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[{"tags":["Family law – Matrimonial proceedings – Jurisdiction – Whether parties who have consented to the grant of interim judgment entitled to a stay of ancillary reliefs on the ground of forum non conveniens","Family law – Ancillary powers of court – Pre-nuptial agreements – Whether case management stay should be granted pending conclusion of foreign proceedings on validity of pre-nuptial agreement","Conflict of laws – Natural forum – Stay of proceedings – Whether Singapore court is an appropriate forum in light of concurrent foreign proceedings"],"date":"2025-01-02","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce Suit No. 249 of 2023, (Summons No. 930 of 2022)","title":"XFS v XFT","citation":"[2025] SGFC 1","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32700-SSP.xml","counsel":["Mr Chiok Beng Piow (AM Legal LLC) and Ms Chuah Hui Fen Christine (D' Bi An LLC) for the Plaintiff","Mr Ivan Cheong, Mr Shaun Ho and Ms Imogen Harvey (Withers KhattarWong LLP) for the Defendant."],"timestamp":"2025-01-10T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kevin Ho","html":"<root><head><title>XFS v XFT</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XFS <em>v</em> XFT </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32700-SSP.xml')\">[2025] SGFC 1</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce Suit No. 249 of 2023, (Summons No. 930 of 2022)</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">02 January 2025</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kevin Ho </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Mr Chiok Beng Piow (AM Legal LLC) and Ms Chuah Hui Fen Christine (D' Bi An LLC) for the Plaintiff; Mr Ivan Cheong, Mr Shaun Ho and Ms Imogen Harvey (Withers KhattarWong LLP) for the Defendant. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XFS — XFT </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Matrimonial proceedings</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Jurisdiction</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Whether parties who have consented to the grant of interim judgment entitled to a stay of ancillary reliefs on the ground of forum non conveniens</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Ancillary powers of court</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Pre-nuptial agreements</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Whether case management stay should be granted pending conclusion of foreign proceedings on validity of pre-nuptial agreement</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Conflict of laws</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Natural forum</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Stay of proceedings</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Whether Singapore court is an appropriate forum in light of concurrent foreign proceedings</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">2 January 2025</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kevin Ho:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 The present application, <em>vide</em>. FC/SUM 930/2023 (“SUM 930”), was filed by the Defendant-Husband (“Husband”) in March 2023 seeking a stay of the divorce proceedings in FC/D 249/2023 (“D 249”) which were commenced by the Plaintiff-Wife (“Wife”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 To better appreciate the context surrounding the present application and the implications of the orders sought in SUM 930, one must first consider the procedural history of D 249.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The Wife commenced D 249 in January 2023. The Husband, who was served the divorce papers, filed a Memorandum of Appearance around a month later indicating his intention to contest the proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 The Husband then filed SUM 930 on 22 March 2023 and sought a stay of the divorce proceedings pending the conclusion of a specific legal action in Israel (which he had commenced against the Wife) on the ground of “<em>forum non conveniens</em>”. This was followed by a Defence and Counterclaim which the Husband filed in May 2023.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 In a somewhat unusual turn of events, the parties reached an agreement that they would proceed with D 249 on an uncontested basis in relation to the <em>grounds of divorce</em> (<em>ie</em>. on both the Wife’s and the Husband’s unreasonable behaviour). Both parties filed amended pleadings in September 2023 – the Wife filed her amended Statement of Claim and Statement Particulars, and the Husband filed his amended Counterclaim.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 Interim Judgment for Divorce (“IJ”) was thus granted on 7 November 2023.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 Even though the IJ had been granted, it remained the Husband’s position that he would continue to pursue SUM 930. That effectively meant that the stay of proceedings he had sought in SUM 930 would relate only to the proceedings for ancillary matters (“AM”) relief in D 249 since the grounds for the parties’ divorce were already fully and finally determined in the IJ.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 Following the grant of the IJ, the Husband applied for and obtained permission from the Court to formally amend SUM 930 to refer only to the AM reliefs sought in the pleadings,<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> as well as to include a general reference to all the legal proceedings which were pending before the Israeli courts (“Israeli Proceedings”). By that time, there were multiple lawsuits between the parties in Israel. I will address the Israeli Proceedings in greater detail later on in these grounds of decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 By the time SUM 930 was heard by this Court, it transpired that much of the Israeli Proceedings have concluded, save that the Husband’s appeal against part of the Israeli Family Court’s earlier decision (“Israeli Appeal”) has not yet been heard. As such, the Husband – through his counsel – sought a <em>permanent</em> stay of D 249. The effect of such a stay would be that the remainder of the divorce proceedings, <em>ie.</em> the proceedings for AM reliefs (“AM Proceedings”), would be brought to an immediate end.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 On 21 October 2024, I delivered my oral grounds of decision in respect of SUM 930. In summary, I dismissed the Husband’s application for a permanent stay and ordered that there be a limited case management stay of D 249 pending the conclusion of his Israeli Appeal.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 Both parties have since appealed against my decision, <em>vide.</em> HCF/RAS 20/2024 and RAS 21/2024. These are my full grounds of decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Stay on the Ground of <em>Forum Non Conveniens</em></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 Given the procedural posture of the present proceedings, there was some initial debate between the parties’ counsel as to whether the Husband’s stay application remained grounded on the basis of <em>forum non conveniens</em>. This issue arose because despite the prayers in SUM 930 referring to phrase “<em>forum non conveniens</em>”, much of the Husband’s counsel’s arguments was focused on the impact and relevance of the parallel Israeli Proceedings, and the concern with multiplicity of proceedings in two jurisdictions, <em>ie.</em> Israel and Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 Notwithstanding the somewhat unusual turn of events, I agreed with the Husband’s counsel that the principle of <em>forum non conveniens</em> remained a live issue between the parties, and was one of the legal bases relied upon by the Husband in support of SUM 930. This was evident from the fact that both counsel had filed detailed written submissions addressing this issue, and the principle itself was referred to in SUM 930.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 Moreover, the concerns as regards <em>lis alibi pendens</em> in the present case arose as a result of the Husband’s subsequent Israeli legal action against the Wife, as compared to D 249 which was the Wife’s initial divorce application in Singapore against the Husband. The situation thus fell within what the Court of Appeal in <em>Virsagi Management (S) Pte Ltd v Welltech Constructions Pte Ltd</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 4 SLR 1097.xml')\">[2013] 4 SLR 1097</a> (“<em>Virsagi</em>”) had observed as being a “reversed parties situation”, <em>ie.</em> where a plaintiff sues a defendant in Singapore, and the same defendant then sues the plaintiff abroad (see <em>Virsagi</em> at [27]). The <em>lis alibi pendens</em> in such a situation operates <em>within</em> the doctrine of <em>forum non conveniens</em>, and is to be considered under the rubric of the general principles applicable to the doctrine (see <em>Virsagi</em> at [38] and [39]).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 I will therefore start by addressing the question of whether the Husband is entitled to seek a stay on the basis of <em>forum non conveniens</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 At the outset, I note that, in both parties’ written submissions, they accept that in considering the issue of <em>forum non conveniens</em>, the Family Court would apply the principles set out in <em>Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/English/68440-E-M.xml')\">[1987] 1 AC 460</a> (or the “<em>Spiliada</em> test”) to determine whether a stay of divorce proceedings should be granted.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> I agree with the said approach as that is consistent with the prevailing caselaw: see <em>TDX v TDY</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/17573-SSP.xml')\">[2015] SGHCF 4</a> and <em>WFU v WFV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27890-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGFC 67</a> at [12].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 In <em>TDX v TDY</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/17573-SSP.xml')\">[2015] SGHCF 4</a>, Debbie Ong JC (as Her Honour then was) held as follows (at [14] of the judgment):</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">14 It is well accepted in Singapore that the doctrine of <em>forum non conveniens</em> remains relevant in matrimonial proceedings, including proceedings involving the custody of children. The High Court in <em>Low Wing Hong Alvin v Kelso Sharon Leigh</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1999] 3 SLR(R) 0993.xml')\">[1999] 3 SLR(R) 993</a> first made it clear that the <em>Spiliada</em> principles (derived from and named after the seminal case of <em>Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/English/68440-E-M.xml')\">[1987] AC 460</a> (“<em>Spiliada</em>”)) apply in matrimonial proceedings. Similarly, the High Court in <em>Mala Shukla v Jayant Amritanand Shukla (Danialle An, co-respondent)</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2002] 1 SLR(R) 0920.xml')\">[2002] 1 SLR(R) 920</a> applied the <em>Spiliada</em> principles to divorce and related ancillary matters, citing [16] of the Court of Appeal decision in <em>PT Hutan Domas Raya v Yue Xiu Enterprises (Holdings) Ltd and another</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2001] 1 SLR(R) 0104.xml')\">[2001] 1 SLR(R) 104</a> which reads […]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 In gist, the <em>Spiliada</em> test is a factors-based test which starts with an assessment as to whether the applicant (in this case, the Husband) has shown that there exists another available forum which is more appropriate. If there is <em>prima facie</em> another more appropriate forum, the court will grant a stay unless there are “special circumstances” which justify refusing to grant the stay: see <em>BDA v BDB</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 1 SLR 0607.xml')\">[2013] 1 SLR 607</a> at [21] – [24]. The latter is commonly referred to as the second stage of the <em>Spiliada</em> test.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 At the second stage, the burden shifts to the responding party (ie. the Wife in the present case) to show the presence of “special circumstances” by reason of which justice requires that a stay should nevertheless be refused: see <em>AZS v AXR</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 3 SLR 0700.xml')\">[2013] 3 SLR 700</a> at [11]; <em>WYZ v WZA</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32014-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 68</a> at [7].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The Husband is precluded from raising forum non conveniens</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 As I had alluded to above, the present case is unique in that the parties agreed to hold SUM 930 in abeyance while allowing the IJ to be granted in relation to D 249 by the Singapore court.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 In my judgment, I find the Husband’s agreement for the Singapore court to grant the IJ to be inimical to his claim that a stay should be granted on account of <em>forum non conveniens.</em> Let me explain.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-4\">(1) <u>The Husband had accepted Singapore as the most appropriate forum</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 To satisfy the <em>Spiliada</em> test, the Husband asserted that there exists another court (presumably, the Israeli court) which would be “more appropriate” than the Singapore court. However, such a claim cannot be sustained when he had himself accepted (and had, in fact, expressly agreed with the Wife) that the Singapore Family Court was the appropriate court to grant IJ.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 What is of especial significance, in the present case, was that the IJ was granted on <em>both</em> the parties’ amended claim and counterclaim relating to their respective unreasonable behaviour. In other words, both the Wife and the Husband expressly invoked the Family Court’s matrimonial jurisdiction to put an end to their marriage.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 In the Husband’s amended pleadings, his entire Defence (including his objection to the Singapore courts having jurisdiction to determine the AM Proceedings) was deleted. In the Husband’s amended Counterclaim, AM reliefs <em>from the Singapore Family Court</em> were expressly sought and for those same reliefs to be adjourned to be determined in Chambers.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> In my view, the Husband thus recognised that the Singapore was the appropriate jurisdiction to grant AM reliefs and cannot then claim that there was a more appropriate forum elsewhere.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-4\">(2) <u>Whether a “partial stay” of divorce proceedings can be granted</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 Does this mean that that the Husband cannot then seek a stay (or, in counsel’s submissions, a “partial” stay) of D 249 such that <em>only</em> the AM proceedings are stayed? In addressing this question, both counsel made extensive submissions on whether the concept of a partial stay was even applicable to divorce proceedings in Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 Drawing from similar principles in the context of civil litigation, the Husband’s case was that the Singapore court can always grant a partial stay whenever a claimant has different claims against the same defendant. The court would then be at liberty to decide which claims ought to be stayed against the defendant (so that they could be pursued elsewhere), while allowing the other claims to proceed within the forum.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 In the present case, the Husband analogised the claims leading to the grant of the IJ (<em>viz.</em> the grounds for the divorce) as being one claim between the parties, and the AM Proceedings (for ancillary relief) being an entirely separate claim, with the latter capable of being stayed independently.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 While I acknowledge that a Singapore court can grant such “partial stays” in relation to commercial claims (as was recognised by the High Court in <em>Humpuss Sea Transport v PT Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi TBK</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19731-SSP.xml')\">[2016] 5 SLR 1322</a> (“<em>Humpuss</em>”)), the cases where the grant of such stays were discussed occurred in the context of a claimant having different civil claims (or causes of action) against the same defendant some of which could be pursued in another jurisdiction.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 For example, the High Court in <em>Humpuss</em> (at [96] of the judgment) referred to a situation where part of a party’s claims arose from a specific jurisdiction’s statutory law. Where such claims are brought alongside other general claims, the statutory cause of action may sometimes be partially stayed in favour of that forum so as to discourage litigants from tacking on claims with no obvious connection to the forum to claims which do.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 However, those principles (which makes sense in the context of civil litigation) do not sit well with, and <em>cannot</em> be easily analogised to, divorce proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 To begin with, the power of the Family Court to grant any form of AM relief is derived from (and consequent on) an interim judgment of divorce being granted to dissolve the parties’ marriage. In my view, one cannot exist without the other.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 There are no <em>separate</em> causes of action or claims within the context of divorce proceedings because a party cannot apply to the Singapore Family Court to independently divide assets or seek a maintenance order, under Chapter 4 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev. Ed.) (“WC”), without first obtaining interim judgment from the same Singapore court. This is apparent from the statutory schema of the WC.