> et cetera. Tertium est verbum divinum, de quo Gen. I, 5: <i>dixit Deus: fiat lux</i> et cetera. Cum ergo Evangelista dicit <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, non intelligi potest de humano vel angelico verbo: quia utrumque istorum verborum est factum, cum homo et Angelus habeant sui esse et operationis principium et causam; verbum autem hominis vel Angeli non potest praeexistere eis. De quo autem verbo intellexerit Evangelista, declarat per hoc quod dicit, hoc verbum non esse factum, cum omnia sint facta per ipsum; hoc autem est verbum Dei, de quo Ioannes hic loquitur.
<td>However, intellectual natures are of three kinds: human, angelic and divine; and so there are three kinds of words. The human word, about which it is said in the Psalm (13:1): “The fool said in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ “ The angelic word, about which it is said in Zechariah (1:9), and in many places in Sacred Scripture, “And the angel said to me.” The third is the divine word, of which Genesis (1:3) says, “And God said, ‘Let there be light.’ “ So when the Evangelist says, <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> we cannot understand this as a human or angelic word, because both these words have been made since man and angel have a cause and principle of their existence and operation, and the word of a man or an angel cannot exist before they do. The word the Evangelist had in mind he shows by saying that this word was not made, since all things were made by it. Therefore, the word about which John speaks here is the Word of God.
<tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
<td>Sciendum est autem, quod hoc verbum differt a nostro verbo in tribus. Prima differentia est, secundum Augustinum, quia verbum nostrum prius est formabile, quam formatum: nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam; et sic est in omnibus aliis, quae a nobis intelliguntur, nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur. Quamdiu ergo sic ratiocinando, intellectus iactatur hac atque illac, nec dum formatio perfecta est, nisi quando ipsam rationem rei perfecte conceperit: et tunc primo habet rationem rei perfecte, et tunc primo habet rationem verbi. Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis. Sic ergo verbum nostrum primo est in potentia quam in actu; sed verbum Dei semper est in actu: et ideo nomen cogitationis verbo Dei proprie non convenit. Dicit enim Augustinus, XV de Trinit., ita dicitur verbum Dei, ut cogitatio non dicatur, ne quid quasi volubile credatur in Deo. Id autem quod Anselmus dicit, scilicet dicere summo spiritui nihil aliud est, quam cogitando intueri, improprie dictum est.
<td>26 We should note that this Word differs from our own word in three ways. The first difference, according to Augustine, is that our word is formable before being formed, for when I wish to conceive the notion of a stone, I must arrive at it by reasoning. And so it is in all other things that are understood by us, with the sole possible exception of the first principles which, since they are known in a simple manner, are known at once without any discourse of reason. So as long as the intellect, in so reasoning, casts about this way and that, the formation is not yet complete. It is only when it has conceived the notion of the thing perfectly that for the first time it has the notion of the complete thing and a word. Thus in our mind there is both a “cogitation,” meaning the discourse involved in an investigation, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of the truth. So our word is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence, the term “cogitation” does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (<i>On the Trinity</i> XV) <i>:</i> “The Word of God is spoken of in such a way that cogitation is not included, lest anything changeable be supposed in God.” Anselm was speaking improperly when he said: “For the supreme Spirit to speak is for him to look at something while cogitating.”
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<td>Secunda vero differentia verbi nostri ad verbum divinum est, quia verbum nostrum est imperfectum, sed verbum divinum est perfectissimum. Quia enim nos non possumus omnes nostras conceptiones uno verbo exprimere, ideo oportet quod plura verba imperfecta formemus, per quae divisim exprimamus omnia, quae in scientia nostra sunt. In Deo autem non est sic: cum enim intelligat, et seipsum etiam et quicquid intelligit per essentiam suam, uno actu, unicum verbum divinum est expressivum totius quod in Deo est, non solum personarum, sed etiam creaturarum: alias esset imperfectum. Unde dicit Augustinus: si quid minus esset in verbo, quam in dicentis scientia continetur, verbum imperfectum esset. Sed constat quod est perfectissimum; ergo est tantum unum. Iob XXXIII, 14: <i>semel loquitur Deus</i>.
<td>27 The second difference is that our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect. For since we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form many imperfect words through which we separately express all that is in our knowledge. But it is not that way with God. For since he understands both himself and everything else through his essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of all that is in God, not only of the Persons but also of creatures; otherwise it would be imperfect. So Augustine says: “If there were less in the Word than is contained in the knowledge of the One speaking it, the Word would be imperfect; but it is obvious that it is most perfect; therefore, it is only one.” “God speaks once” (Jb 33:14).
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<td>Tertia differentia est, quod verbum nostrum non est eiusdem naturae nobiscum, sed verbum divinum est eiusdem naturae cum Deo: et ideo est aliquid subsistens in natura divina. Nam ratio intellecta, quam intellectus videtur de aliqua re formare, habet esse intelligibile tantum in anima nostra; intelligere autem in anima nostra non est idem quod est natura animae, quia anima non est sua operatio. Et ideo verbum quod format intellectus noster, non est de essentia animae, sed est accidens ei. In Deo autem idem est intelligere et esse; et ideo verbum intellectus divini non est aliquid accidens, sed pertinens ad naturam eius: quia quicquid est in natura Dei, est Deus. Unde, dicit Damascenus, quod Deus verbum substantiale est, et in hypostasi ens, reliqua vero, verba nostra scilicet, virtutes sunt animae.
<td>28 The third difference is that our word is not of the same nature as we; but the divine Word is of the same nature as God. And therefore it is something that subsists in the divine nature. For the understood notion which the intellect is seen to form about some thing has only an intelligible existence in our soul. Now in our soul, to understand is not the same as the nature of the soul, because our soul is not its own operation. Consequently, the word which our intellect forms is not of the essence of our soul, but is an accident of it. But in God, to understand and to be are the same; and so the Word of the divine intellect is not an accident but belongs to its nature. Thus it must be subsistent, because whatever is in the nature of God is God. Thus Damascene says that God is a substantial Word, and a hypostasis, but our words are concepts in our mind.
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<td>Ex praemissis etiam patet quod verbum, proprie loquendo, semper personaliter accipitur in divinis, cum non importet nisi quid expressum ab intelligente. Item quod verbum in divinis sit similitudo eius a quo procedit; et quod sit coaeternum ei a quo procedit, cum non prius fuerit formabile quam formatum, sed semper in actu; et quod sit aequale patri, cum sit perfectum, et totius esse patris expressivum; et quod sit coessentiale et consubstantiale patri, cum sit substantia eius.
<td>29 From the above it is clear that the Word, properly speaking, is always understood as a Person in the Divinity, since it implies only something expressed, by the one understanding; also, that in the Divinity the Word is the likeness of that from which it issues; and that it is co-eternal with that from which it issues, since it was not first formable before being formed, but was always in act; and that it is equal to the Father, since it is perfect and expressive of the whole being of the Father; and that it is co-essential and consubstantial with the Father, since it is his substance.
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<td>Patet etiam quod cum in qualibet natura illud quod procedit, habens similitudinem naturae eius a quo procedit, vocetur filius, et hoc verbum procedat in similitudine et identitate naturae eius a quo procedit, convenienter et proprie dicitur filius, et productio eius dicitur generatio.
<td>It is also clear that since in every nature that which issues forth and has a likeness to the nature from which it issues is called a son, and since this Word issues forth in a likeness and identity to the nature from which it issues, it is suitably and appropriately called a “Son,” and its production is called a generation.
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<td>Sic ergo patet primum, scilicet quid sit hoc quod dicitur <i>verbum</i>.
<td>So now the first point is clear, the meaning of the <b>term Word.</b>
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<td>Circa hoc autem quatuor quaestiones occurrunt. Duae sunt Chrysostomi. Prima est cur Ioannes Evangelista patrem dimittens, confestim incepit a filio, dicens <i>in principio erat verbum</i>.
<td>30 There are four questions on this point, two of them from Chrysostom. The first is: Why did John the Evangelist omit the Father and begin at once with the Son, saying, <b>In the beginning was the Word?</b>
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<td>Ad hoc autem est duplex responsio. Una est, quia pater omnibus innotuerat in veteri testamento, quamvis non in ratione patris, sed ut Deus; filius autem ignorabatur: et ideo in novo testamento, in quo agitur de cognitione verbi, incipit a verbo, sive filio.
<td>There are two answers to this. One is that the Father was known to everyone in the Old Testament, although not under the aspect of Father, but as God; but the Son was not known. And so in the New Testament, which is concerned with our knowledge of the Word, he begins with the Word or Son.
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<td>Alia est, quia per filium ducimur in notitiam patris; infra XVII, 6: <i>pater, manifestavi nomen tuum hominibus, quos dedisti mihi</i>. Volens ergo fideles in notitiam patris ducere Evangelista, decenter incepit a filio, statim subiungens de patre cum dicit <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>.
<td>The other answer is that we are brought to know the Father through the Son: “Father, I have manifested your name to the men whom you have given to me” (below 17:6). And so wishing to lead the faithful to a knowledge of the Father, the Evangelist fittingly began with the Son, at once adding something about the Father when he says, <b>and the Word was with God.</b>
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<td>Secunda quaestio est etiam Chrysostomi. Cum enim, sicut dictum est, verbum procedat ut filius, quare dixit <i>verbum</i>, et non filius?
<td>31 The second question is also from Chrysostom. Why did he say <b>Word</b> and not “Son,” since, as we have said, the Word proceeds as Son?
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<td>Ad hoc etiam dupliciter respondetur. Primo quia filius dicit aliquid genitum, et cum audimus generationem filii, posset quis cogitare generationem illam talem esse, qualem comprehendere potest, scilicet materialem et passibilem; ideo ergo non dixit filius sed verbum, quod importat intelligibilem processum, ut non intelligatur materialem et passibilem generationem illam fuisse. Ostendens igitur filium ex Deo impassibiliter nasci, destruit vitiosam suspicionem per verbi nuncupationem.
<td>There are also two answers to this. First, because “son” means something begotten, and when we hear of the generation of the Son, someone might suppose that this generation is the kind he can comprehend, that is, a material and changeable generation. Thus he did not say “Son,” but <b>Word,</b> which signifies an intelligible proceeding, so that it would not be understood as a material and changeable generation. And so in showing that the Son is born of the Father in an unchangeable way, he eliminates a faulty conjecture by using the name <b>Word.</b>
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<td>Aliter potest dici sic: Evangelista tractaturus erat de verbo, inquantum venerat ad manifestandum patrem. Unde cum ratio manifestationis magis importetur in nomine verbi quam in nomine filii, ideo magis est usus nomine verbi.
<td>The second answer is this. The Evangelist was about to consider the Word as having come to manifest the Father. But since the idea of manifesting is implied better in the name “Word” than in the name “Son,” he preferred to use the name <b>Word.</b>
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<td>Tertia quaestio est Augustini in Lib. LXXXIII quaest., quae talis est: in Graeco, ubi nos habemus verbum, habetur logos. Cum ergo logos significet in Latino rationem et verbum, quare translatores transtulerunt verbum, et non rationem, cum ratio sit quid intrinsecum, quemadmodum etiam verbum?
<td>32 The third question is raised by Augustine in his book <i>Eighty-three Questions;</i> and it is this. In Greek, where we have “Word,” they have “Logos”; now since “Logos” signifies in Latin both “notion” and “word” [i.e., <i>ratio et verbum</i> ], why did the translators render it as “word” and not “notion,” since a notion is something interior just as a word is?
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<td>Respondeo. Dicendum quod ratio proprie nominat conceptum mentis, secundum quod in mente est, etsi nihil per illam exterius fiat; per verbum vero significatur respectus ad exteriora: et ideo quia Evangelista per hoc, quod dixit logos, non solum intendebat significare respectum ad existentiam filii in patre, sed etiam operativam potentiam filii, qua <i>per ipsum facta sunt omnia</i>, magis antiqui transtulerunt verbum, quod importat respectum ad exteriora, quam ratio, quae tantum conceptum mentis insinuat.
<td>I answer that “notion” [ratio], properly speaking, names a conception of the mind precisely as in the mind, even if through it nothing exterior comes to be; but “word” signifies a reference to something exterior. And so because the Evangelist, when he said “Logos,” intended to signify not only a reference to the Son’s existence in the Father, but also the operative power of the Son, by which, through him, all things were made, our predecessors preferred to translate it “Word,” which implies a reference to something exterior, rather than “notion “ which implies merely a concept of the mind.
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<td>Quarta quaestio est Origenis, quae talis est. Scriptura in pluribus locis loquens de verbo Dei, nominat ipsum non absolute verbum, sed cum additione, scilicet Dei, cum dicit verbum Dei, vel domini: Eccli. I, 5: <i>fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis</i>, et Apoc. XIX, 13: <i>et nomen eius verbum Dei</i>. Quare ergo Evangelista, cum loqueretur hic de verbo Dei, non dixit: in principio erat verbum Dei, sed dixit tantummodo verbum?
<td>33 The fourth question is from Origen, and is this. In many passages, Scripture, when speaking of the Word of God, does not simply call him the Word, but adds “of God,” saying, “the Word of God,” or “of the Lord”: “The Word of God on high is the foundation of wisdom” (Sir 1:5); “His name is the Word of God” (Rv 19:13). Why then did the Evangelist, when speaking here of the Word of God, not say, “In the beginning was the Word of God,” but said <b>In the beginning was the Word?</b>
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<td>Respondeo. Dicendum, quod licet sint multae veritates participatae, est tamen una veritas absoluta, quae per suam essentiam est veritas, scilicet ipsum esse divinum, qua veritate, omnia verba sunt verba. Eodem modo est una sapientia absoluta supra omnia elevata, scilicet sapientia divina, per cuius participationem omnes sapientes sunt sapientes. Et etiam unum verbum absolutum, cuius participatione omnes habentes verbum, dicuntur dicentes. Hoc autem est verbum divinum, quod per seipsum est verbum super omnia verba elevatum. Ut ergo Evangelista hanc supereminentiam divini verbi significaret, ipsum verbum absque ulla additione nobis absolute proposuit;
<td>I answer that although there are many participated truths, there is just one absolute Truth, which is Truth by its very essence, that is, the divine act of being (<i>esse</i>); and by this Truth all words are words. Similarly, there is one absolute Wisdom elevated above all things, that is, the divine Wisdom, by participating in which all wise persons are wise. Further, there is one absolute Word, by participating in which all persons having a word are called speakers. Now this is the divine Word which of itself is the Word elevated above all words. So in order that the Evangelist might signify this supereminence of the divine Word, he pointed out this Word to us absolutely without any addition.
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<td>et quia Graeci, quando volunt significare aliquid segregatum et elevatum ab omnibus aliis, consueverunt apponere articulum nomini, per quod illud significatur sicut Platonici volentes significare substantias separatas, puta bonum separatum, vel hominem separatum, vocabant illud ly per se bonum, vel ly per se hominem ideo Evangelista volens significare segregationem et elevationem istius verbi super omnia, apposuit articulum ad hoc nomen logos, ut si dicatur in Latino, ly verbum.
<td>And because the Greeks, when they wished to signify something separate and elevated above everything else, did this by affixing the article to the name (as the Platonists, wishing to signify the separated substances, such as the separated good or the separated man, called them the good <i>per se,</i> or man <i>per se</i>), so the Evangelist, wishing to signify the separation and elevation of that Word above all things, affixed an article to the name “Logos,” so that if it were stated in Latin we would say <i>“the</i> Word.”
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<td>Secundo considerandum est, quid significet hoc quod dicitur <i>in principio</i>. Sciendum est autem quod principium, secundum Origenem, multis modis dicitur. Cum enim principium importet ordinem quemdam ad alia, necesse est invenire principium in omnibus, in quibus est ordo. Invenitur autem ordo in quantitatibus; et secundum hoc dicitur principium in numeris et longitudine, puta lineae. Invenitur etiam ordo in tempore; et secundum hoc dicitur principium temporis, vel durationis. Invenitur ordo in disciplinis, et hic est duplex: secundum naturam, et quoad nos; et utroque modo dicitur principium. Hebr. V, v. 12: <i>deberetis esse magistri propter tempus</i>. Et hoc modo, secundum naturam quidem, in disciplina Christiana initium et principium sapientiae nostrae est Christus, inquantum est sapientia et verbum Dei, idest secundum divinitatem. Quoad nos vero principium est ipse Christus, inquantum <i>verbum caro factum est</i>, idest secundum eius incarnationem. Invenitur etiam ordo in productione rei; et secundum hoc principium dicitur ex parte generati, scilicet ipsa prima pars generati seu facti: sicut fundamentum dicitur principium domus. Vel ex parte facientis: et sic est triplex principium, scilicet intentionis, quod est finis, quod movet agentem; rationis, quod est ipsa forma in mente artificis; et executionis, quod est potentia operans. His igitur modis de principio inquirendum est, quomodo sumatur hic principium, cum dicit <i>in principio erat verbum</i>.
<td>34 Secondly, we must consider the meaning of the phrase, <b>In the beginning.</b> We must note that according to Origen, the word <i>principium</i> has many meanings [such as “principle,” “source,” or “beginning”]. Since the word <i>principium</i> implies a certain order of one thing to another, one can find a <i>principium</i> in all those things which have an order. First of all, order is found in quantified things; and so there is a principle of number and lengths, as for example, a line. Second, order is found in time; and so we speak of a “beginning” of time, or of duration. Third, order is found in learning; and this in two ways: as to nature, and as to ourselves, and in both cases we can speak of a “beginning”: “By this time you ought to be teachers” (Heb 5:12). As to nature, in Christian doctrine the beginning and principle of our wisdom is Christ, inasmuch as he is the Wisdom and Word of God, i.e., in his divinity. But as to ourselves, the beginning is Christ himself inasmuch as the Word has become flesh, i.e., by his incarnation. Fourth, in order is found in the production of a thing. In this perspective there can be a <i>principium</i> on the part of the thing generated, that is, the first part of the thing generated or made; as we say that the foundation is the beginning of a house. Another <i>principium is</i> on the part of the generator, and in this perspective there are three “principles”: of intention, which is the purpose, which motivates the agent; of reason, which is the idea in the mind of the maker; and of execution, which is the operative faculty. Considering these various ways of using the term, we now ask how <i>principium</i> is used here when it says, <b>In the beginning was the Word.</b>
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<td>Dicendum est igitur quod potest sumi tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod principium supponit pro persona filii, quod principium est creaturarum secundum rationem virtutis activae, et per modum sapientiae, quae est ratio eorum quae fiunt; unde dicitur I Cor. I, 24: <i>Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam</i>. Unde et dominus de se dicit infra VIII, 25: <i>ego principium, qui et loquor vobis</i>. Sic ergo accipiendo principium, intelligendum est quod dicitur <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, ac si diceret in filio erat verbum, ut sit sensus: ipsum verbum est principium, ex modo loquendi, quo dicitur vita esse in Deo, quae tamen non est aliud, quam ipse Deus.
<td>35 We should note that this word can be taken in three ways. In one way so that <i>principium is</i> understood as the Person of the Son, who is the principle of creatures by reason of his active power acting with wisdom, which is the conception of the things that are brought into existence. Hence we read: “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1:24). And so the Lord said about himself: “I am the <i>principium</i> who also speaks to you” (below 8:25). Taking <i>principium</i> in this way, we should understand the statement, <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> as though he were saying, “The Word was in the Son,” so that the sense would be: The Word himself is the <i>principium,</i> principle, in the sense in which life is said to be “in” God, when this life is not something other than God.
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<td>Et haec est expositio Origenis. Dicit ergo hic Evangelista <i>in principio</i>, ut statim in principio divinitatem verbi ostenderet, ut Chrysostomus dicit, dum asserit ipsum esse principium; quia secundum determinationem omnium principium est honoratissimum.
<td>And this is the explanation of Origen. And so the Evangelist says <b>In the beginning</b> here in order, as Chrysostom says, to show at the very outset the divinity of the Word by asserting that he is a principle because, as determining all, a principle is most honored.
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<td>Secundo modo potest accipi principium, prout supponit pro persona patris, quod est principium non solum creaturarum, sed omnis divini processus; et sic accipitur in Ps. CIX, 3: <i>tecum principium in die virtutis tuae</i>. Secundum hoc ergo dicitur <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, ac si diceretur: in patre erat filius. Et haec est expositio Augustini, et etiam Origenis. Dicitur autem filius esse in patre, quia eiusdem essentiae est cum patre. Cum enim filius sit sui essentia, in quocumque est essentia filii, est filius. Quia ergo in patre est essentia filii per consubstantialitatem, conveniens est quod filius sit in patre. Unde infra XIV, 10 dicitur: <i>ego in patre, et pater in me est</i>.
<td>36 In a second way <i>principium</i> can be understood as the Person of the Father, who is the principle not only of creatures, but of every divine process. It is taken this way in, “Yours is princely power (<i>principium</i>) in the day of your birth” (Ps 110:3). In this second way one reads <b>In the beginning was the Word</b> as though it means, “The Son was in the Father.” This is Augustine’s understanding of it, as well as Origen’s. The Son, however, is said to be in the Father because both have the same essence. Since the Son is his own essence, then the Son is in whomsoever the Son’s essence is. Since, therefore, the essence of the Son is in the Father by consubstantiality, it is fitting that the Son be in the Father. Hence it says below (14:10): “I am in the Father and the Father is in me.”
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<td>Tertio modo potest accipi principium pro principio durationis, ut sit sensus <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, idest verbum erat ante omnia, ut Augustinus exponit, et designatur per hoc verbi aeternitas, secundum Basilium et Hilarium.
<td>37 In a third way, <i>principium</i> can be taken for the beginning of duration, so that the sense of <b>In the beginning was the Word</b> is that the Word was before all things, as Augustine explains it. According to Basil and Hilary, this phrase shows the eternity of the Word.
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<td>Per hoc enim quod dicitur <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, ostenditur quod quodcumque principium durationis accipiatur, sive rerum temporalium, quod est tempus, sive aeviternarum, quod est aevum, sive totius mundi, sive quodcumque imaginatum extensum per multa saecula, in illo principio iam erat verbum. Unde Hilarius dicit VII de Trinitate: <i>transeuntur tempora, transcenduntur saecula, tolluntur aetates. Pone aliquid quod voles tuae opinionis principium; verbum iam erat, unde tractatur</i>. Et hoc est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, 22: <i>dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quicquam faceret a principio</i>. Quod autem est ante durationis principium, est aeternum.
<td>The phrase <b>In the beginning was the Word</b> shows that no matter which beginning of duration is taken, whether of temporal things which is time, or of aeviternal things which is the aeon, or of the whole world or any imagined span of time reaching back for many ages, at that beginning the Word already was. Hence Hilary says (<i>On the Trinity</i> VII): “Go back season by season, skip over the centuries, take away ages. Set down whatever you want as the beginning in your opinion: the Word already was.” And this is what Proverbs (8:23) says: “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything.” But what is prior to the beginning of duration is eternal.
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<td>Sic igitur secundum primam expositionem, asseritur verbi causalitas; secundum autem secundam, verbi consubstantialitas ad patrem, qui verbum loquitur; secundum vero tertiam, verbi coaeternitas.
<td>38 And thus the first explanation asserts the causality of the Word; the second explanation affirms the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, who utters the Word; and the third explanation affirms the co-eternity of the Word.
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<td>Considerandum est etiam hic, quod dicitur <i>verbum erat</i>, quod est temporis praeteriti imperfecti, et hoc maxime videtur competere ad designandum aeterna, si attendamus naturam temporis et eorum quae sunt in tempore. Quod futurum est, nondum est actu; praesens autem actu est, et per hoc quod est actu praesens, non designatur fuisse: praeteritum autem perfectum designat aliquid extitisse, et esse iam determinatum, et iam defuisse; sed praeteritum imperfectum significat aliquid fuisse, et non esse adhuc determinatum, nec defuisse, sed adhuc remanere. Ideo signanter Ioannes ubicumque ponit aliquid aeternum, dicit <i>erat</i>; ubi vero dicit aliquid temporale, dicit <i>fuit</i>, ut infra patebit.
<td>39 Now we should consider that it says that the Word was (<i>erat</i>), which is stated in the past imperfect tense. This tense is most appropriate for designating eternal things if we consider the nature of time and of the things that exist in time. For what is future is not yet in act; but what is at present is in act, and by the fact that it is in act what is present is not described as having been. Now the past perfect tense indicates that something has existed, has already come to an end, and has now ceased to be. The past imperfect tense, on the other hand, indicates that something has been, has not yet come to an end, nor has ceased to be, but still endures. Thus, whenever John mentions eternal things he expressly says “was” (<i>erat,</i> past imperfect tense), but when he refers to anything temporal he says “has been” (<i>fuit,</i> past perfect tense), as will be clear later.
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<td>Sed quantum ad rationem praesentis competit maxime ad designandum aeternitatem praesens tempus, quod signat aliquid esse in actu, quod semper convenit aeternis: et ideo dicitur Ex. III, 14: <i>ego sum qui sum</i>; et Augustinus dicit, quod ille solus vere est, cuius esse non novit praeteritum et futurum.
<td>But so far as concerns the notion of the present, the best way to designate eternity is the present tense, which indicates that some thing is in act, and this is always the characteristic of eternal things. And so it says in Exodus (3:14): “I am who am.” And Augustine says: “He alone truly is whose being does not know a past and a future.
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<td>Est etiam considerandum quod hoc verbum <i>erat</i>, secundum Glossam, non sumitur hic inquantum significat temporales motus, more aliorum verborum, sed secundum quod signat rei existentiam: unde et verbum substantivum dicitur.
<td>40 We should also note that this verb was, according to the Gloss, is not understood here as indicating temporal changes, as other verbs do, but as signifying the existence of a thing. Thus it is also called a substantive verb.
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<td>Sed potest aliquis quaerere, cum verbum sit genitum a patre, quomodo possit esse patri coaeternum: homo enim filius a patre homine genitus, est eo posterior.
<td>41 Someone may ask how the Word can be co-eternal with the Father since he is begotten by the Father: for a human son, born from a human father, is subsequent to his father.
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<td>Ad quod dicendum est quod principium originis invenitur esse prius duratione, eo quod est ex principio, propter tria. Primo quidem quia principium originis alicuius rei praecedit tempore actionem, qua producit rem cuius est principium; sicut non statim quando homo est, incipit scribere, et ideo tempore praecedit Scripturam. Secundo per hoc quod actio successionem habet, et ideo etiam si simul cum agente incipiat, tamen terminus actionis est post agentem: sicut simul cum generatus est ignis in istis inferioribus, incipit sursum tendere; prius tamen est ignis quam sit sursum, quia motus quo sursum tendit, quodam tempore mensuratur. Tertio modo eo quod ex voluntate principii determinatur initium durationis eius quod est in principio, sicut ex voluntate Dei determinatur initium durationis creaturae: unde prius fuit Deus quam creatura.
<td>I answer that there are three reasons why an originative principle is prior in duration to that which derives from that principle. First of all, if the originative principle of anything precedes in time the action by which it produces the thing of which it is the principle; thus a man does not begin to write as soon as he exists, and so he precedes his writing in time. Secondly, if an action is successive; consequently, even if the action should happen to begin at the same time as the agent, the termination of the action is nevertheless subsequent to the agent. Thus, as soon as fire has been generated in a lower region, it begins to ascend; but the fire exists before it has ascended, because the motion by which it tends upward requires some time. Thirdly, by the fact that sometimes the beginning of a thing depends on the will of its principle, just as the beginning of a creature’s coming-to-be depends on the will of God, such that God existed before any creature.
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<td>Nihil autem horum trium in generatione divini verbi invenitur. Non enim Deus primo fuit quam inceperit generare verbum: cum enim generatio verbi nihil aliud sit quam intelligibilis conceptio, sequeretur quod Deus esset prius intelligens in potentia quam in actu, quod est impossibile. Similiter non potest esse quod ipsa verbi generatio sit successiva: sic enim divinum verbum prius esset informe quam formatum, sicut accidit in nobis, qui cogitando verba formamus; quod est falsum, ut iam dictum est. Similiter non potest dici quod pater sua voluntate initium durationis filio suo praestiterit; quia Deus pater non generat filium voluntate, ut Ariani dixerunt, sed naturaliter: Deus enim pater seipsum intelligendo, verbum concepit, et ideo non ante fuit Deus pater quam filius.
<td>Yet none of these three is found in the generation of the divine Word. God did not first exist and then begin to generate the Word: for since the generation of the Word is nothing other than an intelligible conception, it would follow that God would be understanding in potency before understanding in act, which is impossible. Again, it is impossible that the generation of the Word involve succession: for then the divine Word would be unformed before it was formed (as happens in us who form words by “cogitating”), which is false, as was said. Again, we cannot say that the Father pre-established a beginning of duration for his Son by his own will, because God the Father does not generate the Son by his will, as the Arians held, but naturally: for God the Father, understanding himself, conceives the Word; and so God the Father did not exist prior to the Son.
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<td>Huius aliqualis similitudo apparet in igne, et in splendore procedente ab igne: procedit enim splendor naturaliter et sine successione. Item si ignis esset aeternus, splendor eius coaeternus esset: propter quod filius dicitur splendor patris; ad Hebr. I, 3: <i>qui cum sit splendor gloriae</i> et cetera. Sed in hac similitudine deficit connaturalitas, et ideo nominamus eum filium, cum tamen in humana filiatione deficiat coaeternitas: oportet enim ex multis similitudinibus sensibilium in divinam cognitionem pervenire, quia una non sufficit;
<td>An example of this, to a limited degree, appears in fire and in the brightness issuing from it: for this brightness issues naturally and without succession from the fire. Again, if the fire were eternal, its brightness would be coeternal with it. This is why the Son is called the brightness of the Father: “the brightness of his glory” (Heb 1:3). But this example lacks an illustration of the identity of nature. And so we call him Son, although in human sonship we do not find coeternity: for we must attain our knowledge of divine things from many likenesses in material things, for one likeness is not enough.
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<td>et hoc est quod dicitur in libro Ephesini Concilii, coexistere semper patri filium: splendor enim denunciat impassibilitatem, nativitas ostendit verbum, consubstantialitatem vero filii nomen insinuat.
<td>The Council of Ephesus says that the Son always coexists with the Father: for “brightness” indicates his unchangeability, “birth” points to the Word himself, but the name “Son” suggests his consubstantiality.
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<td>Nominamus ergo filium diversis nominibus, ad exprimendum perfectionem eius, quae uno nomine non potest exprimi. Ut enim ostendatur connaturalis patri, dicitur filius; ut ostendatur in nullo dissimilis, dicitur imago; ut ostendatur coaeternus, dicitur splendor; ut ostendatur immaterialiter genitus, dicitur verbum.
<td>42 And so we give the Son various names to express his perfection, which cannot be expressed by one name. We call him “Son” to show that he is of the same nature as the Father; we call him “image” to show that he is not unlike the Father in any way; we call him “brightness” to show that he is coeternal; and he is called the “Word” to show that he is begotten in an immaterial manner.
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<td>Deinde dicit <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>. Hic ponitur secunda clausula, quam Evangelista ponit in sua narratione. Ubi prius consideranda est significatio duorum verborum quae in prima clausula posita non fuerunt, scilicet <i>Deum</i> et <i>apud</i>. Quid enim sit verbum, et quid principium, iam expositum est. Haec ergo quae in hac secunda clausula ponuntur de novo, scilicet <i>Deum</i> et <i>apud</i>, investigantes, diligentius prosequamur. Et ut melius expositionem huius secundae clausulae intelligamus, dicendum est aliquid de significatione utriusque, quantum pertinet ad propositum.
<td>43 Then the Evangelist says, <b>and the Word was with God,</b> which is the second clause in his account. The first thing to consider is the meaning of the two words which did not appear in the first clause, that is, <b>God</b>, and <b>with;</b> for we have already explained the meanings of “Word,” and “beginning. “Let us continue carefully by examining these two new words, and to better understand the explanation of this second clause, we must say something about the meaning of each so far as it is relevant to our purpose.
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<td>Sciendum est ergo in primis quod hoc nomen Deus significat divinitatem, sed in supposito et concrete; hoc vero nomen deitas significat deitatem in abstracto, et absolute: et inde est quod non potest supponere pro persona ex naturali virtute et ex modo significandi; sed supponit solummodo pro natura. Hoc vero nomen Deus habet naturaliter ex modo significandi quod supponat pro aliqua personarum, sicut hoc nomen homo supponit pro supposito humanitatis, et ideo quandocumque veritas locutionis, vel ipsum praedicatum exigit ut hoc nomen Deus supponat pro persona, tunc supponit pro persona ut cum dicimus, Deus generat Deum. Et ita cum hic dicitur <i>apud Deum</i>, necesse est quod Deus pro persona patris supponat, quia haec praepositio apud distinctionem significat verbi, quod esse dicitur <i>apud Deum</i>; et licet significet distinctionem in persona, non tamen in natura, cum eadem sit natura patris et filii. Evangelista igitur significare voluit patris personam per hoc quod dixit <i>Deum</i>.
<td>44 At the outset, we should note that the name “God” signifies the divinity concretely and as inherent in a subject, while the name “deity” signifies the divinity in the abstract and absolutely. Thus the name “deity” cannot naturally and by its mode of signifying stand for a [divine] person, but only for the [divine] nature. But the name “God” can, by its natural mode of signifying, stand for any one of the [divine] persons, just as the name “man” stands for any individual (<i>suppositum</i>) possessing humanity. Therefore, whenever the truth of a statement or its predicate requires that the name “God” stand for the person, then it stands for the person, as when we say, “God begets God.” Thus, when it says here that <b>the Word was with God,</b> it is necessary that God stand for the person of the Father, because the preposition <b>with</b> signifies the distinction of the Word, which is said to be <b>with God.</b> And although this preposition signifies a distinction in person, it does not signify a distinction in nature, since the nature of the Father and of the Son is the same. Consequently, the Evangelist wished to signify the person of the Father when he said God.
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<td>Sciendum est autem circa hoc quod haec praepositio apud quamdam coniunctionem rei significatae per rectum, ad rem significatam per obliquum importat, sicut haec praepositio in. Sed differenter, quia haec praepositio in significat quamdam coniunctionem intrinsecam; haec vero praepositio apud quodammodo extrinsecam coniunctionem importat. Et utrumque dicimus in divinis: scilicet filium esse in patre, et esse apud patrem; et intrinsecum quidem ad consubstantialitatem pertinet, extrinsecum vero (ut sic loqui liceat, cum improprie in divinis dicatur extrinsecum) non nisi ad distinctionem personalem refertur, cum filius a patre solum per originem distinguatur. Et ideo per utrumque istorum, et consubstantialitas in natura designatur, et distinctio in personis: consubstantialitas quidem, inquantum coniunctionem quamdam importat; distinctio vero, inquantum distinctionem quamdam significat, ut superius dictum est.
<td>45 Here we should note that the preposition <b>with</b> signifies a certain union of the thing signified by its grammatical antecedent to the thing signified by its grammatical object, just as the preposition “in” does. However, there is a difference, because the preposition “in” signifies a certain intrinsic union, whereas the preposition <b>with</b> implies in a certain way an extrinsic union. And we state both in divine matters, namely, that the Son is <i>in</i> the Father and <i>with</i> the Father. Here the intrinsic union pertains to consubstantiality, but the extrinsic union (if we may use such an expression, since “extrinsic” is improperly employed in divine matters) refers only to a personal distinction, because the Son is distinguished from the Father by origin alone. And so these two words designate both a consubstantiality in nature and distinction in person: consubstantiality inasmuch as a certain union is implied; but distinction, inasmuch as a certain otherness is signified as was said above.