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 For example, s 112(1) of the WC (which is located within Chapter 4) gives the court the power to divide the parties’ matrimonial assets only “<em>when granting or subsequent to grant of a judgment of divorce</em>”. Section 113(1)(b) similarly gives the court the power to order maintenance “<em>when granting or subsequent to grant of a judgment of divorce</em>”. Indeed, s 123 (in Chapter 5 of the WC) likewise directs the court not to make final any judgment of divorce unless arrangements have been made for the welfare of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 While the present marriage does not involve children, what is clear from the overall context of the provisions in the WC is that proceedings for ancillary relief (which relate to the financial consequences of a divorce and, where applicable, child-related orders) are intimately connected with, and are <em>part of</em>, the same claim for divorce.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 To put matters in perspective, prior to 2011, it was well acknowledged that there was a “gap” in Singapore’s matrimonial law because the Singapore court had no powers to grant any AM relief independently, if it was not the court which granted the judgment for the parties’ divorce (see the Court of Appeal’s decision in <em>UFM v UFN</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/24027-SSP.xml')\">[2019] 2 SLR 650</a> at [1]). Parliament then had to statutorily enact Chapter 4A of the WC to specifically allow former spouses who were divorced in another jurisdiction to apply to the Singapore court for financial relief.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_36\"></a>36 I was thus not persuaded by the Husband’s argument that the AM Proceedings should be considered a separate claim or cause of action which can be “severed” from a claim for the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. They are two inter-connected parts of the same claim.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_37\"></a>37 Accordingly, the Husband was not entitled to seek a stay (whether fully or partially) of D 249 on the ground of <em>forum non conveniens</em> given that he had submitted to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction and had accepted its appropriateness to determine the parties’ divorce. It followed therefore that, by the Husband’s actions, he had acknowledged that the Singapore court was <em>in fact</em> the appropriate court to hear and determine the AM Proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Israel is not a more appropriate forum</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_38\"></a>38 For completeness, even if the Husband was entitled to seek an independent stay of the AM Proceedings (contrary to my decision above) and I had applied the <em>Spiliada</em> test, I would not have found Israel to be a more appropriate forum in the present case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_39\"></a>39 In my view, apart from the fact that there were (and possibly continues to be) legal proceedings in the Israeli courts which the Husband had commenced against the Wife, no other factor clearly points to Israel being the appropriate jurisdiction.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_40\"></a>40 In this regard, I accept the Wife’s submissions that both parties registered and celebrated their marriage in Singapore, and had lived in Singapore both before and after their marriage.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> They both applied for and had obtained Permanent Resident status in Singapore.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> The Wife is now a Singapore citizen. They also worked in Singapore and have significant assets in Singapore, including two Singaporean companies – [SGD] Pte Ltd and [AML] Pte Ltd.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_41\"></a>41 The fact that they may also have an asset overseas (in the United States of America) was, in my view, inconclusive – it certainly does not point to the Israeli court as being the “more appropriate” forum.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> This is particularly so given that the stay sought by the Husband was only in relation to the AM reliefs to be granted by the Singapore court.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_42\"></a>42 Overall, I was satisfied that all relevant connecting factors point to Singapore as being the appropriate forum. The Husband’s request for a stay on the ground of <em>forum non conveniens</em> was therefore not made out.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Other Considerations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_43\"></a>43 Before addressing the Husband’s other arguments, I wish to make clear that in reaching my conclusion that he was not entitled to seek a partial stay on the ground of <em>forum non conveniens</em>, I did not accept the Wife’s submission that because the WC was the “governing law” for marriages in Singapore,<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> it meant that there were public policy considerations which would enjoin this Court to conclude that Singapore must be the most appropriate or, indeed, the only forum of choice.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_44\"></a>44 In the main, the Wife’s submission was that since the parties registered their marriage in Singapore, the “just and equitable” division of assets regime (or the legal concept of a deferred community of property) envisaged under the WC should be seen as a manifestation of public policy operating to favour Singapore as the only jurisdiction of choice when it comes to the parties’ divorce.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_45\"></a>45 In the context of modern-day marriages, spouses can come from different jurisdictions, geographical locations, and they can choose to register (or celebrate) their marriage in any number of countries. It does not seem logical to say that because the parties married in Singapore, <em>ipso facto</em>, Singapore’s domestic marriage laws must apply as a matter of “<em>public policy</em>”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_46\"></a>46 The Family Court, in considering whether a stay of proceedings ought to be granted, will still have to weigh the relevant connecting factors pursuant to the <em>Spiliada</em> test. Where the parties had registered their marriage and the applicable marriage laws of that forum are, at best, one of several considerations and would not be dispositive.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_47\"></a>47 I should also add that my decision in the present case should not be taken as having expressed a definitive view that it is legally impermissible for spouses to agree to have their marriage dissolved in Singapore, but with the AM proceedings dealt with by another court, in another jurisdiction.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_48\"></a>48 Parties may perhaps be entitled to come to an express agreement for such an outcome. Another possibility alluded to by the Husband’s counsel relates to the existence of legal frameworks in other jurisdictions which permit spouses to <em>first</em> apply for the division of their marital assets in that jurisdiction and then apply for divorce elsewhere, or <em>vice-versa</em>. If parties had agreed to take such a path, it might be possible that the divorce sought in Singapore relates only to the dissolution of their marriage. As these considerations were <em>not</em> present in this case, I express no firm views on these matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_49\"></a>49 My decision in the SUM 930 should be limited to the particular facts of the present case – <em>ie.</em> where a party, having freely elected and consented to the Singapore Family Court granting an IJ to end his marriage and agreeing for his prayers for ancillary relief to be adjourned for determination, subsequently seeks to stay the consequent AM proceedings in favour of another jurisdiction on account of <em>forum non conveniens</em>. In such a situation, I find that the party in question is not allowed to do so.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Should a Case Management Stay be granted? </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_50\"></a>50 Although the Husband was not, in my view, entitled to a stay of the D 249 on the basis of <em>forum non conveniens</em>, that was not the end of the matter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_51\"></a>51 The Court can, in exercise of its discretion, grant a case management (or limited) stay if I were to find that there was a risk of multiplicity of proceedings if D 249 is allowed to proceed given the existence of the Israeli Proceedings. In deciding whether to do so, the Court must consider all the circumstances of the case, and determine whether there is a need to ensure the efficient and fair resolution of the dispute as a whole: see <em>BNP Paribas Wealth Management v Jacob Agam and Ruth Agam</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19908-SSP.xml')\">[2017] 3 SLR 27</a> at [34] and [35]. For case management stays, it is not necessary for the Court to consider the principles governing <em>forum non conveniens</em>: see <em>Chan Chin Cheung v Chan Fatt Cheung</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2010] 1 SLR 1192.xml')\">[2010] 1 SLR 1192</a> at [47].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_52\"></a>52 Although the Husband’s main case was that there should be a permanent stay of the D 249 (whether on the ground of <em>forum non conveniens</em>, or because of the outcome of the Israeli Proceedings) and not a limited case management stay, the issue of such a stay was nonetheless raised during oral submissions. It was also expressly referred to in the Wife’s written submissions.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> As the grant of a case management stay was within this Court’s inherent powers, I find it relevant to discuss this issue in detail.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The Israeli Proceedings</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_53\"></a>53 In considering the issue of multiplicity of proceedings, I will first address the Israeli Proceedings which the Husband had relied on as a significant aspect of his case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_54\"></a>54 It was common ground – both in the parties’ submissions and in their experts’ evidence – that there were two separate actions before the Israeli Family Court, <em>ie.</em> Suit No. 60180-XX-XX (“Israeli Suit 1”) and Suit No. 5245-XX-XX (“Israeli Suit 2”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_55\"></a>55 It was also not disputed that Israeli Suit 1 dealt with the <em>financial</em> issues arising from a partnership agreement which parties had signed in March 2015 (“Partnership Agreement”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_56\"></a>56 On 24 October 2023, Judge Samuel Bar Yosef of the Israel Family Court gave his judgment in respect of Israeli Suit 1 (“1<sup>st</sup> Israeli Judgment”). In the said Judgment, the court held that the Partnership Agreement was enforceable only in relation to the properties which the parties had “<em>accumulated until the date of marriage of the parties (January 16, 2020)</em>” and that it was “<em>not enforceable in regards</em> [sic] <em>to property that was accumulated after the marriage of the parties</em>”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> For completeness, Judge Yosef’s decision also covered assets which were accumulated before marriage, but are connected to post-marital assets.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_57\"></a>57 The second common ground between the parties was that part of Israeli Suit 2 was commenced to <em>enforce</em> the 1<sup>st</sup> Israeli Judgment. This was what Judge Yosef had envisaged in the 1<sup>st</sup> Israeli judgment when the learned judge stated in his Judgment that “<em>the implementation of the provisions of the</em> [Partnership Agreement]<em>, according to this ruling shall be conducted in a separate proceeding</em>”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> Israeli Suit 2 was thus the said “separate proceeding”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_58\"></a>58 However, it was clear from the evidence that Israeli Suit 2 covered <em>more</em> than the mere enforcement of the 1<sup>st</sup> Israeli Judgment and/or the implementation of the Partnership Agreement (which provided that the Husband should be entitled to 80% of the relevant assets). The Husband had also sought additional reliefs in Israeli Suit 2 which covered the division of the parties’ <em>post-</em>marital assets.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> The latter issue was one which the court in Israeli Suit 1 <em>did not</em> make orders for.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_59\"></a>59 The judgment for Israeli Suit 2 was delivered by Judge Yosef in April 2024 wherein the learned Judge granted the enforcement order sought by the Husband (arising from Israeli Suit 1) and, <em>in addition</em>, that the Husband was entitled to 50% of the assets accumulated <em>after</em> marriage.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span> In dealing with the parties’ post-marital assets, Israeli Suit 2 had – in effect – determined what the Singapore court would have to decide in the AM Proceedings for D 249.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_60\"></a>60 It follows from the matters discussed above that the relevance of the Israeli Proceedings and the parties’ conduct <em>vis-à-vis</em> these proceedings formed a significant dispute between the parties in the present case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_61\"></a>61 In particular, the Husband focused his arguments on whether this Court should find the Wife as having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Israeli courts. The Husband’s case was that if this Court finds that the Wife had done so, she should then be bound by the judgments in both Israeli Suits 1 and 2, and this Court should not proceed with the AM Proceedings given that those reliefs had already been sought <em>and obtained</em> by the Husband in Israel.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_62\"></a>62 As regards the issue of submission to jurisdiction, I accept the Husband’s argument that the Wife did submit to the jurisdiction of the Israeli court in Israeli Suit 1. The Wife filed submissions in Israeli Suit 1 and had participated in the court hearings leading up to Judge Yosef’s judgment on 24 October 2023.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> This was not seriously disputed by the Wife.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_63\"></a>63 What was more controversial was whether the Wife had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Israeli courts (whether voluntarily or otherwise) in relation to Israeli Suit 2. The Husband’s primary position was that Israeli Suit 2 was merely a “continuation” and/or “enforcement” proceeding following on from Israeli Suit 1 and that this Court should consider both Suits in the Israeli Family Court as being one and the same.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_64\"></a>64 While much ink was spilled in both parties’ written submissions as to the nature of the Israeli Suit 2, the fact remained (and which I accept) that Israeli Suit 2 covered matters which <em>went beyond</em> Israeli Suit 1.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_18\" id=\"Ftn_18_1\"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span> The Husband had sought adjudication by, and relief from, the Israeli Family Court with regard to the parties’ post-marital assets (which was a new claim in Israeli Suit 2). Separate service of legal process was carried out in respect of Israeli Suit 2.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_65\"></a>65 While the Israeli Family Court appeared to have expressed a dim view of the Wife for her decision not to participate in Israeli Suit 2 when she had already participated in Israeli Suit 1, I nevertheless accept the Wife’s foreign law expert’s opinion<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_19\" id=\"Ftn_19_1\"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span> that she did not act in a manner which could be taken as having submitted to the Israeli Family Court’s jurisdiction <em>for Israeli Suit 2</em>. She did not participate in those proceedings, nor did she file any documents or take any steps in those proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_66\"></a>66 To address this concern, the Husband mounted a <em>secondary</em> argument, <em>ie.</em> that this Court should deem the Wife as having submitted to the Israeli court’s jurisdiction of Israeli Suit 2 under the principle of “inchoate submission” referred to in the High Court’s decision of <em>Giant Light Metal Technology (Kunshan) Co Ltd v Aksa Far East Pte Ltd</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2014] 2 SLR 0545.xml')\">[2014] 2 SLR 545</a> (“<em>Giant Light Metal</em>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_67\"></a>67 I accept that the principle of inchoate submission has been recognised by the local courts as being part of Singapore law. The General Division of the High Court’s recent decision in <em>Re Sapura Fabrication Sdn Bhd and anor matter (GAS, non-party)</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32165-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGHC 241</a> at [81] confirmed its application in Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_68\"></a>68 However, I am not persuaded that the principle of inchoate submission applies in the present case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_69\"></a>69 In <em>Giant Light Metal</em>, Andrew Ang J explained the principle as follows (at [48] and [49] of the judgment):</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">48 Underlying all three of these cases is the principle that the courts are willing to recognise, for the purposes of international jurisdiction, that a party’s consent to the jurisdiction of a foreign court in relation to certain claims may be imputed to further claims in some circumstances. … Such “inchoate submission” – as seen in Whyte and Aeroflot – is also possible in relation to claims which are brought pursuant to subsequent and separate proceedings in respect of the same parties, rather than just to claims which are part of the same proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">49 The question then is when consent will be imputed or “inchoate submission” be said to arise. Murthy provided two factual reference points for consent to be so imputed: where the subsequent claim concerns the same subject matter; and where the subsequent claim is related to the original claim. Which subsequent claims will fall under these categories is then a matter of degree based on the circumstances. The courts in making this assessment seemed to be informed by concerns of fairness to both the plaintiff and the defendant, and also a desire to disregard technical impediments created by procedural rules under both foreign and forum law. With respect, I agree with such an approach.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_70\"></a>70 For the reasons I had set out at [64] above, I find that Israeli Suit 1 and Suit 2 did not concern claims for the <em>same</em> subject-matter and/or that the claim in Suit 1 was <em>related</em> to Suit 2. The “same” or “related” subject-matter I am referring to is the claim for the division of the parties’ <em>post-marital</em> assets.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_71\"></a>71 In my view, it would not be appropriate or fair to impute the Wife’s consent to, and participation in, Israeli Suit 1 (which related to the parties’ Partnership Agreement) as being her acceptance of the Israeli court’s jurisdiction <em>vis-à-vis</em> Israeli Suit 2 when a significant part of the latter Suit related to how the parties’ matrimonial assets are to be divided. The two Suits thus involved separate subject-matter and reliefs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_72\"></a>72 On a related issue, the Israeli court had, in its judgment for Israeli Suit 2, determined that there was proper service of legal process on the Wife in accordance with Israeli procedural rules, and that it was satisfied that the Wife was aware of the proceedings in Suit 2 when it proceeded to render its judgment.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_73\"></a>73 Notwithstanding the Israeli court’s decision, the Wife’s counsel submitted that in answering the question as to whether a party had submitted to a foreign jurisdiction, the Singapore court ought to determine the same by reference to <em>Singapore’s</em> conflict of laws principles.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_20\" id=\"Ftn_20_1\"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> In other words, even if a party is deemed to have been within the foreign court’s jurisdiction pursuant to the rules of foreign civil procedure, it does not necessarily mean that there has been voluntary submission under the Singapore law.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_74\"></a>74 I agree with the Wife’s submissions and for the reasons I have explained above, the Wife did not voluntarily submit to the Israeli court’s jurisdiction for the purpose of Israeli Suit 2, despite the foreign court’s own decision that it had jurisdiction over her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_75\"></a>75 In view of my conclusion that the Wife did not submit to the Israeli court’s jurisdiction for the purpose of Israeli Suit 2, I find that the Husband’s other argument relating to transnational issue estoppel (which he had raised in his written submissions) would not be engaged.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_76\"></a>76 In <em>The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/31082-SSP.xml')\">[2024] 1 SLR 56</a> (“<em>Deutsche Telekom AG</em>”), the Court of Appeal re-affirmed the formulation of the legal test for transnational issue estoppel observing (at [64] – [65]) that:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">64 The same test has been applied with some modifications in the context of <em>transnational</em> issue estoppel where the prior judgment is rendered in a foreign jurisdiction (<em>Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp (formerly known as Merck & Co, Inc) v Merck KGaA (formerly known as E Merck)</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/26043-SSP.xml')\">[2021] 1 SLR 1102</a> (“<em>Merck Sharp</em>”) (at [2]); <em>The Sennar</em> at 500). The test for transnational issue estoppel has been formulated as follows (<em>Merck Sharp</em> at [35]–[40]):</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(a) The foreign judgment must be capable of being recognised in this jurisdiction, where issue estoppel is being invoked. Under the common law, this means that the foreign judgment must:</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-3\">(i) be a final and conclusive decision on the merits;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-3\">(ii) originate from a court of competent jurisdiction that has transnational jurisdiction over the party sought to be bound; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-3\">(iii) not be subject to any defences to recognition.</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(b) There must be commonality of the parties to the prior proceedings and to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised.</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(c) The subject matter of the estoppel must be the same as what has been decided in the prior judgment.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">65 With respect to the requirement at [64(a)(ii)] above that the <b>court giving the foreign judgment must have transnational jurisdiction over the party sought to be bound</b>, this requirement has been defined in terms that <b>the forum court recognising the judgment must be satisfied that, according to its own rules of private international law</b>, <b>the foreign court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction in the “international sense”</b> to render that judgment (<em>Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) v PT Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi TBK and another</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19731-SSP.xml')\">[2016] 5 SLR 1322</a> (“<em>Humpuss Sea Transport</em>”) at [71]; <em>The Republic of the Philippines v Maler Foundation and others and other appeals</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2014] 1 SLR 1389.xml')\">[2014] 1 SLR 1389</a> (“<em>Maler Foundation</em>”) at [66]). <b>There are four possible grounds of jurisdiction: (a) presence in the foreign country; (b) filing a claim or counterclaim before the foreign court; (c) voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the foreign court by appearing in the proceedings; and (d) agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction before the commencement of proceedings</b> (<em>Humpuss Sea Transport at [71]; Sang Cheol Woo v Spackman, Charles Choi and others <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/29049-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGHC 298</a> (“Sang Cheol Woo”) at [57]).</em></p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"></p><div align=\"right\">[Emphasis added in <b>bold</b>]</div><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_77\"></a>77 In the present case, none of the four possible grounds of jurisdiction noted by the Court of Appeal in <em>Deutsche Telekom AG</em> (see above) applied such that a judgment in Israeli Suit 2 would be one which “<em>originate from a court of competent jurisdiction that has transnational jurisdiction over the party sought to be bound</em>”. The Wife had no presence in Israel, did not file any formal claim or counterclaim in Israeli Suit 2, nor did she agree and/or voluntarily submit to the Israeli court’s jurisdiction.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_78\"></a>78 For the reasons set out above, I am of the view that allowing D 249 to proceed would not create multiplicity of proceedings. Insofar as Israeli Suit 2 sought to divide the parties’ matrimonial assets, that decision was made in the Wife’s absence, and she is entitled to proceed with the AM Proceedings in Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_79\"></a>79 I do not find there to be a need for a permanent case management stay to be granted as a result of Israeli Suit 2. To avoid doubt, nothing in my decision precludes the Husband from raising the outcome of the Israeli Suit 2 to the Singapore court hearing the AM Proceedings, or for the Wife to apply to set-aside any judgment rendered in Israeli Suit 2 (if she so wishes).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_80\"></a>80 As regards Israeli Suit 1, the subject matter of that action pertains to the parties’ <em>pre</em>-marital assets. It is trite that the spouses’ pre-marital assets are not matrimonial assets over which the Family Court has the power to divide under s 112(1) of the WC. That being the case, the 1<sup>st</sup> Israeli Judgment may well be a matter which could be raised to the court hearing the AM Proceedings in Singapore, but it was not a decision which would result in a multiplicity of proceedings, or might give rise to inconsistent judgments if the AM Proceedings continue in Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Relevance of the Israeli Barring Order </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_81\"></a>81 Before I leave the issue of the Israeli Proceedings, I want to briefly address an order issued by the Israeli Family Court.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_82\"></a>82 On 10 February 2024, the Israeli Family Court issued what the parties referred to as a “Barring Order”. In effect, this Barring Order was akin to an anti-suit injunction prohibiting the Wife from conducting “<em>property proceedings</em>” in a jurisdiction other than in the Israeli court. Both parties accept that the Barring Order would cover D 249.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_83\"></a>83 At the conclusion of the first tranche of the hearing of SUM 930, I directed both parties’ counsel to file further written submissions on the relevance and impact of the Barring Order <em>vis-à-vis</em> SUM 930.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_84\"></a>84 It was common ground in both counsel’s written submissions that while the existence of the Barring Order was something which this Court can consider in the overall analysis of the case, this Court was not bound to follow the Barring Order, save that it may give rise to a consideration of international comity.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_21\" id=\"Ftn_21_1\"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_85\"></a>85 In my view, any concerns as regards international comity in the present case may well be academic given that the Husband (in favour of whom the Barring Order was made) had taken the position – through counsel – that the proceedings in Israel were effectively over. Counsel explained that that Israeli Suit 2 had since completed with the Israeli Family Court issuing an order for the payment of monies.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_86\"></a>86 In other words, there is now an alleged judgment debt due from the Wife arising from the Israeli court’s final determination of the “property dispute” in relation to Israeli Suit 2. How the Husband seeks to enforce that judgment against the Wife would be a separate matter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_87\"></a>87 Insofar as D 249 is concerned, the question before this Court is simply whether it should continue now that the Israeli Family Court had issued its decisions. In my view, this is not a matter which would impinge on, or overlap with, the Barring Order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_88\"></a>88 In any case, whether the Wife is liable for breaching the Barring Order (if at all) would be a matter to be addressed in the Israeli courts.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The Husband’s appeal against the Judgment in Israeli Suit 1</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_89\"></a>89 I move on to the next (and final) issue, <em>ie.</em> what, if any, would be the impact of the Israeli Appeal filed by the Husband’ against the Judge Yosef’s decision for Israeli Suit 1?</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_90\"></a>90 In my judgment, the Husband’s appeal is particularly relevant given that it was the Husband’s case, in Israeli Suit 1, that the Partnership Agreement between the parties operated as a pre-nuptial agreement (“PNA”). In the Husband’s Statement of Appeal to the Israel District Court, he requested the appellate court to intervene and hold that the Partnership Agreement also applied to property accumulated after marriage.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_22\" id=\"Ftn_22_1\"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_91\"></a>91 This meant that if the Israeli appellate court eventually decides that the Partnership Agreement (and its 80:20 division ratio in favour of the Husband) also applied to post-marital assets, such an outcome may potentially have an impact on the Singapore AM Proceedings. This is because the enforceability of a foreign PNA entered into by the parties before marriage may be a relevant fact which the AM court in Singapore may take into account when it determines what would be a just and equitable division of the parties’ matrimonial assets: see for <em>eg. TQ v TR</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2009] 2 SLR(R) 0961.xml')\">[2009] 2 SLR(R) 961</a>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_92\"></a>92 Put another way, the present case would be akin to a case where, in proceedings for ancillary reliefs before the Singapore court, one of the parties wishes to rely on the terms of a PNA governed by foreign law while the other party challenges the PNA’s validity. Where there are parallel proceedings in the foreign court to determine the validity and/or enforceability of the said PNA under the laws applicable to the contract, it is not uncommon for the Singapore court to temporarily stay the local proceedings to await the decision of the foreign court in order to assess whether the foreign court’s decision might impact how the assets are to be divided in Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_93\"></a>93 Both counsel have confirmed, via correspondence to the Court in October 2024, that the Husband’s Israeli Appeal remains pending. Given that the outcome of the appeal may have an impact on what the court hearing the AM Proceedings has to consider, I find it fair and reasonable to grant a limited case management stay of D 249 until the conclusion of the Israeli Appeal.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_94\"></a>94 Over the course of various series of twists and turns in the progress of the Israeli Proceedings, the Husband’s position with respect to the present divorce proceedings have similarly meandered.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_95\"></a>95 SUM 930 which was filed as an application for a stay of the entirety of D 249 on the ground of <em>forum non conveniens</em> turned into to a partial stay of the AM reliefs <em>pending</em> the conclusion the Israeli Proceedings (per the Husband’s application to amend SUM 930), and finally to a request for a permanent stay because of the outcome of the Israeli Proceedings (per the Husband’s counsel’s submissions at the hearing of SUM 930).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_96\"></a>96 In the end, I ordered that there be a limited case management stay in respect of D 249 pending the conclusion of the Husband’s Israeli Appeal. This order was, in effect, similar to what the Husband had sought in his Prayer 1 of the amended FC/SUM 930/2023, <em>ie.</em> that the proceedings in FC/D 249/2023 are stayed pending the final decision of the Courts of Israel (Family court, District court, etc.) in relation to suit no. 60180-XX-XX.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_97\"></a>97 However, given that the Husband was no longer seeking a temporary stay of proceedings and the entirety of the hearing of SUM 930 was focused on whether he was entitled to a <em>permanent</em> stay of D 249 (which I did not agree with), I found that the Wife was, in the overall analysis, the successful party.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_98\"></a>98 When I delivered my oral decision on 21 October 2024, I asked both counsel to address me on the issue of costs which the Wife would be entitled to as costs should follow the event.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_99\"></a>99 In this regard, the Wife’s counsel sought costs in the sum of $8,000, excluding disbursements. The latter would include the costs of the Wife’s foreign law expert, and her counsel had proposed that a separate determination be made for the quantum of such disbursements if parties were unable to reach an agreement. The Husband’s counsel disagreed with the Wife’s claim, including whether the Wife was entitled to claim disbursements and costs relating to her foreign law expert.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_100\"></a>100 Given the parties’ disagreement, I directed both parties to file further submissions on the matter, which both counsel duly did so. Having considered the same, I find that the Wife’s claim for the costs of her foreign law expert in the sum of $36,624.78 to be very high. Given the nature and complexity of the issued which the Court had to consider, the contents of the expert’s report, and the lack of any breakdown or itemization, I am unable to agree with this figure.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_101\"></a>101 I therefore ordered costs be paid by the Husband to the Wife in the sum of $5,000 (inclusive of disbursements).</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>By Order made in FC/SUM 561/2023.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Plaintiff-Wife’s Submissions dd 13.05.24 (“WS1”) at [47]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Husband’s Defence and Counterclaim (Amnd No. 1) re-dated 18.09.23; see also WS1 at [6]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Defendant-Husband’s Written Submissions dd 13.05.24 (“HS1”) at [40] – [43]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>WS1 at [67] and [71]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>WS1 at [67]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Wife’s Affidavit dd 12.04.23 (“W1”) at pp. 119 and 122</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>WS1 at [67(5)] and [69]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Plaintiff-Wife’s Further Submissions dd 16.07.24 (“WS2”) at [29]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup><em>Cf.</em> WS2 at [29b.]