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<td>Et quia haec praepositio in, ut dictum est, principaliter consubstantialitatem designat, inquantum importat coniunctionem intrinsecam, et ex consequenti distinctionem personarum, inquantum omnis praepositio est transitiva; haec autem praepositio apud distinctionem personalem significat principaliter, consubstantialitatem vero, inquantum quamdam coniunctionem significat quasi extrinsecam, ideo Evangelista in hoc loco specialiter ista praepositione apud usus est, ut distinctionem personae filii a patre insinuaret, cum dixit <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>, idest filius apud patrem, ut alia persona apud aliam.
<td>The preposition “in,” as was said, principally signifies consubstantiality, as implying an intrinsic union and, by way of consequence, a distinction of persons, inasmuch as every preposition is transitive. The preposition “with” principally signifies a personal distinction, but also a consubstantiality inasmuch as it signifies a certain extrinsic, so to speak, union. For these reasons the Evangelist specifically used here the preposition “with” in order to express the distinction of the person of the Son from the Father, saying, <b>and the Word was with God,</b> that is, the Son was with the Father as one person with another.
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<td>Sciendum est autem quod per hanc praepositionem apud quatuor significantur, per quae obiectiones quatuor contrariae excluduntur. Significat enim haec praepositio apud primo subsistentiam in recto; quia ea quae subsistentiam per se non habent, non dicuntur proprie esse apud aliquid: sicut non dicimus albedinem esse apud corpus, et similiter de aliis quae per se non subsistunt. Ea autem quae per se subsistunt, dicuntur proprie esse unum apud aliud; sicut dicimus hominem esse apud hominem, et lapidem apud lapidem.
<td>46 We should note further that this preposition <b>with</b> has four meanings, and these eliminate four objections. First, the preposition with signifies the subsistence of its antecedent, because things that do not subsist of themselves are not properly said to be “with” another; thus we do not say that a color is with a body, and the same applies to other things that do not subsist of themselves. But things that do subsist of themselves are properly said to be “with” another; thus we say that a man is with a man, and a stone with a stone.
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<td>Secundo significat auctoritatem in obliquo, non enim proprie dicitur rex esse apud militem sed proprie dicitur miles apud regem. Tertio dicit distinctionem: non enim proprie dicitur aliquis esse apud seipsum, sed unus homo est apud alium. Quarto significat coniunctionem et societatem quamdam: cum enim dicitur aliquis esse apud alium, insinuatur nobis inter eos quaedam socialis coniunctio.
<td>Secondly, it signifies authority in its grammatical object. For we do not, properly speaking, say that a king is with a soldier, but that the soldier is with the king. Thirdly, it asserts a distinction. For it is not proper to say that a person is with himself but rather that one man is with another. Fourthly, it signifies a certain union and fellowship. For when some person is said to be with another, it suggests to us that there is some social union between them.
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<td>Secundum autem istas conditiones importatas in significatione huius praepositionis apud convenienter Evangelista hanc clausulam, scilicet <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>, subiungit primae clausulae, scilicet <i>in principio erat verbum</i>. Praetermissa namque una illarum trium expositionum huius quod est <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, illa scilicet secundum quam principium ponitur pro filio, ad quamlibet aliarum expositionum, scilicet ad illam quae principium dicit idem quod ante omnia, et ad illam secundum quam principium sumitur pro patre, duplex obiectio fit ab haereticis; et sic sunt quatuor obiectiones, quas per quatuor conditiones huius praepositionis <i>apud</i> supra positas excludere possumus.
<td>Considering these four conditions implied in the meaning of this preposition <b>with,</b> the Evangelist quite appropriately joins to the first clause, <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> this second clause, <b>and the Word was with God.</b> For if we omit one of the three explanations of, <b>In the beginning was the Word</b> (namely, the one in which <i>principium</i> was understood as the Son), certain heretics make a twofold objection against each of the other explanations (namely, the one in which <i>principium</i> means the same as “before all things,” and the one in which it is understood as the Father). Thus there are four objections, and we can answer these by the four conditions indicated by this preposition <b>with.</b>
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<td>Quarum prima talis est: tu dicis quod verbum erat in principio, idest ante omnia; sed ante omnia nihil erat; ubi ergo erat verbum, si ante omnia nihil erat? Haec autem obiectio procedit secundum imaginationem eorum qui ponunt, omne quod est, esse alicubi et in loco. Quae quidem excluditur a Ioanne, cum dicit <i>apud Deum</i>. Et designat coniunctionem secundum ultimam dictarum conditionum, ut sit sensus, secundum Basilium: ubi ergo erat verbum? Respondet <i>apud Deum</i>, non in aliquo loco, cum incircumscriptibile sit, sed apud patrem, qui nullo comprehenditur loco.
<td>47 The first of these objections is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But before all things there was nothing. So if before all things there was nothing, where then was the Word? This objection arises due to the imaginings of those who think that whatever exists is somewhere and in some place. But this is rejected by John when he says, <b>with God,</b> which indicates the union mentioned in the last four conditions. So, according to Basil, the meaning is this: Where was the Word? The answer is: <b>with God;</b> not in some place, since he is unsurroundable, but he is with the Father, who is not enclosed by any place.
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<td>Secunda quaestio ad idem, est talis: tu dicis quod verbum erat in principio, idest ante omnia. Sed ea quae sunt ante omnia, a nullo videntur procedere; cum illud a quo procedit aliquid, prius esse videatur eo quod procedit ab ipso; ergo verbum non est procedens ab alio. Haec autem obiectio excluditur cum dicit <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>, ut ly apud accipiatur secundum secundam conditionem, secundum quam importat auctoritatem in causali, et sit sensus secundum Hilarium: a quo est verbum si ante omnia? Evangelista respondet <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>; quasi dicat: licet verbum careat initio durationis, non tamen caret principio vel auctore: erat enim apud Deum, ut apud auctorem.
<td>48 The second objection against the same explanation is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But whatever exists before all things appears to proceed from no one, since that from which something proceeds seems to be prior to that which proceeds from it. Therefore, the Word does not proceed from another. This objection is rejected when he says, <b>the Word was with God,</b> taking “with” according to its second condition, as implying authority in what is causing. So the meaning, according to Hilary, is this: From whom is the Word if he exists before all things? The Evangelist answers: <b>the Word was with God,</b> i.e., although the Word has no beginning of duration, still he does not lack a <i>principium</i> or author, for he was with God as his author.
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<td>Tertia quaestio est ad aliam expositionem secundum quam principium supponit pro patre; quae talis est: tu dicis <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, idest filius erat in patre; sed illud quod est in aliquo, non videtur esse subsistens, ut hypostasis: sicut albedo quae est in corpore, non subsistit. Sed haec obiectio solvitur per hoc quod dicit <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>; ut ly apud sumatur secundum primam conditionem per quam importat subsistentiam in recto; et sic, secundum Chrysostomum, est sensus <i>verbum erat in principio</i>, non ut accidens: sed <i>erat apud Deum</i>, ut subsistens, et hypostasis divina.
<td>49 The third objection, directed to the explanation in which <i>principium</i> is understood as the Father, is this. You say that <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> i.e., the Son was in the Father. But that which is in something does not seem to be subsistent, as a hypostasis; just as the whiteness in a body does not subsist. This objection is solved by the statement, <b>the Word was with God,</b> taking “with” in its first condition, as implying the subsistence of its grammatical antecedent. So according to Chrysostom, the meaning is this: <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> not as an accident, but he was <b>with God,</b> as subsisting, and a divine hypostasis.
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<td>Quarta quaestio ad idem est talis: tu dicis quod verbum erat in principio, idest in patre; quod autem est in aliquo, non est distinctus a patre. Sed haec obiectio excluditur per hoc quod dicit <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>; ut ly apud sumatur secundum tertiam conditionem, secundum quam significat distinctionem: ut sit sensus, secundum Alcuinum et Bedam, <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>, et sic erat in patre per consubstantialitatem naturae, quod tamen est apud ipsum per distinctionem personae.
<td>50 The fourth objection, against the same explanation, is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., in the Father. But whatever is in something is not distinct from it. So the Son is not distinct from the Father. This objection is answered by the statement, <b>and the Word was with God,</b> taking “with” in its third condition, as indicating distinction. Thus the meaning, according to Alcuin and Bede, is this: <b>The Word was with God,</b> and he was with the Father by a consubstantiality of nature, while still being “with” him through a distinction in person.
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<td>Sic ergo per hanc clausulam <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>, ostenditur coniunctio verbi ad patrem in natura, secundum Basilium; distinctio autem in persona, secundum Alcuinum et Bedam; substantia verbi in natura divina, secundum Chrysostomum; auctoritas patris ad verbum, secundum Hilarium.
<td>51 And so, <b>and the Word was with God,</b> indicates: the union of the Word with the Father in nature, according to Basil; their distinction in person, according to Alcuin and Bede; the subsistence of the Word in the divine nature, according to Chrysostom; and the authorship of the Father in relation to the Word, according to Hilary.
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<td>Notandum autem, secundum Origenem, quod per hoc quod dicit <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>, ostendit filium semper fuisse apud patrem. In veteri enim testamento dicitur factum esse verbum domini ad Ieremiam, vel quemcumque alium, ut patet in multis Scripturae locis, non autem dicitur: verbum domini erat apud Ieremiam vel apud alium; quia ad illos fit verbum, qui incipiunt habere verbum, postquam non habuerunt. Unde Evangelista non dixit, verbum factum esse apud patrem, sed <i>erat apud patrem</i>: quia ex quo pater erat, verbum apud eum erat.
<td>52 We should also note, according to Origen, that <b>the Word was with God</b> shows that the Son has always been with the Father. For in the Old Testament it says that the word of the Lord “came” to Jeremiah or to someone else, as is plain in many passages of sacred Scripture. But it does not say that the word of the Lord was “with” Jeremiah or anyone else, because the word “comes” to those who begin to have the word after not having it. Thus the Evangelist did not say that the Word “came” to the Father, but was “with” the Father, because, given the Father, the Word was with him.
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<td>Deinde dicit <i>et Deus erat verbum</i>. Haec est tertia clausula narrationis Ioannis, quae quidem secundum ordinem doctrinae congruentissime sequitur. Quia enim Ioannes dixerat de verbo quando erat et ubi erat; restabat quaerere, quid erat verbum; idest verbum erat Deus, ut ly verbum ponatur ex parte subiecti, et ly Deus ex parte praedicati.
<td>53 Then he says, <b>and the Word was God.</b> This is the third clause in John’s account, and it follows most appropriately considering the order of teaching. For since John had said both <i>when</i> and <i>where</i> the Word was, it remained to inquire <i>what</i> the Word was, that is, <b>the Word was God,</b> taking “Word” as the subject, and “God” as the predicate.
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<td>Sed cum prius quaerendum sit de re quid est, quam ubi et quando sit, videtur quod Ioannes hunc ordinem pervertat, insinuans primo de verbo ubi et quando sit.
<td>54 But since one should first inquire what a thing is before investigating where and when it is, it seems that John violated this order by discussing these latter first.
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<td>Ad hanc autem quaestionem respondet Origenes, quod aliter dicitur esse verbum Dei apud hominem, et aliter apud Deum. Nam apud hominem est ut perficiens ipsum, quia per illud homo efficitur sapiens et bonus, Sap. c. VII, 27: <i>amicos Dei et prophetas constituit</i>. Apud Deum vero non ita dicitur esse verbum, quasi pater perficiatur per verbum et illustretur ab ipso; sed sic est apud Deum, quod accipiat naturalem divinitatem ab ipso, qui verbum loquitur, a quo habet ut sit idem Deus cum eo. Ex eo ergo quod est per originem apud Deum, necesse fuit primum ostendere quod verbum erat in patre et apud patrem, quam quod verbum erat Deus.
<td>Origen answers this by saying that the Word of God is with man and with God in different ways. The Word is with man as perfecting him, because it is through him that man becomes wise and good: “She makes friends of God and prophets” (Wis 7:27). But the Word is not with God as though the Father were perfected and enlightened by him. Rather, the Word is with God as receiving natural divinity from him, who utters the Word, and from whom he has it that he is the same God with him. And so, since the Word was with God by origin, it was necessary to show first that the Word was in the Father and with the Father before showing that the Word was God.
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<td>Sciendum est autem quod per hanc clausulam <i>Deus erat verbum</i>, responderi potest duabus obiectionibus, quae ex praecedentibus insurgunt. Quarum una insurgit ex nomine verbi, et est talis: tu dicis quod <i>verbum erat in principio, et apud Deum</i>; constat autem quod verbum secundum communem usum loquendi significat vocem aliquam et enuntiationem necessariorum, manifestationem cogitationum; sed ista transeunt et non subsistunt; posset ergo credi quod de tali verbo Evangelista loqueretur.
<td>55 This clause also enables us to answer two objections which arise from the foregoing. The first is based on the name “Word,” and is this. You say that <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> and that the Word was with God. Now it is obvious that “word” is generally understood to signify a vocal sound and the statement of something necessary, a manifesting of thoughts. But these words pass away and do not subsist. Accordingly, someone could think that the Evangelist was speaking of a word like these.
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<td>Sed ista quaestio satis per praedicta excluditur, secundum Hilarium et Augustinum, Hom. prima super Io., qui dicit, manifestum esse, verbum in hoc loco non posse pro locutione accipi, quia cum locutio sit in motu et transeat, non posset dici quod <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, si verbum esset quid transiens et in motu. Item cum dicit <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>, datur idem intelligi; satis enim patet quod aliud est inesse, et aliud est adesse. Verbum enim nostrum, cum non subsistat, non adest, sed inest; verbum autem Dei est subsistens, et ideo adest. Et idcirco Evangelista signanter dixit <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>. Sed tamen, ut obiectionis causa tollatur totaliter, naturam et esse verbi subdit, dicens <i>et verbum erat Deus</i>.
<td>According to Hilary and Augustine, this question is sufficiently answered by the above account. Augustine says (Homily I <i>On John</i>) that it is obvious that in this passage “Word” cannot be understood as a statement because, since a statement is in motion and passes away, it could not be said that <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> if this Word were something passing away and in motion. The same thing is clear from <b>and the Word was with God:</b> for to be “in” another is not the same as to be “with” another. Our word, since it does not subsist, is not “with” us, but “in” us; but the Word of God is subsistent, and therefore “with” God. And so the Evangelist expressly says, and the Word was with God. To entirely remove the ground of the objection, he adds the nature and being of the Word, saying, <b>and the Word was God.</b>
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<td>Alia quaestio insurgit ex hoc quod dixerat <i>apud Deum</i>. Cum enim ly apud dicat distinctionem, posset credi quod <i>verbum erat apud Deum</i>, scilicet patrem, ab ipso in natura distinctum. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum statim subdit consubstantialitatem verbi ad patrem, dicens <i>et verbum erat Deus</i>; quasi dicat: non separatus a patre per diversitatem naturae, quia ipsum verbum est Deus.
<td>56 The other question comes from his saying, <b>with God.</b> For since “with” indicates a distinction, it could be thought that <b>the Word was with God,</b> i.e., the Father, as distinct from him in nature. So to exclude this he adds at once the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, saying, <b>and the Word was God.</b> As if to say: the Word is not separated from the Father by a diversity of nature, because the Word itself is God.
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<td>Nota etiam specialem modum significandi, quia dicit <i>verbum erat Deus</i>, absolute ponendo Deum; ut ostendat non eo modo Deum esse, quo nomen deitatis attribui dicitur creaturae in sacra Scriptura; quia cum additione aliqua aliquando hoc nomen creatura participat. Sicut illud Ex. VII, 1: <i>ego constitui te Deum Pharaonis</i>, ad designandum quod non erat Deus simpliciter, nec per naturam, quia constituebatur Deus alicuius determinate; et illud Ps. LXXXI, 6: <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>, quasi dicat: per meam reputationem, non secundum rei veritatem, dii estis: aliud enim est Deum reputari, et aliud esse Deum. Unde verbum absolute dicitur Deus, quia est secundum essentiam suam Deus, et non participative, sicut homines et Angeli.
<td>57 Note also the special way of signifying, since he says, <b>the Word was God,</b> using “God” absolutely to show that he is not God in the same way in which the name of the deity is given to a creature in Sacred Scripture. For a creature sometimes shares this name with some added qualification, as when it says, “I have appointed you the God of Pharaoh” (Ex 7:1), in order to indicate that he was not God absolutely or by nature, because he was appointed the god of someone in a qualified sense. Again, it says in the Psalm (81:6): “I said, ‘You are gods.’” —as if to say: in my opinion, but not in reality. Thus the Word is called God absolutely because he is God by his own essence, and not by participation, as men and angels are.
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<td>Sciendum est etiam quod circa hanc clausulam Origenes turpiter erravit, ex modo loquendi, qui in Graeco habetur, sumens occasionem sui erroris. Consuetudo enim est apud Graecos, quod cuilibet nomini apponunt articulum, ad designandum discretionem quamdam. Quia ergo in Evangelio Ioannis in Graeco, huic nomini quod est verbum, cum dicitur <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, et similiter huic nomini quod est Deus, cum dicitur <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>, apponitur articulus, ut dicatur ly verbum, et ly Deus, ad designandum eminentiam et discretionem verbi ad alia verba, et principalitatem patris in divinitate; ideo, cum in hoc quod dicitur <i>verbum erat Deus</i>, non apponatur articulus huic nomini <i>Deus</i>, quod supponit pro persona filii, blasphemavit Origenes quod verbum non esset Deus per essentiam, licet sit essentialiter verbum; sed dicitur per participationem Deus: solus vero pater est Deus per suam essentiam. Et sic ponebat filium patre minorem.
<td>58 We should note that Origen disgracefully misunderstood this clause, led astray by the Greek manner of speaking. It is the custom among the Greeks to put the article before every name in order to indicate a distinction. In the Greek version of John’s Gospel the name “Word” in the statement, <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> and also the name “God” in the statement, <b>and the Word was with God,</b> are prefixed by the article, so as to read “the Word” and “the God,” in order to indicate the eminence and distinction of the Word from other words, and the principality of the Father in the divinity. But in the statement, <b>the Word was God,</b> the article is not prefixed to the noun “God,” which stands for the person of the Son. Because of this Origen blasphemed that the Word, although he was Word by essence, was not God by essence, but is called God by participation; while the Father alone is God by essence. And so he held that the Son is inferior to the Father.
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<td>Quod autem non sit verum, probat Chrysostomus per hoc quod si articulus positus huic nomini Deus, importaret maioritatem in patre respectu filii, numquam apponeretur huic nomini Deus, cum de alio praedicatur, sed solum quando praedicatur de patre, et semper cum dicitur de patre, apponeretur articulus. Invenimus autem contrarium per duas auctoritates apostoli, qui notat Christum Deum cum appositione articuli, dicens in Epist. ad Titum, II, 13: <i>expectantes beatam spem, et adventum gloriae magni Dei</i>. Ibi enim Deus supponit pro filio, et apponitur ei articulus in Graeco; ergo Christus est Deus magnus. Item idem apostolus, Rom. IX, 5, dicit: <i>ex quibus Christus, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula</i>. Ibi similiter ad ly Deus ponitur in Graeco articulus. Praeterea I Io. ult., 20: <i>ut simus in vero filio eius Christo Iesu; hic est verus Deus, et vita aeterna</i>. Christus ergo non est Deus per participationem, sed verus. Patet igitur esse falsum quod Origenes finxit.
<td>59 Chrysostom proves that this is not true, because if the article used with the name “God” implied the superiority of the Father in respect to the Son, it would never be used with the name “God” when it is used as a predicate of another, but only when it is predicated of the Father. Further, whenever said of the Father, it would be accompanied by the article. However, we find the opposite to be the case in two statements of the Apostle, who calls Christ “God,” using the article. For in Titus (2:13) he says, “the coming of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ,” where “God” stands for the Son, and in the Greek the article is used. Therefore, Christ is the great God. Again he says (Rom 9:5): “Christ, who is God over all things, blessed forever,” and again the article is used with “God” in the Greek. Further, in 1 John (5:20) it says: “That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ; he is the true God and eternal life.” Thus, Christ is not God by participation, but truly God. And so the theory of Origen is clearly false.
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<td>Ratio autem quare Evangelista non apposuit articulum huic nomini Deus, assignatur a Chrysostomo; scilicet quia iam bis nominaverat Deum cum appositione articuli, et ideo non oportebat reiterare tertio, sed subintelligitur. Vel dicendum est et melius, quod Deus ponitur hic in praedicato, et tenetur formaliter; consuetum est autem quod nominibus in praedicato positis non ponitur articulus, cum discretionem importet. Si vero Deus poneretur hic ex parte subiecti, pro quacumque persona supponeret, sive pro filio sive pro spiritu sancto; et tunc non est dubium quod in Graeco ibi apponeretur articulus.
<td>Chrysostom gives us the reason why the Evangelist did not use the article with the name “God,” namely, because he had already mentioned God twice using the article, and so it was not necessary to repeat it a third time, but it was implied. Or, a better reason would be that “God” is used here as the predicate and is taken formally. And it is not the custom for the article to accompany names used as predicates, since the article indicates separation. But if “God” were used here as the subject, it could stand for any of the persons, as the Son or the Holy Spirit; then, no doubt, the article would be used in the Greek.
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<td><b>Lectio 2</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 2</b>
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<blockquote>
2 οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.<br>
3 πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο,<br>
καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν.<br>
ὃ γέγονεν 4 ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ
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<td>
<blockquote>
2 He was in the beginning with God.<br>
3 All things were made through him,<br>
and without him nothing was made.<br>
What was made 4a in him was life.
</blockquote>
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<td>Deinde dicit <i>hoc erat in principio apud Deum</i>. Hic ponitur quarta clausula, quae introducitur propter clausulam praecedentem. Ex hoc enim quod Evangelista dixerat quod <i>verbum erat Deus</i>, duplex falsus intellectus accipi poterat a non recte sentientibus. Unus a gentilibus, qui ponunt pluralitatem et diversitatem deorum, et eorum contrarias dicunt esse voluntates; sicut illi qui fabulantur Iovem pugnasse cum Saturno; et sicut Manichaei, qui ponunt duo contraria principia naturae. Contra hunc errorem dominus dixit, Deut. VI, 4: <i>audi Israel, dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est</i>.
<td>60 Then he says, <b>He was in the beginning with God.</b> This is the fourth clause and is introduced because of the preceding clause. For from the Evangelist’s statement that <b>the Word was God,</b> two false interpretations could be held by those who misunderstand. One of these is by the pagans, who acknowledge many and different gods, and say that their wills are in opposition. For example, those who put out the fable of Jupiter fighting with Saturn; or as the Manicheans, who have two contrary principles of nature. The Lord said against this error (Dt 6:4): “Hear O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord.”
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<td>Quia ergo Evangelista dixerat <i>verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat verbum</i>, possent isti in fulcimentum sui erroris istud adducere, intelligentes alium esse Deum, apud quem est verbum, et alium ipsum verbum, et cum hoc alterius, sive contrariae voluntatis; quod est contra legem Evangelii. Ad hoc ergo excludendum dicit <i>hoc erat in principio apud Deum</i>; quasi dicat, secundum Hilarium: ita dico quod verbum est Deus, quod tamen non est habens divinitatem, sed est apud Deum, scilicet in una natura et eadem in qua ipse est. Item per hoc quod dicit, <i>verbum erat Deus</i> ne intelligeretur quod haberent contrariam voluntatem, addidit hoc, quod scilicet <i>verbum erat in principio apud Deum</i> scilicet patrem; non divisum ab ipso, non contrarium, sed habens cum eo identitatem naturae et concordiam voluntatis: quae quidem unio fit per communionem divinae naturae in tribus personis, et per nexum naturalis amoris patris et filii.
<td>Since the Evangelist had said, <b>the Word was with God; and the Word was God,</b> they could adduce this in support of their error by understanding the God with whom the Word is to be one [God],and the Word to be another, having another, or contrary, will to the former; and this is against the law of the Gospel. And so to exclude this he says, <b>He was in the beginning with God,</b> as if to say, according to Hilary: I say that the Word is God, not as if he has a distinct divinity, but he is with God, that is, in the one same nature in which lie is. Further, lest his statement, <b>and the Word was God,</b> be taken to mean that the Word has an opposed will, he added that the Word <b>was in the beginning with God,</b> namely, the Father; not as divided from him or opposed, but having an identity of nature with him and a harmony of will. This union comes about by the sharing of the divine nature in the three persons, and by the bond of the natural love of the Father and the Son.
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<td>Alius error poterat ex praemissis verbis elici ab Arianis, qui ponunt filium minorem esse quam pater, propter hoc quod dicitur: <i>pater maior me est</i>. Dicunt enim patrem maiorem filio, et quantum ad aeternitatem, et quantum ad naturae divinitatem. Ut ergo Evangelista excluderet, addidit <i>hoc erat in principio apud Deum</i>. Arius enim primam clausulam, scilicet <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, admittit: non tamen vult quod ibi principium accipiatur pro patre, sed pro principio creaturarum. Unde dicit quod verbum erat in principio creaturarum, et ideo nequaquam patri est coaeternus. Sed hoc excluditur, secundum Chrysostomum, per illam clausulam <i>hoc erat in principio</i>, non quidem creaturarum, sed <i>in principio apud Deum</i>; idest ex quo Deus fuit. Numquam enim pater solitarius fuit a filio, sive verbo, sed semper hoc, scilicet verbum, apud Deum erat.
<td>61 The Arians were able to draw out another error from the above. They think that the Son is less than the Father because it says below (14:28): “The Father is greater than I” And they say the Father is greater than the Son both as to eternity and as to divinity of nature. And so to exclude this the Evangelist added: <b>He was in the beginning with God.</b> For Arius admits the first clause, <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> but he will not admit that <i>principium</i> should be taken for the Father, but rather for the beginning of creatures. So he says that the Word was in the beginning of creatures, and consequently is in no sense coeternal with the Father. But this is excluded, according to Chrysostom, by this clause, <b>He was in the beginning,</b> not of creatures, but <b>in the beginning with God,</b> i.e., whenever God existed. For the Father was never alone without the Son or Word, but He, that is, the Word, was always <b>with God.</b>
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<td>Item, Arius confitetur quod verbum erat Deus, sed tamen minor patre. Sed hoc excluditur per ea quae sequuntur. Duo enim sunt propria magni Dei, quae Arius Deo patri singulariter attribuebat, scilicet aeternitas et omnipotentia. In quocumque ergo ista duo inveniuntur, ille est magnus Deus, quo nullus est maior; sed haec duo Evangelista verbo attribuit; ergo verbum est magnus Deus, et non minor. Aeternitatem quidem dicit esse in verbo per hoc quod dicit <i>hoc erat in principio apud Deum</i>; idest verbum ab aeterno, non solum in principio creaturarum, ut Arius intellexit, erat, sed apud Deum, accipiens esse et divinitatem ab eo. Omnipotentiam vero attribuit verbo per hoc quod subdit <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>.
<td>62 Again, Arius admits that the Word was God, but nevertheless inferior to the Father. This is excluded by what follows. For there are two attributes proper to the great God which Arius attributed solely to God the Father, that is, eternity and omnipotence. So in whomever these two attributes are found, he is the great God, than whom none is greater. But the Evangelist attributes these two to the Word. Therefore, the Word is the great God and not inferior. He says the Word is eternal when he states, <b>He was in the beginning with God,</b> i.e., the Word was with God from eternity, and not only in the beginning of creatures (as Arius held), but with God, receiving being and divinity from him. Further, he attributes omnipotence to the Word when he adds, <b>Through him all things came into being.</b>
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<td>Origenes vero hanc eamdem clausulam satis pulchre exponens, dicit ipsam non esse aliam a tribus primis; sed ipsam esse quemdam epilogum praemissorum. Evangelista enim postquam insinuaverat veritatem esse filii, transiturus ad eius insinuandum virtutem, recolligit, quasi in summa epilogando, in quarta clausula, quod in primis tribus praedixerat. Primo enim per hoc quod dicit <i>hoc</i>, intelligit tertiam clausulam; per hoc vero quod dicit <i>erat in principio</i>, recolligit primam; per hoc vero quod subdit <i>erat apud Deum</i>, recolligit secundam, ut sic non intelligas aliud verbum, quod erat in principio et quod erat Deus; sed hoc verbum, quod erat Deus, <i>erat in principio apud Deum</i>.
<td>63 Origen gives a rather beautiful explanation of this clause, <b>He was in the beginning with God,</b> when he says that it is not separate from the first three, but is in a certain sense their epilogue. For the Evangelist, after he had indicated that truth was the Son’s and was about to describe his power, in a way gathers together in a summary form, in this fourth clause, what he had said in the first three. For in saying He, he understands the third clause; by adding <b>was in the beginning,</b> he recalls the first clause; and by adding <b>with God,</b> he recalls the second, so that we do not think that the Word which was in the beginning is different than the Word which was God; but this Word which was God <b>was in the beginning with God.</b>
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<td>Si quis ergo recte consideret has quatuor propositiones, inveniet evidenter per eas destrui omnes haereticorum et philosophorum errores. Quidam enim haeretici, sicut Ebion et Cerinthus, dixerunt, Christum non praeextitisse beatae virgini, sed ab ea sumpsisse essendi et durationis principium, ponentes eum fuisse hominem purum, sed meruisse divinitatem per bona merita. Quod etiam Photinus et Paulus Samosatenus eos secuti dixerunt. Horum errorem Evangelista excludit, dicens <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, idest ante omnia, et in patre ab aeterno; ergo non sumpsit initium ex virgine.
<td>64 If one considers these four propositions well, he will find that they clearly destroy all the errors of the heretics and of the philosophers. For some heretics, as Ebion and Cerinthus, said that Christ did not exist before the Blessed Virgin, but took from her the beginning of his being and duration; for they held that he was a mere man, who had merited divinity by his good works. Photinus and Paul of Samosata, following them, said the same thing. But the Evangelist excludes their errors saying, <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> i.e., before all things, and in the Father from eternity. Thus he did not derive his beginning from the Virgin.
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<td>Sabellius vero, licet fateretur quod Deus qui carnem suscepit, ex virgine non sumpsit initium, sed fuit ab aeterno, tamen dicebat quod non erat alia persona patris, qui fuit ab aeterno, et filii, qui carnem assumpsit ex virgine, sed idem erat pater et filius personaliter; Trinitatem personarum in divinis confundens. Contra hunc errorem dicit Evangelista <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>, scilicet filius apud patrem, ut alius apud alium.
<td>Sabellius, on the other hand, although he admitted that the God who took flesh did not receive his beginning from the Virgin, but existed from eternity, still said that the person of the Father, who existed from eternity, was not distinct from the person of the Son, who took flesh from the Virgin. He maintained that the Father and Son were the same person; and so he failed to distinguish the trinity of persons in the deity. The Evangelist says against this error, <b>and the Word was with God,</b> i.e., the Son was with the Father, as one person with another.
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<td>Eunomius vero posuit filium omnino dissimilem esse patri: et hoc consequenter Evangelista excludit, dicens <i>et Deus erat verbum</i>. Arius vero dicebat filium patre minorem; sed hoc excludit Evangelista cum dicit <i>hoc erat in principio apud Deum</i>, quod supra fuit expositum.
<td>Eunomius declared that the Son is entirely unlike the Father. The Evangelist rejects this when he says, <b>and the Word was God.</b> Finally, Arius said that the Son was less than the Father. The Evangelist excludes this by saying, <b>He was in the beginning with God,</b> as was explained above.
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<td>Per hoc etiam excluduntur errores philosophorum. Quidam enim philosophorum antiqui, scilicet naturales, ponebant mundum non ex aliquo intellectu, neque per aliquam rationem, sed a casu fuisse; et ideo a principio rationem non posuerunt seu intellectum aliquam causam rerum, sed solam materiam fluitantem, utpote athomos, sicut Democritus posuit, et alia huiusmodi principia materialia, ut alii posuerunt. Contra hos est quod Evangelista dicit <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, a quo res scilicet principium sumpserunt et non a casu.
<td>65 These words also exclude the errors of the philosophers. For some of the ancient philosophers, namely, the natural philosophers, maintained that the world did not come from any intellect or through some purpose, but by chance. Consequently, they did not place at the beginning as the cause of things a reason or intellect, but only matter in flux; for example, atoms, as Democritus thought, or other material principles of this kind as different philosophers maintained. Against these the Evangelist says, <b>In the beginning was the Word,</b> from whom, and not from chance, things derive their beginning.
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<td>Plato autem posuit rationes omnium rerum factarum subsistentes, separatas in propriis naturis, per quarum participationem res materiales essent: puta per rationem hominis separatam, quam dicebat per se hominem, haberent quod sint homines. Sic ergo ne hanc rationem, per quam omnia facta sunt, intelligas rationes separatas a Deo, ut Plato ponebat, addit Evangelista <i>et verbum erat apud Deum</i>.
<td>Plato, however, thought that the Ideas of all the things that were made were subsistent, i.e., existing separately in their own natures; and material things exist by participating in these. For example, he thought men existed through the separated Idea of man, which he called Man <i>per se.</i> So lest you suppose, as did Plato, that this Idea through which all things were made be Ideas separated from God, the Evangelist adds, <b>and the Word was with God.</b>
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<td>Alii etiam Platonici, ut Chrysostomus refert, ponebant Deum patrem eminentissimum, et primum, sub quo ponebant mentem quamdam, in qua dicebant esse similitudines et ideas omnium rerum. Ne ergo sic intelligas, quod verbum erat apud patrem, quasi sub eo et minor eo, addit Evangelista <i>et verbum erat Deus</i>.
<td>Other Platonists, as Chrysostom relates, maintained that God the Father was most eminent and first, but under him they placed a certain mind in which there were the likenesses and ideas of all things. So lest you think that the Word was with the Father in such a way as to be under him and less than he, the Evangelist adds, <b>and the Word was God.</b>
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<td>Aristoteles vero posuit in Deo rationes omnium rerum, et quod idem est in Deo intellectus et intelligens et intellectum; tamen posuit mundum coaeternum sibi fuisse. Et contra hoc est quod Evangelista dicit <i>hoc</i>, scilicet <i>verbum</i> solum, <i>erat in principio apud Deum</i>; ita quod ly hoc non excludit aliam personam, sed aliam naturam coaeternam.
<td>Aristotle, however, thought that the ideas of all things are in God, and that in God, the intellect, the one understanding, and what is understood, are the same. Nevertheless, he thought that the world is coeternal with him. Against this the Evangelist says, He, the Word alone, was <b>in the beginning with God,</b> in such a way that He does not exclude another person, but only another coeternal nature.
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<td>Nota etiam in praedictis differentiam Ioannis ab aliis Evangelistis, quomodo scilicet dignius Evangelium suum incepit, quam alii. Ipsi enim annuntiaverunt Christum filium Dei ex tempore natum; Matth. II, 1: <i>cum natus esset Iesus in Bethlehem</i>. Ioannes vero dicit eum ab aeterno fuisse, <i>in principio</i>, inquit, <i>erat verbum</i>. Ipsi etiam dicunt eum subito inter homines apparuisse; Lc. II, 29: <i>nunc dimittis servum tuum, domine, secundum verbum tuum in pace; quia viderunt oculi mei salutare tuum, quod parasti ante faciem omnium populorum, lumen ad revelationem gentium, et gloriam plebis tuae, Israel</i>. Ioannes vero dicit eum apud patrem semper fuisse. <i>Et verbum</i>, inquit, <i>erat apud Deum</i>. Alii vero ipsum hominem; Matth. IX, v. 8: <i>glorificabant Deum, qui potestatem talem hominibus dedit</i>. Ioannes vero dicit ipsum esse Deum. <i>Et verbum</i>, inquit, <i>erat Deus</i>. Alii dixerunt eum fuisse cum hominibus conversatum; Matth. XVII, 21: <i>conversantibus autem illis in Galilaea, dixit Iesus</i> etc.; sed Ioannes dicit eum apud patrem semper fuisse. <i>Hoc</i>, inquit, <i>erat in principio apud Deum</i>.