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>WS1 at [2] – [5]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>Husband’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Affidavit dd 21.02.24 (“H2”) at p. 52</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>H2 at p. 52 (see [45] of the 1<sup>st</sup> Israeli Judgment)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>Husband’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Affidavit dd 05.05.24 (“H3”) at p. 25</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>H3 at p. 28</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>See Chronology of Events in the Husband’s Expert Report dd 15.02.24 (“HE1”) at p.9</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>Wife’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Affidavit dd 22.04.24 (“W2”) at [10]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_18_1\" id=\"Ftn_18\">[note: 18]</a></sup>W2 at [23]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_19_1\" id=\"Ftn_19\">[note: 19]</a></sup>Wife’s Expert Affidavit dd 06.05.24 at p. 17</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_20_1\" id=\"Ftn_20\">[note: 20]</a></sup>WS2 at p. 29</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_21_1\" id=\"Ftn_21\">[note: 21]</a></sup>WS2 at [29]; Defendant-Husband’s Further Written Submissions dd 16.07.24 (“HS2”) at [7]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_22_1\" id=\"Ftn_22\">[note: 22]</a></sup>Husband’s Supplemental Affidavit dd 27.03.24 (“H2A”) at p. 16</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – matrimonial assets – matrimonial home"],"date":"2025-01-02","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 2385 of 2022","title":"XGW v XGX","citation":"[2025] SGFC 2","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32690-SSP.xml","counsel":["Mr Joseph Chen (Joseph Chen & Co) for the Plaintiff","Defendant in person"],"timestamp":"2025-01-08T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Nicole Loh","html":"<root><head><title>XGW v XGX</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XGW <em>v</em> XGX </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32690-SSP.xml')\">[2025] SGFC 2</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 2385 of 2022</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">02 January 2025</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Nicole Loh </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Mr Joseph Chen (Joseph Chen & Co) for the Plaintiff; Defendant in person </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XGW — XGX </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">matrimonial assets</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">matrimonial home</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">2 January 2025</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Nicole Loh:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 Parties in this marriage had a short childless marriage of slightly under 5 years. After a contested divorce, the issue of the division of assets came before me for hearing. I ordered for each party to keep their respective assets and for the Husband to pay cost fixed at $2,500 for the ancillary matters hearing. The Wife appealed against the entire order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Facts</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The parties</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 Parties married on 15 December 2018 in Singapore and the Interim Judgment dissolving the marriage was granted on 2 October 2023. During the course of the marriage, both parties did not work. The Wife was about 32 years of age at the time of the hearing and the Husband was about 55 years of age. The Wife is a Chinese National residing in China whilst the Husband is a Singapore Citizen residing in Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Background to the dispute</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 Prior to the marriage, the Husband transferred sums of money to the Wife and her parents. After the marriage, as the Husband had surrendered his passport to the authorities, parties lived together in the Husband’s HDB flat whenever the Wife was in Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 Sometime around 18 May 2021, the Wife discovered the Husband had acted improperly with another lady. The Husband was then incarcerated a few days later (around 20 May 2021). They had little to no contact until the Wife served the divorce papers on the Husband in 2022. In the ancillary proceedings, the Husband sought the return of the monies from the Wife and the Wife claimed a share of the Husband’s HDB flat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The parties’ cases</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The Husband’s claim is based on the monies:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_a\"></a>(a) he/his brother had transferred to his Wife and her parents between 1 February 2015 to 19 May 2021<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span>; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b\"></a>(b) withdrawn from his China account between 20 September 2015 and 31 January 2018.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"\"></a>Totalling: CNY2,744,794.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 He claimed there was an agreement/understanding between the parties that the above sums were for investment purposes and he sought a recovery of 50% of the amount.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 The Wife resisted the Husband’s claim on the basis that the monies were gifts to her and disputed the existence of any agreement. In any event, the Wife submitted that the Husband’s claim is a civil claim and cannot be claimed as a division of matrimonial assets pursuant to a divorce.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 The Wife claimed a 30% share of the Husband’s HDB flat on the basis of her indirect contributions during the marriage. The Husband resisted this claim on the basis that the HDB flat was acquired by him prior to the marriage and therefore not a matrimonial asset.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Husband’s claim for 50% of the monies with the Wife </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 The Husband clarified at the first ancillary hearing on 23 April 2024 that he sought the Wife’s repayment of 50% of the sum referred to in paragraph 5. He claimed that the monies were for investment and the Wife had purchased a property in China (which was meant to be their matrimonial home) as well as banking products from such monies. He claimed 50% repayment of the principal invested amount and claimed this was fair since he is sharing this equally with her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>Transactions set out in tables 7.1 and 7.8 of the Husband’s 4<sup>th</sup> Affidavit</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 The Wife conceded that the transfers set out were received/taken save for Table 7.1:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_a\"></a>(a) SN 16: a transfer of CNY500,000 to the Wife’s mother on 20 July 2018</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_b\"></a>(b) SN 15: cash savings of S$60,000 withdrawn from the Wife’s UOB account on 19 May 2021</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 For SN 16, the Husband’s evidence was on page 78 of his 4<sup>th</sup> Affidavit. However, page 78 contains what appears to be a screenshot of a mobile message in Mandarin save for 2 names, which did not appear to belong to the parties. The message was not translated and the Husband was clearly aware of the requirement for evidence to be translated as he was reminded of this by me during the contested divorce trial wherein some of his evidence was expunged for the lack of translation. The alleged transfer in SN 16 is therefore unproven.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 For SN 15, the Husband referred to pages 51 and 52 of his Affidavit of Assets and Means. The 2 pages contain translated messages between the Husband and Wife around 28 October 2018. Firstly, the message occurred years before the alleged timing of the transaction in SN 15 and secondly, the messages only reflected the Wife’s initial impression that she could not withdraw monies from a Singapore bank account in China. There is no supporting evidence to prove that during the marriage:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Wife’s UOB bank account contained S$60,000 which belonged to him; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_b\"></a>(b) Such amount was withdrawn by the Wife.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"\"></a>Therefore, SN 15 is also unproven.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 For the remaining amounts which the Wife admitted to, she explained they were monies given to her by the Husband, her boyfriend at that time, for financial support and as gifts. They had an ongoing relationship where she was fully supported by him financially and these monies were just given to her or instructed by him to be withdrawn by her for her own use. There were no instructions from the Husband about investments and she was free to deal with the funds as she wished as they were gifted to her. She explained she used the funds for her living expenses as well as her parents’ living expenses and also did some investments (in which she suffered losses). In any event, she submitted that these monies do not form any matrimonial asset since all transactions occurred prior to the marriage.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>Applicable law on the division of matrimonial assets</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 The Family Court has the power to divide matrimonial assets upon a divorce. The definition of matrimonial assets is defined in section 112(10) of the Women’s Charter. The case of <em>USB v USA and another appeal</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24645-SSP.xml')\">[2020] SGCA 57</a> (hereinafter referred to as “<em>USB v USA</em>”) is instructive:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">“18 Examining the above provision, it is clear that the intention of the legislature was to confine the court’s powers of division to <em>assets relating to marriage</em>. It is established law that in determining the legislative purpose of a provision, primacy must be accorded to both the text and statutory context of the legislation: <em>Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/21018-SSP.xml')\">[2017] 2 SLR 850</a> at [43]. As a starting point, the title of s 112 of the Charter states that the provision deals with the “[p]ower of court to order division of matrimonial assets”, <em>ie</em>, assets relating to marriage. Further, s 112 falls under Pt X of the Charter which, on the whole, pertains to matters relating to the dissolution of <em>marriage</em>. In the Charter, Parliament made the decision to confine the court’s power to divide assets belonging to divorcing parties to those they acquired during marriage. This was a matter of social policy, and one clearly within Parliament’s purview. The court cannot and should not wade into matters of social policy where the legislature has established a clear statutory framework providing for the division of assets relating to <em>marriage</em>. <b><em>It is, thus, axiomatic that the court must disregard assets which were acquired during pre-marital cohabitation or during any non-marital relationship. The ownership of such assets would have to be determined in accordance with general property law principles.</em></b> It should further be emphasised that in determining the length of a marriage, the court ought not to take into account the period during which parties were cohabiting. Marriage confers a legal status on the parties which carries with it specified rights and obligations. For non-Muslim couples who marry in Singapore, their marriage begins when they satisfy the various statutory prescriptions which the Charter sets out for the attainment of that status. The Charter governs all aspects of civil marriage and divorce in Singapore. Thus, under our law, it is inherently self-contradictory to treat parties as “married” when they were simply cohabiting.”</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis in original omitted; emphasis added in bold italics]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 The Husband’s claim is not on any of the Wife’s existing assets/investments<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span>, although he made reference to the existence of them, which shows she has hidden assets that can meet his claim<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> and/or corroborates his case that there was an agreement/understanding to invest. Majority of his claim is based on transactions that occurred prior to the marriage. The exceptions are SN 15 (which is unproven) and SN 10. For SN 10, there were 3 transfers from the Husband’s brother (allegedly to return a loan to the Husband) totalling CNY 80,000.00 (S$16,000) into the Wife’s account in 2019. The Husband’s consistent case throughout the hearing was to recover investment monies based on an alleged agreement formed prior to the marriage between parties. This is not a claim that can be made pursuant to the Court’s ancillary powers in divorce proceedings. Notwithstanding the Husband’s claim that they were already planning to marry then and he treated her as his wife, it is the conferment of the legal status through a valid marriage that satisfies the relevant statutory requirements that parties can avail themselves of the marital rights and obligations set out in the Women’s Charter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 I therefore made no order, based on the Husband’s claim although he is at liberty to take up other appropriate actions for the relief he sought.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Wife’s claim for 30% share of the Husband’s HDB flat</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>Whether the HDB flat is a matrimonial asset</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 It is undisputed that the HDB flat in question is solely owned by the Husband and was fully acquired by him prior to the marriage. The Wife sought a 30% share of the HDB flat based on her indirect contributions<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span>. In paragraphs 15-18 of her Affidavit of Assets and Means, she confirmed she made no direct financial contributions towards the flat and listed her indirect non-financial contributions during the marriage, which I summarise to be broadly to be,</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_a\"></a>(a) when she stayed with the Husband in Singapore for short periods of 1 to 2 months at a time between December 2018 to 2019 and then for one year period between 2020 to 2021, she provided companionship and comfort to the Husband; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_b\"></a>(b) when in China, she provided companionship and comfort to the Husband via WeChat calls and messages.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 In the Wife’s Affidavit of Assets and Means, she did not initially make any claim on the Husband’s HDB flat. The claim was first made in the Wife’s second Ancillary Affidavit. There was no further evidence detailing the Wife’s contributions. Little ink was spilled in the Wife’s written submissions on this claim.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 I first considered whether the HDB flat is a matrimonial asset as it was clearly acquired before the marriage. Section 112(10) provides for the inclusion of assets acquired prior to the marriage as matrimonial assets if transformed. Again, the case of <em>USB v USA</em> at paragraph 19 offers guidance:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">(b) “Transformed matrimonial assets”: we use this term to denote assets which were acquired before the marriage by one spouse (or, more rarely, by both spouses), but which have been substantially improved during the marriage by the other spouse or by both spouses, or which were ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or their children while residing together for purposes such as shelter, transport, household use, <em>etc</em>. Once transformed, the whole asset goes into the pool but if there is no transformation then, subject to (c) below, any asset acquired before the marriage even if acquired by both parties would be dealt with in accordance with general principles of property law.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 Parties did live in the HDB flat, as their home whenever the Wife was in Singapore notwithstanding the short marriage. In the case of <em>TNC v TND</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19114-SSP.xml')\">[2016] 3 SLR 1172</a>, ordinary use and enjoyment cannot be occasional or casual:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">18 I found that the Bayshore property was ordinarily used by both parties for shelter and, therefore, a matrimonial asset. The requirement of ordinary use would not be satisfied if the parties’ use of or stay at the property was “occasional or casual”: <em>BJS v BJT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 4 SLR 0041.xml')\">[2013] 4 SLR 41</a> at [23]. Examples of casual residence are staying in a property for no more than 21 days out of 14 years of marriage (<em>Ryan Neil John v Berger Rosaline</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2000] 3 SLR(R) 0647.xml')\">[2000] 3 SLR(R) 647</a> at [60]) or on only two occasions throughout the marriage (<em>JAF v JAE</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19032-SSP.xml')\">[2016] 3 SLR 717</a> at [15]). On the present facts, even if I had accepted the Husband’s submission, residence in the property for 15 months is sufficient to constitute ordinary use for shelter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 In the current case, parties lived together in the HDB flat during the marriage for about 23 months<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> based on the Wife’s own evidence<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span>. This was the only residence they lived together during their marriage as the Husband could not travel. There were multiple earlier attempts by the Husband to try to obtain longer residential passes for the Wife in Singapore, which supported the probability parties intended to make Singapore their home base. There were no indications that the HDB flat was meant to be a casual or temporary residence pending further plans to move to a more permanent home. I therefore made a finding that the HDB flat is a transformed matrimonial asset.