<td>66 Note the difference in what has been said between John and the other Evangelists: how he began his Gospel on a loftier plane than they. They announced Christ the Son of God born in time: “When Jesus was born in Bethlehem” (Mt 2:1); but John presents him existing from eternity: <b>In the beginning was the Word.</b> They show him suddenly appearing among men: “Now you dismiss your servant, 0 Lord, in peace, according to your word; because my eyes have seen your salvation” (Lk 2:29); but John says that he always existed with the Father: and the Word was with God. The others show him as a man: “They gave glory to God who had given such authority to men” (Mt 9:8); but John says that he is God: and the Word was God. The others say he lives with men: “While living in Galilee, Jesus said to them” (Mt 17:21); but John says that he has always been with the Father: <b>He was in the beginning with God.</b>
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<td>Nota etiam quod Evangelista signanter recitat hoc verbum <i>erat</i>, ut ostendat verbum Dei omnia tempora, scilicet praesens, praeteritum et futurum, excedere. Quasi dicat: erat ultra tempus praesens, praeteritum et futurum, secundum quod tangitur in Glossa.
<td>67 Note also how the Evangelist designedly uses the word was (<i>erat</i>) to show that the Word of God transcends all times: present, past and future. It is as though he were saying: He was beyond time: present, past and future, as the Gloss says.
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<td>Postquam Evangelista esse et naturam divini verbi, quantum dici potest ab homine, insinuaverat, consequenter manifestat eius virtutem. Et primo ostendit eius virtutem quantum ad omnia, quae in esse procedunt; secundo specialiter quantum ad homines, ibi <i>erat vita lux hominum</i>. Circa primum ponit tres clausulas, quas non distinguimus ad praesens, quia secundum diversas expositiones sanctorum sunt diversimode distinguendae.
<td>68 After the Evangelist has told of the existence and nature of the Divine Word, so far as it can be told by man, he then shows the might of his power. First, he shows his power with respect to all things that come into existence. Secondly, with respect to man. As to the first, he uses three clauses; and we will not distinguish these at present because they will be distinguished in different ways according to the different explanations given by the saints.
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<td>Prima ergo clausula est <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>; quae inducitur ad ostendendum tria de verbo. Et primo, secundum Chrysostomum, ad ostendendum aequalitatem verbi ad patrem. Sicut enim dictum est supra, Evangelista excluserat errorem Arii, ostendens coaeternitatem filii ad patrem per hoc quod dixerat <i>hoc erat in principio apud Deum</i>, hic vero eumdem errorem excludit, ostendendo omnipotentiam filii, dicens, <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>. Esse enim principium omnium factorum proprium est Dei magni omnipotentis, iuxta illud Ps. CXXXIV, 6: <i>omnia quaecumque dominus voluit, fecit in caelo et in terra</i>. Verbum ergo per quod facta sunt omnia, est Deus magnus et coaequalis patri.
<td>69 The first clause, <b>All things were made through him</b>, is used to show three things concerning the Word. First, according to Chrysostom, to show the equality of the Word to the Father. For as stated earlier, the error of Arius was rejected by the Evangelist when he showed the coeternity of the Son with the Father by saying, “He was in the beginning with God.” Here he excludes the same error when he shows the omnipotence of the Son, saying, <b>All things were made through him</b>. For to be the principle of all the things that are made is proper to the great omnipotent God, as the Psalm (134:6) says, “Whatever the Lord wills he does, in heaven and on earth.”Thus the Word, through whom all things were made, is God, great and coequal to the Father.
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<td>Secundo, ad ostendendum coaeternitatem verbi ad patrem, secundum Hilarium. Quia enim per hoc quod dixerat <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, posset aliquis intelligere hoc dictum fuisse de principio creaturarum, id est fuisse aliquod tempus ante omnem creaturam, in quo verbum non erat, ideo hoc excludens Evangelista dixit <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>. Si enim omnia sunt facta per verbum ergo et ipsum tempus. Ex quo sic argumentatur: si omne tempus ab ipso factum est; ergo nullum tempus fuit ante ipsum; nec cum ipso; quia ante omnia erat; ergo sunt ab aeterno coaeterni.
<td>70 Secondly, according to Hilary, this clause is used to show the coeternity of the Word with the Father. For since someone might understand the earlier statement, “In the beginning was the Word,” as referring to the beginning of creatures, i.e., that before there were any creatures there was a time in which the Word did not exist, the Evangelist rejects this by saying, <b>All things were made through him.</b> For if all things were made through the Word, then time was also. From this we can form the following argument: If all time was made through him, there was no time before him or with him, because before all these, he was. Therefore they [the Son and the Father] are eternally coeternal.
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<td>Tertio, secundum Augustinum, ad ostendendam consubstantialitatem verbi ad patrem. Si enim facta omnia sunt per verbum, ergo ipsum verbum non potest dici factum: quia si est factum, est factum per aliquod verbum, quia omnia per verbum facta sunt. Oportet ergo esse aliud verbum, per quod verbum, de quo hic loquitur Evangelista, sit factum. Et illud verbum dicimus unigenitum Dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, quia nec factum est, nec creatura est; et si non est creatura, necesse est dicere ipsum esse eiusdem substantiae cum patre, cum omnis substantia praeter essentiam divinam facta sit. Substantia autem, quae creatura non est, Deus est. Verbum ergo, per quod omnia facta sunt, consubstantiale est patri, cum nec factum, nec creatura sit.
<td>71 Thirdly, according to Augustine, this clause is used to show the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father. For if all things were made through the Word, the Word himself cannot be said to have been made; because, if made, he was made through some Word, since all things were made through the Word. Consequently, there would have been another Word through whom was made the Word of whom the Evangelist is speaking. This Word, through whom all things are made, we call the only begotten Son of God, because he is neither made nor is he a creature. And if he is not a creature, it is necessary to say that he is of the same substance with the Father, since every substance other than the divine essence is made. But a substance that is not a creature is God. And so the Word, through whom all things were made, is consubstantial with the Father, since he is neither made, nor is he a creature.
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<td>Sic ergo habes verbi aequalitatem ad patrem, secundum Chrysostomum, coaeternitatem secundum Hilarium, et consubstantialitatem, secundum Augustinum per hoc quod dicit <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>.
<td>72 And so in saying <b>All things were made through him,</b> you have, according to Chrysostom, the equality of the Word with the Father; the coeternity of the Word with the Father, according to Hilary; and the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, according to Augustine.
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<td>Cavendi sunt autem hic tres errores. Et primo error Valentini. Ipse enim intellexit per hoc quod dicitur <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, quod verbum dederit causam creatori, quod mundum crearet, ut dicantur omnia sic per verbum facta, quasi ex verbo processerit quod pater mundum creavit. Et hoc videtur ducere in positionem illorum, qui dicebant Deum mundum fecisse propter aliquam exteriorem causam; quod est contra illud Prov. XVI, 4: <i>universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus</i>. Sed hoc est falsum, quia, sicut Origenes dicit, si verbum fuisset causa creatori praestans ei materiam ad faciendum, non dixisset <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, sed, e converso, omnia facta sunt per creatorem a verbo.
<td>73 Here we must guard against three errors. First, the error of Valentine. He understood <b>All things were made through him</b> to mean that the Word proferred to the Creator the cause of his creating the world; so that all things were made through the Word as if the Father’s creating the world came from the Word. This leads to the position of those who said that God created the world because of some exterior cause; and this is contrary to Proverbs (16:4), “The Lord made all things for himself.” The reason this is an error is that, as Origen says, if the Word had been a cause to the Creator by offering him the material for making things, he would not have said, <b>All things were made through him,</b> but on the contrary, that all things were made through the Creator by the Word.
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<td>Secundo vitandus est error Origenis, qui dicit spiritum sanctum, inter omnia, factum esse per verbum, ex quo sequitur ipsum esse creaturam: et hoc posuit Origenes. Hoc autem est haereticum et blasphemum, cum spiritus sanctus eiusdem sit gloriae et substantiae et dignitatis cum patre et filio, iuxta illud Matth. ult., 19: <i>docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patris, et filii, et spiritus sancti</i>; et iuxta illud I Io. V, v. 7: <i>tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo, pater, verbum et spiritus sanctus: et hi tres unum sunt</i>. Cum ergo dicit Evangelista <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, non est intelligendum simpliciter facta omnia, sed in genere creaturarum et rerum factarum. Quasi dicat: omnia, quae facta sunt, per ipsum facta sunt. Alias, si simpliciter intelligatur, sequeretur patrem et spiritum sanctum factos per ipsum: quod est blasphemum. Igitur nec pater, nec aliquid substantiale patri, per verbum factum est.
<td>74 Secondly, we must avoid the error of Origen. He said that the Holy Spirit was included among all the things made through the Word; from which it follows that he is a creature. And this is what Origen thought. This is heretical and blasphemous, since the Holy Spirit has the same glory and substance and dignity as the Father and the Son, according to the words of Matthew (28:19), “Make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.” And, “There are three who give testimony’ in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one” (l Jn 5:7). Thus when the Evangelist says, <b>All things were made through him</b>, one should not understand “all things” absolutely, but in the realm of creatures and of things made. As if to say: All things that were made, were made through him. Otherwise, if “all things” were taken absolutely, it would follow that the Father and the Holy Spirit were made through him; and this is blasphemous. Consequently, neither the Father nor anything substantial with the Father was made through the Word.
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<td>Tertio vitandus est alius error ipsius Origenis. Ipse enim sic omnia facta esse per verbum dixit, sicut aliquid fit a maiori per minorem, quasi minor sit filius, et ut organum patris. Sed quod per hanc praepositionem per non significetur minoritas in obliquo, scilicet filio, seu verbo, patet ex pluribus Scripturae locis. Dicit enim apostolus, I Cor. I, 9, loquens de patre: <i>fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius</i>. Si ille, per quem fit aliquid, habet superiorem, ergo et pater superiorem habebit; hoc autem est falsum; ergo per praepositionem per non significatur minoritas in filio, cum dicuntur omnia facta per ipsum.
<td>75 Thirdly, we must avoid another of Origen’s errors. For he said that all things were made through the Word as something is made by a greater through a lesser, as if the Son were inferior to, and an instrument of, the Father. But it is clear from many places in Scripture that the preposition “through” (<i>per</i>) does not signify inferiority in the thing which is its grammatical object, i.e., in the Son or Word. For the Apostle says, “God is faithful, through whom you were called into the fellowship of his Son” (1 Cor 1:9). If he “through” whom something is done has a superior, then the Father has a superior. But this is false. Therefore, the preposition “through” does not signify any inferiority in the Son when all things are said to have been made through him.
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<td>Ad maiorem autem evidentiam huius sciendum est, quod quando dicitur aliquid per aliquem fieri, haec praepositio per denotat causalitatem in obliquo, respectu operationis aliquo modo, sed diversimode. Cum enim operatio, secundum modum significandi, consideretur media inter operantem et operatum, potest considerari ipsa operatio dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod exit ab operante, qui est causa ipsius actionis; alio modo secundum quod terminatur ad operatum. Quandoque ergo praepositio per significat causam operationis, secundum quod exit ab operante; quandoque autem, secundum quod terminatur ad operatum. Causam autem operationis, secundum quod exit ab operante, significat quando illud quod significatur per obliquum, est causa operanti quod operetur, vel efficiens, vel formalis. Formalis quidem, sicut ignis calefacit per calorem: est enim calor causa formalis calefactionis ignis. Causa vero movens, seu efficiens, ut secunda agentia operantur per prima, ut si dicam quod balivus operatur per regem, quia rex est causa efficiens balivo quod operetur. Et hoc modo intellexit Valentinus, omnia facta esse per verbum, ac si verbum esset causa conditori ut omnia faceret. Causalitatem vero operationis, secundum quod terminatur ad operatum, importat haec praepositio per, quando illud, quod significatur per ipsam causalitatem, non est causa ipsa quod operetur, sed est causa operationis, secundum quod terminatur ad operatum. Sicut cum dico carpentarius facit scamnum per securim, quae non est causa carpentario quod operetur, sed ponimus esse causam quod scamnum fiat ab operante.
<td>76 To explain this point further, we should note that when something is said to be made through someone, the preposition “through” (<i>per</i>) denotes some sort of causality in its object with respect to an operation; but not always the same kind of causality. For since an operation, according to our manner of signifying, is considered to be medial between the one acting and the thing produced, the operation itself can be regarded in two ways. In one way, as issuing from the one operating, who is the cause of the action itself; in another way, as terminated in the thing produced. Accordingly, the preposition “through” sometimes signifies the cause of the operation insofar as it issues from the one operating: but sometimes as terminated in the thing which is produced. It signifies the cause of the operation as issuing from the one operating when the object of the preposition is either the efficient or formal cause why the one operating is operating. For example, we have a formal cause when fire is heating through heat; for heat is the formal cause of the fire’s heating. We have a movent or efficient cause in cases where secondary agents act through primary agents; as when I say that the bailiff acts through the king, because the king is the efficient cause of the bailiff’s acting. This is the way Valentine understood that all things were made through the Word: as though the Word were the cause of the maker’s production of all things. The preposition “through” implies the causality of the operation as terminated in the thing produced when what is signified through that causality is not the cause which operates, but the cause of the operation precisely as terminated in the thing produced. So when I say, “The carpenter is making a bench through [by means of] a hatchet,” the hatchet is not the cause of the carpenter’s operating; but we do say that it is the cause of the bench’s being made by the one acting.
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<td>Sic ergo cum dicitur <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>; si ly per denotet efficientem causam, seu moventem patrem ad operandum, dicendum est quod pater nihil operatur per filium, sed per seipsum omnia operatur, ut dictum est. Si vero ly per denotet causam formalem, sic cum pater operetur per sapientiam suam, quae est sua essentia, operatur per suam sapientiam, sicut operatur per suam essentiam; et quia sapientia et virtus patris attribuitur filio, I Cor. I, 24, dicimus: <i>Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam</i>, ideo appropriate dicimus quod pater omnia operatur per filium, idest per sapientiam suam. Et ideo dicit Augustinus quod hoc quod dicitur <i>ex quo omnia</i>, appropriatur patri; <i>per quem omnia</i>, filio; <i>in quo omnia</i>, spiritui sancto. Si vero ly per denotet causalitatem ex parte operati, tunc hoc quod dicimus patrem omnia operari per filium non est appropriatum verbo, sed proprium eius, quia hoc quod est causa creaturarum, habet ab alio, scilicet a patre, a quo habet esse.
<td>And so when it says that <b>All things were made through him,</b> if the “through” denotes the efficient or movent cause, causing the Father to act, then in this sense the Father does nothing through the Son, but he does all things through himself, as has been said. But if the “through” denotes a formal cause, as when the Father operates through his wisdom, which is his essence, he operates through his wisdom as he operates through his essence. And because the wisdom and power of the Father are attributed to the Son, as when we say, “Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1:24), then by appropriation we say that the Father does all things through the Son, i.e., through his wisdom. And so Augustine says that the phrase “from whom all things,” is appropriated to the Father; “through whom all things,” is appropriated to the Son; and “in whom all things,” is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. But if the “through” denotes causality from the standpoint of the thing produced, then the statement, “The Father does all things through the Son,” is not [mere] appropriation but proper to the Word, because the fact that he is a cause of creatures is had from someone else, namely the Father, from whom he has being.
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<td>Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur ipsum esse instrumentum patris, licet omne quod movetur ab alio ad aliquid operandum, rationem instrumenti habeat. Cum autem dico aliquem operari per virtutem receptam ab alio, potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod eadem numero sit virtus et dantis, et accipientis: et hoc modo qui operatur per virtutem acceptam ab alio, non est minor, sed aequalis ei a quo accipit. Quia ergo pater eamdem virtutem, quam habet, dat filio, per quam filius operatur, cum dicitur pater operari per filium, propter hoc filius non est dicendum minor patre, neque instrumentum eius. Sed hoc sequitur in illis qui non eamdem virtutem accipiunt ab aliquo, sed aliam et creatam. Sic ergo patet quod nec spiritus sanctus, nec filius, est causa patri quod operetur, neque patris minister seu instrumentum, ut deliravit Origenes.
<td>However, it does not follow from this that the Word is the instrument of the Father, although whatever is moved by another to effect something partakes of the nature of an instrument. For when I say that someone works through a power received from another, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, as meaning that the power of the giver and of the receiver is numerically one and the same power; and in this way the one operating through a power received from another is not inferior but equal to the one from whom he receives it. Therefore, since the same power which the Father has he gives to the Son, through which the Son works, when it is said that “the Father works through the Son,” one should not on that account say that the Son is inferior to the Father or is his instrument. This would be the case, rather, in those who receive from another not the same power, but another and created one. And so it is plain that neither the Holy Spirit nor the Son are causes of the Father’s working, and that neither is the minister or instrument of the Father, as Origen raved.
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<td>Si autem recte considerentur verba praedicta <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, evidenter apparet Evangelistam propriissime fuisse locutum. Quicumque enim aliquid facit, oportet quod illud praeconcipiat in sua sapientia, quae est forma et ratio rei factae: sicut forma in mente artificis praeconcepta est ratio arcae faciendae. Sic ergo Deus nihil facit nisi per conceptum sui intellectus, qui est sapientia ab aeterno concepta, scilicet Dei verbum, et Dei filius: et ideo impossibile est quod aliquid faciat nisi per filium. Unde Augustinus de Trinitate dicit quod verbum est ars plena omnium rationum viventium. Et sic patet quod omnia quae pater facit, facit per ipsum.
<td>77 If we carefully consider the words, <b>All things were made through him,</b> we can clearly see that the Evangelist spoke with the utmost exactitude. For whoever makes something must preconceive it in his wisdom, which is the form and pattern of the thing made: as the form preconceived in the mind of an artisan is the pattern of the cabinet to be made. So, God makes nothing except through the conception of his intellect, which is an eternally conceived wisdom, that is, the Word of God, and the Son of God. Accordingly, it is impossible that he should make anything except through the Son. And so Augustine says, in <i>The Trinity,</i> that the Word is the art full of the living patterns of all things. Thus it is clear that all things which the Father makes, he makes through him.
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<td>Notandum autem, secundum Chrysostomum, quod omnia quae Moyses per multa enumerat in productione rerum a Deo, dicens: <i>dixit dominus, fiat lux</i>, et <i>fiat firmamentum</i> etc., haec omnia Evangelista excedens, uno verbo comprehendit, dicens <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>. Cuius ratio est quia Moyses tradere volebat emanationem creaturarum a Deo, et ideo sigillatim enumerat; Ioannes vero ad altiorem festinans materiam, in hoc libro intendit nos inducere specialiter in cognitionem ipsius creatoris.
<td>78 It should be remarked that, according to Chrysostom, all the things which Moses enumerates individually in God’s production of things, saying, “And God said, ‘Let there be light’” (Gn 1:3) and so forth, all these the Evangelist transcends and embraces in one phrase, saying, <b>All things were made through him.</b> The reason is that Moses wished to teach the emanation of creatures from God; hence he enumerated them one by one. But John, hastening toward loftier things, intends in this book to lead us specifically to a knowledge of the Creator himself.
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<td>Deinde dicit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i>. Haec est secunda clausula quam quidam perverse intellexerunt, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de Nat. boni. Nam, ex hoc modo loquendi quo Ioannes hic utitur, ponens hoc quod dicitur <i>nihil</i> in fine orationis, crediderunt ipsum nihil teneri affirmative, quasi nihil sit aliquid, quod sine verbo factum sit; unde voluerunt quod haec clausula posita sit ab Evangelista ad excludendum aliquid quod a verbo non sit factum. Unde dicunt quod postquam Evangelista dixerat <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, consequenter adiungit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i> quasi dicat: ita dico omnia per ipsum facta esse, quod tamen sine ipso factum est aliquid, scilicet ipsum nihil.
<td>79 Then he says, <b>and without him nothing was made.</b> This is the second clause which some have distorted, as Augustine says in his work, <i>The Nature of the Good.</i> Because of John’s manner of speaking here, they believed that he was using “nothing” in an affirmative sense; as though nothing was something which was made without the Word. And so they claimed that this clause was added by the Evangelist in order to exclude something which was not made by the Word. They say that the Evangelist, having said that <b>All things were made through him,</b> added <b>and without him nothing was made.</b> It was as if to say: I say that all things were made through him in such a way that still something was made without him, that is, the “nothing”.
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<td>Ex hoc autem processit triplex haeresis, scilicet Valentini, qui, ut dicit Origenes, ponit multa principia, et ex illis principiis dicit procedere triginta saecula. Prima tamen principia quae ponit, sunt duo, scilicet profundum, quod vocat Deum patrem, et silentium. Ex his duobus dicit processisse decem saecula. Ex profundo autem, et silentio dicit esse alia duo principia, scilicet intellectum et veritatem, ex quibus processerunt octo saecula. Ex intellectu autem et veritate dicit esse alia duo principia, scilicet verbum et vitam, ex quibus procedunt duodecim saecula, et sic sunt triginta. Ex verbo autem et vita, secundum aevum, processit homo Christus, et Ecclesia. Sic ergo Valentinus ponebat prolationem verbi multa saecula praecessisse. Et ideo dicit quod, quia Evangelista dixerat <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, ne aliquis intelligeret illa saecula praecedentia esse perfecta per verbum, consequenter adiunxit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i>, idest omnia saecula praeexistentia et quae in eis fuerunt; quae ideo Ioannes vocat <i>nihil</i>, quia humanam rationem excedunt, nec possunt capi per intellectum.
<td>80 Three heresies came from this. First, that of Valentine. He affirmed, as Origen says, a multitude of principles, and taught that from them came thirty eras. The first principles he postulates are two: the Deep, which he calls God the Father, and Silence. And from these proceed ten eras. But from the Deep and from Silence, he says, there are two other principles, Mind and Truth; and from these issued eight eras. Then from Mind and Truth, there are two other principles, Word and Life; and from these issued twelve eras; thus making a total of thirty. Finally, from the Word and Life there proceeded in time, the man Christ and the Church. In this way Valentine affirmed many eras previous to the issuing forth of the Word. And so he said that because the Evangelist had stated that <b>all things were made through him,</b> then, lest anyone think that those previous eras had been effected through the Word, he added, <b>and without him nothing was made,</b> i.e., all the preceding eras and all that had existed in them. All of these John calls “nothing,” because they transcend human reason and cannot be grasped by the mind.
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<td>Secundus error, ex hoc procedens, fuit Manichaei, qui ponebat duo contraria principia, unum scilicet rerum incorruptibilium, et aliud corruptibilium. Dicit ergo quod postquam Ioannes dixerat <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, ne crederetur verbum esse corruptibilium rerum causam, statim subiunxit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i>, idest corruptioni subiecta, quae nihil esse dicuntur, quia eorum esse est continue transmutari in nihil.
<td>81 The second error to arise from this was that of Manichaeus, who affirmed two opposing principles: one is the source of incorruptible things, and the other of corruptible things. He said that after John had stated that <b>All things were made through him,</b> then, lest it be thought that the Word is the cause of corruptible things, he immediately added, <b>and without him nothing was made,</b> i.e., things subject to corruption, which are called “nothing” because their being consists in being continually transformed into nothing.
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<td>Tertius error est eorum qui volunt quod per nihil intelligatur Diabolus, iuxta illud Iob XVIII, 15: <i>habitent in tabernaculo eius socii eius, qui non est</i>. Dicunt ergo omnia esse facta per verbum, praeter Diabolum. Et ideo exponunt <i>sine ipso factum est nihil</i>, idest Diabolus.
<td>82 The third error is that of those who claim that by “nothing” we should understand the devil, according to Job (18:15), “May the companions of him who is not dwell in his house.” And so they say that all things except the devil were made through the Word. In this way they explain, <b>without him nothing was made,</b> that is, the devil.
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<td>Sed omnes isti tres errores ex uno fonte procedentes, scilicet ex hoc quod ipsum <i>nihil</i> volunt affirmative accipi, excluduntur per hoc quod <i>nihil</i> non ponitur hic affirmative, sed negative tantum. Ut sit sensus: ita facta sunt omnia per verbum, quod nihil est participans esse, quod non sit factum per ipsum.
<td>83 All these three errors, arising as they do from the same source, namely, taking “nothing” in a positive sense, are excluded by the fact that “nothing” in not used here in an affirmative, but in a merely negative sense: the sense being that all things were made through the Word in such a way that there is nothing participating in existence that was not made through him.
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<td>Sed instabit forsitan aliquis, dicens hanc clausulam superflue fuisse appositam, si intelligatur negative, eo quod Evangelista dicens, <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, sufficienter videtur dixisse non esse aliquid quod non sit factum per verbum.
<td>84 Perhaps someone will object and say that it was superfluous to add this clause, if it is to be understood negatively, on the ground that the Evangelist, in stating that <b>All things were made through him,</b> seems to have already said adequately enough that there is not something that was not made through the Word.
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<td>Ad quod dicendum quod secundum multos introducta est haec particula multipliciter, et multis de causis. Quarum una causa est, secundum Chrysostomum, ne aliquis legens in veteri testamento et inveniens solum visibilia enumerata a Moyse in creatione rerum, crederet illa tantum facta esse per verbum. Ideo Evangelista, dum dixisset <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, quae scilicet enumerat Moyses, ideo consequenter adiunxit <i>sine ipso factum est nihil</i>; quasi dicat: nihil eorum quae sunt, sive visibile sive invisibile, est factum sine verbo. Et hoc modo loquitur apostolus, Col. I, 16, dicens omnia condita esse in Christo, sive visibilia, sive invisibilia: ubi apostolus specialiter mentionem facit de invisibilibus, quia de eis Moyses aperte mentionem non fecerat, propter ruditatem illius populi, qui supra sensibilia elevari non poterat.
<td>The answer to this is that, according to many expositors, this clause was added in many ways for a number of reasons. One of these reasons is, according to Chrysostom, so that no one reading the Old Testament and finding only visible things listed by Moses in the creation of things, would think that these were the only things made through the Word. And so after he had said, <b>All things were made through him,</b> namely, those that Moses listed, the Evangelist then added, <b>and without him nothing was made,</b> as though he were saying: None of the things which exist, whether visible or invisible, was made without the Word. Indeed, the Apostle also speaks in this way (Col 1:16), saying that all things, visible and invisible, were created in Christ; and here the Apostle makes specific mention of invisible things because Moses had made no express mention of them on account of the lack of erudition of that people, who could not be raised above the things of sense.
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<td>Introducitur etiam, secundum Chrysostomum, alio modo sic. Posset enim aliquis legens Evangelium, multa signa et miracula facta per Christum, sicut illud Matth. XI, 5: <i>caeci vident, claudi ambulant, leprosi mundantur</i> etc., credere per hoc quod dicit Ioannes <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, debere intelligi omnia illa tantum quae in illis Evangeliis continentur, et nihil aliud factum per ipsum. Et ideo ne hoc suspicetur quis, consequenter Evangelista inducit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i>; quasi dicat: non solum ea quae in Evangeliis continentur, sunt facta per ipsum, sed nihil eorum quae facta sunt, est factum sine ipso. Et sic, secundum Chrysostomum, haec particula introducitur ad ostendendum totalem causalitatem, et est quasi completiva praemissae.
<td>Chrysostom also gives another reason why this clause was added. For someone reading in the Gospels of the many signs and miracles worked by Christ, such as, “The blind see, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed” (Mt 11:5), might believe that in saying, <b>All things were made through him,</b> John meant that only the things mentioned in those Gospels, and nothing else, were made through him. So lest anyone suspect this, the Evangelist adds, <b>and without him nothing was made.</b> As if to say: Not only all the things contained in the Gospels were made through him, but none of the things that were made, was made without him. And so, according to Chrysostom, this clause is added to bring out his total causality, and serves, as it were, to complete his previous statement.
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<td>Secundum Hilarium vero introducitur haec particula ad ostendendum quod verbum habet virtutem operativam ab alio. Quia enim Evangelista dixerat <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, posset intelligi patrem excludi ab omni causalitate; ideo consequenter addit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i>. Quasi dicat: sic per eum facta sunt omnia, ut tamen pater cum eo omnia fecerit. Nam tantum valet sine eo, ac si dicatur non solus; ut sit sensus: non ipse solus est per quem facta sunt omnia, sed ipse est alius, sine quo factum est nihil. Quasi dicat <i>sine ipso</i>, cum alio operante, scilicet patre, <i>factum est nihil</i>; iuxta illud Prov. VIII, 30: <i>cum eo eram cuncta componens</i>.
<td>85 According to Hilary, however, this clause is introduced to show that the Word has operative power from another. For since the Evangelist had said, <b>All things were made through him,</b> it might be supposed that the Father is excluded from all causality. For that reason he added, <b>and without him nothing was made.</b> As if to say: All things were made through him, but in such a way that the Father made all things with him. For “without him” is equivalent to saying, “not alone,” so that the meaning is: It is not he alone through whom all things were made, but he is the other one without whom nothing was made. It is as if he said: <b>Without him,</b> with another working, i.e., with the Father, <b>nothing was made,</b> as it says, “I was with him forming all things” (Prv 8:30).
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<td>In quadam autem homilia quae incipit, <i>vox spiritualis aquilae</i>, et attribuitur Origeni, invenitur alia expositio satis pulchra. Dicitur enim ibi quod in Graeco est choris, ubi in Latino habemus sine. Choris autem idem est quod foris vel extra; quasi dicat ita <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i> quod extra ipsum <i>factum est nihil</i>. Et ideo hoc dicit ut ostendat, per verbum et in verbo omnia conservari; iuxta illud Hebr. I, 3: <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis suae</i>. Quaedam enim sunt quae non indigent operante, nisi quantum ad fieri, cum possint subsistere postquam fuerunt facta, absque agentis influxu; sicut domus indiget quidem artifice quantum ad suum fieri, sed tamen persistit in suo esse absque artificis influentia. Ne ergo credat aliquis, omnia per verbum sic facta esse quod sit causa eorum quantum ad fieri solum, et non quantum ad conservationem in esse, ideo consequenter Evangelista subiunxit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i>. Hoc est: nihil factum est extra ipsum, quia ipse ambit omnia, conservans ea.
<td>86 In a certain homily attributed to Origen, and which begins, “The spiritual voice of the eagle,” we find another rather beautiful exposition. It says there that the Greek has <i>thoris</i> where the Latin has <i>sine</i> (without). Now <i>thoris</i> is the same as “outside” or “outside of.” It is as if he had said: <b>All things were made through him</b> in such a way that outside him <b>nothing was made.</b> And so he says this to show that all things are conserved through the Word and in the Word, as stated in Hebrews (1:3), “He sustains all things by his powerful word.” Now there are certain things that do not need their producer except to bring them into existence, since after they have been produced they are able to subsist without any further activity on the part of the producer. For example, a house needs a builder if it is to come into existence, but it continues to exist without any further action on the part of the builder. So lest anyone suppose that all things were made through the Word in such a way that he is merely the cause of their production and not of their continuation in existence, the Evangelist added, <b>and without him nothing was made,</b> i.e., nothing was made outside of him, because he encompasses all things, preserving them.
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<td>Exponitur autem haec particula secundum Augustinum et Origenem et plures alios sic ut per nihil intelligatur peccatum. Quia ergo cum diceret <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, posset intelligi malum et peccatum per ipsum fieri; ideo consequenter adiunxit <i>et nihil</i>, idest peccatum, <i>est factum sine ipso</i>. Nam sicut ars non est principium seu causa alicuius defectus in artificiatis, sed per se est causa perfectionis ipsorum et formae, ita et verbum, quod est ars patris, plena rationum viventium, non est causa alicuius mali vel inordinationis in rebus, et praecipue mali culpae, quod habet perfectam rationem mali; sed huius mali causa per se est voluntas creaturae, sive hominis sive Angeli, libere declinans a fine, ad quem naturaliter ordinatur. Operans secundum artem, voluntarie errans, est causa defectuum incidentium in artificiatis, non per artem, sed per voluntatem. Unde in talibus ars non est principium seu causa defectuum, sed voluntas: et ideo malum est defectus voluntatis, et non artis alicuius: et ideo inquantum tale, nihil est.
<td>87 This clause is also explained by Augustine and Origen and several others in such a way that “nothing” indicates sin. Accordingly, because <b>All things were made through him</b> might be interpreted as including evil and sin, he added, <b>and without him nothing,</b> i.e., sin, <b>was made.</b> For just as art is not the principle or cause of the defects in its products, but is through itself the cause of their perfection and form, so the Word, who is the art of the Father, full of living archetypes, is not the cause of any evil or disarrangement in things, particularly of the evil of sin, which carries the full notion of evil. The <i>per se</i> cause of this evil is the will of the creature, either a man or an angel, freely declining from the end to which it is ordained by its nature. One who can act in virtue of his art but purposely violates it, is the cause of the defects occurring in his works, not by reason of his art, but by reason of his will. So in such cases, his art is not the source or cause of the defects, but his will is. Consequently, evil is a defect of the will and not of any art. And so to the extent that it is such [i.e., a defect], it is nothing.
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<td>Sic ergo ista particula additur ad ostendendum ipsius verbi universalem causalitatem secundum Chrysostomum, societatem ad patrem, secundum Hilarium et virtutem verbi in conservando, secundum Origenem. Item puritatem causalitatis: quia sic est causa bonorum, quod non est causa peccati, secundum Augustinum et Origenem et plures alios.
<td>88 So then, this clause is added to show the universal causality of the Word, according to Chrysostom; his association with the Father, according to Hilary; the power of the Word in the preserving of things, according to Origen; and finally, the purity of his causality, because he is so the cause of good as not to be the cause of sin, according to Augustine, Origen, and a number of others.
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<td>Deinde dicit <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>. Hic ponitur tertia particula, ubi cavendus est falsus intellectus Manichaei, qui ex hoc verbo motus est ad dicendum quod omnia quae sunt, vivunt; puta lapis, lignum, et homo, et quicquid aliud est in mundo. Et punctabat sic: <i>quod factum est in ipso</i>, distingue, <i>erat vita</i>. Sed non erat vita nisi viveret; ergo quicquid factum est in ipso, vivit. Vult etiam quod <i>in ipso</i> idem sic ac si dicatur per ipsum, cum communiter in Scriptura in ipso, vel per ipsum accipiatur; sicut illud Col. I, 16: <i>in ipso, et per ipsum condita sunt omnia</i>. Sed hunc intellectum ista expositio ostendit esse falsum.
<td>89 Then he says, <b>What was made in him was life;</b> and this is the third clause. Here we must avoid the false interpretation of Manichaeus, who was led by this to maintain that everything that exists is alive: for example, stones, wood, men, and anything else in the world. He understood the clause this way: <b>What was made in him,</b> comma, <b>was life.</b> But it was not life unless alive. Therefore, whatever was made in him is alive. He also claimed that “in him” is the same as saying “through him,” since very often in Scripture “in him” and “through him” are interchangeable, as in “in him and through him all things were created” (Col 1:16). However, our present explanation shows that this interpretation is false.
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<td>Potest tamen sine errore multipliciter exponi. Nam in illa homilia vox spiritualis exponitur sic: <i>quod factum est in ipso</i>, idest per ipsum, hoc vita erat non in seipso sed in sua causa. In omnibus enim causatis hoc commune est, quod effectus, sive per naturam sive per voluntatem producti, sunt in suis causis non secundum proprium esse, sed secundum virtutem propriae suae causae; sicut effectus inferiores sunt in sole ut in causa, non secundum eorum esse, sed secundum virtutem solis. Quia ergo causa omnium effectuum productorum a Deo, est vita quaedam et ars plena rationum viventium, ideo omne, quod factum est in ipso, idest per ipsum, vita erat in sua causa, scilicet in ipso Deo.