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>Division of a solely acquired matrimonial asset in a short childless marriage</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 In the case of <em>TNL v TNK</em> and <em>another appeal and another matter</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/20138-SSP.xml')\">[2017] 1 SLR 609</a> (hereinafter referred to as “<em>TNK v TNK</em>”), the Court of Appeal clarified that the approach set out in <em>ANJ v ANK</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/17925-SSP.xml')\">[2015] 4 SLR 1043</a> (hereinafter referred to as “<em>ANJ v ANK</em>”) will not apply to single income marriages. The Court of Appeal confirmed the approach for long single-income marriages albeit leaving the considerations for short Single-Income marriages open:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">48 In <em>long</em> Single-Income Marriages, the precedent cases show that our courts tend towards an equal division of the matrimonial assets. We are in general agreement with this approach. We pause to highlight that different considerations may attach in <em>short</em> Single-Income Marriages, although we propose to leave that issue to be dealt with in an appropriate case in the future.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 In the current case, neither party worked during the marriage. However, the Husband was clearly the sole financial provider during the marriage. I am of the view that the same principle why <em>ANJ v ANK</em> methodology should not be used for single-income marriages would similarly apply in this case to unduly favour the Husband as explained in <em>TNL v TNK</em>:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">44 Our reconsideration of the <em>ANJ</em> approach in the context of Single-Income Marriages stems from the fact that <em>ANJ</em> approach tends to unduly favour the working spouse over the non-working spouse. This is because financial contributions are given recognition under <em>both</em> Steps 1 and 2 of the <em>ANJ</em> approach. Under Step 1, the working spouse in a Single-Income Marriage would be accorded 100% (or close to 100%) of direct contributions. He or she would also be accorded a substantial percentage under Step 2 solely on the basis of his or her indirect financial contributions, and this could well be the case even if he or she made little or no non-financial contributions. On the other side of the equation, this means that the non-working spouse is, in this sense, doubly (and severely) disadvantaged.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 Whilst for long single-income marriages, division tends towards equal division, this cannot be similarly applied to short marriages. Although decided before <em>ANJ v ANK</em> and <em>TNL v TNK</em>, the Court of Appeal held in <em>Ong Boon Huat Samuel v Chan Mei Lan Kristine</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/53472-M.xml')\">[2007] 2 SLR 729</a> non-financial contributions in a short childless marriage will be minimal:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">28 Having excluded Malvern Springs from division, we now turn to consider the division of the matrimonial home. <em>In a short and childless marriage, the division of matrimonial assets will usually be in accordance with the parties’ direct financial contributions as non-financial contributions will be minimal.</em> Thus, in <em>Wang Shi Huah Karen v Wong King Cheung Kevin</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1992] 2 SLR(R) 0172.xml')\">[1992] 2 SLR(R) 172</a>, a case where the wife left home after a year, the High Court divided the matrimonial home solely in accordance with the parties’ direct financial contributions. In the present case, it has been established that the direct financial contributions of the parties to the matrimonial home are in the proportions of 64:36 from the Husband and the Wife respectively. The Wife rightly did not make a claim for any non-financial contributions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis added in italics]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 In the current case, I find the non-financial contributions claimed by the Wife to be minimal in view of the short marriage, especially bearing in mind the Husband’s incarceration and lack of contact since then.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 I therefore awarded the Wife no share in the HDB flat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 Neither party succeeded in their claim in the ancillary matters hearing. However, I awarded costs of $2,500 in the Wife’s favour given that hearing time was almost entirely spent on the Husband’s claim. I also took into account the fact that the Wife took up a belated application to file a further affidavit after the matter was fixed for ancillary hearing.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>Set out in Table 7.1, the first set of SN 1 to 17 of the Husband’s 4<sup>th</sup> Affidavit</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Set out in Table 7.8 of the Husband’s 4<sup>th</sup> Affidavit</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Husband orally submitted on 10 July 2024 that he does not plan to claim investment returns but only to get back his investment principal.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Husband’s oral submission on 16 July 2024 that paragraphs 10.2 to 10.4 of his 4<sup>th</sup> Affidavit is to prove the Wife’s accounts have money which she has hidden but his claim is 50% of what was transferred to her.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Paragraph 10 of Wife’s 3<sup>rd</sup> AM Hearing Submissions</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>There was an error in the timeframe in my brief reasons but nothing turns on this error.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Paragraph 17 of the Wife’s 4<sup>th</sup> Affidavit</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Ancillary powers of court – Parties seeking to vary order on division of matrimonial home – How power to vary is to be exercised – Section 112(4) Women’s Charter 1961"],"date":"2024-12-23","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 4937 of 2021, Summons No. 3012 of 2024; Summons No. 3316 of 2024","title":"WQF v WQG","citation":"[2024] SGFC 113","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32687-SSP.xml","counsel":["Ryan Yu Gen Xian (M/s Aspect Law Chambers LLC) for the Plaintiff","Chew Wei En (M/s Teoh & Co LLC) for the Defendant."],"timestamp":"2025-01-08T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kow Keng Siong","html":"<root><head><title>WQF v WQG</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> WQF <em>v</em> WQG </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32687-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 113</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 4937 of 2021, Summons No. 3012 of 2024; Summons No. 3316 of 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">23 December 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kow Keng Siong </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Ryan Yu Gen Xian (M/s Aspect Law Chambers LLC) for the Plaintiff; Chew Wei En (M/s Teoh & Co LLC) for the Defendant. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> WQF — WQG </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Ancillary powers of court</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Parties seeking to vary order on division of matrimonial home</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">How power to vary is to be exercised</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Section 112(4) Women’s Charter 1961</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">23 December 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kow Keng Siong:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 The Plaintiff and the Defendant were formerly husband and wife. They have a son together (D.O.B.: May 2013). In August 2023, orders on ancillary matters (“<b>Order</b>”) were made following the parties’ divorce.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 Clause 3 of the Order deals with the matrimonial home. It states –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The matrimonial property at XXX shall be divided in the proportion of 54% to the Plaintiff and 46% to the Defendant, based on joint valuation in the event of a transfer. <em>In the event of a transfer</em>, the transferee will bear the costs and expenses of the transfer. <em>In the event of a sale</em>, parties will bear the costs and expenses of sale equally. Parties are to refund their CPF monies utilised towards the purchase of the matrimonial property with accrued interest from their own share of the matrimonial property. <em>Parties will work out the payment terms within 4 weeks. Failing which, parties are to apply for further orders</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 It is common ground that based on Clause 3, the Plaintiff is to receive <b>$475,200</b> as his share in the matrimonial home.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Parties’ positions and interests</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 The parties are however unable to agree on how the Plaintiff is to receive the relevant funds.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Plaintiff wants to receive the funds by <em>selling</em> the home in the open market. According to him, he needs his share of the sale proceeds to move on with his life and to purchase his own place.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_b\"></a>(b) On the other hand, the Defendant wants to <em>take over</em> the matrimonial home – to ensure continuity in the son’s current living arrangements. In the Defendant’s view, such a continuity is important because the son is sitting for his PSLE in 2025.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Proposed variations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 Given their disagreement on how the matrimonial home ought to be dealt with, the parties applied to vary the Order. The details of their proposed variations are in <b><u>Annex A</u></b>. In summary –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Plaintiff proposes that Clause 3 be varied such that –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_a-p3_i\"></a>(i) The matrimonial home is to be sold in the open market within six months,</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_a-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Both parties are to have joint conduct of the sale, and</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_a-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) Each party is to retain the balance of the sale proceeds in the ratio of 54% (Plaintiff) and 46% (Defendant) after the relevant payments and refunds have been made.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Defendant proposes that Clause 3 and Clause 2 (on child maintenance) be varied such that she takes over the matrimonial home after making the following payments (totalling $475,200) to the Plaintiff:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) $220,000 (cash) <span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) $153,900 (from lump sum child maintenance payable by the Plaintiff)</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) $101,300 (transfer from the Defendant’s CPF Special Account to the Plaintiff’s CPF Special Account).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Applicable principles</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 Before I address the proposed variations, it is useful to first summarise the applicable principles.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">When is power available</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 The power to vary an order for the division of matrimonial assets is provided in s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“<b>Charter</b>”). This power is available only if the order has <em>not</em> been completely implemented. Put in another way, if everything that is required to be done under the order has been carried out and the assets concerned has already been distributed, then the court will not have the power under s 112(4) to revisit or reopen the order: <em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 1 SLR 0924.xml')\">[2013] 1 SLR 924</a> (“<b><em>AYM</em></b>”) at [22].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 In the present case, it is not disputed that the power to vary the Clause 3 is available as the provision has not been implemented yet.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Whether power should be exercised </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 The next question is whether I ought to vary Clause 3.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 Given the need for finality, courts will exercise the power to vary an order for the division of matrimonial assets only in limited situations: <em>AYM</em> at [22]. Two well established situations where courts will exercise the power are as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_a\"></a>(a) Where the order is <em>unworkable to begin with</em>. This unworkability can be due to (i) a lack of functionality of the order, or (ii) a fundamental misunderstanding at the time the order was made: <em>AYM</em> at [29].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_b\"></a>(b) Where the order has <em>become unworkable</em> because of <em>new circumstances</em> which either (i) make the order impossible to implement practically, or (ii) so radically changes the situation so that to implement the order would be to implement something radically different from what was originally intended: <em>AYM</em> at [25] to [27].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 I should add that the Court of Appeal has left open the issue of whether an application under s 112(4) will also be entertained in the following situations:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_a\"></a>(a) Where there has been fraud in an order for the division of matrimonial assets: <em>AYM</em> at [30].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_b\"></a>(b) Where the division is made by a consent order and there has been an absence of full and frank disclosure of material facts by one of the parties: <em>AYM</em> at [31].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_c\"></a>(c) Where there has been fraudulent misrepresentation made by one of the parties before the divorce: <em>AYM</em> at [32].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 In my view, the present case falls within [10(b)] above. I say this because Clause 3 <em>could have been implemented</em> if the parties are able to agree on how the matrimonial home is to be dealt with. However, as it turns out, such an agreement is not possible. (Clause 3 did not provide for this contingency – e.g., by directing that the matrimonial home be sold in the open market if the parties fail to reach an agreement on its transfer to the Defendant after a specified period.) As a result of the disagreement, Clause 3 is impossible to implement. In the circumstances, I agree with the parties that I ought to vary Clause 3 to resolve the parties’ impasse regarding the matrimonial home.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">How should power be exercised</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 This brings me to the next issue – how should Clause 3 be varied? In this case, the parties have presented me with competing proposals for variation. How should I decide?</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 In the context of the present case (which involves a variation under [10(b)] above), I find the following considerations to be relevant.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>Starting point</em>. It is well settled that when a court exercises its power under s 122(4), it will not re-open the original order. Neither will the court allow the parties to re-litigate the order: <em>UMM v UML</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22258-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGHCF 13</a> (“<b><em>UMM</em></b>”) at [15]. The starting point is that the original order is just and equitable, and that the variation must be done in a way that preserves its integrity and finality.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b\"></a>(b) In line with the above, a court needs to consider the following when varying an order:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) <em>Whether the variation is surgical</em>. The variation should be surgical – i.e., (1) it should be done with a light touch, and (2) it should be limited to do only what is necessary to make the original order workable: <em>TYA v TYB</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/21710-SSP.xml')\">[2018] 3 SLR 1170</a> at [46].</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) <em>Whether the variation reflects intent of original order</em>. It is necessary to consider (1) what is the intent behind the original order (<em>AYM</em> at [25]) and (2) whether the variation is consistent with this intent. The variation should not have the effect of altering the purpose and effect of the original order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) <em>Whether the variation preserves parties’ rights and obligations</em>. The variation should also avoid prejudice to the parties – whether in (1) diminishing/removing their rights under the original order, (2) imposing new obligation(s), or (3) making existing obligation(s) more onerous.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b-p3_iv\"></a>(iv) <em>Whether the variation achieves the best outcome</em>. When presented with more than one option to vary an order, a court should logically choose the option that has the most upsides and the least downsides. The variation should ultimately achieve a just or equitable outcome: <em>Seet Poh v Lim Lee Cheng</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2014] 3 SLR 0208.xml')\">[2014] 3 SLR 208</a> at [35]. To be clear, this does not mean that a court has the license to re-write the original order on how the matrimonial assets are to be divided: see [14(a)] above. Rather, the aim is simply to avoid a situation where the variation (inadvertently) results in unfairness.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">My decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 Having set out the applicable principles, I will not apply them to the present case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Agreed variations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 As a preliminary point – I note that the Defendant consents to some of the variations proposed by the Plaintiff. These are in the white boxes at <b><u>Annex A</u></b>. In my view, these variations (a) are in line with the intent of Clause 3, (b) do not impinge on the finality of the Order, and (c) are reasonable. Accordingly, I allow these variations.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Disputed variations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 I now turn to the proposed variations that are disputed.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 Between the two, I prefer the Plaintiff’s proposed variations over the Defendant’s proposed variations. This is because I find that the Plaintiff’s proposed variations (a) are surgical, (b) better reflects the Order’s original intent, (c) better preserves the parties’ rights and obligations under the Order, and (d) achieves a better outcome. For my detailed reasons, see <b><u>Annex B</u></b>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 At this stage, I wish to make a few observations.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff “bears the burden of proof if he wishes to vary the order to that of a sale order instead of a transfer order”. According to her, this is because “the original order provided for a transfer as there was reference to payment terms”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> This submission is plainly unmeritorious. <em>First</em>, Clause 3 contemplates the possibility of both a <em>sale</em> and a transfer of the home – and not just a transfer. <em>Second</em>, given that the Defendant is seeking to transfer the home to herself, she must prove why this is appropriate.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b\"></a>(b) This conveniently leads me to my next point. A central theme of the Defendant’s submission is that a sale of the matrimonial home will disrupt the son’s living arrangements and PSLE preparations.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> In my view, the impact of the potential disruption is overstated:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) <em>First</em>, I find that the potential impact to the son’s PSLE preparations from the sale of the matrimonial home is likely to be minor. I have explained why in <b><u>Annex B</u></b> at (4)(A)(ii).</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) <em>Second</em>, it bears highlighting that the potential disruption to the son can in fact be minimised <em>by the Defendant herself</em> – by selling her Parc Riviera property. The Defendant however is not prepared to do so because she did not want to incur “hefty financial costs” from its sale.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> In my view, the Defendant should get her priorities clear – if she is really concerned for her son’s welfare, then she should make the necessary financial sacrifice.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) <em>Finally</em>, the Defendant’s proposed variations entail her obtaining a $220,000 bank loan and maintaining the son solely on her own salary. There is a risk that she might end up becoming financially stretched as a result, be unable to adequately provide maintenance for the son, and thus jeopardise his welfare.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_c\"></a>(c) I come to my last point. The Defendant’s proposal requires Clause 2 (on child maintenance) to be varied. In my view, the Defendant’s underlying motives for the variation is unprincipled.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_c-p3_i\"></a>(i) <em>First</em>, to vary an order on child maintenance, the Defendant must prove that there has been a “material change in the circumstances” of either the son or his parents: s 72 and s 127(2) of the Charter; <em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/16670-SSP-M.xml')\">[2014] 4 SLR 559</a> at [16]; <em>UGK v UGL</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/20919-SSP.xml')\">[2017] SGFC 121</a> at [15]. According to the Defendant, this requirement is met because –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-3\">if the Father’s application is allowed, there will be such a material change in circumstances as the child will be forced to seek alternative accommodation (and there will be a different set of expenses such as rental etc). In the circumstances, we submit that the Mother has crossed the threshold given that the Father was the party who has filed for such orders.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"\"></a>I find the Defendant’s submission to be disingenuous. Based on her own case, the variation is to <em>prevent</em> a change in the son’s living arrangement (so that the child can continue to stay in the matrimonial home) – and <em>not in response</em> to such a change (e.g., to cover rental costs).</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_c-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) <em>Second</em>, one of the Defendant’s motives for the variation is to finance <em>her</em> takeover of the matrimonial home<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> – and not because, e.g., there has been an increase in the <em>son’s</em> monthly expenses. The Defendant clearly has no intention of using the lump sum maintenance that she is seeking to pay <em>for the son’s daily living expenses</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_c-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) <em>Third</em>, the Defendant’s other motive for seeking a lump sum maintenance is to facilitate a clean break between the Plaintiff and the son. This is contrary to the well settled legal position that such a clean break (between a parent and a child) is rarely desirable and courts are slow to order a lump sum maintenance for this reason: <em>VSL v VSM</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26653-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGHCF 33</a> at [30]. The Defendant has failed to provide any compelling reason why it is necessary, and in the son’s interest, for him to have a clean break from the Plaintiff. For clarity, I wish to state that the mere fact that the Plaintiff had allegedly failed to exercise his access rights or take care of the son during his access periods<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> is not a good reason for a clean break.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_c-p3_iv\"></a>(iv) <em>Finally</em>, there is nothing to stop the Defendant from seeking further child maintenance from the Plaintiff in future – given that the latter has a continuing duty to maintain his child: s 68, s 69(2) and s 73 of the Charter; <em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/16670-SSP-M.xml')\">[2014] 4 SLR 559</a> at [16]. Such a prospect is very likely given that the son is only 11 years old, and his expenses will certainly increase in the coming years. When the son’s financial needs increases beyond her means, there is nothing to compel the Defendant to sell the Parc Riveira property – despite her assurances to do so (as these are non-legally binding).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 Given the above, my decision is as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_a\"></a>(a) For the Plaintiff’s application in Summons No. 3012 of 2024 –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_a-p3_i\"></a>(i) Prayers 1(a) to 1(c) are granted. For the avoidance of doubt, I accept the Defendant’s submissions and find that the “outstanding loan” referred to in Prayer 1(b) should be determined as <em>at the date of the Order</em>, and <em>not</em> the date of the transfer of the Parc Riviera property.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_a-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Prayer 2 is dismissed – I agree with the Defendant that a penal notice is unnecessary.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_a-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) Prayer 4 is granted.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_b\"></a>(b) I dismiss the Defendant’s application in Summons No. 3316 of 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 Before concluding, I wish to highlight one learning point from this case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_a\"></a>(a) During the AM proceedings, the Plaintiff had left it to the district judge to make a just and equitable division of the matrimonial home,<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> while the Defendant had wanted the Plaintiff to transfer his interests in the home to her for no consideration.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_b\"></a>(b) Clause 3 is open-ended – the parties are left to decide whether the matrimonial home should be sold on the open market or transferred to one of them. It does not address the situation where the parties <em>cannot</em> agree on how the home should be dealt with – which is exactly what had occurred in this case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c\"></a>(c) The failure to address the above situation could have been avoided. After all, the ancillary matters were hotly contested, and it is foreseeable that the parties will not agree on whether the matrimonial home should be sold or transferred. Even if it was felt appropriate for the Defendant to be given the first option to purchase the Plaintiff’s share in the home, there should have been a deadline imposed for the exercise of such an option. For an example of this, see clauses 1 and 2 of the consent order in <em>VPB v VPC</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25653-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 15</a> at [5].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 In my view, (a) the delay in dealing with the matrimonial home, (b) the applications before me, and (c) the financial and emotional costs in litigating the applications, could have been avoided <em>if all parties concerned</em> had carefully thought through the issues and had taken a clearer and firmer position on how the matrimonial home is to be dealt with. This is of course said with the benefit of hindsight. It would do well for parties and counsel to take note of the learning point raised in these applications in future cases.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 Given my views in [21] and [22] above, the Defendant is not solely responsible for the events that had led to the applications before me. Contrary to the Plaintiff submissions,<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> the evidence does not prove unequivocally that the Defendant had conducted the proceedings in an unreasonable manner. In the circumstances, it inappropriate to order costs against her. Accordingly, I order that the parties are to bear their own costs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a>__________________</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a></p><div align=\"right\"> <b><u>ANNEX A</u></b> </div><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a></p><div align=\"center\"> <b>PROPOSED VARIATIONS</b> </div><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a> <em>Note. The texts in underscore do not appear in the original Order. The proposed variations in grey boxes are disputed, and those in white boxes are agreed.</em> </p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"50.48%\"><col width=\"49.52%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Plaintiff’s application:</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Summons No. 3012/2024</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Defendant’s application:</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Summons No. 3316/2024</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer 1(a)</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <u>Clause 3 – To be completely replaced with the following:</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">That the matrimonial property at XXX (the “<b>Matrimonial Home</b>”) be sold in the open market within six (6) months from this Order where the sale proceeds shall be utilized as follows: </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) To make full payment of the outstanding loan (if any); </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) To pay the HDB resale levy (if any); </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(c) To pay all costs and expenses relating to the sale including agent’s commission; </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(d) The net sale proceeds are to be divided 54% to the Plaintiff and 46% to the Defendant; </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(e) Each party is to refund his/her own Central Provident Fund (“<b>CPF</b>”) moneys withdrawn for the purchase of the Matrimonial Home with accrued interest from their share of the net sale proceeds in accordance with applicable CPF laws to the parties’ respective CPF accounts; </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(f) Parties shall have joint conduct of sale.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer 1</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <u>Clause 3 – To be completely replaced with the following:</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">That Plaintiff’s rights, title and interests in the matrimonial property at XXX (the “<b>Matrimonial Home</b>") be transferred to the Defendant (other than by way of sale) upon the Defendant paying the sum of $220,000 to the Plaintiff within six (6) months from this Order with no refunds to the Plaintiff’s CPF account. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The Defendant shall bear the reasonable costs of the transfer. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">In addition, the Plaintiff is due the sum<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span> of $255,200 which shall be repaid as follows:</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) The sum of $153,900 shall be offset against the lump sum maintenance due to the Defendant by the Plaintiff;</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) Any balance sum shall be transferred from the Defendant’s CPF SA account to the Plaintiff’s CPF SA account.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <em>Note. The Plaintiff </em> <b><em>objects </em></b> <em>to the proposed variation.</em> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer 2</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <u>Clause 2 – To be varied as follows:</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The Plaintiff shall pay the Defendant <u>lump sum maintenance of $153,900 (being $1,350 x 114 months (i.e. November 2024 – May 2034) for the Child of the marriage. </u><del>the monthly sum of $1,350 being maintenance of the Child of the marriage on the first day of each month. Such payment shall be made into the Defendant's designated bank account with effect from 1 September 2023.</del></p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <em>Note. Under the proposed variation, the child maintenance is payable on a lump sum basis (instead of on a monthly basis).</em> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer 1(b)</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <u>Clause 5 – To be varied as follows:</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">That Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff 25% of the value of Parc Riviera <u>valued at $790,000.00</u> (less outstanding loan and $87,414 <u>and $18,150.00 (being backdated maintenance ordered in HCF/RAS 21/2022 and $43,635.38 (being the amount due to the Defendant in HCF/DCA 23))</u> in settlement of the Plaintiff's share in Parc Riviera <u>within one (1) month from this Order</u>. <del>Parties will work out the payment terms within 4 weeks. Failing which, parties are to apply for further orders.</del></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <em>Note. The Defendant </em> <b><em>consents </em></b> <em>to this variation.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span></em> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer 1(c)</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <u>Clause 6 (new) – Insert the following:</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The Registrar/Assistant Registrar of the Family Justice Courts under section 31 of the Family Justice Act (No. 27 of 2014) is empowered to execute, sign, or indorse all necessary documents relating to matters contained in this order on behalf of either party should either party fail to do so within seven (7) days of written request being made to the other party. In such event, the defaulting party shall be liable for all costs and incidentals incurred on an indemnity basis.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <em>Note. The Defendant </em> <b><em>consents </em></b> <em>to this variation.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span></em> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer 2</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <u>Insert the usual Penal Notice to the Order</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <em>Purpose – “To ensure cooperation” by the Defendant.</em> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <em>Note. The Defendant </em> <b><em>objects </em></b> <em>to this variation – on the basis that the clause is not necessary, especially in view of Clause 6 (new).<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_18\" id=\"Ftn_18_1\"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span></em> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer 4</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">All other paragraphs in the Order of Court dated 22 August 2023 shall remain.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <em>Note. The Defendant did not object to this variation.</em> </p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a></p><div align=\"right\"> <b><u>ANNEX B</u></b> </div><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a></p><div align=\"center\"> <b><font style=\"text-transform: uppercase;\">ANALYSIS OF PARTIES’ PROPOSED VARIATIONS to clauses 3 and 2</font></b> </div><p></p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"7.47850429914017%\"><col width=\"26.1747650469906%\"><col width=\"33.6332733453309%\"><col width=\"32.7134573085383%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Considerations</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>(A) Analysis of</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Plaintiff’s proposal</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>(B) Analysis of</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Defendant’s proposal</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(1)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Whether the variation is surgical</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The proposed variations are <em>surgical</em> – they target only Clause 3, which is the area of the dispute between the parties.