<td>90 There are, nevertheless, a number of ways to explain it without error. In that homily, “The spiritual voice,” we find this explanation: <b>What was made in him,</b> i.e., through him, <b>was life,</b> not in each thing itself, but in its cause. For in the case of all things that are caused, it is always true that effects, whether produced by nature or by will, exist in their causes, not according to their own existence, but according to the power of their appropriate cause. Thus, lower effects are in the sun as in their cause, not according to their respective existences but according to the power of the sun. Therefore, since the cause of all effects produced by God is a certain life and an art full of living archetypes, for this reason <b>What was made in him,</b> i.e., through him, <b>was life,</b> in its cause, i.e., in God.
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<td>Augustinus autem aliter legit, sic punctando: <i>quod factum est</i>, distingue, <i>in ipso vita erat</i>. Res enim dupliciter considerari possunt, secundum scilicet quod sunt in seipsis et secundum quod sunt in verbo. Si considerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, sic non omnes res sunt vita nec etiam viventes, sed aliquae carent vita, aliquae vivunt. Sicut facta est terra, facta sunt etiam et metalla, quae nec vita sunt, nec vivunt; facta sunt animalia, facti sunt homines, quae secundum quod sunt in seipsis, non sunt vita, sed vivunt solum. Si vero considerentur secundum quod sunt in verbo, non solum sunt viventes, sed etiam vita. Nam rationes in sapientia Dei spiritualiter existentes, quibus res factae sunt ab ipso verbo, sunt vita: sicut arca facta per artificem in se quidem nec vivit nec vita est, ratio vero arcae, quae praecessit in mente artificis, vivit quodammodo, inquantum habet esse intelligibile in mente artificis, non tamen est vita, quia per ipsum intelligere artificis non est in sua essentia, neque suum esse. In Deo autem suum intelligere est sua vita et sua essentia: et ideo quicquid est in Deo, non solum vivit sed est ipsa vita, quia quicquid est in Deo, est sua essentia. Unde creatura in Deo est creatrix essentia. Si ergo considerentur res secundum quod in verbo sunt, vita sunt. Hanc expositionem habes alibi.
<td>91 Augustine reads this another way, as: <b>What was made,</b> comma, <b>in him was life.</b> For things can be considered in two ways: as they are in themselves, and as they are in the Word. If they are considered as they are in themselves, then it is not true that all things are life or even alive, but some lack life and some are alive. For example, the earth was made and metals were made, but none is life, none is living; animals and men were made, and these, considered in themselves, are not life, but merely living. Yet considered as they are in the Word, they are not merely living, but also life. For the archetypes which exist spiritually in the wisdom of God, and through which things were made by the Word, are life, just as a chest made by an artisan is in itself neither alive nor life, yet the exemplar of the chest in the artisan’s mind prior to the existence of the chest is in some sense living, insofar as it has an intellectual existence in the mind of the artisan. Nevertheless it is not life, because it is neither in his essence nor is it his existence through the act of understanding of the artisan. But in God, his act of understanding is his life and his essence. And so whatever is in God is not only living, but is life itself, because whatever is in God is his essence. Hence the creature in God is the creating essence. Thus, if things are considered as they are in the Word, they are life. This is explained in another place.
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<td>Origenes vero super Ioannem legit hoc aliter, punctando sic: <i>quod factum est in ipso</i>, distingue, <i>vita erat</i>. Ubi notandum est quod de filio Dei dicitur aliquid, secundum se, sicut dicitur Deus omnipotens, et huiusmodi; aliquid vero dicitur de eo per comparationem ad nos, sicut salvator et redemptor; aliquid vero utroque modo, sicut sapientia et iustitia. In omnibus autem quae absolute et secundum se de filio dicuntur, non dicitur quod sit factus, sicut non dicitur filius factus Deus, neque omnipotens; sed in illis quae dicuntur in comparatione ad nos, seu utroque modo, potest addi adiunctio facti, ut dicatur secundum illud I Cor. I, 30: <i>qui factus est nobis a Deo sapientia, et iustificatio, et sanctificatio, et redemptio</i>. Et sic, licet semper fuerit in seipso sapientia et iustitia, tamen potest dici quod de novo factus est nobis iustitia et sapientia.
<td>92 Origen, commenting on John, gives another reading, thus: <b>That which was made in him;</b> and then, <b>was life.</b> Here we should note that some things are said of the Son of God as such; for example, that he is God, omnipotent, and the like. And some things are said of him in relation to ourselves; for example, we say he is Savior and Redeemer. Some things are said in both ways, such as wisdom and justice. Now in all things said absolutely and of the Son as such, it is not said that he was “made”, for example, we do not say that the Son was made God or omnipotent. But in things said in reference to us, or in both ways, the notion of being made can be used, as in, “God made him [Jesus Christ] our wisdom, our justice, our sanctification and redemption” (1 Cor 1:30). And so, although he was always wisdom and justice in himself, yet it can be said that he was newly made justice and wisdom for us.
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<td>Secundum hoc ergo Origenes exponens dicit quod quamvis in seipso sit vita, tamen nobis factus est vita per hoc quod nos vivificavit, iuxta illud I Cor. XV, 22: <i>sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in ipso omnes vivificabuntur</i>. Et ideo dicit quod <i>verbum quod factum est</i> nobis vita, <i>in ipso vita erat</i>, ut quandoque nobis fieret vita; et ideo statim subdit <i>et vita erat lux hominum</i>.
<td>And so Origen, explaining it along these lines, says that although in himself the Son is life, yet he was made life for us by the fact that he gave us life, as is said, “Just as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will come to life” (1 Cor 15:22). And so he says “the Word that was made” life for us <b>in himself was life,</b> so that after a time he could become life for us; and so he immediately adds, <b>and that life was the light of men.</b>
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<td>Hilarius enim sic punctat <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est in ipso</i>, et postea dicatur <i>vita erat</i>. Quia ipse dicit in II de Trin. cum dicit Evangelista <i>et factum est nihil</i>, posset esse ambiguum an quaedam alia adhuc quae per ipsum facta sunt, fuerunt facta non per ipsum, non tamen sine ipso; sed in eis associavit facientem; et hanc clausulam esse additam ad correptionem praecedentis. Ne ergo hoc intelligeretur, ideo Evangelista cum dixisset <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>, subiungit <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil</i>, quod tamen factum est <i>in ipso</i>, idest per ipsum: et ratio huius est, quia <i>vita erat</i>.
<td>93 Hilary reads the clause differently, thus: <b>And without him was made nothing, which was made in him,</b> and later it says, <b>he was life.</b> For he says (<i>The Trinity</i> II) that when the Evangelist says <b>without him nothing was made,</b> one might be perplexed and ask whether there are still other things made by him, that were not made through him, although not without him, but with respect to which he was associated with the maker; and this clause is added to correct the aforesaid error. Therefore lest this be so understood, when the Evangelist says, <b>All things were made through him,</b> he adds, <b>and without him nothing was made,</b> which was made, in him, that is, through him; and the reason for this is that <b>he was life.</b>
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<td>Manifestum est enim quod hoc modo omnia dicuntur per verbum facta, inquantum verbum ex patre procedens est Deus. Ponamus autem quod aliquis pater filium habeat, qui non sit perfecte habens operationes hominis, sed paulatim ad hoc perveniat, manifestum est quod multa faciet, non per ipsum filium, licet non sine eo. Quia ergo filius Dei eamdem vitam habuit ab aeterno, quam et pater, secundum illud infra V, 26: <i>sicut pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et filio vitam habere in semetipso</i>, ideo non potest dici quod Deus pater, etsi nihil fecerit sine filio, tamen fecit aliqua non per ipsum, quia vita erat. In viventibus enim quae vitam participant, potest contingere quod vita imperfecta praecedat vitam perfectam; sed in per se vita, quae non participat vitam, sed est absolute et simpliciter vita, nullo modo potest imperfectio aliqua esse. Quia ergo verbum est per se vita, numquam fuit in eo vita imperfecta, sed semper perfecta; et ideo ita <i>nihil factum est sine eo</i>, quod tamen non sit factum <i>in ipso</i>, idest per ipsum.
<td>For it is plain that all things are said to have been made through the Word inasmuch as the Word, who proceeds from the Father, is God. But let us suppose that some father has a son who does not perfectly exercise the operations of a man, but reaches such a state gradually. In that case the father will do many things, not through the son, yet not without [having] him. Since, therefore, the Son of God has from all eternity the same life that the Father has—“Just as the Father possesses life in himself, so has he granted it to the Son to have life in himself” (below 5:26)—one cannot say that God the Father, although he made nothing without the Son, nevertheless made some things not through him, because he was life. For in living things which participate life, it can happen that imperfect life precedes perfect life; but in <i>per se</i> life, which does not participate life but is simply and absolutely life, there can be no imperfection at all. Accordingly, because the Word is <i>per se</i> life, there was never imperfect life in him, but always perfect life. And so in such a way that nothing was made without him that was not also made in him, i.e., through him.
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<td>Chrysostomus autem aliud modum legendi habet, et punctat sic: <i>et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est</i>. Et ratio huius est, quia aliquis posset credere quod spiritus sanctus esset factus per verbum. Et ideo Evangelista hoc volens excludere dicit <i>quod factum est</i>, quia spiritus sanctus non est quid factum; et postea sequitur <i>in ipso vita erat</i>; quod introducitur propter duo. Unum est ut post productionem omnium rerum ostendatur indeficientia causalitatis ad res non solum productas, sed etiam producendas. Quasi dicat <i>in ipso vita erat</i>, qua scilicet non solum omnia producere potuit, sed etiam quae habet indeficientem fluxum et causalitatem absque mutationis dispendio ad res continue producendas, utpote fons vivus qui non minoratur ex fluxu continuo; aqua vero collecta et non viva, cum defluit, minoratur et deficit; unde dicitur in Ps. XXXV, 10: <i>apud te est fons vitae</i>. Secundum est ut ostendatur gubernatio rerum esse per verbum. Quia enim <i>in ipso vita erat</i>, ostenditur quod non produxit res per necessitatem naturae, sed per voluntatem et intellectum, et quod res productas gubernat; Hebr. IV, 12: <i>vivus est sermo Dei</i> et cetera.
<td>94 Chrysostom has a different reading and punctuation, thus: <b>And without him was made nothing that was made.</b> The reason for this is that someone might believe that the Holy Spirit was made through the Word. So to exclude this, the Evangelist says, <b>that was made,</b> because the Holy Spirit is not something that is made. And afterward follows, <b>In him was life,</b> which is introduced for two reasons. First, to show that after the creation of all things his causality was indefectible not only with respect to the things already produced, but also with respect to things yet to be produced. As if to say: <b>In him was life,</b> by which he could not only produce all things, but which has an unfailing flow and a causality for producing things continually without undergoing any change, being a living fountain which is not diminished in spite of its continuous outflow; whereas collected water, that is not living [i.e., running] water, is diminished when it flows out, and is used up. So the Psalm (35:10) says, “With you is the fountain of life.” The second reason is to show that things are governed by the: Word. For since <b>In him was life,</b> this shows that he produced things by his intellect and will, not by a necessity of his nature, and that he governs the things he made. “The Word of God is living” (Heb 4:12).
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<td>Et quia apud Graecos Chrysostomus est tantae auctoritatis in suis expositionibus, quod ubi ipse aliquid exposuit in sacra Scriptura, nullam aliam expositionem admittant, ideo in omnibus libris Graecis invenitur sic punctatum, sicut punctat Chrysostomus, scilicet hoc modo: <i>sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est</i>.
<td>Chrysostom is held in such esteem by the Greeks in his explanations that they admit no other where he expounded anything in Holy Scripture. For this reason, this passage in all the Greek works is found to be punctuated exactly as Chrysostom did, namely, <b>And without him was made nothing that was made.</b>
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<td><b>Lectura 3</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 3</b>
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ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων:<br>
5 καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει,<br>
καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν.
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4b And that life was the light of men.<br>
5 And the light shines in the darkness,<br>
and the darkness did not overcome it.
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<td>Evangelista supra insinuavit virtutem verbi, secundum quam omnia produxit in esse; hic vero insinuat eius virtutem, secundum quam se habet ad homines, dicens, hoc verbum esse lucem hominibus. Ubi primo introducit nobis lucem quamdam, cum dicit <i>et vita erat lux hominum</i>; secundo lucis irradiationem, cum dicit <i>et lux in tenebris lucet</i>; tertio lucis participationem, cum dicit <i>et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt</i>. Potest autem totum dupliciter exponi. Uno modo secundum influxum cognitionis naturalis; alio modo secundum communicationem gratiae.
<td>95 Above, the Evangelist described the power of the Word insofar as he brought all things into existence; here he describes his power as it is related to men, saying that this Word is a light to men. First, he introduces a certain light to us (v 4b); secondly, the light’s irradiation (v 5a); thirdly, participation in the light (v 5b). This whole section may be explained in two ways: first, according to the influx of natural knowledge; secondly, according to participation in grace.
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<td>Dicit ergo quantum ad primum, quod <i>vita erat lux hominum</i>.
<td>As to the first point he says, <b>And that life was the light of men.</b>
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<td>Ubi primo considerandum est quod, secundum Augustinum et plures alios, nomen lucis magis proprie dicitur in spiritualibus quam in sensibilibus. Ambrosius tamen vult quod splendor metaphorice dicatur de Deo. Sed in hoc non est magna vis facienda: nam de quocumque nomen lucis dicatur ad manifestationem refertur, sive illa manifestatio sit in intelligibilibus, sive in sensibilibus. Si ergo comparentur manifestatio intelligibilis et sensibilis, secundum naturam prius invenitur lux in spiritualibus; sed quoad nos, qui nomina rebus imponimus ex earum proprietatibus nobis notis, prius invenitur in sensibilibus, quia prius impositum est a nobis hoc nomen ad significandum lucem sensibilem, quam intelligibilem; quamvis secundum virtutem prius et verius conveniat spiritualibus quam sensibilibus.
<td>96 Here we should note first that, according to Augustine and many others, light is more properly said of spiritual things than of sensible things. Ambrose, however, thinks that brightness is said metaphorically of God. But this is not a great issue, for in whatever way the name “light” is used, it implies a manifestation, whether that manifesting concerns intelligible or sensible things. If we compare sensible and intelligible manifestation, then, according to the nature of things, light is found first in spiritual things. But for us, who give names to things on the basis of their properties as known to us, light is discovered first in sensible things, because we first used this name to signify sensible light before intelligible light; although as to power, light belongs to spiritual things in a prior and truer way than to sensible things.
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<td>Ad evidentiam autem eius quod dicitur <i>et vita erat lux hominum</i>, sciendum est quod multipliciter est gradus vitae. Quaedam namque vivunt, sed absque luce, quia nullam cognitionem habent, sicut sunt plantae: unde vita earum non est lux. Quaedam vero vivunt et cognoscunt; sed tamen eorum cognitio, cum sit sensus tantum, non est nisi particularium et materialium, sicut est in brutis: et ideo haec et vitam habent et lucem quamdam, sed non lucem hominum qui vivunt et cognoscunt non solum ipsa vera, sed ipsius veritatis rationem, sicut sunt creaturae rationales, quibus non solum manifestatur hoc vel illud, sed ipsa veritas quae manifestabilis est et manifestativa omnium.
<td>97 To clarify the statement, <b>And that life was the light of men,</b> we should remark that there are many grades of life. For some things live, but do so without light, because they have no knowledge; for example, plants. Hence their life is not light. Other things both live and know, but their knowledge, since it is on the sense level, is concerned only with individual and material things, as is the case with the brutes. So they have both life and a certain light. But they do not have the light of men, who live, and know, not only truths, but also the very nature of truth itself. Such are rational creatures, to whom not only this or that are made manifest, but truth itself, which can be manifested and is manifestive to all.
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<td>Et ideo Evangelista loquens de verbo dicit non solum esse vitam, sed etiam esse lucem, ne intelligas vitam sine agnitione; <i>hominum</i> autem ne tantum cognitionem sensibilem suspiceris, qualis est in brutis.
<td>And so the Evangelist, speaking of the Word, not only says that he is life but also <b>light,</b> lest anyone suppose he means life without knowledge. And he says that he is the <b>light of men,</b> lest anyone suppose he meant only sensible knowledge, such as exists in the brutes.
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<td>Sed quare dixit <i>hominum</i>, cum etiam sit lux Angelorum? Ad hoc est duplex responsio. Chrysostomus enim dicit quod Evangelista intendebat in isto Evangelio tradere nobis cognitionem de verbo, secundum quod ad salutem hominum ordinatur; et ideo magis refert secundum suam intentionem ad homines quam ad Angelos. Origenes vero dicit quod participatio huius lucis pertinet ad homines, inquantum sunt rationalis naturae; et ideo Evangelista dicens <i>erat lux hominum</i>, voluit intelligi omnis rationalis naturae.
<td>98 But since he is also the light of angels, why did he say, of men? Two answers have been given to this. Chrysostom says that the Evangelist intended in this Gospel to give us a knowledge of the Word precisely as directed to the salvation of men and therefore refers, in keeping with his aim, more to men than to angels. Origen, however, says that participation in this light pertains to men insofar as they have a rational nature; accordingly, when the Evangelist says, <b>the light of men,</b> he wants us to understand every rational nature.
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<td>In hoc etiam ostenditur perfectio et dignitas huius vitae, quia est intellectualis seu rationalis. Cum enim illa dicuntur viventia, quae se aliquo modo movent, illa dicuntur vitam habere perfectam, quae perfecte seipsa movent; movere autem seipsum perfecte et proprie, in inferioribus creaturis soli homini convenit. Nam etsi alia ex seipsis ab aliquo principio intrinseco moveantur, non tamen illud principium se habet ad opposita; et ideo ex necessitate moventur, et non libere. Mota igitur a tali principio magis aguntur quam agunt. Homo vero, cum sit dominus sui actus, libere se movet ad omnia quae vult; et ideo homo habet vitam perfectam, et similiter quaelibet intellectualis natura. Vita ergo verbi, quae est lux hominum, est vita perfecta.
<td>99 We also see from this the perfection and dignity of this life, because it is intellectual or rational. For whereas all things that in some way move themselves are called living, only those that perfectly move themselves are said to have perfect life; and among lower creatures only man moves himself, properly speaking, and perfectly. For although other things are moved by themselves by some inner principle, that inner principle is nevertheless not open to opposite alternatives; hence they are not moved freely but from necessity. As a result, those things that are moved by such a principle are more truly made to act than act themselves. But man, since he is master of his act, moves himself freely to all that he wills. Consequently, man has perfect life, as does every intellectual nature. And so the life of the Word, which is the light of men, is perfect life.
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<td>Attenditur etiam in praemissis verbis congruus ordo: nam in naturali rerum ordine primo invenitur esse, et hoc primo Evangelista insinuavit, dicens <i>in principio erat verbum</i>, secundo vivere, et hoc est quod sequitur <i>in ipso vita erat</i>, tertio intelligere, et hoc consequenter adiunxit <i>vita erat lux hominum</i>. Unde, secundum Origenem, convenienter vitae attribuit lucem, quia lux nonnisi viventi attribui potest.
<td>100 We find a fitting order in the above. For in the natural order of things, existence is first; and the Evangelist implies this in his first statement, <b>In the beginning was the Word.</b> Secondly, comes life; and this is mentioned next, <b>In him was life.</b> Thirdly comes understanding; and that is mentioned next; <b>And that life was the light of men.</b> And, according to Origen, he fittingly attributes light to life because light can be attributed only to the living.
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<td>Est tamen notandum quod lux ad viventem dupliciter comparari potest, vel ut obiectum, vel ut participata, ut patet in visu exteriori. Oculus enim lucem exteriorem cognoscit tamquam obiectum, sed oportet ad hoc quod eam videat, quod participet aliquam lucem interiorem, per quam aptetur et disponatur oculus ad lucem exteriorem videndam. Sic ergo, quod hic dicit <i>et vita erat lux hominum</i>, dupliciter potest intelligi. Ut dicatur lux hominum per modum obiecti quasi a solis hominibus conspicabilis; quia ipsam sola rationalis creatura conspicere potest, cum ipsa sola divinae visionis sit capax (Iob XXXV, v. 11: <i>docet nos super iumenta terrae, et super volucres caeli erudit nos</i>); quia licet alia animalia cognoscant aliqua quae vera sunt, solus tamen homo ipsam rationem veritatis cognoscit.
<td>101 We should note that light can be related in two ways to what is living: as an object and as something in which they participate, as is clear in external sight. For the eyes know external light as an object, but if they are to see it, they must participate in an inner light by which the eyes are adapted and disposed for seeing the external light. And so his statement, <b>And that life was the light of men,</b> can be understood in two ways. First, that the <b>light of men</b> is taken as an object that man alone can look upon, because the rational creature alone can see it, since he alone is capable of the vision of God who “teaches us more than the beasts of the earth, and enlightens us more than the birds of the air” Jb 35:11); for although other animals may know certain things that are true, nevertheless, man alone knows the nature itself of truth.
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<td>Potest etiam dici lux hominum participata. Numquam enim ipsum verbum et ipsam lucem conspicere possemus nisi per participationem eius, quae in ipso homine est, quae est superior pars animae nostrae, scilicet lux intellectiva, de qua dicitur in Ps. IV, 7: <i>signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui</i>, idest filii tui, qui est facies tua, qua manifestaris.
<td>The <b>light of men</b> can also be taken as a light in which we participate. For we would never be able to look upon the Word and light itself except through a participation in it; and this participation is in man and is the superior part of our soul, i.e., the intellectual light, about which the Psalm (4:7) says, “The light of your countenance, O Lord, is marked upon us,” i.e., of your Son, who is your face, by whom you are manifested.
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<td>Introduxit supra Evangelista lucem quamdam; nunc vero agit de ipsius irradiatione cum dicit <i>lux in tenebris lucet</i>. Quod quidem dupliciter exponi potest, secundum duplicem acceptionem tenebrarum.
<td>102 Having introduced a certain light, the Evangelist now considers its irradiation, saying, And the light shines in the darkness. This can be explained in two ways, according to the two meanings of “darkness.”
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<td>Primo vero accipiamus tenebras naturalem defectum, ac creatae mentis. Nam, ita se habet mens ad lucem istam, de qua hic loquitur Evangelista, sicut se habet aer ad lucem solis: quia, licet aer capax sit lucis solis, tamen, in se consideratus, tenebra est. Et secundum hoc sensus est: <i>lux</i>, idest vita illa, quae est lux hominum, <i>in tenebris lucet</i>, scilicet in animabus et mentibus creatis, irradiando semper omnes. Iob III, 23: <i>viro cui abscondita est lux</i>.
<td>First, we might take “darkness” as a natural defect, that of the created mind. For the mind is to that light of which the Evangelist speaks here as air is to the light of the sun; because, although air is receptive of the light of the sun, considered in itself it is a darkness. According to this the meaning is: the light, i.e., that life which is the light of men, shines in the darkness, i.e., in created souls and minds, by always shedding its light on all. “On a man from whom the light is hidden” (Jb 3:23).
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<td>Sed <i>tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt</i>, idest includere non potuerunt. Illud enim dicitur comprehendi, cuius fines concluduntur et conspiciuntur. Quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, attingere Deum mente, magna beatitudo est: comprehendere vero, impossibile est. <i>Tenebrae</i> ergo <i>eam non comprehenderunt</i>. Iob XXXVI, 26: <i>ecce Deus magnus vincens scientiam nostram</i>; Ier. XXXII, 19: <i>magnus consilio et incomprehensibilis cogitatu</i>. Et haec expositio habetur in illa homilia quae incipit <i>vox spiritualis aquilae</i>.
<td><b>And the darkness did not overcome it,</b> i.e., enclose it [i.e., intellectually]. For to overcome something [ <i>comprehendere,</i> to overcome, to comprehend, to seize or apprehend, and so forth], is to enclose and understand its boundaries. As Augustine says, to reach God with the mind is a great happiness; but to overcome [comprehend] him is impossible. And so, the darkness did not overcome it. “Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge” (Jb 36:26); “Great in counsel, incomprehensible in thought” as Jeremiah (32:19) says. This explanation is found in that homily which begins, “The spiritual voice of the eagle.”
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<td>Alio modo potest exponi accipiendo tenebras, secundum Augustinum, pro naturali insipientia hominum, quae tenebra dicitur. Eccle. II, 13: <i>vidi quia tantum praecederet sapientia stultitiam, quantum differt lux a tenebris</i>. Ex eo ergo aliquis insipiens est quod privatur lumine sapientiae divinae. Sicut ergo mentes sapientum participatione istius divinae lucis et sapientiae lucidae sunt, ita eius privatione tenebrae sunt. Quod ergo quidam tenebrosi sint, non est ex defectu istius lucis; quia, inquantum est de se, in tenebris lucet et omnes irradiat; sed ideo insipientes privati sunt ea luce, quia <i>tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt</i>, idest non apprehenderunt, ad ipsius participationem eorum insipientia pertingere non valentes, ut post elati non durantes. Iob XXXVI, 32: <i>immanibus</i>, idest superbis, <i>abscondit lucem</i>, idest lumen sapientiae, <i>et annuntiat de ea amico suo, quod possessio eius sit, et ad eam possit ascendere</i>; Baruch III, 23: <i>viam autem sapientiae nescierunt, neque commemorati sunt semitas eius</i>.
<td>103 We can explain this passage in another way by taking “darkness” as Augustine does, for the natural lack of wisdom in man, which is called a darkness. “And I saw that wisdom excells folly as much as light excells knowledge” (Ecc 2:13). Someone is without wisdom, therefore, because he lacks the light of divine wisdom. Consequently, just as the minds of the wise are lucid by reason of a participation in that divine light and wisdom, so by the lack of it they are darkness. Now the fact that some are darkness is not due to a defect in that light, since on its part it shines in the darkness and radiates upon all. Rather, the foolish are ‘without that light because <b>the darkness did not overcome it,</b> i.e., they did not apprehend it, not being able to attain a participation in it due to their foolishness; after having been lifted up, they did not persevere. “From the savage,” i.e., from the proud, “he hides his light,” i.e., the light of wisdom, “and shows his friend that it belongs to him, and that he may approach it” (Jb 36:32); “They did not know the way to wisdom, nor did they remember her paths” (Bar 3:23).
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<td>Licet autem aliquae mentes sint tenebrosae, idest sapida et lucida sapientia privatae, nulla tamen adeo tenebrosa est quin aliquid lucis divinae participet. Quia quidquid veritatis a quocumque cognoscitur, totum est ex participatione istius lucis, quae in tenebris lucet, quia omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Et tamen <i>tenebrae</i>, idest homines tenebrosi, <i>eam non comprehenderunt</i>, secundum veritatem. Sic ergo exponitur ista clausula, secundum Origenem et secundum Augustinum.
<td>Although some minds are darkness, i.e., they lack savory and lucid wisdom, nevertheless no man is in such darkness as to be completely devoid of divine light, because whatever truth is know by anyone is due to a participation in that light which shines in the darkness; for every truth, no matter by whom it is spoken, comes from the Holy Spirit. Yet the darkness, i.e., men in darkness, did not overcome it, apprehend it in truth. This is the way, [ i.e., with respect to the natural influx of knowledge] that Origen and Augustine explain this clause.
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<td>Alio modo ab illo loco <i>et vita erat lux hominum</i>, exponitur secundum fluxum gratiae, qua irradiamur per Christum; et continuatur sic ad praecedentia.
<td>104 Starting from <b>And that life was the light of men,</b> we can explain this in another way, according to the influx of grace, since we are illuminated by Christ.
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<td>Supra egit Evangelista de creatione rerum per verbum, hic vero tractat de restauratione rationalis creaturae facta per Christum dicens: <i>et vita</i>, verbi, <i>erat lux hominum</i>, communiter, et non Iudaeorum tantum; quia filius Dei carnem assumere venit in mundum, ut illuminaret gratia et veritate omnes homines. Io. c. XVIII, 37: <i>in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati</i>. Item, infra IX, 5: <i>quamdiu in mundo sum, lux sum mundi</i>. Et ideo non dicit lux Iudaeorum, quia licet olim tantum in Iudaea notus esset, tamen postea toti mundo innotuit; Is. XLIX, v. 6: <i>dedi te in lucem gentibus, ut sis salus mundo usque ad extremum terrae</i>.
<td>After he had considered the creation of things through the Word, the Evangelist considers here the restoration of the rational creature through Christ, saying, <b>And that life,</b> of the Word, was the <b>light of</b> men, i.e., of all men in general, and not only of the Jews. For the Son of God assumed flesh and came into the world to illumine all men with grace and truth. “I came into the world for this, to testify to the truth” (below 18:37); “As long as I am in the world I am the light of the world” (below 9:5). So he does not say, “the light of the Jews,” because although previously he had been known only in Judea, he later became known to the world. “I have given you as a light to the nations, that you might be my salvation to the ends of the earth” (Is 49:6).
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<td>Congrue etiam coniungit lucem et vitam dicens <i>et vita erat lux hominum</i>, ut ostendat ista duo, lucem scilicet et vitam, nobis provenisse per Christum. Vitam quidem per participationem gratiae; infra: <i>gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est</i>; lucem vero per cognitionem veritatis et sapientiae.
<td>It was fitting to join light and life by saying, <b>And that life was the light of men,</b> in order to show that these two have come to us through Christ: life, through a participation in grace, “Grace and truth have come through Jesus Christ” (below 1:17); and light, by a knowledge of truth and wisdom.
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<td>Hoc autem quod dicit <i>lux in tenebris lucet</i>, potest secundum hanc expositionem exponi tripliciter, secundum quod tripliciter possumus accipere tenebras.
<td>105 According to this explanation, <b>the light shines in the darkness,</b> can be expounded in three ways, in the light of the three meanings of “darkness.”
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<td>Uno modo pro poena: nam quaelibet tristitia et afflictio cordis tenebra quaedam dici potest, sicut quodlibet gaudium lux; Mich. ult., v. 8: <i>cum sedero in tenebris et in afflictionibus, dominus lux mea est</i>, idest gaudium et consolatio. Dicit ergo Origenes: secundum hoc lux in tenebris lucet, idest Christus in mundum veniens, et corpus passibile et absque peccato habens <i>in similitudinem carnis</i>, secundum quod dicitur Rom. VIII, 3. Lux in carne, quae scilicet caro Christi, secundum quod in se habet similitudinem carnis peccati, tenebra dicitur. Quasi dicat: lux, idest verbum Dei circumvelatum tenebris carnis, luxit in mundum, secundum illud Ez. XXXII, 7: <i>solem nube tegam</i>.
<td>In one way, we can take “darkness” for punishment. For any sadness and suffering of heart can be called a darkness, just as any joy can be called a light. “When I sit in darkness and in suffering the Lord is my light,” i.e., my joy and consolation (Mi 7:8). And so Origen says: In this explanation, <b>the light shines in the darkness,</b> is Christ coming into the world, having a body capable of suffering and without sin, but “in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom 8:3). The light is in the flesh, that is, the flesh of Christ, which is called a darkness insofar as it has a likeness to sinful flesh. As if to say: The light, i.e., the Word of God, veiled about by the darkness of the flesh, shines on the world; “I will cover the sun with a cloud” (Ez 32:7).
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<td>Secundo, accipiendo per tenebras Daemones, iuxta illud Eph. ult., 12: <i>non est nobis colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem tantum, sed adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum</i>. Secundum hoc dicit: <i>lux</i>, idest filius Dei, <i>in tenebris lucet</i>, idest in mundum descendit, ubi tenebrae, idest Daemones, dominabantur. Infra XII, 31: <i>princeps huius mundi, eiicietur foras. Et tenebrae</i>, idest Daemones, <i>eam non comprehenderunt</i>, idest eum obscurare non potuerunt tentando, ut patet Matth. IV.
<td>106 Secondly, we can take “darkness” to mean the devils, as in Ephesians (6:12), “Our struggle is not against flesh and blood; but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness.” Looked at this way he says, <b>the light,</b> i.e., the Son of God, <b>shines in the darkness,</b> i.e., has descended into the world where darkness, i.e., the devils, hold sway: “Now the prince of this world will be cast out” (below 12:31). <b>And the darkness,</b> i.e., the devils, <b>did not overcome it,</b> i.e., were unable to obscure him by their temptations, as is plain in Matthew (c 4)
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<td>Tertio accipiendo tenebras errores sive ignorantias, quibus totus mundus ante adventum Christi plenus erat, secundum quod dicit apostolus: <i>eratis aliquando tenebrae</i>. Dicit ergo quod <i>lux</i>, idest verbum Dei incarnatum, <i>in tenebris lucet</i>, idest hominibus mundi, erroris et ignorantiae tenebris obscuratis. Lc. I, 79: <i>illuminare his qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent</i>; et Is. IX, 2: <i>populus qui sedebat in tenebris, vidit lucem magnam.</i>
<td>107 Thirdly, we can take “darkness” for the error or ignorance which filled the whole world before the coming of Christ, “You were at one time darkness” (Eph 5:8). And so he says that <b>the light,</b> i.e., the incarnate Word of God, <b>shines in the darkness,</b> i.e., upon the men of the world, who are blinded by the darkness or error and ignorance. “To enlighten those who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death” (Lk 1:79), “The people who were sitting in darkness saw a great light” (Is 9:2).
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<td>Et tenebrae eum non comprehenderunt, idest non vicerunt. Quia quantumcumque homines peccatis obscurati, invidia excaecati, superbia tenebrosi, contra Christum pugnaverunt, ut patet ex Evangelio, exprobrando scilicet, iniurias et contumelias inferendo, et tandem occidendo, non tamen <i>eum comprehenderunt</i>; idest non vicerunt eum obscurando, quin eius claritas per totum mundum fulgeret. Sap. VII, 29: <i>luci comparata invenitur prior: illi enim succedit nox, sapientiam autem</i>, idest filium Dei incarnatum, <i>non vincit malitia</i>, Iudaeorum scilicet et haereticorum; quia, ut dicitur Sap. X, 12, <i>certamen forte dedit illi, ut vinceret, et sciret quoniam omnium potentior est sapientia</i>.
<td><b>And the darkness did not overcome it,</b> i.e., did not overcome him. For in spite of the number of men darkened by sin, blinded by envy, shadowed over by pride, who have struggled against Christ (as is plain from the Gospel) by upbraiding him, heaping insults and calumnies upon him, and finally killing him, nevertheless they did not overcome it, i.e., gain the victory of so obscuring him that his brightness would not shine throughout the whole world. Wisdom (7:30) says, “Compared to light, she takes precedence, for night supplants it, but wisdom,” that is, the incarnate Son of God, “is not overcome by wickedness,” that is, of the Jews and of heretics, because it says, “She gave him the prize for his stern struggle that he might know that wisdom is mightier than all else” (Wis 10:12).
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<td><b>Lectura 4</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 4</b>
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<blockquote>
6 ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ θεοῦ, ὄνομα αὐτῷ Ἰωάννης:<br>
7 οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός,<br>
ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσιν δι' αὐτοῦ. 8 οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ φῶς,<br>
ἀλλ' ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός.
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6 There was a man sent by God, whose name was John.<br>
7 He came as a witness, that he might bear witness to the light,<br>
so that through him all men might believe. 8 He was not the light,<br>
but [he came] in order to bear witness to the light.
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<td>Supra Evangelista egit de verbi divinitate; in parte vero ista incipit agere de verbi incarnatione: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo agit de teste verbi incarnati seu praecursore; secundo de adventu verbi, ibi <i>erat lux vera</i>. Circa primum duo facit. Primo describit praecursorem in testimonium venientem; secundo ostendit eum ad salvandum insufficientem, ibi <i>non erat ille lux</i>.
<td>108 Above, the Evangelist considered the divinity of the Word; here he begins to consider the incarnation of the Word. And he does two things concerning this: first, he treats of the witness to the incarnate Word, or the precursor; secondly, of the coming of the Word (1:9). As to the first, he does two things: first, he describes the precursor who comes to bear witness; secondly, he shows that he was incapable of the work of our salvation (1:8).
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<td>Praecursorem autem describit quadrupliciter. Primo a naturae conditione, cum dicit <i>fuit homo</i>; secundo ab auctoritate, cum dicit <i>missus a Deo</i>; tertio ab officii idoneitate, cum dicit <i>cui nomen erat Ioannes</i>; quarto ab officii dignitate, ibi <i>hic venit</i>.
<td>He describes the precursor in four ways. First, according to his nature, <b>There was a man.</b> Secondly, as to his authority, <b>sent by God.</b> I’hirdly, as to his suitability for the office, <b>whose name was John.</b> Fourthly, as to the dignity of his office, <b>He came as a witness.</b>
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<td>Considerandum autem est circa primum, quod statim cum Evangelista incipit de aliquo temporali, mutat modum loquendi. Cum enim supra loqueretur de aeternis, utebatur hoc verbo erat, quod est praeteriti imperfecti, ostendens per hoc, aeterna interminata esse; nunc vero, cum loquitur de temporalibus, utitur hoc verbo, fuit, ad ostendendum quod temporalia sic praeterierunt quod tamen terminantur.
<td>109 We should note with respect to the first that, as soon as the Evangelist begins speaking of something temporal, he changes his manner of speech. When speaking above of eternal things, he used the word “was” (<i>erat</i>), which is the past imperfect tense; and this indicates that eternal things are without end. But now, when he is speaking of temporal things, he uses “was” (<i>fuit</i>, i.e., “has been”); this indicates temporal things as having taken place in the past and coming to an end there.
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<td>Dicit ergo <i>fuit homo</i>; per quod in principio excludit perversam opinionem haereticorum, contra conditionem seu naturam Ioannis, qui, propter id quod dominus, Matth. c. XI, 10, dicit de Ioanne: <i>hic est de quo scriptum est: ecce mitto Angelum meum ante faciem meam</i>, et etiam Mc. I, 2 dicitur de ipso, opinati sunt quod Ioannes fuisset natura Angelus. Quod excludens Evangelista dicit <i>fuit homo</i>, natura, non Angelus. Eccle. c. VI, 10: <i>scitur quod sit homo, et quod non possit contra fortiorem se in iudicio contendere</i>.
<td>110 And so he says, <b>There was a man</b> (<i>Fuit homo</i>). This excludes at the very start the incorrect opinion of certain heretics who were in error on the condition or nature of John. They believed that John was an angel in nature, basing themselves on the words of the Lord, “I send my messenger [in Greek, <i>angelos</i> ] before you, who will prepare your way” (Mt 11:10); and the same thing is found in Mark (1:2). But the Evangelist rejects this, saying, <b>There was a man</b> by nature, not an angel. “The nature of man is known, and that he cannot contend in judgment with one who is stronger than himself” (Ecc 6:10).
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<td>Convenienter autem homo ad homines mittitur, per quem homines magis alliciuntur, utpote per sibi similem; unde dicitur Hebr. c. VII, 28: <i>lex enim homines constituit sacerdotes infirmitatem habentes</i>. Poterat enim Deus homines gubernare per Angelos; sed maluit per homines, ut ipsorum exemplo magis instruerentur. Et ideo Ioannes homo fuit, et non Angelus.
<td>Now it “ is fitting that a man be sent to men, for men are more easily drawn to a man, since he is like themselves. So in Hebrews (7:28) it says, “The law appoints men, who have weakness, priests.” God could have governed men through angels, but he preferred men so that we could be more instructed by their example. And so John was a man, and not an angel.
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<td>Ex auctoritate quidem describitur, cum dicit <i>missus a Deo</i>. Equidem, licet Ioannes natura non fuerit Angelus, fuit tamen officio, quia <i>missus a Deo</i>. Proprium enim Angelorum officium est quod a Deo mittantur, et sint nuntii Dei; Hebr. I, 14: <i>omnes sunt administratorii spiritus in ministerium missi</i>, unde Angelus nuntius interpretatur. Possunt ergo homines, qui a Deo ad aliquid annuntiandum mittuntur, Angeli dici, iuxta illud Aggaei I, 13: <i>dixit Aggaeus, nuntius domini ex nuntiis domini</i>.
<td>11 1 John is described by his authority when it says, sent by God. Indeed, although John was not an angel in nature, he was so by his office, because he was sent by God. For the distinctive office of angels is that they are sent by God and are messengers of God. “All are ministering spirits, sent to serve” (Heb 1:14). Hence it is that “angel” means “messenger.” And so men who are sent by God to announce something can be called angels. “Haggai the messenger of the Lord” (Hg 1:13).
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<td>Requiritur autem ad hoc quod aliquis testimonium de Deo perhibeat, quod sit a Deo missus; iuxta illud Rom. X, 15: <i>quomodo praedicabunt nisi mittantur?</i> Et quia cum a Deo mittuntur, non sua quaerunt, sed quae Iesu Christi II Cor. IV, 5: <i>non enim praedicamus nosmetipsos, sed Iesum Christum</i>: qui vero mittitur a seipso, non a Deo, sua quaerit, vel quae sunt hominis, non autem quae Christi, ideo hic dicitur <i>fuit homo missus a Deo</i>: ut intelligas quia non annuntiavit nisi divinum, non humanum.
<td>If someone is to bear witness to God, it is necessary that he be sent by God. “How can they preach unless they are sent?” as is said in Romans (10:15). And since they are sent by God, they seek the things of Jesus Christ, not their own. “We do not preach ourselves, but Jesus Christ” (2 Cor 4:5). On the other hand, one who sends himself, and is not sent by God, seeks his own things or those of man, and not the things of Christ. And so he says here, <b>There was a man sent by God,</b> so that we would understand that John proclaimed something divine, not human.
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<td>Nota autem, quod tripliciter invenimus aliquos missos a Deo. Scilicet per internam inspirationem, sicut Is. XLVIII, 16: <i>et nunc misit me dominus, et spiritus eius</i>; quasi dicat: per interiorem spiritus inspirationem sum a Deo missus. Item, per expressam et apertam iussionem sive corporalem, sive imaginariam. Et sic iterum missus est Isaias; unde dicit ibid. VI, 8: <i>audivi vocem domini dicentis: quem mittam, et quis ibit nobis? Et dixi: ecce ego, mitte me</i>. Item, per praelati iniunctionem, qui gerit in hoc personam Dei; II Cor. II, 10: <i>nam et ego, si quid donavi propter vos in persona Christi</i>. Et inde est quod qui mittuntur a praelato, mittuntur a Deo, sicut missi fuerunt ab apostolo Barnabas et Timotheus.
<td>112 Note that there are three ways in which we see men sent by God. First, by an inward inspiration. “And now the Lord God has sent me, and his spirit” (Is 48:16). As if to say: I have been sent by God through an inward inspiration of the spirit. Secondly, by an expressed and clear command, perceived by the bodily senses or the imagination. Isaiah was also sent in this way; and so he says, “And I heard the voice of the Lord saying, ‘Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?’ Then I said, ‘Here I am! Send me’” (Is 6:8). Thirdly, by the order of a prelate, who acts in the place of God in this matter. “I have pardoned in the person of Christ for your sake” as it says in 2 Corinthians (2:10). This is why those who are sent by a prelate are sent by God, as Barnabas and Timothy were sent by the Apostle.
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<td>Cum autem dicitur hic <i>fuit homo missus a Deo</i>, intelligendum est per interiorem inspirationem; vel etiam forte per exteriorem iussionem a Deo eum missum fuisse. Infra: <i>qui misit me, ipse dixit: super quem videris spiritum descendentem et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat in spiritu sancto</i>.
<td>When it is said here, <b>There was a man sent by</b> God, we should understand that he was sent by God through an inward inspiration, or perhaps even by an outward command. “He who sent me to baptize with water had said to me: ‘The man on whom you see the Spirit come down and rest is the one who is to baptize with the Holy Spirit’ “ (below 1:33).
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<td>Per hoc etiam quod dixit <i>fuit homo missus a Deo</i>, non est intelligendum, sicut quidam haeretici ponebant, credentes animas hominum ante corpus fuisse cum Angelis ab initio creatas, et mitti animam cuiuscumque, quando nascitur, ad corpus; et quod Ioannes sit missus ad vitam, idest eius anima ad corpus; sed quod fuit missus a Deo ad officium baptizandi et praedicandi.
<td>113 We should not understand, <b>There was a man sent by God,</b> as some heretics did, who believed that from the very beginning human souls were created without bodies along with the angels, and that one’s soul is sent into the body when he is born, and that John was sent to life, i.e., his soul was sent to a body. Rather, we should understand that he was sent by God to baptize and preach.
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<td>Ex idoneitate vero commendatur, cum dicit <i>cui nomen erat Ioannes</i>. Ad officium namque testimonii requiritur idoneitas: nam nisi testis sit idoneus, qualitercumque mittatur ab alio, non est sufficiens testimonium eius. Homo autem efficitur idoneus ex gratia Dei; I Cor. XV, 10: <i>gratia Dei sum id quod sum</i>; II Cor. III, 6: <i>qui idoneos nos fecit ministros novi testamenti</i>. Satis ergo congrue Evangelista idoneitatem praecursoris insinuat ex eius nomine, dicens <i>cui nomen erat Ioannes</i>, quod interpretatur in quo est gratia.
<td>114 John’s fitness is given when he says, <b>whose name was John.</b> One must be qualified for the office of bearing witness, because unless a witness is qualified, then no matter in what way he is sent by another, his testimony is not acceptable. Now a man becomes qualified by the grace, of God. “By the grace of God I am what I am” (1 Cor 15:10); “who has made us fit ministers of a new covenant” (2 Cor 3:6). So, the Evangelist appropriately implies the precursor’s fitness from his name when he says, <b>whose name was John,</b> which is interpreted, “in whom is grace.”
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<td>Quod quidem nomen non fuit frustra sibi impositum, sed ex divina praeordinatione, et antequam nasceretur, ut patet Lc. I, 13: <i>et vocabis nomen eius Ioannem</i>, dixit Angelus ad Zachariam. Unde potest dicere illud Is. XLIX, 1: <i>dominus ab utero vocavit me</i>; et Eccl. VI, 10: <i>qui futurus est, iam vocatum est nomen eius</i>. Quod etiam ostendit Evangelista ex modo loquendi, cum dicit <i>erat</i>, quantum ad Dei praeordinationem.
<td>This name was not given to him meaninglessly, but by divine preordination and before he was born, as is clear from Luke (1:13), “You will name him John,” as the angel said to Zechariah. Hence he can say what is said in Isaiah (49:1), “The Lord called me from the womb”; “He who will be, his name is already called” (Ecc 6:10). The Evangelist also indicates this from his manner of speaking, when he says was, as to God’s preordination.
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<td>Ex officii etiam dignitate describitur, cum dicit <i>hic venit in testimonium</i>; ubi primo ponitur officium; secundo ratio officii, ibi <i>ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine</i>.
<td>115 Then he is described by the dignity of his office. First, his office is mentioned. Secondly, the reason for his office, <b>to bear witness to the light.</b>
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<td>Officium autem huius est testificandi; unde dicit <i>hic venit in testimonium</i>.
<td>116 Now his office is to bear witness; hence he says, <b>He came as a witness.</b>
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<td>Ubi notandum est quod Deus et homines, et omnia quae facit, propter se operatur; Prov. XVI, 4: <i>universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus</i>; non quidem ut aliquid ei accrescat, quia bonorum nostrorum non eget, sed ut eius bonitas manifestetur in omnibus a se factis, inquantum <i>per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur; sempiterna eius virtus, et divinitas</i>; Rom. I, 20. Fit ergo quaelibet creatura in testimonium Dei, inquantum quaelibet creatura est testimonium quoddam divinae bonitatis. Et quidem magnitudo creaturae testimonium quoddam est divinae virtutis et omnipotentiae; pulchritudo vero divinae sapientiae. Speciali vero modo ordinantur a Deo quidam homines; et non solum naturaliter inquantum sunt, sed etiam spiritualiter per sua bona opera Deo testimonium ferunt. Unde omnes sancti viri testes sunt Dei, inquantum propter eorum bona opera Deus gloriosus apud homines efficitur; Matth. V, 16: <i>sic luceat lux vestra coram hominibus, ut videant opera vestra bona, et glorificent patrem vestrum qui in caelis est</i>. Sed tamen illi, qui participant non solum dona Dei in seipsis per gratiam Dei bene operando, sed etiam diffundunt ad alios dicendo, movendo et exhortando, specialius sunt testes Dei. Is. XLIII, 7: <i>omnem qui invocat nomen meum, in laudem meam creavi illum</i>. Ioannes ergo venit in testimonium ad hoc, ut in alios diffunderet dona Dei, et annuntiaret laudem.
<td>Here it should be remarked that God makes men, and everything else he makes, for himself. “The Lord made all things for himself” (Prv 16:4). Not, indeed, to add anything to himself, since he has no need of our good, but so that his goodness might be made manifest in all of the things made by him, in that “his eternal power and divinity are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made”(Rom 1:20). Thus, each creature is made as a witness to God in so far as each creature is a certain witness of the divine goodness. So, the vastness of creation is a witness to God’s power and omnipotence; and its beauty is a witness to the divine wisdom. But certain men are ordained by God in a special way, so that they hear witness to God not only naturally by their existence, but also spiritually by their good works. Hence all holy men are witnesses to God inasmuch as God is glorified among men by their good works. “Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven” (Mt 5:16). But those who not only share in God’s gifts in themselves by acting well through the grace of God, but also spread them to others by their teaching, influencing and encouraging others, are in a more special way witnesses to God. “Everyone who calls upon my name, I have created for my glory” (Is 43:7). And so John came as a witness in order to spread to others the gifts of God and to proclaim his praise.
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<td>Hoc autem officium Ioannis, scilicet testificandi, est valde magnum, quia nullus potest de aliquo testificari, nisi eo modo quo illud participat; infra III, 11: <i>quod scimus loquimur, et quod vidimus testamur</i>. Unde testimonium perhibere divinae veritati, indicium est cognitionis ipsius veritatis. Et inde est quod etiam Christus hoc officium habuit; infra XVIII, 37: <i>ad hoc veni, et in hoc natus sum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati</i>. Sed aliter Christus, et aliter Ioannes. Christus enim ut ipsum lumen comprehendens, immo ipsum lumen existens; Ioannes vero, ut ipsum lumen participans tantum. Et ideo Christus perfecte testimonium perhibet, et perfecte manifestat veritatem, Ioannes vero et alii sancti inquantum ipsam veritatem divinam participant. Est ergo magnum officium Ioannis et ex participatione divini luminis et ex similitudine ad Christum, qui hoc officio usus fuit. Is. LV, 4: <i>ecce testem populis dedi eum, ducem ac praeceptorem gentibus</i>.
<td>117 This office of John, that of bearing witness, is very great, because no one can testify about something except in the manner in which he has shared in it. “We know of what we speak, and we bear witness of what we see” (below 3:11). Hence, to bear witness to divine truth indicates a knowledge of that truth. So Christ also had this office: “I have come into the world for this, to testify to the truth” (below 18:37). But Christ testifies in one way and John in another. Christ bears witness as the light who comprehends all things, indeed, as the existing light itself. John bears witness only as participating in that light. And so Christ gives testimony in a perfect manner and perfectly manifests the truth, while John and other holy men give testimony in so far as they have a share of divine truth. John’s office, therefore, is great both because of his participation in the divine light and because of a likeness to Christ, who carried out this office. “I made him a witness to the peoples, a leader and a commander of the nations” (Is 55:4).
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<td>Ratio autem huius officii ponitur, cum dicit <i>ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine</i>. Ubi sciendum est, quod alicui rei testimonium perhibetur duplici de causa. Una causa potest esse ex parte rei, cui testimonium adhibetur, puta si est dubia, vel incerta; alia causa est ex parte audientium, si sunt duri et tardi corde ad credendum. Ioannes vero in testimonium quidem venit non propter ipsam rem, cui testimonium perhibebat, quia lumen erat. Unde dicit <i>ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine</i>, non de re obscura sed de re manifesta. Venit ergo in testimonium propter ipsos quibus testificabatur, <i>ut omnes crederent per eum</i>, scilicet Ioannem. Nam sicut lumen non solum in seipso et per se visibile est, sed etiam omnia alia per ipsum videri possunt, ita verbum Dei non solum in se lumen est, sed etiam est omnia manifestans quae manifestantur. Cum enim unumquodque manifestetur per suam formam et cognoscatur, omnes autem formae sint formae sint per verbum, quod est ars plena rationum viventium: est ergo lumen, non solum in se, sed omnia manifestans; Eph. V, 13: <i>omne quod manifestatur, lumen est</i>.
<td>118 The purpose of this office is given when he says, <b>that he might bear witness to the light.</b> Here we should understand that there are two reasons for bearing witness about something. One reason can be on the part of the thing with which the witness is concerned; for example, if there is some doubt or uncertainty about that thing. The other is on the part of those who hear it; if they are hard of heart and slow to believe. John came as a witness, not because of the thing about which he bore witness, for it was light. Hence he says, <b>bear witness to the light,</b> i.e., not to something obscure, but to something clear. He came, therefore, to bear witness on account of those to whom he testified, <b>so that through him</b> (i.e., John) <b>all men might believe.</b> For as light is not only visible in itself and of itself, but through it all else can be seen, so the Word of God is not only light in himself, but he makes known all things that are known. For since a thing is made known and understood through its form, and all forms exist through the Word, who is the art full of living forms, the Word is light not only in himself, but as making known all things; “all that appears is light” (Eph 5:13).
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<td>Congrue autem Evangelista filium dicit lumen, quia venit <i>lumen ad revelationem gentium</i>, Lc. II, 32. Supra autem dixit filium Dei verbum, quo pater dicit se, et omnem creaturam. Unde cum proprie sit lux hominum, et hic Evangelista de eo agat secundum quod venit ad salutem hominum procurandam, congrue intermittit hoc nomen verbum, cum loquitur de filio, et dicit illud lumen.
<td>And so it was fitting for the Evangelist to call the Son “light,” because he came as “a revealing light to the Gentiles” (Lk 2:32). Above, he called the Son of God the Word, by which the Father expresses himself and every creature. Now since he is, properly speaking, the light of men, and the Evangelist is considering him here as coming to accomplish the salvation of men, he fittingly interrupts the use of the name “Word” when speaking of the Son, and says, “light.”
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<td>Sed si istud lumen sufficiens est per se omnia manifestare, non solum seipsum, quid ergo indigebat ut testificaretur? Non ergo necessaria sunt testimonia Ioannis et prophetarum de Christo. Respondeo dicendum, quod haec obiectio est Manichaeorum, qui volunt destruere vetus testamentum. Unde a sanctis contra hos multiplex ratio assignatur, quare Christus testimonium prophetarum voluit habere.
<td>119 But if that light is adequate of itself to make known all things, and not only itself, what need does it have of any witness? This was the objection of the Manichaeans, who wanted to destroy the Old Testament. Consequently, the saints gave many reasons, against their opinion, why Christ wanted to have the testimony of the prophets.
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<td>Origenes quidem assignat tres rationes ad hoc. Primo quidem quod Deus vult aliquos testes habere, non quod ipse eorum testimonio indigeat, sed ut eos nobilitet quos constituit testes; sicut videmus etiam in ordine universi, quod Deus producit aliquos effectus per causas medias, non quia ipse impotens sit ad eos immediate producendos, sed quia ad nobilitandas ipsas causas medias eis causalitatis dignitatem communicare dignatur. Sic ergo, etsi Deus potuerit omnes homines illuminare per se et in cognitionem suam adducere, ut tamen debitus ordo servaretur in rebus, et ut aliquos homines nobilitaret, voluit divinam cognitionem ad homines per aliquos homines devenire. Is. XLIII, 10: <i>vere vos testes mei estis, dicit dominus</i>.
<td>Origen gives three reasons. The first is that God wanted to have certain witnesses, not because he needed their testimony, but to ennoble those whom he appointed witnesses. Thus we see in the order of the universe that God produces certain effects by means of intermediate causes, not because he himself is unable to produce them without these intermediaries, but he deigns to confer oil them the dignity of causality because he wishes to-ennoble these intermediate causes. Similarly, even though God could have enlightened all men by himself and lead them to a knowledge of himself, yet to preserve due order in things and to ennoble certain men, he willed that divine knowledge reach men through certain other men. “‘You are my witnesses,’ says the Lord” (Is 43:10).
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<td>Secunda ratio est, quia Christus illuxit mundo per miracula: quae quidem, quia in tempore facta erant, temporaliter transierunt, neque pervenerunt ad omnes. Verba vero prophetarum commendata Scripturae, poterant non solum ad praesentes, sed etiam ad posteros pervenire. Voluit ergo dominus homines ad cognitionem verbi venire per testimonia prophetarum, ut non solum praesentes, sed etiam futuri de ipso illuminarentur; et ideo signanter dicit <i>ut omnes crederent per illum</i>, non solum praesentes, sed etiam futuri.
<td>A second reason is that Christ was a light to the world through his miracles. Yet, because they were performed in time, they passed away with time and did not reach everyone. But the words of the prophets, preserved in Scripture, could reach not only those present, but could also reach those to come after. Hence the Lord willed that men come to a knowledge of the Word through the testimony of the prophets, in order that not only those present, but also men yet lo come, might be enlightened about him. So it says expressly, <b>so that through him all men might believe,</b> i.e., not only those present, but also future generations.
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<td>Tertia ratio est, quia homines sunt diversae conditionis, et diversimode ad veritatis cognitionem perducti et dispositi. Quidam namque ad veritatis cognitionem magis perducuntur per signa et miracula; quidam vero magis per sapientiam; unde I Cor. I, 22: <i>Iudaei signa petunt, et Graeci sapientiam quaerunt</i>. Ut ergo dominus omnibus ostenderet viam salutis, utramque viam pandere voluit, scilicet signorum et sapientiae, ut qui non perducerentur ad viam salutis per miracula in veteri et novo testamento facta, saltem per viam sapientiae, ut in prophetis et aliis sacrae Scripturae libris, ad veritatis cognitionem perveniant.
<td>The third reason is that not all men are in the same condition, and all are not led or disposed to a knowledge of the truth in the same way. For some are brought to a knowledge of the truth by signs and miracles; others are brought more by wisdom. “The Jews require signs, and the Greeks seek wisdom” (1 Cor 1:22). And so the Lord, m order to show the path of salvation to all, willed both ways to be open. i.e., the way of signs and the way of wisdom, so that those who would not be brought to the path of salvation by the miracles of the Old and New Testaments, might be brought to a knowledge of the truth by the path of wisdom, as in the prophets and other books of Sacred Scripture.
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<td>Quarta ratio est Chrysostomi, quia scilicet homines infirmi intellectus, veritatem et cognitionem Dei seipsa capere non possunt; unde voluit Deus eis condescendere et illuminare quosdam homines de divinis prae aliis, ut ab eis humano modo cognitionem de divinis acciperent, quorum cognitionem in seipsis attingere non valebant. Et ideo dicit <i>ut omnes crederent per illum</i>. Quasi dicat: <i>venit in testimonium</i>, non propter ipsum lumen, sed propter ipsos homines, ut scilicet <i>crederent per illum</i>. Sic ergo patet idonea esse et congruentia testimonia prophetarum, et ideo recipienda utpote nobis necessaria ad veritatis cognitionem.
<td>A fourth reason, given by Chrysostom, is that certain men of weak understanding are unable to grasp the truth and knowledge of God by themselves. And so the Lord chose to come down to them and to enlighten certain men before others about divine matters, so that these others might obtain from them in a human way the knowledge of divine things they could not reach by themselves. And so he says, that <b>through him all men might believe.</b> As if to say: he came as a witness, not for the sake of the light, but for the sake of men, so <b>that through him all men might believe.</b> And so it is plain that the testimonies of the prophets are fitting and proper, and should be received as something needed by us for the knowledge of the truth.
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<td>Dicit autem <i>crederent</i> quia est duplex participatio divini luminis. Una scilicet perfecta, quae est in gloria, Ps. XXXV, v. 10: <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>, alia est imperfecta, quae scilicet habetur per fidem, quia <i>venit in testimonium</i>. De istis duobus modis dicitur I Cor. XIII, 12: <i>videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate; tunc autem facie ad faciem</i>; et ibidem dicitur: <i>nunc cognosco ex parte; tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum</i>. Istorum autem modorum prior est modus participationis per fidem; quia per ipsam pervenitur ad speciem. Unde Is. VII, 9, secundum aliam litteram: <i>nisi credideritis, non intelligetis</i>; ubi nostra habet: <i>si non credideritis, non permanebitis</i>. II Cor. c. III, 18: <i>nos autem omnes revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem</i>, scilicet quam perdidimus, <i>transformamur a claritate in claritatem</i>; Glossa: a claritate fidei, in claritatem speciei.
<td>120 He says believe, because there are two ways of participating in the divine light. One is the perfect participation which is present in glory, “In your light, we shall see the light” (Ps 3 5:10). The other in imperfect and is acquired through faith, since he came as a witness. Of these two ways it is said, “Now we see through a mirror, in an obscure manner, but then we shall see face to face” (1 Cor 13:12). And in the same place we find, “Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known.” Among these two ways, the first is the way of participation through faith, because through it we are brought to vision. So in Isaiah (7:9) where our version has, “If you do not believe, you will not persist,” another version has, “If you do not believe, you will not understand.” “All of us, gazing on the Lord’s glory with unveiled faces, are being transformed from glory to glory into his very image,” which we have lost (2 Cor 3:18). “From the glory of faith to the glory of vision,” as a Gloss says.
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<td>Dicit ergo <i>ut omnes crederent per illum</i>; non ut omnes viderent illum perfecte statim, sed ut primo per fidem credendo, et postea per speciem in patria perfruendo.
<td>And so he says, <b>that through him all men might believe,</b> not as though all would see him perfectly at once, but first they would believe through faith, and later enjoy him through vision in heaven.
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<td>Dicit autem <i>per eum</i>, ut ostendat differentiam eius ad Christum. Christus enim venit, ut omnes crederent in eum; infra VII, v. 38: <i>qui credit in me, sicut dicit Scriptura, flumina de ventre eius fluent aquae vivae</i>. Ioannes vero ut omnes crederent, non quidem in eum, sed in Christum per eum.
<td>121 He says through him, to show that John is different than Christ. For Christ came so that all might believe in him. “He who believes in me, as Scripture says, “Out of his heart shall flow rivers of living water” (below 7:38). John, on the other hand, <b>came that all men might believe,</b> not in him, but in Christ <b>through him.</b>
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<td>Sed contra. Non omnes crediderunt per illum. Si ergo venit ut omnes crederent per illum, frustra venit. Respondeo dicendum, quod quantum est ex parte Dei mittentis, et ex parte Ioannis venientis, sufficiens modus adhibitus est omnibus perveniendi ad finem; sed ex parte eorum qui <i>oculos suos statuerunt declinare in terram</i>, et noluerunt videre ipsum lumen, defectus fuit, quia non omnes crediderunt.
<td>One may object that not all have believed. So if John came to that all might believe through him, he failed. I answer that both on the part of God, who sent John, and of John, who came, the method used is adequate to bring all to the truth. But on the <b>part</b> of those “who have fixed their eyes on the ground” (Ps 16:11), and refused to see the light, there was a failure, because all did not believe.
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<td>Licet autem Ioannes, de quo tot dicta sunt, et quod missus a Deo, magnus sit, nihilominus tamen eius adventus non est sufficiens hominibus ad salutem; quia salus hominis in hoc consistit, quod participet ipsam lucem. Unde, et si Ioannes lux fuisset, suffecisset hominibus ad salutem eius adventus; sed ipse non erat lux; unde dicit <i>non erat ille lux</i>. Et ideo necessaria erat lux, quae sufficeret hominibus ad salutem.
<td>122 Now although John, of whom so much has been said, even including that he was sent by God, is an eminent person, his coming is not sufficient to save men, because the salvation of man lies in participating in the light. If John had been the light, his coming would have sufficed to save men; but he was not the light. So he says, <b>he was not the light</b>. Consequently, a light was needed that would suffice to save men.
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<td>Vel aliter. Ioannes venit ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Consuetum est autem testificantem esse maioris auctoritatis, quam ille cui perhibet testimonium. Ne ergo credatur Ioannem esse maioris auctoritatis, quam Christus, dicit Evangelista <i>non erat ille lux, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine</i>. Testatur enim non quia maior, sed quia notior, etiamsi sit minor.
<td>Or, we could look at it another way. John came to bear witness to the light. Now it is the custom that the one who testifies is of greater authority than the one for whom he bears witness. So, lest John be considered to have greater authority than Christ, the Evangelist says, he was <b>not the light, but he came in order to bear witness to the light.</b> For he bears witness not because he is greater, but because he is better known, even though he is not as great.
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<td>Sed quaeritur de hoc quod dicit <i>non erat ille lux</i>. Contra dicitur Eph. V, 8: <i>eratis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino</i>; et Matth. V, 14: <i>vos estis lux mundi</i>. Sunt ergo Ioannes, et apostoli, et omnes boni, lux.
<td>123 There is a difficulty about his saying, he was not the light. Conflicting with this is, “You were at one time darkness, but now you are light in the Lord” (Eph 5:8); and “You are the light of the world” (Mt 5:14). Therefore, John and the apostles and all good men are a light.
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<td>Respondeo. Quidam dicunt quod Ioannes non erat lux cum articulo, quia hoc est solius Dei proprium; sed si lux ponatur sine articulo, erat Ioannes et omnes sancti facti lux. Quod est dictu: filius Dei est lux per essentiam, Ioannes vero et omnes sancti per participationem. Et ideo quia Ioannes participabat verum lumen, congruenter testimonium perhibebat de lumine: ignis enim convenientius manifestatur per aliquod ignitum quam per aliquid aliud, et color per coloratum.
<td>I answer that some say that John was not the light, because this belongs to God alone. But if “light” is taken without the article, then John and all holy men were made lights. The meaning is this: the Son of God is light by his very essence; but John and all the saints are light by participation. So, because John participated in the true light, it was fitting that he bear witness to the light; for fire is better exhibited by something afire than by anything else, and color by something colored.
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<td><b>Lectura 5</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 5</b>
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<blockquote>
9 ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν,<br>
ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον, ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.<br>
10 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο,<br>
καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω.
</blockquote>
<td>
<blockquote>
9 He [the Word] was the true light,<br>
which enlightens every man coming into this world.<br>
10 He was in the world, and through him the world was made,<br>
and the world did not know him.
</blockquote>
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<td>Superius egit Evangelista de praecursore, et teste verbi incarnati; in parte vero ista agit de ipso verbo incarnato: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit adventus verbi necessitatem; secundo ex adventu verbi collatam nobis utilitatem, ibi <i>in propria venit</i>; tertio veniendi modum, ibi <i>et verbum caro factum est</i>.
<td>124 Above, the Evangelist considered the precursor and his witness to the incarnate Word; in the present section he considers the incarnate Word himself. As to this he does three things. First, he shows why it was necessary for the Word to come. Secondly, the benefit we received from the coming of the Word (1:11). And thirdly, the way he came (1:14).
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<td>Necessitas autem adventus verbi videtur esse defectus divinae cognitionis, quae in mundo erat. Unde hanc necessitatem sui adventus assignat, dicens, infra XVIII, 37: <i>in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni</i>. Ad insinuandum ergo hunc divinae cognitionis defectum, duo facit Evangelista. Primo ostendit quod iste defectus non est ex parte Dei, neque ex defectu verbi; secundo ostendit quod est ex parte hominum, ibi <i>et mundus eum non cognovit</i>.
<td>The necessity for the Word’s coming is seen be the lack of divine knowledge in the world. He points out this need for his coming when he says, “For this was I born, and I came into the world for this, to testify to the truth” (below 18:37). To indicate this lack of divine knowledge, the Evangelist does two things. First, he shows that this lack does not pertain to God or the Word. Secondly, that it does pertain to men (v 10b).
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<td>Quod autem non fuerit defectus ex parte Dei et verbi, quin homines Deum cognoscerent et illuminarentur a verbo, ostendit ex tribus. Primo ex ipsius divinae lucis efficacia, quia <i>erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>; secundo ex ipsius divinae lucis praesentia, quia <i>in mundo erat</i>; tertio ex eius evidentia, quia <i>mundus per ipsum factus est</i>. Non fuit ergo defectus divinae cognitionis in mundo ex parte verbi, quia efficax est. Unde primo ostendit rationem huius efficaciae, quia <i>erat lux vera</i>; secundo ipsam eius efficaciam, quia <i>illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>.
<td>He shows in three ways that there was no defect in God or in the Word that prevented men from knowing God and from being enlightened by the Word. First, from the efficacy of the divine light itself, because <b>He was the true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world.</b> Secondly, from the presence of the divine light, because <b>He was in the world.</b> Thirdly, from the obviousness of the light, because <b>through him the world was made.</b> So the lack of divine knowledge in the world was not due to the Word, because it is sufficient. First, he shows the nature of this efficiency, that is, <b>He was the true light.</b> Secondly, its very efficiency, <b>which enlightens every man.</b>
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<td>Est enim efficax divinum verbum ad illuminandum, quia <i>erat lux vera</i>. Quomodo autem verbum sit lux, et quomodo sit lux hominum, quia supra satis explanatum est, superfluum est ad praesens reiterare. Istud tamen ad praesens est dicendum, quomodo sit <i>lux vera</i>. Notandum est ergo ad huiusmodi evidentiam, quod verum in Scriptura tribus opponitur. Aliquando enim dividitur contra falsum, sicut illud Eph. IV, 25: <i>deponentes mendacium, loquimini veritatem</i>. Aliquando autem dividitur contra figurale, sicut illud infra I, 17: <i>lex per Moysen data est; gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est</i>, quia veritas figurarum legis facta est per Christum. Aliquando vero dividitur contra participans, sicut illud I Ioan. ult., 20: <i>ut simus in vero filio eius</i>; qui scilicet non est filius per participationem.
<td>125 The divine Word is efficacious in enlightening because <b>He was the true light.</b> How the Word is light, and how he is the light of men need not be discussed again, because it was sufficiently explained above. What we must discuss at present is how he is the true light. To explain this, we should note that in Scripture the “true” is contrasted with three things. Sometimes it is contrasted with the false, as in “Put an end to lying, and let everyone speak the truth” (Eph 4:25). Sometimes it is contrasted with what is figurative, as in “The law was given through Moses; grace and truth have come through Jesus Christ” (below 1:17), because the truth of the figures contained in the law was fulfilled by Christ. Sometimes it is contrasted with what is something by participation, as in “that we may be in his true Son” (1 Jn 5:20), who is not his Son by participation.
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<td>Fuit autem ante adventum verbi in mundo quaedam lux, quam scilicet philosophi se habere iactabant; sed haec quidem falsa fuit, quia, ut dicitur Rom. I, 21: <i>evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum; dicentes enim se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt</i>; Ier. X, 14: <i>stultus factus est omnis homo a scientia sua</i>. Fuit etiam quaedam alia lux, quam gloriabantur se habere Iudaei ex doctrina legis; sed haec quidem lux erat lux figuralis; Hebr. X, 1: <i>umbram habens lex futurorum bonorum, non ipsam imaginem rerum</i>. Erat etiam in Angelis et in sanctis hominibus lux quaedam, inquantum specialiori modo per gratiam Deum cognoscebant; sed haec lux participata erat; Iob XXV, 3: <i>super quem non resplendet lumen illius?</i> Quasi dicat: quicumque lucidi sunt, intantum lucent inquantum participant lumen illius, idest Dei.