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The proposed variations are <em>more extensive</em>. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) Apart from Clause 3, the variations also touch on Clause 2 – which deals with the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay child maintenance. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) Clause 2 has nothing to do with the division of the matrimonial home.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_19\" id=\"Ftn_19_1\"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span></p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(2)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Whether the variation reflects the Order’s original intent</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The proposed variations to Clause 3 are <em>consistent</em> with the Order’s intent.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The proposed variations to Clause 3 and Clause 2 are <em>not</em> consistent with the Order’s intent.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) Clause 3 does not envisage that the Defendant will use the child maintenance to subsidize her payments to the Plaintiff to effect the transfer of the home.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) Clause 2 envisages the child maintenance to be paid monthly. Under the Defendant’s proposal, the maintenance will be paid in one lump sum.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(3)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Whether the variation preserves the parties’ rights and obligations under the Order</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The proposed variations will <em>not</em> lead to any change to the parties’ rights and obligations under the Order.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The proposed variations <em>will change</em> the Plaintiff’s rights and obligations under the Order. Specifically, the variations –</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) Will affect how the Plaintiff is to enjoy his right over his share in the matrimonial home, and </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) Will impose on the Plaintiff the <em>(more) onerous</em> burden of paying $153,900 as child maintenance <em>in one lump sum</em><span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_20\" id=\"Ftn_20_1\"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> – when he was allowed under the original Order to pay the maintenance at $1,350 monthly over a period of 10 years.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_21\" id=\"Ftn_21_1\"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(4)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Whether the variation achieves the best outcome</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b><em>Proposal’s downsides –</em></b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) The proposed variations will result in the sale of the matrimonial home. This <em>will disrupt</em> the son’s current living arrangements as he has been residing at the home since his birth. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) According to the Defendant, the sale of the home will also affect the son’s preparation for PSLE (due in 2025).<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_22\" id=\"Ftn_22_1\"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span></p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b><em>Comments</em></b> –</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(i) The potential disruption to the son’s living arrangement and PSLE can be avoided if the Defendant sells her Parc Riviera property. The Defendant <em>did not rebut</em> the Plaintiff’s submission that the sale will give her funds to take over the matrimonial home.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_23\" id=\"Ftn_23_1\"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span></p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(ii) Even if the home is to be sold, I am of the view that the potential impact of this to the son’s PSLE preparations is <em>likely to be minor</em>. Under the Plaintiff’s proposal, the matrimonial home is to be sold within six months (i.e., by June 2025). PSLE starts only sometime thereafter. Based on historical data, PSLE typically starts with oral examination in August, listening comprehension in September, and written examination in late September to early October. </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b><em>Proposal’s upsides –</em></b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) The proposed variations will ensure continuity in the son’s current living arrangements. The matrimonial home has been his only residence and is close to his school. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) The son is scheduled to take his PSLE examinations in 2025. According to the Defendant, ordering a sale of the home at this juncture will disrupt his studies and undermine the principles of therapeutic justice.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_24\" id=\"Ftn_24_1\"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span></p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b><em>Proposal’s downsides –</em></b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The proposed variations–</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a) Will result in the Plaintiff not receiving a portion of the cash that he can receive from the sale of the home.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_25\" id=\"Ftn_25_1\"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span></p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b) Will result in the Plaintiff being unable to use $122,428.12 (which the Defendant plans to pay him) for a few years. This is because the Defendant intends for this payment to be made by way of a transfer of funds from her CPF Special Account into his CPF Special Account. The Plaintiff is now about 51 years old (born in November 1973),<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_26\" id=\"Ftn_26_1\"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span> and will only be able to use the funds when he reaches 55.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(c) Entails the Defendant obtaining a $220,000 bank loan and maintaining the son solely on her own salary. There is a risk that she might end up becoming financially stretched as a result, be unable to adequately provide maintenance for the son, and thus jeopardise his welfare.</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>This is based on 54% x $880,000 (agreed valuation of the home).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 20 September 2024 at [11] and [12].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [9] and [10].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>According to the Defendant, this is the maximum bank loan she could obtain: Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [13].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Defendant’s Written Submissions dated 16 December 2024 at [16].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>Defendant’s Written Submission dated 16 December 2024 at [12], [17], [18], [20] to [22].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Defendant’s Written Submissions dated 16 December 2024 at [19].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>Defendant’s Written Submissions dated 16 December 2024 at [26].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Defendant’s Written Submissions dated 16 December 2024 at [25].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [24] – [29].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>The parties disagree on the date on which the outstanding loan is to be assessed, i.e., whether it should be (A) at the date of the Order or (B) at the date of transfer of the property. The Defendant’s view is that the outstanding loan should be assessed based on (A) because (1) this was the intention of the district judge who made the Order and (2) the Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if the later date (i.e., B) is used as the Defendant was one who had made the instalment payments to reduce the loan when the Plaintiff should also have contributed to his share to such payments: Defendant’s Written Submissions dated 16 December 2024 at [13].The Plaintiff’s view is that the outstanding loan should be assessed based on (B) because the Defendant had protracted the proceedings.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Written Submissions for Ancillary Matters Hearing dated 13 April 2023 at [31].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>Defendant Wife’s Written Submissions (Ancillary Matters) dated 10 April 2023 at [113] and [114].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Written Submissions at [30] to [35].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>During the hearing on 19 December 2024, the Defendant’s counsel clarified that this phrase is intended to mean that the <em>Defendant is to pay</em> the Plaintiff a sum of $255,200.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [4] and [38].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [4] and [38].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_18_1\" id=\"Ftn_18\">[note: 18]</a></sup>Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [4] and [38].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_19_1\" id=\"Ftn_19\">[note: 19]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 5 November 2024 at [15].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_20_1\" id=\"Ftn_20\">[note: 20]</a></sup>As to how this sum is derived, see Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 20 September 2024 at [13(iii)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_21_1\" id=\"Ftn_21\">[note: 21]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 5 November 2024 at [15].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_22_1\" id=\"Ftn_22\">[note: 22]</a></sup>Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [9], [10], [30] and [31].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_23_1\" id=\"Ftn_23\">[note: 23]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 5 November 2024 at [11].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_24_1\" id=\"Ftn_24\">[note: 24]</a></sup>Defendant’s affidavit dated 16 October 2024 at [9] and [10]; Defendant’s Written Submission dated 16 December 2024 at [12], [17], [18], [20] to [22].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_25_1\" id=\"Ftn_25\">[note: 25]</a></sup>As to how this sum is derived, see Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 20 September 2024 at [12] and [13(i)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_26_1\" id=\"Ftn_26\">[note: 26]</a></sup>As to how this sum is derived, see Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 20 September 2024 at [13(iv)]. See also Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 5 November 2024 at [19].</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Guardianship of Infants Act – Shared custody, care and control – Access"],"date":"2024-12-31","court":"Family Court","case-number":"FC/OSG 12/2022","title":"XGE v XGF","citation":"[2024] SGFC 109","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32684-SSP.xml","counsel":["Mrs Quah Li Hwee Patricia (Patricia Quah & Co) for the plaintiff","Mr Tan Hock Lay Robin (Robin Tan & Co) for the defendant"],"timestamp":"2025-01-07T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Cassandra Cheong","html":"<root><head><title>XGE v XGF</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XGE <em>v</em> XGF </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32684-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 109</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">FC/OSG 12/2022</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">31 December 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Cassandra Cheong </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Mrs Quah Li Hwee Patricia (Patricia Quah & Co) for the plaintiff; Mr Tan Hock Lay Robin (Robin Tan & Co) for the defendant </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XGE — XGF </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Guardianship of Infants Act</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Shared custody, care and control<sup></sup></span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Access</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">31 December 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Cassandra Cheong:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 This was essentially an application by the Plaintiff Father (“the Father”) for joint custody and shared care and control of the child of the marriage (“C”). In the alternative, the Father sought joint custody, with care and control to the Defendant (“the Mother”) and liberal access, including overnight access, to C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The Mother disagreed with the Father’s application. She sought for joint custody, with sole care and control to herself and supervised access to the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 There were also prayers for maintenance of the child which were heard subsequently. For avoidance of doubt, as the maintenance orders are not the subject matter of the appeal, I will not be addressing the issue of maintenance in this decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 Prior to the hearing of the main application, I had ordered, with the consent of parties, for a custody evaluation report to be done. Parties were also referred to the Divorce Support Specialist Agency (“DSSA”) for four rounds of supervised visitation sessions and subsequently supervised exchange. They were also ordered to attend counselling at the DSSA.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 After hearing parties and considering the child evaluation report and reports from the DSSA, I made the following orders:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_a\"></a>(a) Parties shall have joint custody of C, with care and control to the Mother and liberal access to the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b\"></a>(b) <u>Weekly Access</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) With effect from 1<sup>st</sup> August 2024 till 12<sup>th</sup> June 2025 (inclusive), the Father shall have access to C as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_i-p4_A\"></a>(A) Every Wednesday from 4.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_i-p4_B\"></a>(B) Every Friday from 4.30 p.m. to 8.00 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_i-p4_C\"></a>(C) Every Saturday from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) With effect on or after 13<sup>th</sup> June 2025 (upon the child turning 5 years of age), the Father shall have access to C as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_ii-p4_A\"></a>(A) Every Wednesday from 4.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. and</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b-p3_ii-p4_B\"></a>(B) Every Friday from 4.30 p.m. to Sunday 9.30 a.m. (with overnight stay)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_c\"></a>(c) <u>Chinese New Year Access</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_c-p3_i\"></a>(i) With effect from the year 2025, the Father shall have access to C as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_c-p3_i-p4_A\"></a>(A) on odd years, on the eve of Chinese New Year Eve from 12.00 pm to 8.30 p.m. and on the 1<sup>st</sup> day of Chinese New Year from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_c-p3_i-p4_B\"></a>(B) on even years, on Chinese New Year Eve from 12.00 pm to 8.30 p.m. and on the 2<sup>nd</sup> day of Chinese New Year from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_c-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Regardless of odd or even years, if there is a public holiday on the 3<sup>rd</sup> day of Chinese New Year, the Father shall have access to C from 3.00 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_d\"></a>(d) <u>Christmas Day and 1<sup>st</sup> January</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_d-p3_i\"></a>(i) With effect from 2024, the Father shall have access to C on even years, on Christmas day from 9.30 a.m. to 9.00 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_d-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) With effect from 2026, the Father shall have access to C on even years, on 1<sup>st</sup> January from 9.30 a.m. to 7 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_e\"></a>(e) <u>Public Holidays (excluding Chinese New Year, Christmas and 1<sup>st</sup> January)</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_e-p3_i\"></a>(i) With effect from 1<sup>st</sup> August 2024 till 12<sup>th</sup> June 2025 (inclusive), the Father shall have access to the C on the following public holidays from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.:-</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_e-p3_i-p4_A\"></a>(A) National Day;</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_e-p3_i-p4_B\"></a>(B) Good Friday;</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_e-p3_i-p4_C\"></a>(C) Deepavali; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_e-p3_i-p4_D\"></a>(D) Vesak Day</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"\"></a>(collectively “Public Holidays (P)")</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_e-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) On and after 13<sup>th</sup> June 2025 (upon the child turning 5 years of age), the Father shall be granted overnight access commencing on the Eve of the aforesaid Public Holidays (P) from 4.30 pm to the end of the day of the Public Holidays at 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f\"></a>(f) <u>Father’s Day, Child’s birthday and Father’s birthday</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i\"></a>(i) The Father shall be granted additional access to C:</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i-p4_A\"></a>(A) On Father’s Day (which falls on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Sunday in June) from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i-p4_B\"></a>(B) On C's birthday, if it does not fall during the Father's access period, as follows:-</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i-p4_B-p5_I\"></a>(I) If it is a school day, on the eve of her birthday from 4.