<td>Before the Word came there was in the world a certain light which the philosophers prided themselves on having; but this was a false light, because as is said, “They became stultified in their speculations, and their foolish hearts were darkened; claiming to be wise, they became fools” (Rom 1:21); “Every man is made foolish by his knowledge” (Jer 10:14). There was another light from the teaching of the law which the Jews boasted of having; but this was a symbolic light, “The law has a shadow of the good things to come, not the image itself of them” (Heb 10:1). There was also a certain light in the angels and in holy men in so far as they knew God in a more special way by grace; but this was a participated light, “Upon whom does his light not shine?” (Jb 25:3), which is like saying: Whoever shine, shine to the extent that they participate in his light, i.e., God’s light.
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<td>Sed verbum Dei non erat lux falsa, non figuralis, non participata, sed lux vera, idest per essentiam suam. Et ideo dicit <i>erat lux vera</i>.
<td>But the Word of God was not a false light, nor a symbolic light, nor a participated light, but the true light, i.e., light by his essence. Therefore he says, <b>He was the true light.</b>
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<td>In quo quidem excluditur duplex error, scilicet Photini, qui Christum opinatus est ex virgine initium sumpsisse. Et ideo ne aliquis hoc suspicari posset, Evangelista loquens de incarnatione verbi, dicit <i>erat lux vera</i>, scilicet ab aeterno, non solum ante virginem, sed ante omnem creaturam. Excluditur etiam error Arii et Origenis dicentium Christum non fuisse verum Deum, sed per participationem tantum. Quod si verum esset, non esset lux vera, ut Evangelista dicit. Sicut enim dicitur I Io. I, 5: <i>Deus lux est</i>, non per participationem, sed lux vera. Si ergo verbum erat lux vera, manifestum est illud esse Deum verum.
<td>126 This excludes two errors. First, that of Photinus, who believed that Christ derived his beginning from the Virgin. So, lest anyone suppose this, the Evangelist, speaking of the incarnation of the Word, says, <b>He was the true light,</b> i.e., eternally, not only before the Virgin, but before every creature. This also excludes the error of Arius and Origen; they said that Christ was not true God, but God by participation. If this were so, he could not be the true light, as the Evangelist says here, and as in “God is light” (1 Jn 1:5), i.e., not by participation, but <b>the true light.</b> So if the Word was the true light, it is plain that he is true God. Now it is clear how the divine Word is effective in causing divine knowledge.
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<td>Patet ergo ratio efficaciae divini verbi ad divinam cognitionem causandam. Efficacia autem ipsius verbi est, quia <i>illuminat omnem hominem venientem</i>. Omne enim quod est per participationem, derivatur ab eo quod est per essentiam suam tale; ut omne ignitum est hoc per participationem ignis, qui est ignis per suam naturam. Quia ergo verbum est lux vera per suam naturam, oportet quod omne lucens luceat per ipsum, inquantum ipsum participat. Ipse ergo <i>illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>.
<td>127 The effectiveness or efficiency of the Word lies in the fact that he <b>enlightens every man coming into this world.</b> For everything which is what it is by participation is derived from that which is such by its essence; just as everything afire is so by participation in fire, which is fire by its very essence. Then since the Word is the true light by his very essence, then everything that shines must do so through him, insofar as it participates in him. And so he <b>enlightens every man coming into this world.</b>
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<td>Sciendum est autem ad horum intellectum, quod mundus in Scriptura accipitur tribus modis. Aliquando enim ratione suae creationis, sicut hic inferius ait Evangelista <i>mundus per ipsum factus est</i>. Aliquando autem ratione suae perfectionis, ad quam per Christum pertingit, sicut illud II Cor. V, 19: <i>Deus erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi</i>. Aliquando ratione suae perversitatis sicut illud I Io. V, 19: <i>totus mundus in maligno positus est</i>.
<td>128 To understand this, we should know that “world” is taken in three ways in Scripture. Sometimes, from the point of view of its creation, as when the Evangelist says here, “through him the world was made” (v 10). Sometimes, from the point of view of its perfection, which it reaches through Christ, as in “God was, in Christ, reconciling the world to himself” (2 Cor 5:19). And sometimes it is taken from the point of view of its perversity, as in “The whole world lies under the power of the evil one” (1 Jn 5:19).
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<td>Illuminatio seu illuminari per verbum, intelligitur dupliciter: scilicet de lumine naturalis cognitionis, de quo dicitur in Ps. IV, 7: <i>signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>. Item de lumine gratiae, de quo dicitur Is. LX, 1: <i>illuminare, Ierusalem</i>.
<td>On the other hand, “enlightenment” or “being enlightened” by the Word is taken in two ways. First, in relation to the light of natural knowledge, as in “The light of your countenance, O Lord, is marked upon us” (Ps 4:7). Secondly, as the light of grace, “Be enlightened, O Jerusalem” (Is 60:1).
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<td>His duabus distinctionibus suppositis, facile solvitur dubitatio quae ex istis oritur. Cum enim dicit Evangelista <i>illuminat omnem hominem</i>, videtur subesse falsum, cum adhuc multi sint in mundo tenebrosi. Si ergo nos, memores dictarum distinctionum, accipiamus mundum secundum quod ponitur ratione suae creationis; et illuminare, secundum quod accipitur pro lumine naturalis rationis, verbum Evangelistae nullam habet calumniam: quia homines omnes venientes in hunc mundum sensibilem illuminantur lumine naturalis cognitionis ex participatione huius verae lucis, a qua derivatur quicquid de lumine naturalis cognitionis participatur ab hominibus.
<td>129 With these two sets of distinctions in mind, it is easy to solve a difficulty which arises here. For when the Evangelist says, he <b>enlightens every man,</b> this seems to be false, because there are still many in darkness in the world. However, if we bear in mind these distinctions and take “world” from the standpoint of its creation, and “enlighten” as referring to the light of natural reason, the statement of the Evangelist is beyond reproach. For all men coming into this visible world are enlightened by the light of natural knowledge through participating in this true light, which is the source of all the light of natural knowledge participated in by men.
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<td>Utitur autem Evangelista hoc modo loquendi, ut dicat <i>venientem in hunc mundum</i>, non quod homines vixissent aliquo temporis spatio extra mundum, et postea venirent in mundum, cum hoc sit contra sententiam apostoli, Rom. IX, 11: <i>cum enim nondum nati essent, aut aliquid egissent boni, aut mali (ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret), non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est</i> et cetera. Unde cum non egissent aliquid antequam nati essent, manifestum est quod anima non est antequam corpori coniungatur. Dicit ergo <i>venientem in hunc mundum</i>, ut ostendat quod homines illuminantur a Deo, secundum hoc scilicet quod veniunt in mundum, idest secundum intellectum qui est ab extrinseco. Homo enim ex duplici natura constituitur, corporali scilicet et intellectuali: et secundum corporalem quidem naturam, seu sensibilem, illuminatur homo lumine corporeo et sensibili; secundum animam vero et intellectualem naturam, illuminatur lumine intellectuali et spirituali. Cum ergo homo, secundum naturam corporalem non veniat in hunc mundum, sed sit ex mundo, sed secundum intellectualem naturam, quae est ab extrinseco, ut dictum est, sit a Deo per creationem, unde dicitur Eccle. XII, 7: <i>donec omnis caro in suam revertatur originem, et spiritus dirigatur ad Deum qui fecit illum</i>: ostendit Evangelista quod haec illuminatio est secundum illud quod est ab extrinseco, scilicet secundum intellectum, cum dicit <i>venientem in hunc mundum</i>.
<td>When the Evangelist speaks of <b>man coming into this world,</b> he does not mean that men had lived for a certain time outside the world and then came into the world, since this is contrary to the teaching of the Apostle in Romans (9:11), “When the children were not yet born nor had they done anything good or evil.” Therefore, since they had done nothing before they were born, it is plain that the soul does not exist prior to its union with the body. He refers to <b>every man coming into this world,</b> to show that men are enlightened by God with respect to that according to which they came into the world, i.e., with respect to the intellect, which is something external [to the world]. For man is constituted of a twofold nature, bodily and intellectual. According to his bodily or sensible nature, man is enlightened by a bodily and sensible light; but according to his soul and intellectual nature, he is enlightened by an intellectual and spiritual light. Now man does not come into this world according to his bodily nature, but under this aspect, he is from the world. His intellectual nature is derived from a source external to the world, as has been said, i.e., from God through creation; as in “Until all flesh returns to its origin, and the spirit is directed to God, who made it” (Ecc 12:7). For these reasons, when the Evangelist speaks of <b>every man coming into this world</b>, he is showing that this enlightenment refers to what is from without, that is, the intellect.
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<td>Si vero accipiatur illuminari pro lumine gratiae, sic hoc quod dicitur, <i>illuminat omnem hominem</i> potest tripliciter exponi. Uno modo, secundum Origenem in illa Hom. aquila grandis, exponitur hoc modo, ut accipiamus mundum ratione suae perfectionis, ad quam perducitur homo reconciliatus per Christum. Et tunc dicitur <i>illuminat omnem hominem venientem</i>, per fidem, <i>in hunc mundum</i>, spiritualem, scilicet Ecclesiam illuminatam lumine gratiae.
<td>130 If we understand “enlightenment” with respect to the light of grace, then <b>he enlightens every man</b> may be explained in three ways. The first way is by Origen in his homily, “The great eagle,” and is this. “World” is understood from the point of view of its perfection, which man attains by his reconciliation through Christ. And so we have, he enlightens every man coming, by faith, into this world, i.e., this spiritual world, that is, the Church, which has been enlightened by the light of grace.
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<td>Alio modo, secundum Chrysostomum, exponitur, accipiendo mundum ratione suae creationis, et talis est sensus: <i>illuminat</i>, scilicet verbum, quantum de se est, quia ex parte sua nulli deest, imo <i>vult omnes salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>, ut dicitur I Tim. II, 4, <i>omnem hominem venientem</i>, idest qui nascitur in hunc mundum sensibilem. Quod si aliquis non illuminatur, ex parte hominis est, avertentis se a lumine illuminante.
<td>Chrysostom explains it another way. He takes “world” under the aspect of creation. Then the sense is: He <b>enlightens,</b> i.e., the Word does, in so far as it depends on him, because he fails no one, but rather “wants all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim 2:4); <b>every man coming</b>, i.e., who is born into this sensible world. If anyone is not enlightened, it is due to himself, because he turns from the light that enlightens.
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<td>Tertio modo, secundum Augustinum, exponitur, ut ly omnem sit distributio accommoda. Ut sit sensus <i>illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, non simpliciter, sed <i>omnem hominem</i>, qui illuminatur, scilicet quia nullus illuminatur nisi a verbo. Dicit ergo, secundum Augustinum, <i>venientem</i>, ut assignet rationem quare homo indiget illuminari; accipiendo tamen mundum ratione suae perversitatis et defectus. Quasi dicat: ideo indiget illuminari, quia venit in hunc mundum, perversitate et defectibus tenebrosum et ignorantia plenum. De mundo spirituali primo hominis; Lc. I, 79: <i>illuminare his, qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent</i>.
<td>Augustine explains it a third way. For him, “every” has a restricted application, so that the sense is: He <b>enlightens every man coming into this world,</b> not every man universally, but every man who is enlightened, since no one is enlightened except by the Word. According to Augustine, the Evangelist says, <b>coming into this world,</b> in order to give the reason why man needs to be enlightened, and he is taking “world” from the point of view of its perversity and defect. It is as though he were saying: Man needs to be enlightened because he is coming into this world which is darkened by perversity and defects and is full of ignorance. (This followed the spiritual world of the first man.) As Luke says (1:79), “To enlighten those who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death.”
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<td>Destruitur autem per verba praedicta error Manichaei ponentis, homines a principio contrario, idest Diabolo, in mundo creatos fuisse: quia si homo fuisset creatura Diaboli, veniens in mundum, non illuminaretur a Deo, sive a verbo; quia <i>Christus venit in mundum, ut dissolvat opera Diaboli</i>; I Io. III.
<td>131 The above statement refutes the error of the Manichaeans, who think than men were created in the world from an opposing principle, i.e., the devil. For if man were a creature of the devil when coming into this world, he would not be enlightened by God or by the Word, for “Christ came into the world to destroy the works of the devil” (1 Jn 3:8).
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<td>Sic ergo patet ex efficacia divini verbi, quod defectus cognitionis in hominibus non est ex parte ipsius verbi: quia ad omnes illuminandos efficax est, cum sit <i>lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>.
<td>132 So it is clear, from the efficacy of the divine Word, that the lack of knowledge in men is not due to the Word, because he is effective in enlightening all, being <b>the true light, which enlightens</b> every <b>man coming into this world.</b>
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<td>Sed ne credas defectum ipsum esse ex remotione seu absentia verae lucis, hoc excludens Evangelista, subdit: <i>in mundo erat</i>. Simile huic habetur Act. XVII, 27: <i>non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum</i>, scilicet Deus, <i>in ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus</i>. Quasi dicat Evangelista: verbum divinum efficax est et praesens est ad illuminandum.
<td>But so you do not suppose this lack arose from the withdrawal or absence of the true light, the Evangelist rules this out adding, <b>He was in the world</b>. A comparable statement is found in “He is not far from any one of us,” that is, God, “for in him we live, and move, and are” (Acts 17:28). It is as though the Evangelist were saying: The divine Word is effective and is at hand in order to enlighten us.
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<td>Notandum vero quod in mundo dicitur aliquid esse tripliciter. Uno modo per continentiam, sicut locatum in loco; infra c. XVII, 11: <i>hi in mundo sunt</i>. Alio modo, sicut pars in toto; nam pars mundi dicitur esse in mundo, etiamsi non sit locata; sicut substantiae supernaturales, licet localiter non sint in mundo, tamen sunt ut partes Ps. CXLV, v. 6: <i>qui fecit caelum et terram, mare et omnia quae in eis sunt</i>. Neutro autem istorum modorum lux vera in mundo erat, quia nec localis est, nec pars universi: immo quodammodo (ut ita liceat loqui), totum universum est pars, bonitatem eius partialiter participans.
<td>133 We should remark that something is said to be “in the world” in three ways. In one way, by being contained, as a thing in place exists in a place: “They are in the world” (below 17:11). In another way, as a part in a whole; for a part of the world is said to be in the world even though it is not in a place. For example, supernatural substances, although not in the world as in a place, are nevertheless in it as parts: “God... who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them” (Ps 145:6). But the true light was not in the world in either of these ways, because that light is neither localized nor is it a part of the universe. Indeed, if we can speak this way, the entire universe is in a certain sense a part, since it participates in a partial way in his goodness.
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<td>Erat ergo in mundo tertio modo, sicut causa efficiens et conservans; Ier. XXIII, 24: <i>caelum et terram ego impleo</i>. Sed tamen aliter est de verbo agente et causante omnia, et aliter de aliis agentibus. Nam alia agentia operantur ut extrinsecus existentia: cum enim non agant nisi movendo et alterando aliquo modo quantum ad ea quae sunt extrinseca rei, ut extrinseca operantur. Deus vero operatur in omnibus ut interius agens, quia agit creando. Creare autem est dare esse rei creatae. Cum ergo esse sit intimum cuilibet rei, Deus, qui operando dat esse, operatur in rebus ut intimus agens.
<td>Accordingly, the true light was in the world in a third way, i.e., as an efficient and preserving cause: “I fill heaven and earth” as said in Jeremiah (23:24). However, there is a difference between the way the Word acts and causes all things and the way in which other agents act. For other agents act as existing externally: since they do not act except by moving and altering a thing qualitatively in some way with respect to its exterior, they work from without. But God acts in all things from within, because he acts by creating. Now to create is to give existence (<i>esse</i>) to the thing created. So, since esse is innermost in each thing, God, who by acting gives <i>esse</i> acts in things from within. Hence God was in the world as one giving <i>esse</i> to the world.
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<td>In mundo ergo erat ut dans esse mundo. Consuetum est autem dici Deum esse in omnibus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est quod per potentiam dicitur esse aliquis in omnibus quae subduntur potentiae eius: sicut rex dicitur esse in toto regno sibi subiecto, per suam potentiam; non tamen ibi est per praesentiam, neque per essentiam. Per praesentiam dicitur esse in omnibus quae sunt in conspectu eius, sicut rex dicitur esse per praesentiam in domo sua. Per essentiam vero dicitur esse in illis rebus, in quibus est sua substantia: sicut est rex in uno loco determinato.
<td>134 It is customary to say that God is in all things by his essence, presence and power. To understand what this means, we should know that someone is said to be by his power in all the things that are subject to his power; as a king is said to be in the entire kingdom subject to him, by his power. He is not there, however, by presence or essence., Someone is said to be by presence in all the things that are within his range of vision; as a king is said to be in his house by presence. And someone is said to be by essence in those things in which his substance is; as a king is in one determinate place.
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<td>Dicimus enim Deum esse ubique per potentiam, quia omnia eius potestati subduntur; Ps. CXXXVIII, 8: <i>si ascendero in caelum, tu illic es (...). Si sumpsero pennas meas diluculo et habitavero in extremis maris: etenim illuc manus tua deducet me et tenebit me dextera tua</i>. Per praesentiam vero, quia <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius</i>, quae sunt in mundo, ut habetur Hebr. IV, 13. Per essentiam autem, quia essentia sua intima est omnibus rebus: oportet enim de necessitate omne agens, inquantum agens, immediate coniungi suo effectui, cum movens et motum oporteat simul esse. Deus autem actor est et conservator omnium secundum esse uniuscuiusque rei. Unde, cum esse rei sit intimum in qualibet re, manifestum est quod Deus per essentiam suam, per quam omnia creat, sit in omnibus rebus.
<td>Now we say that God is everywhere by his power, since all things are subject to his power: “If I ascend into heaven, you are there.... If I take my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the furthest part of the sea, even there your hand will lead me, and your right hand will hold me” (Ps 138:8). He is also everywhere by his presence, because “all things are bare and open to his eyes,” as is said in Hebrews (4:13). He is present everywhere by his essence, be cause his essence is innermost in all things. For every agent, as acting, has to be immediately joined to its effect, because mover and moved must be together. Now God is the maker and preserver of all things with respect to the <i>esse</i> of each. Hence, since the <i>esse</i> of a thing is innermost in that thing, it is plain that God, by his essence, through which he creates all things, is in all things.
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<td>Notandum autem quod Evangelista signanter utitur hoc verbo <i>erat</i>, cum dicit <i>in mundo erat</i>, ostendens ab initio creaturae semper ipsum fuisse in mundo, causans et conservans omnia: quia si ad momentum subtraheret Deus virtutem suam a rebus conditis, omnia in nihilum redigerentur, et esse desinerent. Unde Origenes satis ad hoc congruo exemplo utitur, dicens quod sicut se habet vox humana ad verbum humanum in mente conceptum, sic se habet creatura ad verbum divinum: nam sicut vox nostra est effectus verbi concepti in mente nostra, ita et creatura est effectus verbi in divina mente concepti; <i>dixit enim et facta sunt</i>. Ps. CXLVIII, v. 5. Unde sicut videmus quod statim, deficiente verbo nostro, vox sensibilis deficit, ita si virtus verbi divini subtraheretur a rebus, statim res omnes in ipso momento deficerent; et hoc quia est <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis suae</i>, Hebr. I, 3.
<td>135 It should be noted that the Evangelist significantly uses the word “was,” when he says, <b>He was in the world,</b> showing that from the beginning of creation he was always in the world, causing and preserving all things; because if God for even a moment were to withhold his power from the things he established, all would return to nothing and cease to be. Hence Origen uses an apt example to show this, when he says that as a human vocal sound is to a human word conceived in the mind, so is, the creature to the divine Word; for as our vocal sound is the effect of the word conceived in our mind, so the creature is the effect of the Word conceived in the divine mind. “For he spoke, and they were created” (Ps 148:5). Hence, just as we notice that as soon as our inner word vanishes, the sensible vocal sound also ceases, so, if the power of the divine Word were withdrawn from things, all of them would immediately cease to be at that moment. And this is because he is “sustaining all things by his powerful word” (Heb 1:3).
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<td>Sic ergo patet quod defectus divinae cognitionis non est in hominibus ex verbi absentia, quia <i>in mundo erat</i>; non est etiam ex verbi <span class="nota" title="ed. Cai: indivisibilitate">invisibilitate</span> seu occultatione, quia fecit opus, in quo similitudo evidenter relucet, scilicet mundum. Sap. XIII, 5: <i>a magnitudine speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit eorum creator videri</i>; et Rom. I, 20: <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur</i>. Et ideo statim Evangelista subiungit <i>et mundus per ipsum factus est</i>, ut scilicet in ipso lux ipsa manifestaretur. Sicut in artificio manifestatur ars artificis, ita totus mundus nihil aliud est quam quaedam repraesentatio divinae sapientiae in mente patris conceptae; Eccli. I, 10: <i>sparsit illam super omnia opera sua</i>.
<td>136 So it is plain that a lack of divine knowledge in minds is not due to the absence of the Word, because <b>He was in the world</b>; nor is it due to the invisibility or concealment of the Word, because he has produced a work in which his likeness is clearly reflected, that is, the world: “For from the greatness and beauty of creatures, their creator can be seen accordingly” (Wis 13:5), and “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made” (Rom 1:20). And so the Evangelist at once adds, <b>and through him the world was made,</b> in order that that light might be manifested in it. For as a work of art manifests the art of the artisan, so the whole world is nothing else than a certain representation of the divine wisdom conceived within the mind of the Father, “He poured her [wisdom] out upon all his works,” as is said in Sirach (1:10).
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<td>Sic ergo patet quod defectus divinae cognitionis non est ex parte verbi, quia efficax est, cum sit <i>lux vera</i>; praesens est, quia <i>in mundo erat</i>; evidens est, quia <i>mundus per ipsum factus est</i>.
<td>Now it is clear that the lack of divine knowledge is not due to the Word, because he is efficacious, being <b>the true light;</b> and he is at hand, since he <b>was in the world;</b> and he is knowable, since <b>through him the world was made.</b>
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<td>Unde autem sit huius defectus, ostendit Evangelista consequenter, cum dicit <i>et mundus eum non cognovit</i>; quasi dicat, non est ex parte ipsius, sed ex parte mundi, qui <i>eum non cognovit</i>.
<td>137 The Evangelist indicates the source of this lack when he says, <b>and the world did not know him.</b> As if to say: It is not due to him, but to the world, who did not know him.
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<td>Dicit autem <i>eum</i> in singulari, quia supra verbum dixerat non solum lucem hominum, sed Deum: unde cum dicit <i>eum</i>, intelligit Deum. Ponitur autem hic mundus pro homine: Angeli namque cognoverunt eum intelligendo; elementa cognoverunt eum obediendo; sed mundus, idest homo habitator mundi, eum non cognovit.
<td>He says him in the singular, because earlier he had called the Word not only the “light of men,” but also “God”; and so when he says him, he means God. Again, he uses “world” for man. For the angels knew him by their understanding, and the elements by their obeying him; but <b>the world,</b> i.e., man, who lives in the world, <b>did not know him.</b>
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<td>Et possumus hunc defectum cognitionis divinae referre vel ad naturam hominis, vel ad culpam. Ad naturam quidem, quia licet omnia haec praedicta auxilia data sint homini, ut ducatur in cognitionem Dei, tamen ratio humana in se deficiens est ab hac cognitione; Iob XXXVI, v. 25: <i>unusquisque intuetur eum procul</i>; et iterum ibi: <i>ecce Deus magnus vincens scientiam nostram</i>. Sed si aliqui eum cognoverunt, hoc fuit non inquantum fuerunt in mundo, sed inquantum fuerunt supra mundum, et tales quibus dignus non erat mundus, quia <i>mundus eum non cognovit</i>. Et est quasi ratio quare ab hominibus Deus non cognoscitur. Et sic mundus accipitur pro inordinato mundi amore; quasi dicat <i>mundus eum non cognovit</i>. Unde si aliquid aeternum in mente perceperunt, hoc fuit inquantum non erant de hoc mundo.
<td>138 We attribute this lack of divine knowledge either to the nature of man or to his guilt. To his nature, indeed, because although all the aforesaid aids were given to man to lead him to the knowledge of God, human reason in itself lacks this knowledge. “Man beholds him from afar” (Jb 36:25), and immediately after, “God is great beyond our knowledge.” But if some have known him, this was not insofar as they were in the world, but above the world; and the kind for whom the world was not worthy, because <b>the world did not know him.</b> Hence if they mentally perceived anything eternal, that was insofar as they were not of this world.
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<td>Si vero referatur ad culpam hominis, tunc hoc quod dixit <i>mundus eum non cognovit</i>, est quasi ratio quare ab hominibus Deus non cognoscitur; et sic accipitur mundus pro inordinato mundi amatore. Quasi dicat <i>mundus eum non cognovit</i>, quia sunt mundi amatores. Amor enim mundi, ut dicit Augustinus, maxime retrahit a Dei cognitione; quia <i>amor mundi inimicum Dei constituit</i>, Iac. c. IV, 4. Qui autem non diligit Deum, non potest eum cognoscere; I Cor. II, 14: <i>animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus Dei</i>.
<td>But if this lack is attributed to man’s guilt, then the phrase, <b>the world did not know him,</b> is a kind of reason why God was not known by man; in this sense <b>world</b> is taken for inordinate lovers of the world. It is as though it said, <b>The world did not know him,</b> because they were lovers of the world. For the love of the world, as Augustine says, is what chiefly withdraws us from the knowledge of God, because “Love of the world makes one an enemy to God” (Jas 4:4); “The sensual man does not perceive the things that pertain to the Spirit of God” (1 Cor 2:14).
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<td>Notandum autem quod ex hoc solvitur quaestio gentilium, qui vane quaerunt: si a paucis temporibus filius Dei pro salute humana mundo innotuit, videtur quod ante tempus illud naturam humanam despiceret. Quibus dicendum est quod non despexit, sed semper fuit in mundo, et quantum in se est, cognoscibilis est ab hominibus; sed quod aliqui eum non cognoverunt, fuit eorum culpa, quia mundi amatores erant.
<td>139 From this we answer the question of the Gentiles who futilely ask this: If it is only recently that the Son of God is set before the world as the Savior of men, does it not seem that before that time he scorned human nature? We should say to them that he did not scorn the world but was always in the world, and on his part is knowable by men; but it was due to their own fault that some have not known him, because they were lovers of the world.
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<td>Notandum etiam quod Evangelista loquitur de incarnatione verbi, ut ostendat idem esse verbum incarnatum, et quod <i>erat in principio apud Deum</i> et Deus. Resumit quae de ipso supra dixerat. Ibi enim dixerat quod <i>verbum erat lux hominum</i>; hic vero dicit quod <i>erat lux vera</i>. Ibi quod <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>; hic vero <i>et mundus per ipsum factus est</i>. Supra vero dixit, quod <i>sine ipso factum est nihil</i>, idest, secundum unam expositionem, omnia conservans; hic vero dicit <i>in mundo erat</i>, mundum et omnia creans et conservans. Ibi dixit: <i>et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt</i>; hic vero <i>et mundus eum non cognovit</i>. Et ideo totum hoc quod sequitur ab illo loco <i>erat lux vera</i>, videtur quaedam explicatio superiorum.
<td>140 We should also note that the Evangelist speaks of the incarnation of the Word to show that the incarnate Word and that which “was in the beginning with God,” and God, are the same. He repeats what he had said of him earlier. For above he had said he [the Word] “was the light of men”; here he says he was <b>the true light.</b> Above, he said that “all things were made through him”; here he says that through him the world was made. Earlier he had said, “without him nothing was made,” i.e., according to one explanation, he conserves all things; here he says, he was in the world, creating and conserving the world and all things. There he had said, “the darkness did not overcome it”; here he says, <b>the world did not know him.</b> And so, all he says after he was the <b>true light,</b> is an explanation of what he had said before.
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<td>Possumus etiam ex praedictis accipere triplicem rationem, quare Deus voluit incarnari. Una est perversitas humanae naturae, quae ex sui malitia iam obtenebrata erat vitiorum et ignorantiae obscuritate. Unde supra dixerat quod <i>tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt</i>. Venit ergo in carnem Deus, ut tenebrae possent apprehendere lucem, idest cognitionem eius pertingere. Is. IX, 2: <i>populus, qui ambulabat in tenebris, vidit lucem magnam</i>.
<td>141 We can gather three reasons from the above why God willed to become incarnate. One is because of the perversity of human nature which, because of its own malice, had been darkened by vices and the obscurity of its own ignorance. And so he said before, the darkness did not overcome it. Therefore, God came in the flesh so that the darkness might apprehend the light, i.e., obtain a knowledge of it. “The people who walked in darkness saw a great light” (Is 9:2).
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<td>Secunda propter insufficientiam prophetici testimonii. Venerunt enim prophetae, venerat Ioannes; sed sufficienter illuminare non poterant, quia <i>non erat ille lux</i>. Unde necessarium erat ut post prophetarum vaticinia, post Ioannis adventum, lux ipsa veniret, et sui cognitionem mundo traderet; et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, Hebr. I, 1: <i>multifarie, multisque modis olim Deus loquens patribus in prophetis, novissime locutus est nobis in filio</i>; et II Petr. I, 19: <i>habetis propheticum sermonem, cui bene facitis attendentes, donec dies illucescat</i>.
<td>The second reason is that the testimony of the prophets was not enough. For the prophets came and John had come; but they were not able to give sufficient enlightenment, because <b>he was not the light.</b> And so, after the prophecies of the prophets and the coming of John, it was necessary that the light itself come and give the world a knowledge of itself. And this is what the Apostle says: “In past times, God spoke in many ways and degrees to our fathers through the prophets; in these days he has spoken to us in his Son” as we find in Hebrews (1:1). “We have the prophetic message, to which you do well to give attention, until the day dawns” (2 Pt 1:19).
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<td>Tertia propter creaturarum defectum. Nam creaturae insufficientes erant ad ducendum in cognitionem creatoris; unde <i>mundus per ipsum factus est, et ipsum non cognovit</i>. Unde necessarium erat ut ipse creator per carnem in mundum veniret, et per seipsum cognosceretur: et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. I, 21: <i>nam, quia in Dei sapientia mundus non cognovit per sapientiam Deum, placuit Deo per stultitiam praedicationis salvos facere credentes</i>.
<td>The third reason is because of the shortcomings of creatures. For creatures were not sufficient to lead to a knowledge of the Creator; hence he says, <b>through him the world was made, and the world did not know him.</b> Thus it was necessary that the Creator himself come into the world in the flesh, and be known through himself. And this is what the Apostle says: “Since in the wisdom of God the world did not know God by its wisdom, it pleased God to save those who believe by the foolishness of our preaching” (1 Cor 1:21).
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<td><b>Lectio 6</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 6</b>
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<blockquote>
11 εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον.<br>
12 ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι,<br>
τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ,<br>
13 οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς<br>
οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.
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<td>
<blockquote>
11 He came unto his own, and his own did not receive him;<br>
12 but whoever received him, he gave them power to become the sons of God,<br>
to all who believe in his name,<br>
13 who are born not from blood, nor from the desires of the flesh,<br>
nor from man’s willing it, but from God.
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<td>Assignata necessitate incarnationis verbi, consequenter Evangelista manifestat utilitatem ex ipsa incarnatione ab hominibus consecutam. Et primo insinuat lucis adventum, quia <i>in propria venit</i>; secundo hominum occursum, ibi <i>et sui eum non receperunt</i>; tertio fructum ex adventu lucis allatum, ibi <i>dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri</i>.
<td>142 Having given the necessity for the incarnation of the Word, the Evangelist then shows the advantage men gained from that incarnation. First, he shows the coming of the light (v 11); secondly, its reception by men (v 11b); thirdly, the fruit brought by the coming of the light (v 12).
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<td>Ostendit ergo quod lux quae erat praesens in mundo et evidens seu manifesta per effectum, non tamen cognoscebatur a mundo. Et ideo <i>venit in propria</i>, ut cognosceretur. Sed ne, cum dicit <i>venit</i>, intelligeres motum localem hoc modo, ut scilicet venerit quasi desinens esse ubi prius erat, et denuo incipiens esse, ubi prius non erat, dicit Evangelista <i>in propria</i>; idest in ea quae erant sua, quae ipse fecit; et venit ipse, ubi erat. Infra XVI, 28: <i>exivi a patre, et veni in mundum.</i>
<td>143 He shows that the light which was present in the world and evident, i.e., disclosed by its effect, was nevertheless not known by the world. Hence, he came unto his own, in order to be known. The Evangelist says, <b>unto his own,</b> i.e., to things that were his own, which he had made. And he says this so that you do not think that when he says, he came, he means a local motion in the sense that he came as though ceasing to be where he previously was and newly beginning to be where he formerly had not been. He came where he already was. “I came forth from the Father, and have come into the world,” as said below (16:2 8).
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<td>Venit, inquam, <i>in propria</i>, idest in Iudaeam, secundum quosdam, quae quidem speciali modo sua erat; Ps. LXXV, 2: <i>notus in Iudaea Deus</i>; Is. V, 7: <i>vinea domini exercituum, domus Israel est</i>. Sed melius est ut dicatur, <i>propria</i>, idest in mundum ab eo creatum; Ps. XXIII, 1: <i>domini est terra</i>.
<td>He came, I say, unto his own, i.e., to Judea, according to some, because it was in a special way his own. “In Judea God is known” (Ps 75:1); “The vineyard of the Lord of hosts is the house of Israel” (Is 5:7). But it is better to say, unto his own, i.e., into the world created by him. “The earth is the Lord’s” (Ps 23:1).
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<td>Sed si prius erat in mundo, quomodo venit in mundum? Respondeo, dicendum quod venire in aliquem locum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet vel quod aliquis veniat ubi nullo modo prius fuerat, vel quod ubi aliquo modo prius fuerat, incipiat esse quodam novo modo. Sicut rex, qui prius erat in civitate aliqua sui regni per potentiam, ad illam postmodum veniens personaliter, dicitur venire ubi prius erat: venit enim per suam substantiam ubi prius erat solum per suam potentiam. Sic ergo filius Dei venit in mundum, et tamen in mundo erat. Erat quidem per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, sed venit per carnis assumptionem; erat invisibilis, venit ut esset visibilis.
<td>144 But if he was previously in the world, how could he come into the world? I answer that “coming to some place” is understood in two ways. First, that someone comes where he absolutely had not been before. Or, secondly, that someone begins to be in a new way where he was before. For example, a king, who up to a certain time was in a city of his kingdom by his power and later visits it in person, is said to have come where he previously was: for he comes by his substance where previously he was present only by his power. It was in this way that the Son of God came into the world and yet was in the world. For he was there, indeed, by his essence, power and presence, but he came by assuming flesh. He was there invisibly, and he came in order to be visible.
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<td>Deinde cum dicit <i>et sui eum non receperunt</i>, sequitur hominum occursus, qui differenter se habuerunt ad venientem. Quia quidam eum receperunt, non sui; unde dicitur <i>et sui eum non receperunt</i>. Sui sunt homines, quia ab eo formati; Gen. II, 7: <i>formavit Deus hominem</i>; Ps. XCIX, 3: <i>scitote, quoniam dominus ipse fecit nos</i>, quia ad eius imaginem facti: Gen. I, 26: <i>faciamus hominem</i>.
<td>145 Then when he says, <b>and his own did not receive him,</b> we have the reception given him by men, who reacted in different ways. For some did receive him, but these were not his own; hence he says, <b>his own did not receive him.</b> “His own” are men, because they were formed by him. “The Lord God formed man” (Gn 2:7); “Know that the Lord is God: he made us” (Ps 99:3). And he made them to his own image, “Let us make man to our image” (Gn 1:26).
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<td>Sed melius est ut dicamus <i>sui</i>, idest Iudaei, <i>eum non receperunt</i>, per fidem credendo et honorando; infra V, 43: <i>ego veni in nomine patris mei, et non recepistis me</i>; et infra VIII, 49: <i>ego honorifico patrem meum, et vos inhonorastis me</i>. Sunt quidem Iudaei, sui, quia ab ipso in populum peculiarem electi; Deut. XXVI, 18: <i>elegit te dominus in populum peculiarem</i>. Sui secundum carnem coniuncti; Rom. IX, 5: <i>ex quibus Christus secundum carnem</i>. Item sui, ab eo beneficiis promoti; Is. I, 2: <i>filios enutrivi, et exaltavi</i>. Sed licet <i>sui</i>, Iudaei <i>eum non receperunt</i>.
<td>But it is better to say, <b>his own,</b> i.e., the Jews, <b>did not receive him,</b> through faith by believing, and by showing honor to him. “I have come in the name of my Father, and you do not receive me” (below 5:43), and “I honor my Father and you have dishonored me” (below 8:49). Now the Jews are his own because they were chosen by him to be his special people. “The Lord chose you to be his special people” (Dt 26:18). They are his own because related according to the flesh, “from whom is Christ, according to the flesh,” as said in Romans (9:3). They are also his own because enriched by his kindness, “I have reared and brought up sons” (Is 1:2). But although the Jews were his own, they did not receive him.
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<td>Non defuerunt tamen, qui eum receperunt; unde subdit <i>quotquot autem receperunt</i>. Utitur Evangelista hoc modo loquendi, dicens <i>quotquot</i>, ut ostendat ampliorem esse factam solutionem, quam fuerit promissio, quae facta fuit solum suis, scilicet Iudaeis; Is. XXXIII, 22: <i>dominus legifer noster, dominus rex noster; ipse salvabit nos</i>. Sed solutio non solum fuit facta suis, sed <i>quotquot receperunt eum</i>, idest omnibus in eum credentibus; Rom. XV, 8: <i>dico autem Christum ministrum fuisse circumcisionis propter veritatem Dei, ad confirmandas promissiones patrum</i>, idest patribus factas. Gentes autem super misericordia, quia misericorditer sunt recepti.
<td>146 However, there were not lacking those who did receive him. Hence he adds, <b>but whoever received him.</b> The Evangelist uses this manner of speaking, saying, but whoever, to indicate that the deliverance would be more extensive than the promise, which had been made only to his own, i.e., to the Jews. “The Lord is our law giver, the Lord is our king; he will save us” (Is 33:22). But this deliverance was not only for his own, but for <b>whoever received him,</b> i.e., whoever believe in him. “For I say that Christ was a minister to the circumcised, for the sake of God’s truth, to confirm the promises made to the fathers” (Rom 15:8). The Gentiles, however, [are delivered] by his mercy, because they were received through his mercy.
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<td>Dicit <i>quotquot</i>, ut ostendat quod gratia Dei indifferenter datur omnibus recipientibus Christum; Act. X, 45: <i>ergo in nationes gratia spiritus sancti effusa est</i>. Et non solum liberis, sed etiam servis, non solum masculis, sed etiam feminis; Gal. III, 28: <i>in Christo Iesu non est masculus, nec femina, gentilis, vel Iudaeus, circumcisio et praeputium</i> et cetera.
<td>147 He says, whoever, to show that God’s grace is given without distinction to all who receive Christ. “The grace of the Holy Spirit has been poured out upon the Gentiles”(Acts 10:45). And not only to free men, but to slaves as well; not only to men, but to women also. “In Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female, Jew or Greek, the circumcised or uncircumcised” (Gal 3:28).
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<td>Deinde cum dicit <i>dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri</i>, sequitur fructus eius adventus. Ubi primo ponit fructus magnificentiam, quia <i>dedit eis potestatem</i>; secundo ostendit quibus datur, quia <i>his qui credunt</i>; tertio insinuat modum dandi, quia <i>non ex sanguinibus</i>.
<td>148 Then when he says, he gave them power to become the sons of God, we have the fruit of his coming. First, he mentions the grandeur of the fruit, for he gave them power. Secondly, he shows to whom it is given, <b>to all who believe.</b> Thirdly, he indicates the way it is given, <b>not from blood,</b> and so forth.
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<td>Est ergo fructus adventus filii Dei magnus, quia homines fiunt per hoc filii Dei; Gal. IV, 4: <i>misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere, ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus</i>. Et hoc congrue, ut qui sumus filii Dei, per hoc quod assimilamur filio, reformemur per filium.
<td>149 The fruit of the coming of the Son of God is great, because by it men are made sons of God. “God sent his Son made from a woman... so that we might receive our adoption as sons” (Gal 4:5). And it was fitting that we, who. are sons of God by the fact that we are made like the Son, should be reformed through the Son.
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<td>Dicit ergo <i>dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri</i>. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod homines fiunt filii Dei per assimilationem ad Deum; et ideo secundum triplicem assimilationem hominum ad Deum homines sunt filii Dei. Primo enim per gratiae infusionem: unde quicumque habet gratiam gratum facientem, efficitur filius Dei; Rom. VIII, 15: <i>non enim accepistis spiritum servitutis</i> etc.; Gal. IV, 6: <i>quoniam estis filii Dei, misit Deus spiritum filii sui</i>.
<td>150 So he says, <b>he gave them power to become the sons of God.</b> To understand this we should remark that men become sons of God by being made like God. Hence men are sons of God according to a threefold likeness to God. First, by the infusion of grace; hence anyone having sanctifying grace is made a son of God. “You did not receive the spirit of slavery... but the spirit of adoption as sons,” as said in Romans (8:15). “Because you are sons of God, God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts” (Gal 4:6).
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<td>Secundo assimilamur Deo per operum perfectionem, quia qui facit opera iustitiae, est filius; Matth. V, 44: <i>diligite inimicos vestros</i>.
<td>Secondly, we are like God by the perfection of our actions, because one who acts justly is a son: “Love your enemies... so that you may be the children of your Father” (Mt 5:44).
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<td>Tertio assimilamur Deo per gloriae adeptionem, et quantum ad animam per lumen gloriae, I Io. III, 2: <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus</i>, et quantum ad corpus, Phil. III, v. 21: <i>reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae</i>. Unde de istis duobus dicitur Rom. VIII, 23: <i>adoptionem filiorum Dei expectantes</i>.
<td>Thirdly, we are made like God by the attainment of glory. The glory of the soul by the light of glory, “When he appears we shall be like him” (1 Jn 3:2); and the glory of the body, “He will reform our lowly body” (Phil 3:21). Of these two it is said in Romans (8:23), “We are waiting for our adoption as sons of God.”
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<td>Si ergo accipiamus potestatem filios Dei fieri quantum ad operum perfectionem et gloriae adeptionem, nullam difficultatem habebit sermo, quia cum dicit <i>dedit eis potestatem</i>, intelligitur de potestate gratiae, qua habita, potest homo facere opera perfectionis, et adipisci gloriam; quia, ut dicitur Rom. VI, 23, <i>gratia Dei vita aeterna</i>. Et secundum hunc modum dicitur <i>dedit eis</i>, qui eum receperunt, <i>potestatem</i>, idest infusionem gratiae, <i>filios Dei fieri</i>, bene operando, et gloriam acquirendo.
<td>151 If we take the power to become the sons of God as referring to the perfection of our actions and the attainment of glory, the statement offers no difficulty. For then when he says, he gave them power, he is referring to the power of grace; and when a man possesses this, he can perform works of perfection and attain glory, since “The grace of God is eternal life” (Rom 6:23). According to this way we have, he gave them, to those who received him, power, i.e., the infusion of grace, to become the sons of God, by acting well and acquiring glory.
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<td>Si vero intelligatur de gratiae infusione, tunc dubitationem habet hoc quod dicitur <i>dedit eis potestatem</i>, quia non est in potestate nostra fieri filios Dei, cum non sit in potestate nostra gratiam habere. Hoc ergo quod dicit <i>dedit eis potestatem</i>, aut intelligitur de potestate naturae: et hoc non videtur esse verum, quia infusio gratiae est supra naturam nostram. Aut intelligitur de potestate gratiae: et tunc hoc ipsum est gratiam habere, quod habere <i>potestatem filios Dei fieri</i>; et sic non dedit potestatem filios fieri Dei, sed filios Dei esse.
<td>152 But if this statement refers to the infusion of grace, then his saying, <b>he gave them power,</b> gives rise to a difficulty. And this is because it is not in our power to be made sons of God, since it is not in our power to possess grace. We can understand, he gave them power, as a power of nature; but this does not seem to be true since the infusion of grace is above our nature. Or we can understand it as the power of grace, and then to have grace is to have power to <b>become the sons of God.</b> And in this sense he did not give them power to become sons of God, but to be sons of God.
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<td>Ad quod dicendum quod in datione gratiae requiritur in homine adulto ad iustificationem suam consensus per motum liberi arbitrii: unde quia in potestate hominis est ut consentiat et non consentiat, <i>dedit eis potestatem</i>. Dedit autem hanc potestatem suscipiendi gratiam dupliciter: praeparando, et hominibus proponendo. Sicut enim qui facit librum, et proponit homini ad legendum, dicitur dare potestatem legendi; ita Christus, per quem gratia facta est, ut dicitur infra, et <i>qui operatus est salutem in medio terrae</i>, ut dicitur in Ps. LXXIII, 12, <i>dedit</i> nobis <i>potestatem filios Dei fieri</i> per gratiae susceptionem.
<td>153 The answer to this is that when grace is given to an adult, his justification requires an act of consent by a movement of his free will. So, because it is in the power of men to consent and not to consent, <b>he gave them power.</b> However, he gives this power of accepting grace in two ways: by preparing it, and by offering it to him. For just as one who writes a book and offers it to a man to read is said to give the power to read it, so Christ, through whom grace was produced (as will be said below), and who “accomplished salvation on the earth” (Ps 73:12), <b>gave us power to become the sons of God</b> by offering grace.
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<td>Secundo, quia hoc non sufficit, cum etiam liberum arbitrium indigeat ad hoc quod moveatur ad gratiae susceptionem, auxilio gratiae divinae, non quidem habitualis, sed moventis, ideo dat potestatem movendo liberum arbitrium hominis, ut consentiat ad susceptionem gratiae, iuxta illud Thren. ult., v. 21: <i>converte nos, domine, ad te</i>, movendo voluntatem nostram ad amorem tuum, <i>et convertemur</i>. Et hoc modo vocatur interior vocatio, de qua dicitur Rom. VIII, 30: <i>quos vocavit</i>, interius voluntatem instigando ad consentiendum gratiae, <i>hos iustificavit</i>, gratiam infundendo.
<td>154 Yet this is not sufficient since even free will, if it is to be moved to receive grace, needs the help of divine grace, not indeed habitual grace, but movent grace. For this reason, secondly, he gives power by moving the free will of man to consent to the reception of grace, as in “Convert us to yourself, 0 Lord,” by moving our will to your love, “and we will be converted” (Lam 5:21). And in this sense we speak of an interior call, of which it is said, “Those whom he called,” by inwardly moving the will to consent to grace, “he justified,” by infusing grace (Rom 8:3).
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<td>Quia vero per hanc gratiam habet homo hanc potestatem conservandi se in divina filiatione, potest et aliter dici: <i>dedit eis</i>, idest eum recipientibus, <i>potestatem filios Dei fieri</i>, idest gratiam, per quam potentes sunt in divina filiatione conservari; I Io. ult., 18: <i>omnis qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat, sed gratia Dei</i>, per quam regeneramur in filios Dei, <i>conservat eum</i>.
<td>155 Since by this grace man has the power of maintaining himself in the divine sonship, one may read these words in another way. He gave them, i.e., those who receive him, <b>power to become the sons of God,</b> i.e., the grace by which they are able to be maintained in the divine sonship. “Everyone who is born from God does not sin, but the grace of God,” through which we are reborn as children of God, “preserves him” (1 Jn 5:18).
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<td>Sic ergo <i>dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri</i>, per gratiam gratum facientem, per operum perfectionem, per gloriae adeptionem, et haec praeparando, movendo et conservando gratiam.
<td>156 Thus, <b>he gave them power to become the sons of God,</b> through sanctifying grace, through the perfection of their actions, and through the attainment of glory; and he did this by preparing this grace, moving their wills, and preserving this grace.
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<td>Deinde cum dicit <i>his qui credunt in nomine eius</i>, ostenditur quibus conferatur fructus eius adventus. Et hoc quidem potest accipi dupliciter, vel ut sit expositivum superiorum, vel determinativum. Expositivum quidem, quia Evangelista dixerat <i>quotquot autem receperunt eum</i>; ut ergo ostendat quid est recipere eum, quasi exponendo, consequenter subiungit <i>his qui credunt in nomine eius</i>; quasi dicat: hoc est recipere eum, in eum credere, quia per fidem Christus habitat in cordibus nostris, iuxta illud Eph. III, 17: <i>habitare Christum per fidem in cordibus vestris</i>. Illi ergo <i>receperunt eum, qui credunt in nomine eius</i>.
<td>157 Then when he says, <b>to all who believe in his name,</b> he shows those on whom the fruit of his coming is conferred. We can understand this in two ways: either as explaining what was said before, or as qualifying it. We can regard it as explaining as the Evangelist had said, whoever received him, and now to show what it is to receive him, he adds by way of explanation, <b>who believe in his name.</b> It is as though he were saying: To receive him is to believe in him, because it is through faith that Christ dwells in your hearts, as in “that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith” (Eph 3:17). Therefore, they <b>received him, who believe in his name.</b>
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<td>Ut determinativum vero ponitur ab Origene in homilia quae incipit <i>vox spiritualis</i>. Hoc modo multi recipiunt Christum, dicentes se esse Christianos, qui tamen non fiunt filii Dei, quia non vere credunt in nomine eius, falsa dogmata de Christo suggerendo, subtrahendo scilicet aliquid sibi de divinitate, vel de humanitate, iuxta illud I Io. c. IV, 3: <i>omnis spiritus qui solvit Christum, ex Deo non est</i>. Et ideo Evangelista quasi determinando dicit <i>dedit eis</i>, scilicet recipientibus eum per fidem, <i>potestatem filios Dei fieri</i>, illis tamen, <i>qui credunt in nomine eius</i>, idest qui nomen Christi integrum servant, ut nihil de divinitate, vel humanitate Christi diminuant.
<td>158 Origen regards this as a qualifying statement, in his homily, “The spiritual voice.” In this sense, many receive Christ, declaring that they are Christians, but they are not sons of God, because they do not truly believe in his name; for they propose false dogmas about Christ by taking away something from his divinity or humanity, as in “Every spirit that denies Christ is not from God” (1 Jn 4:3). And so the Evangelist says, as though contracting his meaning, <b>he gave them,</b> i.e., those who receive him by faith, <b>power to become the sons of God,</b> to those, however, <b>who believe in his name,</b> i.e., who keep the name of Christ whole, in such a way as not to lessen anything of the divinity or humanity of Christ.
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<td>Potest etiam hoc referri ad formationem fidei, ut dicatur <i>his</i> scilicet <i>dedit potestatem filios Dei fieri, qui credunt in nomine eius</i>, idest per fidem charitate formatam opera salutis faciunt. Illi enim qui habent solum fidem informem, non credunt in nomine eius, quia non operantur ad salutem.
<td>159 We can also refer this to formed faith, in the sense that to all, that is, <b>he gave power to become the sons of God, who believe in his name,</b> i.e., those who do the works of salvation through a faith formed by charity. For those who have only an unformed faith do not believe in his name because they do not work unto salvation.
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<td>Sed prima expositio, quae accipitur ut expositivum praemissorum, melior est.
<td>However, the first exposition, which is taken as explaining what preceded, is better.
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<td>Deinde cum dicit <i>qui non ex sanguinibus</i> etc., ostenditur qualiter conferatur hominibus tam magnificus fructus. Quia enim dixerat quod fructus advenientis lucis est potestas fieri filios Dei hominibus data; filius autem dicitur aliquis ex eo quod nascitur: ne aestimes eos materiali generatione nasci, dicit <i>non ex sanguinibus</i>. Et licet hoc nomen sanguis in Latino non habeat plurale, quia tamen in Graeco habet, ideo translator regulam grammaticae servare non curavit, ut veritatem perfecte doceret. Unde non dicit ex sanguine, secundum Latinos, sed <i>ex sanguinibus</i>; per quod intelligitur quicquid ex sanguine generatur, concurrens ut materia ad carnalem generationem. Semen autem, secundum philosophum, est ultimi superfluitas cibi sanguinei. Unde sive semen viri, sive menstruum mulieris, intelligitur per sanguinem.
<td>160 Then when he says, <b>who are born not from blood,</b> he shows the way in which so great a fruit is conferred on men. For since he had said that the fruit of the light’s coming is the power given to men to become the sons of God, then to forestall the supposition that they are born through a material generation he says, <b>not from blood.</b> And although the word “blood” (<i>sanguis</i>) has no plural in Latin, but does in Greek, the translator [from Greek into Latin] ignored a rule of grammar in order to teach the truth more perfectly. So he does not say, “from blood,” in the Latin manner, but “from bloods” (<i>ex sanguinibus</i>) <i>.</i> This indicates whatever is generated from blood, serving as the matter in carnal generation. According to the Philosopher [ <i>On the Generation of Animals, 1,</i> c 18, 726a26-8], “semen is a residue derived from useful nourishment in its final form.” So “blood” indicates either the seed of the male or the menses of the female.
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<td>Causa vero motiva ad actum carnalem est voluntas se commiscentium, scilicet maris et feminae, quia licet actus virtutis generativae secundum quod huiusmodi, non sit subiectus voluntati, praeambula tamen ad ipsum voluntati subiiciuntur; et ideo dicit <i>neque ex voluntate carnis</i>, pro persona mulieris, <i>neque ex voluntate viri</i>, ut ex causa efficiente <i>sed ex Deo nati sunt</i>; quasi dicat: non carnaliter, sed spiritualiter filii Dei fiunt.
<td>The cause moving to the carnal act is the will of those coming together, the man and the woman. For although the act of the generative power as such is not subject to the will, the preliminaries to it are subject to the will. So he says, <b>nor from the desires of the flesh,</b> referring to the woman; <b>nor from man’s willing it,</b> as from an efficient cause; <b>but from God.</b> It is as though he were saying: They became sons of God, not carnally, but spiritually.
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<td>Accipitur autem hic caro, secundum Augustinum, pro muliere, quia sicut caro obedit spiritui, sic mulier debet obedire viro; Gen. c. II, 23 dixit Adam de muliere: <i>hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis</i>. Et attendendum, secundum Augustinum, quod sicut dissipatur possessio domus, in qua principatur mulier et subiicitur vir, ita dissipatur homo, cum caro dominatur spiritui; propter quod dicit apostolus, Rom. VIII, 12: <i>debitores sumus non carni, ut secundum carnem vivamus</i>. De modo autem dictae generationis carnalis dicitur Sap. VII, 1: <i>in ventre matris figuratus sum caro</i>.
<td>According to Augustine, “flesh” is taken here for the woman, because as the flesh obeys the spirit, so woman should obey man. Adam (Gn 2:23) said of the woman, “This, at last, is bone of my bones.” And note, according to Augustine, that just as the possessions of a household are wasted away if the woman rules and the man is subject, so a man is wasted away when the flesh rules the spirit. For this reason the Apostle says, “We are not debtors to the flesh, so that we should live according to the flesh” (Rom 8:12). Concerning the manner of this carnal generation, we read, “In the womb of my mother I was molded into flesh” (Wis 7:1).
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<td>Vel possumus dicere quod motivum ad carnalem generationem est duplex; unum scilicet ex parte appetitus intellectivi, quae est voluntas; aliud a parte sensitivi, quod est concupiscentia. Ad designandum ergo materialem causam, dixit <i>non ex sanguinibus</i>; sed ad designandum causam efficientem quantum ad concupiscentiam, dicit <i>neque ex voluntate carnis</i>; quamvis improprie voluntas dicatur concupiscentia carnis, quo tamen modo dicitur Gal. V, 17: <i>caro concupiscit adversus spiritum</i> et cetera. Ad designandum vero appetitum intellectivum dicit <i>non ex voluntate viri</i>. Sic ergo generatio filiorum Dei non est carnalis, sed est spiritualis, quia <i>ex Deo nati sunt</i>. I Io. V, 4: <i>omne quod natum est ex Deo vincit mundum</i>.
<td>161 Or, we might say that the moving force to carnal generation is twofold: the intellectual appetite on the one hand, that is, the will; and on the other hand, the sense appetite, which is concupiscence. So, to indicate the material cause he says, <b>not from blood.</b> To indicate the efficient cause, in respect to concupiscence, he says, <b>nor from the desires of the flesh</b> [ <i>ex voluntate carnis</i>, literally, “from the will of the flesh”], even though the concupiscence of the flesh is improperly called a “will” in the sense of Galatians (5:17), “The flesh lusts against the spirit.” Finally, to indicate the intellectual appetite he says, <b>nor from man’s willing it.</b> So, the generation of the sons of God is not carnal but spiritual, because they were born <b>from God.</b> “Every one who is born from God conquers the world” (1 Jn 5:4).
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<td>Nota autem quod haec praepositio de semper denotat materialem causam, et efficientem, et etiam consubstantialem: dicimus enim quod faber facit cultellum de ferro, et pater generat filium suum de seipso, quia aliquid sui concurrit aliquo modo ad generationem. Haec vero praepositio a semper denotat causam moventem. Haec vero praepositio ex accipitur ut communis, quia importat causam materialem et efficientem, non tamen consubstantialem.
<td>162 Note, however, that this preposition <i>de</i> (“of,” or “from”), always signifies a material cause as well as an efficient and even a consubstantial cause. Thus we say a blacksmith makes a knife <i>de ferro</i> (“from” iron), and a father generates his son <i>de seipso</i> (“from” himself), because something of his concurs somehow in begetting. But the preposition <i>a</i> (“by”) always signifies a moving cause. The preposition <i>ex</i> (“from,” or “by”)—[in the sense of “out of” or “by reason of”]—is taken as something common, since it implies an efficient as well as a material cause, although not a consubstantial cause.
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<td>Unde quia solus filius Dei, qui est verbum, est de substantia patris, imo cum patre est una substantia, alii vero sancti, qui sunt filii adoptivi, non sunt de eius substantia; ideo Evangelista utitur hac praepositione ex, dicens de aliis <i>ex Deo nati sunt</i>; de filio vero naturali, quod de patre est natus.
<td>Consequently, since only the Son of God, who is the Word, is “ <i>of</i> ” (<i>de</i>) the substance of the Father and indeed is one substance with the Father, while the saints, who are adopted sons, are not of his substance, the Evangelist uses the preposition <i>ex,</i> saying of others that they are born <b>from God</b> (<i>ex Deo</i>) <i>,</i> but of the natural Son, he says that he is born of the Father (<i>de Patre</i>) <i>.</i>
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<td>Notandum est etiam quod secundum ultimam expositionem carnalis generationis possumus accipere differentiam carnalis generationis ad spiritualem. Quia enim illa est ex sanguinibus, ideo carnalis; ista vero, quia non est ex sanguinibus, ideo spiritualis; infra III, 6: <i>quod natum est ex carne, caro est, et quod natum est ex spiritu, spiritus est</i>. Item, quia materialis generatio est ex voluntate carnis, idest ex concupiscentia, ideo est immunda, et generat filios peccatores; Eph. II, 3: <i>eramus natura filii irae</i>. Item, quia illa est <i>ex voluntate viri</i>, idest hominis, facit filios hominum; haec vero, quia est ex Deo, facit filios Dei.
<td>163 Note also that in the light of our last exposition of carnal generation, we can discern the difference between carnal and spiritual generation. For since the former is from blood, it is carnal; but the latter, because it is not from blood, is spiritual. “What is born from flesh is itself flesh; and what is born from Spirit is itself spirit” (below 3:6). Again, because material generation is from the desires of the flesh, i.e., from concupiscence, it is unclean and begets children who are sinners: “We were by nature children of wrath” as it says in Ephesians (2:3). Again, because the former is <b>from man’s willing it,</b> that is, from man, it makes children of men; but the latter, because it is from God, makes children of God.
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<td>Si vero hoc quod dicit <i>dedit eis potestatem</i>, voluit referre ad Baptismum, propter quod in filios Dei regeneramur, possumus videre in hoc ordinem Baptismi, ut scilicet primo requiratur fides, quod fit in catechumenis, qui debent primo instrui de fide, ut scilicet credant in nomine eius, et deinde regenerentur per Baptismum, non quidem ex sanguinibus carnaliter, sed ex Deo spiritualiter.
<td>164 But if he intends to refer his statement, <b>he gave them power,</b> to baptism, in virtue of which we are reborn as sons of God, we can detect in his words the order of baptism: that is, the first thing required is faith, as shown in the case of catechumens, who must first be instructed about the faith so that they may believe in his name; then through baptism they are reborn, not carnally from blood, but spiritually from God.
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<td><b>Lectio 7</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 7</b>
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14 καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν,
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14a And the Word was made flesh, and made his dwelling among us.
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<td>Posita necessitate adventus verbi in carnem et etiam utilitate, consequenter Evangelista modum veniendi manifestat dicens <i>et verbum caro factum est</i>. Et secundum hoc continuatur ad hoc quod dixerat: <i>in propria venit</i>; quasi dicat: verbum Dei <i>in propria venit</i>. Sed ne credas ipsum venisse, locum mutando, ostendit modum quo venit, scilicet per incarnationem: eo enim modo venit, quo missus est a patre, a quo missus est, inquantum factus est caro. Gal. IV, 4: <i>misit Deus filium suum, factum ex muliere</i> etc., ubi dicit Augustinus: eo missum, quo factum.
<td>165 Having explained the necessity for the Word’s coming in the flesh as well as the benefits this conferred, the Evangelist now shows the way he came (v 14a). He thus resumes the thread with his earlier statement, <b>he came unto his own.</b> As if to say: The Word of God came unto his own. But lest anyone suppose that he came by changing his location, he shows the manner in which he came, that is, by an incarnation. For he came in the manner in which he was sent by the Father, by whom he was sent, i.e., he was made flesh. “God sent his Son made from a woman” (Gal 4:4). And Augustine says about this that “He was sent in the manner in which he was made.”
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<td>Secundum Chrysostomum autem continuatur ad illud <i>dedit eis potestatem</i> etc.; quasi dicat: si quaeris unde potuit dare hanc potestatem hominibus, ut filii Dei fierent, respondet Evangelista <i>quia verbum caro factum est</i>, dedit nobis quod possemus filii Dei fieri. Gal. IV, 5: <i>misit Deus filium suum, ut adoptionem filiorum Dei reciperemus</i>.
<td>According to Chrysostom, however, he is here continuing the earlier statement, <b>he gave them power to become the sons of God.</b> As if to say: If you wonder how he was able to give this power to men, i.e., that they become sons of God, the Evangelist answers: because <b>the Word was made flesh,</b> he made it possible for us to be made sons of God. “God sent his Son... so that we might receive our adoption as sons” (Gal 4:5).
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<td>Secundum vero Augustinum continuatur sic ad hoc quod dixerat <i>sed ex Deo nati sunt</i>: quasi enim dure videbatur, ut homines ex Deo nascerentur, ideo quasi in argumentum huius dicti, ut scilicet verbum esse credatur, subdit Evangelista illud de quo minus videtur, scilicet quod <i>verbum caro factum est</i>. Quasi dicat: ne mireris si homines ex Deo sunt nati, quia <i>verbum caro factum est</i>, idest Deus factus est homo.
<td>But according to Augustine, he is continuing the earlier statement, <b>who are born from God.</b> For since it seemed a hard saying that men be born from God, then, as though arguing in support of this and to produce belief in the existence of the Word, the Evangelist adds something which seems less seemly, namely, that <b>the Word was made flesh.</b> As if to say: Do not wonder if men are born from God, because <b>the Word was made flesh,</b> i.e., God became man.
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<td>Notandum quod hoc quod dicitur <i>verbum caro factum est</i>, quidam male intelligentes, sumpserunt occasionem erroris. Quidam namque posuerunt verbum ita carnem factum esse ac si ipsum vel aliquid eius sit in carnem conversum, sicut cum farina fit panis, et aer ignis. Et hic fuit Eutiches, qui posuit commixtionem naturarum in Christo, dicens in eo eamdem fuisse Dei et hominis naturam. Sed huius opinionis falsitas manifeste apparet, quia, sicut est dictum supra, <i>verbum erat Deus</i>. Deus autem immutabilis est, ut dicitur Mal. III, 6: <i>ego Deus, et non mutor</i>, unde nullo modo potest esse quod in aliam naturam convertatur. Est ergo dicendum contra Eutichem <i>verbum caro factum est</i>: verbum carnem assumpsit, non quod ipsum verbum sit ipsa caro; sicut si dicamus: homo factus est albus, non quod ipse sit ipsa albedo, sed quod albedinem assumpsit.
<td>166 It should be noted that this statement, <b>the Word was made flesh,</b> has been misinterpreted by some and made the occasion of error. For certain ones have presumed that the Word became flesh in the sense that he or something of him was turned into flesh, as when flour is made into bread, and air becomes fire. One of these was Eutyches, who postulated a mixture of natures in Christ, saying that in him the nature of God and of man was the same. We can clearly see that this is false because, as was said above, “the Word was God.” Now God is immutable, as is said, “I am the Lord, and I do not change” (Mal 3:6). Hence in no way can it be said that he was turned into another nature. Therefore, one must say in opposition to <b>Eutyches, the Word was made flesh,</b> i.e., the Word assumed flesh, but not in the sense that the Word himself is that flesh. It is as if we were to say: “The man became white,” not that he is that whiteness, but that he assued whiteness.
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<td>Fuerunt etiam alii qui, licet crederent verbum non in carnem mutatum sed quod eam assumpsit, tamen dixerunt ipsum assumpsisse carnem sine anima; nam si carnem animatam assumpsisset, dixisset Evangelista: <i>verbum caro</i> cum anima <i>factum est</i>. Et sic fuit error Arii, qui dixit quod in Christo non erat anima, sed verbum Dei erat ibi loco animae.
<td>167 There were others who, although they believed that the Word was not changed into flesh but assumed it, nevertheless said that he assumed flesh without a soul; for if he had assumed flesh with a soul, the Evangelist would have said, “the Word was made flesh with a soul.” This was the error of Arius, who said that there was no soul in Christ, but that the Word of God was there in place of a soul.
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<td>Et huius positionis falsitas apparet, tum quia repugnat sacrae Scripturae, quae in pluribus locis mentionem facit de anima Christi, sicut illud Matth. XXVI, 38: <i>tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem</i>; tum etiam quia quaedam passiones animae recitantur de Christo, quae in verbo Dei nullo modo esse possunt, nec etiam in carne sola, sicut illud Matth. XXVI, 37: <i>coepit Iesus taedere, et maestus esse</i>; tum etiam quia Deus non potest esse forma alicuius corporis; nec etiam Angelus corpori uniri potest per modum formae, cum secundum naturam a corpore sit separatus; anima autem unitur corpori sicut forma. Non igitur verbum Dei corporis forma esse potest.
<td>The falsity of this opinion is obvious, both because it is in conflict with Sacred Scripture, which often mentions the soul of Christ, as: “My soul is sad, even to the point of death” (Mt 26:38), and because certain affections of the soul are observed in Christ which can not possibly exist in the Word of God or in flesh alone: “He began to be sorrowful and troubled” (Mt 26:37). Also, God cannot be the form of a body. Nor can an angel be united to a body as its form, since an angel, according to its very nature, is separated from body, whereas a soul is united to a body as its form. Consequently, the Word of God cannot be the form of a body.
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<td>Praeterea, constat quod caro non sortitur speciem carnis, nisi per animam: quod patet, quia recedente anima a corpore hominis, seu bovis, caro hominis vel bovis, non dicitur caro nisi aequivoce. Si ergo verbum non assumpsit carnem animatam, manifestum est quod non assumpsit carnem. Sed <i>verbum caro factum est</i>; ergo carnem animatam assumpsit.
<td>Furthermore, it is plain that flesh does not acquire the specific nature of flesh except through its soul. This is shown by the fact that when the soul has withdrawn from the body of a man or a cow, the flesh of the man or the cow is called flesh only in an equivocal sense. So if the Word did not assume flesh with a soul, it is obvious that he did not assume flesh. <b>But the Word was made flesh;</b> therefore, he assumed flesh with a soul.
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<td>Fuerunt autem alii, qui, ex hoc moti, dixerunt verbum carnem quidem animatam assumpsisse, sed anima sensitiva tantum, non intellectiva, loco cuius in corpore Christi dixerunt verbum esse. Et hic fuit error Apollinaris, qui quandoque Arium secutus est, tandem propter auctoritates praedictas coactus fuit ponere aliquam animam in Christo, quae posset harum passionum esse subiectum, ita tamen quod ratione et intellectu careret sed loco horum verbum esset in homine Christo.
<td>168 And there were others who, influenced by this, said that the Word did indeed assume flesh with a soul, but this soul was only a sensitive soul, not an intellectual one; the Word took the place of the intellectual soul in Christ’s body. This was the error of Apollinaris. He followed Arius for a time, but later in the face of the [scriptural] authorities cited above, was forced to admit a soul in Christ which could be the subject of these emotions. But he said this soul lacked reason and intellect, and that in the man Christ their place was taken by the Word.
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<td>Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum, quia repugnat auctoritati sacrae Scripturae, in qua quaedam dicuntur de Christo, quae nec in divinitate, nec in anima sensitiva, nec in carne inveniri possunt: sicut illud quod admiratus est, ut dicitur Matth. VIII, 10; admiratio autem est passio animae rationalis et intellectivae, cum sit desiderium cognoscendi causam occultam effectus visi. Sic igitur, sicut tristitia cogit in Christo ponere partem animae sensitivam, contra Arium, ita admiratio cogit ponere in ipso partem animae intellectivam, contra Apollinarem.
<td>This too is obviously false, because it conflicts with the authority of Sacred Scripture in which certain things are said of Christ that cannot be found in his divinity, nor in a sensitive soul, nor in flesh alone; for example, that Christ marvelled, as in Matthew (8:10). For to marvel or wonder is a state which arises in a rational and intellectual soul when a desire arises to know the hidden cause of an observed effect. Therefore, just as sadness compels one to place a sensitive element in the soul of Christ, against Arius, so marvelling or amazement forces one to admit, against Apollinaris, an intellectual element in Christ.
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<td>Idem etiam apparet per rationem. Sicut enim non est caro sine anima, ita non est vera caro humana sine anima humana, quae est anima intellectiva. Si ergo verbum assumpsit carnem animatam anima sensitiva tantum, et non rationali, non assumpsit carnem humanam: et ita non poterit dici: Deus factus est homo.
<td>The same conclusion can be reached by reason. For as there is no flesh without a soul, so there is no human flesh without a human soul, which is an intellectual soul. So if the Word assumed flesh which was animated with a merely sensitive soul to the exclusion of a rational soul, he did not assume human flesh; consequently, one could not say: “God became man.”
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<td>Praeterea ad hoc verbum humanam naturam assumpsit, ut eam repararet. Ergo id reparavit quod assumpsit. Si ergo non assumpsit animam rationalem, non reparasset eam: et sic nullus fructus proveniret nobis ex verbi incarnatione, quod falsum est. <i>Verbum</i> ergo <i>caro factum est</i>, idest carnem animatam anima rationali assumpsit.
<td>Besides, the Word assumed human nature in order to repair it. Therefore, he repaired what he assumed. But if he did not assume a rational soul, he would not have repaired it. Consequently, no fruit would have accrued to us from the incarnation of the Word; and this is false. <b>Therefore, the Word was made flesh,</b> i.e., assumed flesh which was animated by a rational soul.
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<td>Sed forte dicis: si verbum carnem sic animatam assumpsit, quare Evangelista de anima rationali mentionem non fecit, sed de carne solum dicens <i>verbum caro factum est?</i> Respondeo dicendum quod propter quatuor rationes Evangelista hoc fecit.
<td>169 But you may say: If the Word did assume flesh with such a soul, why did the Evangelist not mention “rational soul,” instead of only “flesh,” saying, <b>the Word was made flesh?</b> I answer that the Evangelist had four reasons for doing this.
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<td>Primo ad ostendendum veritatem incarnationis contra Manichaeos, qui dicebant verbum non assumpsisse veram carnem, sed phantasticam tantum, cum non esset conveniens ut boni Dei verbum assumeret carnem, quam ipsi dicebant Diaboli creaturam. Et ideo Evangelista, ut hoc excluderet, fecit de carne specialiter mentionem; sicut et Christus, Lc. XXIV, 39, existimantibus discipulis eum esse phantasma, veritatem resurrectionis ostendit, dicens: <i>spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere</i>.
<td>First, to show the truth of the incarnation against the Manichaeans, who said that the Word did not assume true flesh, but only imaginary flesh, since it would not have been becoming for the Word of the good God to assume flesh, which they regarded as a creature of the devil. And so to exclude this the Evangelist made special mention of the flesh, just as Christ showed the truth of the resurrection to the disciples when they took him for a spirit, saying: “A spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see that I have” (Lk 24:39).
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<td>Secundo ad demonstrandam Dei erga nos magnitudinem benignitatis. Constat enim quod anima rationalis magis conformis est Deo quam caro, et quidem magnum pietatis sacramentum fuisset si verbum assumpsisset animam humanam, utpote sibi conformem, sed assumere etiam carnem elongatam a simplicitate suae naturae, fuit multo amplioris, immo inaestimabilis pietatis indicium; secundum quod apostolus dicit I ad Tim. III, 16: <i>et manifeste magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne</i>. Et ideo ut hoc ostenderet Evangelista, solum de carne mentionem fecit.
<td>Secondly, to show the greatness of God’s kindness to us. For it is evident that the rational soul has a greater conformity to God than does flesh, and that it would have been a great sign of compassion if the Word had assumed a human soul, as being conformed to himself. But to assume flesh too, which is something far removed from the simplicity of his nature, was a sign of a much greater, indeed, of an incomprehensible compassion. As the Apostle says (1 Tim 3:16): “Obviously great is the mystery of godliness which appeared in the flesh.” And so to indicate this, the Evangelist mentioned only flesh.
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<td>Tertio ad demonstrandam veritatem et singularitatem unionis in Christo. Aliis enim hominibus sanctis unitur quidem Deus, quantum ad animam solum; unde dicitur Sap. VII, v. 27: <i>per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, amicos Dei et prophetas constituens</i>. Sed quod verbum Dei uniretur carni, hoc est singulare in Christo, secundum illud in Ps. CXL, 10: <i>singulariter sum ego donec transeam</i>; Iob XXVIII, 17: <i>non adaequabitur ei aurum</i>. Hanc ergo singularitatem unionis in Christo ostendere volens Evangelista, de carne solum mentionem fecit, dicens <i>verbum caro factum est</i>.
<td>Thirdly, to demonstrate the truth and uniqueness of the union in Christ. For God is indeed united to other holy men, but only with respect to their soul; so it is said: “She [wisdom] passes into holy souls, making them friends of God and prophets” (Wis 7:27). But that the Word of God is united to flesh is unique to Christ, according to the Psalmist: “I am alone until I pass” (Ps 140:10). “Gold cannot equal it” (Jb 28:17). So the Evangelist, wishing to show the uniqueness of the union in Christ, mentioned only the flesh, saying, <b>the Word was made flesh.</b>
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<td>Quarto ad insinuandam congruitatem humanae reparationis. Homo enim per carnem infirmabatur, et ideo Evangelista volens insinuare adventum verbi congruum esse nostrae reparationi, mentionem de carne specialiter fecit, ut ostenderet quod caro infirma per carnem verbi reparata fuit; et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, 3: <i>nam quod impossibile erat legi, in quo infirmabatur per carnem, Deus filium suum mittens in similitudinem carnis peccati, et de peccato damnavit peccatum in carne</i>.
<td>Fourthly, to suggest its relevance to man’s restoration For man was weak because of the flesh. And thus the Evangelist, wishing to suggest that the coming of’ the Word was suited to the task of our restoration, made special mention of the flesh in order to show that the weak flesh was repaired by the flesh of the Word. And this is what the Apostle says: “The law was powerless because it was weakened by the flesh. God, sending his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and in reparation for sin, condemned sin in his flesh” (Rom 83).
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<td>Sed quaeritur, quare Evangelista non dixit verbum carnem assumpsit, sed potius <i>verbum caro factum est</i>. Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc ideo fecit, ut excluderet errorem Nestorii, qui dixit in Christo fuisse duas personas, et duos filios, et alium esse filium virginis: unde non concedebat quod beata virgo esset mater Dei.
<td>170 A question arises as to why the Evangelist did not say that the Word assumed flesh, but rather that <b>the Word was made flesh.</b> I answer that he did this to exclude the error of Nestorius. He said that in Christ there were two persons and two sons, [one being the Son of God] the other being the son of the Virgin. Thus he did not admit that the Blessed Virgin was the mother of God.
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<td>Sed secundum hoc Deus non esset factus homo; quia impossibile est quod duorum singularium, quae diversa sunt secundum suppositum, unum praedicetur de alio. Unde si alia est persona verbi, seu suppositum, et alia persona hominis, seu suppositum in Christo, tunc non erit verum quod dicit Evangelista <i>verbum caro factum est</i>. Ad hoc enim fit aliquid, ut sit; si ergo verbum non esset homo, non posset dici quod verbum sit factum homo. Et ideo signanter Evangelista dixit <i>factum est</i>, et non dixit assumpsit, ut ostendat quod unio verbi ad carnem non est talis qualis est assumptio prophetarum, qui non assumebantur in unitatem suppositi, sed ad actum propheticum: sed est talis quod Deum vere faceret hominem, et hominem Deum, idest quod Deus esset homo.
<td>But if this were so, it would mean that God did not become man, for one particular <i>suppositum</i> cannot be predicated of another. Accordingly, if the person or <i>suppositum</i> of the Word is different than the person or <i>suppositum</i> of the man, in Christ, then what the Evangelist says is not true, namely, <b>the Word was made flesh.</b> For a thing is made or becomes something in order to be it; if, then, the Word is not man, it could not be said that the Word became man. And so the Evangelist expressly said was made, and not “assumed,” to show that the union of the Word to flesh is not such as was the “lifting up” of the prophets, who were not “taken up” into a unity of person, but for the prophetic act. This union is such as would truly make God man and man God, i.e., that God would be man.
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<td>Fuerunt et alii, qui non intelligentes modum incarnationis, posuerunt quidem assumptionem praedictam esse terminatam ad veritatem personae, confitentes in Deo unam personam Dei et hominis; sed tamen dicunt in ipso fuisse duas hypostases, sive duo supposita, unum naturae humanae creatum, et temporale, aliud divinae increatum, et aeternum. Et talis est prima opinio quae ponitur III Sent. dist. VI.
<td>171 There were some, too, who, misunderstanding the manner of the incarnation, did indeed admit that the aforesaid assumption was terminated at a oneness of person, acknowledging in God one person of God and man. But they said that in him there were two hypostases, i.e., two <i>supposita;</i> one of a human nature, created and non-eternal, ‘and the other of the divine nature, non-created and eternal. This is the first opinion presented in the <i>Sentences</i> (III, d6).
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<td>Sed secundum hanc opinionem non habet veritatem ista propositio: Deus factus est homo, et homo factus est Deus. Et ideo haec opinio damnata est tamquam haeretica in quinto Concilio, ubi dicitur: si quis in domino Iesu Christo unam personam, et duas hypostases dixerit, anathema sit. Et ideo Evangelista, ut omnem assumptionem excluderet, quae non terminatur ad unitatem personae, utitur hoc verbo <i>factum est</i>.
<td>According to this opinion the proposition, “God was made man and man was made God,” is not true. Consequently, this opinion was condemned as heretical by the Fifth Council, where it is said: “If anyone shall assert one person and two hypostases in the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.” And so the Evangelist, to exclude any assumption not terminated at a oneness of person, says, was made.
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<td>Si vero quaeris quomodo verbum est homo, dicendum quod eo modo est homo quo quicumque alius est homo, scilicet habens humanam naturam. Non quod verbum sit ipsa humana natura, sed est divinum suppositum unitum humanae naturae. Hoc autem quod dicitur <i>verbum caro factum est</i>, non aliquam mutationem in verbo, sed solum in natura assumpta de novo in unitatem personae divinae dicit. <i>Et verbum caro factum est</i>, per unionem ad carnem. Unio autem relatio quaedam est. Relationes autem de novo dictae de Deo in respectu ad creaturas, non important mutationem ex parte Dei, sed ex parte creaturae novo modo se habentis ad Deum.
<td>172 If you ask how the Word is man, it must be said that he is man in the way that anyone is, man, namely, as having human nature. Not that the Word is human nature itself, but he is a divine suppo <i>situm</i> united to a human nature. The statement, <b>the Word was made flesh,</b> does not indicate any change in the Word, but only in the nature newly assumed into the oneness of a divine person. <b>And the Word was made flesh</b> through a union to flesh. Now a union is a relation. And relations newly said of God with respect to creatures do not imply a change on the side of God, but on the side of the creature relating in a new way to God.
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<td>Sequitur <i>et habitavit in nobis</i>; quod quidem dupliciter distinguitur a praemissis. Primo ut dicatur quod supra Evangelista egit de verbi incarnatione, dicens <i>verbum caro factum est</i>; hic vero modum incarnationis insinuat, dicens <i>et habitavit in nobis</i>. Secundum enim Chrysostomum et Hilarium, per hoc quod Evangelista dicit <i>verbum caro factum est</i>, posset aliquis intelligere quod sit conversum in carnem, et non sint in Christo duae naturae distinctae, sed una tantum natura ex humana et divina commixta; ideo Evangelista hoc excludens, subiunxit <i>et habitavit in nobis</i>, idest in nostra natura, ut tamen in sua maneret distinctum. Illud enim quod in aliquid convertitur, non manet ab eo in quod convertitur secundum naturam distinctum;
<td>173 Now follows, <b>and made his dwelling among us.</b> This is distinguished in two ways from what went before. The first consists in stating that above the Evangelist dealt with the incarnation of the Word when he said, <b>the Word was made flesh;</b> but now he touches on the manner of the incarnation, saying, <b>and made his dwelling among us.</b> For according to Chrysostom and Hilary, by the Evangelist saying <b>the Word was made flesh,</b> someone might think that he was converted into flesh and that there are not two distinct natures in Christ, but only one nature compounded from the human and divine natures. And so the Evangelist, excluding this, added, <b>and made his dwelling among us,</b> i.e., in our nature, yet so as to remain distinct in his own. For what is converted into something does not remain distinct in its nature from that into which it is converted.
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<td>quod autem ab aliquo non distinguitur, non inhabitat illud; quia habitare distinctionem inhabitantis et in quo habitat importat. Sed verbum habitavit in nostra natura ergo naturaliter est ab ipsa distinctum. Et ideo inquantum humana natura a natura verbi fuit in Christo distincta, dicitur habitaculum divinitatis et templum, iuxta illud infra II, 21: <i>hoc autem dicebat de templo corporis sui</i>.
<td>Furthermore, something which is not distinct from another does not dwell in it, because to dwell implies a distinction between the dweller and that in which it dwells. But the Word dwelt in our nature; therefore, he is distinct in nature from it. And so, inasmuch as human nature was distinct from the nature of the Word in Christ, the former is called the dwelling place and temple of the divinity, according to John (2:21): “But he spoke of the temple of his body.”
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<td>Et quidem, quamvis a praedictis sanctis hoc sane dicatur, cavenda est tamen calumnia quam aliqui ex hoc incurrunt. Nam antiqui doctores et sancti, emergentes errores circa fidem ita persequebantur, ut interdum viderentur in errores labi contrarios; sicut Augustinus contra Manichaeos, qui destruebant libertatem arbitrii, taliter disputat, quod videtur in haeresim Pelagii incidisse. Hoc igitur modo Evangelista Ioannes, ne per hoc quod dixerat <i>verbum caro factum est</i>, intelligeretur in Christo confusio vel transmutatio naturarum, subiunxit <i>et habitavit in nobis</i>:
<td>174 Now although what is said here by these holy men is orthodox, care must be taken to avoid the reproach which some receive for this. For the early doctors and saints were so intent upon refuting the emerging errors concerning the faith that they seemed meanwhile to fall into the opposite ones. For example, Augustine, speaking against the Manichaeans, who destroyed the freedom of the will, disputed in such terms that he seemed to have fallen into the heresy of Pelagius. Along these lines, John the Evangelist added, <b>and made his dwelling among us,</b> so that we would not think there was a mingling or transformation of natures in Christ because he had said, <b>the Word was made flesh.</b>
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<td>ex quo verbo Nestorius occasionem sumens erroris, dixit, filium Dei sic esse unitum homini ut tamen Dei et hominis non esset una persona: voluit enim quod verbum per solam inhabitationem per gratiam fuerit humanae naturae unitum. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod filius Dei non sit homo.
<td>Nestorius misunderstood this phrase, <b>and made his dwelling among us,</b> and said that the Son of God was united to man in such a way that there was not one person of God and of man. For he held that the Word was united to human nature only by an indwelling through grace. From this, however, it follows that the Son of God is not man.
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<td>Ad quorum evidentiam sciendum est quod in Christo duo considerare possumus, scilicet naturam et personam. Secundum naturam autem attenditur in Christo distinctio, non secundum personam, quae una et eadem est in duabus naturis; quia humana natura in Christo fuit assumpta in unitatem personae. Inhabitatio ergo, quam ponunt sancti, referenda est ad naturam, ut dicatur quod <i>habitavit in nobis</i>, idest natura verbi inhabitavit naturam nostram, non secundum hypostasim seu personam, quae est eadem utriusque naturae in Christo.
<td>175 To clarify this we should know that we can consider two things in Christ: his nature and person. In Christ there is a distinction in nature, but not in person, which is one and the same in the two natures, since the human nature in Christ was assumed into a oneness of person. Therefore, the indwelling which the saints speak of must be referred to the nature, so as to say, he <b>made his dwelling among us,</b> i.e., the nature of the Word inhabited our nature; not according to the hypostasis or person, which is the same for both natures in Christ.
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<td>Quod autem blasphemat Nestorius, auctoritate sacrae Scripturae evidenter refellitur. Apostolus enim Phil. II, 6 unionem Dei et hominis exinanitionem vocat, dicens de filio Dei: <i>qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est se esse aequalem Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens</i>. Non autem dicitur Deus exinaniri Deus ex eo quod creaturam rationalem per gratiam inhabitet, quia sic pater et spiritus sanctus exinanirentur, cum et ipsi inhabitare hominem dicantur per gratiam; dicit enim Christus de se et de patre loquens, infra XIV, 23: <i>ad eum veniemus et mansionem apud eum faciemus</i>. De spiritu autem sancto dicit apostolus, I Cor. III, 16: <i>spiritus Dei habitat in nobis</i>.
<td>176 The blasphemy of Nestorius is further refuted by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For the Apostle calls the union of God and man an emptying, saying of the Son of God: “He, being in the form of God... emptied himself, taking the form of a servant” (Phil 2:6). Clearly, God is not said to empty himself insofar as he dwells in the rational creature by grace, because then the Father and the Holy Spirit would be emptying themselves, since they too are said to dwell in man through grace: for Christ, speaking of himself and of the Father says, “We will come to him and make our home with him” (below 14:23); and of the Holy Spirit the Apostle says: “The Spirit of God dwells in us” (1 Cor 3:16).
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<td>Praeterea, si Christus personaliter Deus non esset, praesumptuosissime dixisset: <i>ego et pater unum sumus</i>; et <i>antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum</i>. Ego autem personam loquentis demonstrat; homo autem erat, qui loquebatur; unum cum patre praeexistebat Abrahae.
<td>Furthermore, if Christ was not God as to his person, he would have been most presumptuous to say: “I and the Father are one” (below 10:30), and “Before Abraham came to be, I am,” as is said below (8:58). Now “I” refers to the person of the speaker. And the one who was speaking was a man, who, as one with the Father, existed before Abraham.
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<td>Potest etiam aliter continuari, ut dicatur quod supra egit de verbi incarnatione, nunc autem agit de verbi incarnati conversatione, dicens <i>et habitavit in nobis</i>, idest inter nos apostolos conversatus est familiariter, secundum quod dicit Petrus, Act. I, 21: <i>in omni tempore quo intravit et exivit inter nos dominus Iesus</i>. Baruch IV, 38: <i>post haec in terris visus est</i>.
<td>177 However, another connection [besides that given in 173] with what went before is possible, by saying that above he dealt with the incarnation of the Word, but that now he is treating the manner of life of the incarnate Word, saying, he <b>made his dwelling among us,</b> i.e., he lived on familiar terms with us apostles. Peter alludes to this when he says, “During all the time that the Lord Jesus came and went among us” (Acts 1:21). “Afterwards, he was seen on earth” (Bar 3:38).
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<td>Hoc autem Evangelista addidit propter duo. Primo ut ostendat mirabilem conformitatem verbi ad homines, inter quos sic conversatus est, ut videretur quasi unus ex eis. Non solum enim in natura voluit assimilari hominibus, sed etiam in convictu et familiari conversatione absque peccato, cum eis voluit esse simul, ut sic homines suae conversationis dulcedine allectos traheret ad seipsum.
<td>178 The Evangelist added this for two reasons. First, to show the marvelous likeness of the Word to men, among whom he lived in such a way as to seem one of them. For he not only willed to be like men in nature, but also in living with them on close terms without sin, in order to draw to himself men won over by the charm of his way of life.
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<td>Secundo ut ostendat sui testimonii veritatem. Evangelista enim supra de verbo magna quaedam dixerat et adhuc multa de eo mirabilia dicturus erat, et ideo ut eius testimonium credibilius fieret, accepit quasi in veritatis argumentum, se cum Christo conversatum fuisse, dicens <i>et habitavit in nobis</i>. Quasi dicat: bene possum testimonium perhibere de ipso quia cum ipso conversatus sum; I Io. c. I, 1: <i>quod fuit ab initio, quod audivimus, quod vidimus oculis nostris, quod perspeximus, et manus nostrae contrectaverunt de verbo vitae</i> etc., et Act. X, 40: <i>dedit eum manifestum fieri, non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo idest nobis qui manducavimus et bibimus cum illo</i>.
<td>Secondly, to show the truthfulness of his [the Evangelist’s] statements. For the Evangelist had already said many great things about the Word, and was yet to mention more wonderful things about him; and so that his testimony would be more credible he took as a proof of his truthfulness the fact that he had lived with Christ, saying, he <b>made his dwelling among us.</b> As if to say: I can well bear witness to him, because I lived on close terms with him. “We tell you... what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes” (1 Jn 1:1); “God raised him up on the third day, and granted that he be seen, not by all the people, but by witnesses preordained by God,” that is, “to us who ate and drank with him” (Acts 10:40).
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<td><b>Lectio 8</b>
<td><b>LECTURE 8</b>
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<blockquote>
καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ,<br>
δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας.
</blockquote>
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<blockquote>
14b And we have seen his glory,<br>
the glory as of the Only Begotten of the Father,<br>
full of grace and truth.
</blockquote>
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<td>Posita verbi incarnatione, hic consequenter Evangelista insinuat verbi incarnati evidentiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit modum manifestationis verbi incarnati; secundo utrumque modum exponit, ibi <i>de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus</i>. Innotuit autem apostolis verbum incarnatum dupliciter. Primo quidem per visum acceperunt de eo notitiam; secundo per auditum ex testimonio Ioannis Baptistae. Primo ergo manifestat quid de verbo viderunt; secundo quid a Ioanne audierunt, ibi <i>Ioannes testimonium perhibet de ipso</i>.
<td>179 Having set forth the incarnation of the Word, the Evangelist then begins to give the evidence for the incarnate Word. He does two things about this. First, he shows the ways in which the incarnate Word was made known. Secondly, he clarifies each way, below (1:16). Now the incarnate Word was made known to the apostles in two ways: first of all, they obtained knowledge of him by what they saw; secondly, by what they heard of the testimony of John the Baptist. So first, he states what they saw about the Word; secondly, what they heard from John (v 15).
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<td>Dicit autem tria de verbo. Primo eius gloriae manifestationem; unde dicit <i>et vidimus gloriam eius</i>; secundo eius gloriae singularitatem, cum subdit <i>quasi unigeniti</i>; tertio huius gloriae determinationem, quia <i>plenum gratiae et veritatis</i>.
<td>He states three things about the Word. First, the manifestation of his glory; hence he says, <b>we have seen his glory.</b> Secondly, the uniqueness of his glory, when he adds, as <b>of the Only Begotten.</b> Thirdly, the precise nature of this glory, because <b>full of grace and truth.</b>
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<td>Hoc autem quod dicit <i>vidimus gloriam eius</i>, potest continuari ad praecedentia tripliciter. Primo ut sit argumentum eius quod dixerat <i>verbum caro factum est</i>: quasi dicat: ex hoc habeo et scio quod verbum Dei est incarnatum, quia ego et alii apostoli vidimus gloriam eius. Infra III, 11: <i>quod scimus, loquimur: et quod vidimus, testamur</i>. Et I Io. c. I, 1: <i>quod fuit ab initio, quod audivimus, quod vidimus oculis nostris</i> et cetera.
<td>180 <b>And we have seen his glory,</b> can be connected in three ways with what went before. First, it can be taken as an argument for his having said, <b>the Word was made flesh.</b> As if to say: I hold and know that the Word of God was incarnate because I and the other apostles have seen his glory. “We know of what we speak, and we bear witness of what we see” (below 3:11). “We tell you... what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes” (1 Jn 1:1).
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<td>Secundo continuatur, secundum Chrysostomum, ut sit expressivum multiplicis beneficii. Quasi dicat: non solum hoc beneficium collatum est nobis per incarnationem verbi, scilicet quod efficiamur filii Dei, sed etiam quod videamus gloriam. Oculi enim debiles et infirmi lucem solis non possunt videre; sed tunc eam videre possunt, cum in nube vel in aliquo corpore opaco resplendet. Ante incarnationem enim verbi mentes humanae erant invalidae ad videndum in seipsa lucem divinam, quae illuminat omnem rationalem naturam; et ideo ut a nobis facilius cerni contemplarique posset nube nostrae carnis se texit, iuxta illud Ex. XVI, 10: <i>respexerunt ad solitudinem, et viderunt gloriam domini in nube</i>, idest verbum Dei in carne.
<td>181 Secondly, according to Chrysostom, the connection is made by taking this statement as expressing many benefits. As if to say: The incarnation of the Word not only conferred on us the benefit of becoming sons of God, but also the good of seeing his glory. For dull and feeble eyes cannot see the light of the sun; but they can see it when it shines in a cloud or on some opaque body. Now before the incarnation of the Word, human minds were incapable of seeing the divine light in itself, the light which enlightens every rational nature. And so, in order that it might be more easily seen and contemplated by us, he covered it with the cloud of our flesh: “They looked towards the desert, and saw the glory of the Lord in a cloud” (Ex 16:10), i.e., the Word of God in the flesh.
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<td>Secundum Augustinum autem continuatur sic quod referatur ad beneficium gratiae. Spirituales enim oculi hominum non solum naturaliter deficiebant a contemplatione divinae lucis, sed etiam ex defectu peccati, secundum illud Ps. LVII, 9: <i>supercecidit ignis</i>, scilicet concupiscentiae, <i>et non viderunt solem</i>, scilicet iustitiae. Ut ergo ipsa divina lux posset a nobis videri, sanavit oculos hominum, faciens de carne sua salutare collirium, ut sic oculos ex concupiscentia carnis corruptos verbum collirio suae carnis curaret. Et inde est quod statim cum verbum factum est caro, dixerunt <i>et vidimus gloriam eius</i>. Ad hoc significandum fecit dominus lutum ex sputo, et linivit oculus caeci nati, infra IX, 6. Lutum quidem de terra est, sputum autem a capite derivatur. Ita in persona Christi, natura quidem humana assumpta de terra est; verbum vero incarnatum a capite est, scilicet a Deo patre. Hoc ergo lutum statim cum appositum fuit oculis hominum, <i>vidimus gloriam eius</i>.
<td>182 According to Augustine, however, the connection refers to the gift of grace. For the failure of the spiritual eyes of men to contemplate the divine light is due not only to their natural limitations but also to the defects incurred by sin: “Fire,” that is, of concupiscence, “fell on them, and they did not see the sun,” of justice (Ps 57:9). Hence in order that the divine light might be seen by us, he healed our eyes, making an eye salve of his flesh, so that with the salve of his flesh the Word might heal our eyes, weakened by the concupiscence of the flesh. And this is why just after saying, <b>the Word was made flesh,</b> he says, <b>we have seen his glory.</b> To indicate this the Lord made clay from his saliva and spread the clay upon the eyes of the man born blind (below 9:6). For clay is from the earth, but saliva comes from the head. Similarly, in the person of Christ, his human naure was assumed from the earth; but the incarnate Word is from the head, i.e., from God the Father. So, when this clay was spread on the eyes of men, <b>we saw his glory.</b>
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<td>Hanc autem verbi gloriam Moyses videre optavit, dicens <i>ostende mihi gloriam tuam</i> (Ex. XXXIII, 18). Sed eam videre non meruit: immo dictum est ei a domino: <i>posteriora mea videbis</i>, idest umbras et figuras. Apostoli vero ipsam claritatem viderunt; II Cor. III, 18: <i>nos autem revelata facie gloriam Dei speculantes in eamdem imaginem transformamur de claritate in claritatem</i>. Moyses enim et alii prophetae verbi gloriam manifestandam mundo in fine temporum speculabantur in aenigmatibus et figuris; unde dicit apostolus, infra XII: <i>haec dixit Isaias, quando vidit gloriam eius</i>. Apostoli autem ipsam verbi claritatem per praesentiam corporalem viderunt. II Cor. III, v. 18: <i>nos autem revelata facie</i> etc.; et Lc. c. X, 23: <i>beati oculi qui vident quae vos videtis. Multi enim reges et prophetae voluerunt videre quae vos videtis et non viderunt</i>.
<td>183 This is the glory of the Word Moses longed to see, saying, “Show me your glory” (Ex 32:18). But he did not deserve to see it; indeed, he was answered by the Lord: “You shall see my back” (Ex 33:23), i.e., shadows and figures. But the apostles saw his brightness: “All of us, gazing on the Lord’s glory with unveiled faces, are being transformed from glory to glory into his very image” (2 Cor 3:18). For Moses and the other prophets saw in an obscure manner and in figures the glory of the Word that was to be manifested to the world at the end of their times; hence the Apostle says: “Now we see through a mirror, in an obscure manner, but then face to face” in 1 Corinthians (13:12); and below (12:41), “Isaiah said this when he saw his glory.” But the apostles saw the very brilliance of the Word through his bodily presence: “All of us, gazing on the Lord’s glory,” and so forth (2 Cor 3:18); “Blessed are the eyes which see what you see. For many kings and prophets desired to see what you see, and did not see it” (Lk 10:23).
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<td>Consequenter cum dicit <i>gloriam quasi unigeniti</i>, ostendit gloriae eius singularitatem. Cum enim de quibusdam hominibus inveniatur quod fuerunt gloriosi, sicut de Moyse legitur Ex. XXXIV, 29: <i>et facies eius facta est splendida</i>, vel <i>cornuta</i>, secundum aliam litteram, posset aliquis dicere quod ex hoc quod viderunt eum gloriosum, non debet dici quod verbum Dei sit factum caro. Sed hoc Evangelista excludit, dicens <i>gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre</i>. Quasi dicat: gloria eius non est sicut gloria Angeli, vel Moysis, et Eliae, vel Elisei, vel cuiusque alterius, sed <i>quasi unigeniti</i>; quia, ut dicitur Hebr. III, 3: <i>ampliori gloria iste prae Moyse dignus est habitus</i>. Ps. LXXXVIII, 7: <i>quis similis Deo in filiis Dei?</i>
<td>184 Then when he says, <b>the glory as of the Only Begotten,</b> he shows the uniqueness of his glory. For since it is written of certain men that they were in glory, as of Moses it says that “his face shone” (Ex 34:29), or was “horned,” according to another text, someone might say that from the fact that they saw him [Jesus] in glory, it should not be said that the Word of God was made flesh. But the Evangelist excludes this when he says, <b>the glory as of the Only Begotten of the Father.</b> As if to say: His glory is not like the glory of an angel, or of Moses, or Elijah, or Elisha, or anything like that. but <b>the glory as of the Only Begotten;</b> for as it is said, “He [Jesus] was counted worthy of more glory than Moses” (Heb 3:3); “Who among the sons of God is like God?” (Ps 88:7).
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<td>Hoc autem quod dicit <i>quasi</i> est expressivum veritatis, secundum Gregorium, et est modus, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Sicut si aliquis vidisset regem multiplici gloria incedentem, et interrogatus ab aliquo, qualiter regem vidisset, volens se expedire, illam multiplicem gloriam uno verbo exprimeret, dicens quod ipse incedebat sicut rex, idest sicut regem decebat; ita hic Evangelista, quasi interrogaretur ab aliquo, qualis esset gloria verbi quam viderat, non valens eam plene exprimere, dicit eam esse <i>quasi unigeniti a patre</i>, idest talem qualem decebat unigenitum Dei.
<td>185 The word "as", according to Gregory, is used to express the fact. But according to Chrysostom, it expresses the manner of the fact: as if someone were to see a king approaching in great glory and being asked by another to describe the king he saw, he could, if he wanted to be brief, express the grandeur of his glory in one word, and say that he approached “as” a king, i.e., as became a king. So too, here, the Evangelist, as though asked by someone to describe the glory of the Word which he had seen, and being unable to fully express it, said that it was “as” of the Only Begotten of the Father, i.e., such as became the Only Begotten of God.
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<td>Attenditur autem singularitas gloriae verbi quantum ad quatuor. Primo quantum ad patris testimonium, quod filio reddidit. Quia Ioannes fuit unus de tribus qui viderant Christum transfiguratum in monte, et audierunt vocem patris dicentis: <i>hic est filius meus dilectus, in quo mihi bene complacui</i>; et de ista gloria dicitur II Petr. I, 17: <i>accepit a Deo patre honorem et gloriam, voce delapsa ad eum huiuscemodi a magnifica gloria: hic est filius meus dilectus</i>.
<td>186 The uniqueness of the glory of the Word is brought out in four ways. First, in the testimony which the Father gave to the Son. For John was one of the three who had seen Christ transfigured on the mountain and heard the, voice of the Father saying: “This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased” (Mt 17:5). Of this glory it is said, “He received honor and glory from God the Father... ‘This is my beloved Son’” (2 Pt 1:17)
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<td>Secundo quantum ad Angelorum ministerium. Nam ante incarnationem Christi homines erant Angelis subiecti; postmodum vero, Christo subiecti ministraverunt, Matth. IV, 11: <i>tunc accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant ei</i>.
<td>Secondly, it is brought out by the service of the angels. For prior to the incarnation of Christ, men were subject to the angels. But after it, angels ministered, as subjects, to Christ. “Angels came and ministered to him” (Mt 4:11).
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<td>Tertio vero quantum ad naturae obsequium. Tota enim natura Christo obediens ei obsequebatur ad nutum, utpote ab ipso instituta, quia <i>omnia per ipsum facta sunt</i>: quod quidem nec Angelis, nec alicui alii creaturae concessum est, nisi soli verbo incarnato. Et hoc est quod dicitur Matth. VIII, 27: <i>qualis est iste, quia mare et venti obediunt ei?</i>
<td>Thirdly, it is brought out by the submission of nature. For all nature obeyed Christ and heeded his slightest command, as something established by him, because “All things were made through him” (above 1:3). This is something granted neither to angels nor to any creature, but to the incarnate Word alone. And this is what we read, “What kind of man is this, for the winds and the sea obey him?” (Mt 8:27).
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<td>Quarto quantum ad docendi, seu operandi modum. Moyses enim et alii prophetae non propria auctoritate praecepta dabant et homines instruebant, sed Dei; unde dicebant: <i>haec dicit dominus</i> etc.; et: <i>locutus est dominus ad Moysen</i> et cetera. Christus vero loquitur tamquam dominus et potestatem habens, idest propria virtute: unde dicebat, Matth. V, v. 22: <i>ego dico vobis</i> etc.; propter quod in fine sermonis eius in monte dicitur, quod erat docens quasi <i>potestatem habens</i> et cetera. Item, alii sancti operabantur miracula virtute non sua; Christus vero virtute propria; unde dicitur Mc. I, 27: <i>quaenam est haec nova doctrina, quia in potestate etiam spiritibus immundis imperat, et obediunt ei?</i> Sic ergo singularis est gloria verbi.
<td>Fourthly, we see it in the way he taught and acted. For Moses and the other prophets gave commands to men and taught them not on their own authority, but on the authority of God. So they said: “The Lord says this”; and “The Lord spoke to Moses.” But Christ speaks as the Lord, and as one having power, i.e., by reason of his own power. Hence he says, “I say to you” (Mt 5:22). This is the reason why, at the end of the Sermon on the Mountain, it is said that he taught as one “having authority” (Mt 7:29). Furthermore, other holy men worked miracles, but not by their own power. But Christ worked them by his own power. In these ways, then, the glory of the Word is unique.
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<td>Nota autem quod aliquando dicimus in Scriptura Christum unigenitum, sicut hic, et infra: <i>unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris ipse enarravit</i>. Aliquando vero dicimus ipsum primogenitum; Hebr. I, 6: <i>et cum iterum introducit primogenitum in orbem terrae, dicit: et adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei</i>. Quod ideo est, quod sicut totius sanctae Trinitatis proprium est esse Deum, ita verbo Dei proprium est quod sit Deus genitus: et quandoque quidem nominamus Deum, secundum quod est in se, et sic ipse solus singulariter est Deus per essentiam suam. Unde hoc modo dicimus quod est tantum unus Deus, secundum illud Deut. VI, 4: <i>audi Israel, dominus Deus tuus, unus est</i>. Quandoque nomen deitatis derivamus etiam ad alios, secundum quod aliqua similitudo divinitatis ad homines derivatur: et sic dicimus multos deos, secundum illud I Cor. VIII, 5: <i>siquidem sunt dii multi, et domini multi</i>.
<td>187 Note that sometimes in Scripture we call Christ the Only Begotten, as here, and below (1:18): “it is the Only Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, who has made him known.” At other times we call him the First-born: “When he brings the Firstborn into the world, he says, ‘Let all the angels of God adore him’ “ (Heb 1:6). The reason for this is that just as it belongs to the whole Blessed Trinity to be God, so it belongs to the Word of God to be God Begotten. Sometimes, too, he is called God according to what he is in himself; and in this way he alone is uniquely God by his own essence. It is in this way that we say there is but one God: “Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one” (Dt 6:4). At times, we even apply the name of deity to others, insofar as a certain likeness of the divinity is given to men; in this sense we speak of many gods: “Indeed, there are many gods and many lords” (1 Cor 8:5).
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<td>Eodem modo ergo, si consideremus proprietatem filii qua genitus est, quantum ad modum quo sibi ista filiatio attribuitur, scilicet per naturam, dicimus ipsum unigenitum Dei: quia cum ipse solus sit naturaliter genitus a patre, unus tantum est genitus Dei. Si vero consideremus ipsum filium, secundum quod per similitudinem ad ipsum filiatio derivatur ad alios, sic sunt multi filii Dei per participationem. Et quia per eius similitudinem dicuntur filii Dei, ideo ipse dicitur primogenitus omnium. Rom. VIII, 29: <i>quos praescivit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus</i>.