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i-p4_B-p5_II\"></a>(II) If it is during the school holiday period, on the eve of her birthday from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i-p4_C\"></a>(C) On the Father's Birthday, if it does not fall during his regular access period, as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i-p4_C-p5_I\"></a>(I) If it is a school day, after school to 7.30 pm.</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_f-p3_i-p4_C-p5_II\"></a>(II) If it falls on a school holiday, from 9.30 am to 7.30 pm.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g\"></a>(g) <u>Gazetted School Holidays</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_i\"></a>(i) Prior to C turning 5 years of age, the Father shall have access to C on Wednesday, Friday and Saturday from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m. and alternate Sundays from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Upon C turning 5 years of age. the Father shall have access to C as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii-p4_A\"></a>(A) During the March and September school holidays, on Wednesday, Friday and Saturday from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m. with an alternate overnight access from Friday 9.30 a.m. to Sunday 9.00 a.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii-p4_B\"></a>(B) During the June school holidays:</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii-p4_B-p5_I\"></a>(I) On the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> weeks of the June school holidays on odd years</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii-p4_B-p5_II\"></a>(II) On the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> weeks of the June school holidays on even years.</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii-p4_C\"></a>(C) During the year-end school holidays:</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii-p4_C-p5_I\"></a>(I) On the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> week on odd years</p> <p class=\"Judg-5\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_g-p3_ii-p4_C-p5_II\"></a>(II) On the 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> week on even years</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"\"></a>(A school holiday access during the June school holidays and year-end school holidays is deemed to commence on a Monday 9.30 a.m. to Sunday 9.30 p.m.)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_h\"></a>(h) <u>Overseas Access</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_h-p3_i\"></a>(i) Upon C attaining the age of 5, the Father shall be at liberty to bring C overseas during the school holidays.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_h-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) If either party should bring C overseas during the school holidays, each trip shall not be more than 14 days. The travelling party is to provide the other party with 21 days' prior notice of C's travel itinerary, place of accommodation, flight details and contact number of the travelling party whilst overseas.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_h-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) The Mother shall hold C’s passport, travel and identification documents and shall release the passport / travel / identification documents of C to the Father within 48 hours of the Father's request (whether such request is by SMS or WhatsApp or email). The Father shall return the passport of C to the Mother within 48 hours upon C's return to Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_i\"></a>(i) <u>General Terms of Access</u>:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_i-p3_i\"></a>(i) The Father shall fetch C from C's school, if access commences on a school day, or from the void deck of the Mother's residence at Property 1 (“the Void Deck") if access commences on a non-school day. The return of C to the Mother shall be at the Void Deck at all times.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_i-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Only the Father shall be present during the pick-up and return of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_i-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) At all material times, the access time of the Father to C shall not be impeded by the Mother or with any enrichment classes the child is scheduled to attend unless it is with the consent of both parties. </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 The Mother now appeals against the following portions of my decision:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_a\"></a>(a) That the Father be granted access to C on the following public holidays from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m.:-</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"\"></a>(A) National Day;</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"\"></a>(B) Good Friday;</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"\"></a>(C) Deepavali; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"\"></a>(D) Vesak Day</p> <p class=\"Judg-4\"><a id=\"\"></a>(collectively “Public Holidays (P)")</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_b\"></a>(b) That the Father be granted overnight access on and after 13 June 2025 as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) weekly access from Friday 4.30 p.m. to Sunday 9.30 a.m.; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) on the eve of the aforesaid Public Holidays (P) from 4.30 p.m. to the day of the public holiday 7.30 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 From the Notice of Appeal filed on 5 August 2024, it appears that the Mother’s main point of contention pertains to the apportionment of the Public Holidays between parties and the Father being granted overnight access to the child, upon the child turning 5 years of age. It is worth noting, however, that the Mother did not appeal against my decision to grant the Father overseas and overnight access to C during the gazetted school holidays.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background Facts</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The parties</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 Parties met sometime in February 2016 and were married two years later in Singapore on 5<sup>th</sup> October 2018. They have only one child to the marriage, C born on xx June 2020. At the time of the hearings, C had just turned 4 years of age. After marriage, parties lived together with the Father’s parents and sister at the Father’s family home (“the family home”). It is not disputed that the Father comes from a traditional, Chinese patriarchal family.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 Sometime in 2016, parties sought the approval of the Father’s father (“the Grandfather”) to marry prior to the demise of the Mother’s mother, who was terminally ill. Their request was rejected by the Grandfather. According to the Mother, the Grandfather was often critical of the Mother, her family and their finances. To exacerbate matters, the Mother and the Father’s family had differing family values and practices, especially in relation to the upbringing of C, which resulted in increased tension within the family home. The Father inevitably found himself caught between both sides of the family overtime.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Background to the dispute</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 On 6 April 2021, a dispute arose between the Mother and the Grandfather during dinner, when the Grandfather told the Mother to shave C’s hair. C was about 9 months old at the time. According to the Father, prior to the incident, the Grandfather had on numerous occasions advised parties to shave C’s hair, in keeping with Chinese tradition, but the advice went unheeded.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 When the Mother refused, an argument broke out at the dining table and the Grandfather threw a spoon on the table in the direction of the Mother. The Grandfather also threatened to cut C’s hair himself if the Mother did not do so. Following the incident, as she was afraid that the Grandfather would carry through with his threat, the Mother urged the Father to move out of the family home. They eventually moved out a few days later to stay with the Mother’s father at his flat, together with C. However, about two weeks after moving into the flat, the Father returned to his family home to live. According to the Father, the Mother’s father had express unhappiness with the Father for failing to provide for the Mother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 Although the Father returned to his family home to live, it is not disputed that he continued to visit the Mother and C on a daily basis, from about 8.00 p.m. to 11.30 p.m. to help take care of C and perform his duties before C fell asleep. He would bring with him necessities, groceries and food for the Mother and C. On Saturdays, parties would bring C over to the family home to visit the Father’s family and on Sundays, the Father would go over to spend time with C in the morning until her naptime after lunch. During her naptime, he would return home until the Mother called to inform him that C was awake. Parties would then bring C out together to visit attractions, playgrounds, parks or the library until after dinner. This arrangement lasted until 7 January 2022.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Incident on 7 January 2022</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 On 7 January 2022, during the Father’s visit, the Mother found the Father locked in the common toilet together with C at the flat. The Mother knocked on the toilet door repeatedly until the Father opened the door. To her horror, the Mother saw that C’s fringe had been snipped by the Father who was holding onto a pair of kitchen scissors. According to the Father, prior to 7 January 2022, the Father had noticed that the C’s fringe was getting longer to the point of irritating her eyes. He advised the Mother to trim C’s fringe, but nothing was done. As such, he decided to give C a quick trim. Shaken by the incident, the Mother called her father for assistance and the Father was asked to leave the flat by the latter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Incident on 11 January 2022</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 After the incident, there was no communication between parties until 11 January 2022. As the Father had not seen C since the incident, he requested to visit the child around 7.30 p.m. and was informed by the Mother to visit the child after 8.30 p.m. Unknown to the Mother, the Father’s family accompanied him on this particular visit as the Father had decided on separating from or divorcing the mother, and they wanted to discuss with the Mother and her father care and access issues relating to C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 During the discussion, the Grandfather proposed for each party to have the child live with them for 3.5 days a week. It is not disputed that this discussion took place largely between the Grandfather and the Mother’s father for about an hour, with little or no input from the parties themselves during the discussion. When asked whether she agreed to the proposed arrangement, the Mother refused. Dissatisfied with the Mother’s response, the Grandfather told the Mother that he would call the police (which he promptly did) since the Father is entitled to 50% of the week with the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 On 14 January 2022, the Father sent messages to the Mother requesting to bring the child out to the parks and the zoo alone. The Mother replied stating that she was not agreeable to the Father taking C out without her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 On 16 January 2022, the Mother sent a message asking the Father to see a counsellor together with her. She also informed the Father that he could visit the child as usual at her father's flat but he could not bring C out without her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 On 17 January 2022, while at work, the Father learnt from his parents that the Mother had applied for a personal protection order against the Father, his parents and his sister and they had just been served with the Summons for the application. This led to the Father doubting the Mother’s intentions to co-parent C equally with him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 Propelled by the above incidents, the Father filed the present application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Legal Proceedings</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Applications for Personal Protection Orders (“PPOs”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 The Mother instituted applications for PPOs for herself and for C against the Father and the Father’s family, the details of which is as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_a\"></a>(a) SS x2/2022 filed by the Mother against the Father’s sister on 14 January 2022. This was withdrawn on 1 March 2022.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_b\"></a>(b) SS x3/2022 filed by the Mother against the Father’s mother (“the Grandmother”) on 14 January 2022. This was withdrawn on 1 March 2022.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_c\"></a>(c) SS x4/2022 filed by the Mother against the Grandfather on 14 January 2022. I heard the matter and dismissed the application on 20 April 2023. There was no appeal against this decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_d\"></a>(d) SS x5/2022 filed by the Mother against the Father on 14 January 2022. This was withdrawn on 8 August 2023.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Orders for Supervised Visitation and Counselling at a Divorce Specialist Support Agency</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 After the commencement of this Originating Summons, at a case conference on 16 February 2022, parties agreed for the Father to have supervised access to C at a Divorce Specialist Support Agency (“DSSA”) for 2 hours weekly. This was without prejudice to parties’ position taken in the main application. Parties were also referred for mediation.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 The supervised visitation sessions carried on for about 8 sessions between March to May 2022 (“1<sup>st</sup> tranche of supervised visitation”) and a report from the DSSA was furnished to court, recommending (i) that parties attend co-parenting counselling and (ii) subject to the consent of the paternal grandparents and the Father, counselling for the paternal grandparents to negotiate and manage their boundaries.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 From the court’s perspective, given the disruptive nature of the relationship between parties and the extended family at the time, the recommendations were aimed at equipping parties and the paternal grandparents with the necessary tools required to support and enable parties to co-parent effectively for the benefit of C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">2<sup>nd</sup> tranche of supervised visitation orders</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 As parties were unable to reach an agreement at mediation, at the case conferences on 30 May 2022 and 16 November 2022, parties agreed for supervised access to continue at the DSSA. The aim was to facilitate the Father’s continued access to C, pending the outcome of the Mother’s PPO application against the Father. The access carried on for about 8 sessions between August to December 2022 (“2<sup>nd</sup> tranche of supervised visitation”) and a further 8 sessions between January to June 2023 (“3<sup>rd</sup> tranche of supervised visitation”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 I also ordered parties to attend counselling to work on their co-parenting skills and, subject to the consent of the paternal grandparents, for the paternal grandparents to attend counselling, as recommended in the report. In view of the nature of the relationship between the Father and the paternal grandparents, and how the Father would often defer to the opinion of the paternal grandparents, particularly the Grandfather, I found it necessary for the paternal grandparents to learn the importance of holding boundaries in order to assist and support the Father and Mother in their efforts to co-parent C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 A report from the DSSA was again furnished to court after each tranche of supervised visitation orders.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">3<sup>rd</sup> tranche of supervised visitation orders</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 After the 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche of supervised visitation, a report from the DSSA was furnished to court, recommending for a 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche of supervised visitation to be ordered. This was to enable the Father and C to continue bonding and for the Father to receive parenting modelling and intervention during the supervised visitation sessions at the DSSA.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 The report further recommended that the paternal grandparents be included in the supervised visitation sessions so as to (i) provide the paternal grandparents with information on grandparenting and (ii) support the family in defining boundaries through modelling and psycho-education during the supervised visitation sessions, such as not undermining the Father's parental role. Simultaneously, the Father was recommended to attend the “Triple P Programme” to gain parental skills and confidence in bonding with C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 Orders were made in accordance with the recommendations and a report was submitted to the court by the DSSA thereafter, recommending for a 4<sup>th</sup> tranche of supervised visitation to be ordered and for counselling to continue for the parties and the paternal grandparents to explore the possibility of re-communication between parties and their extended families on child related matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 It was noted from the report that the paternal grandparents were present for 4 out of the 8 supervised visitation sessions for the 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche, and only during the second half of each session. It was further noted that following the counselling sessions and interventions received during the 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche of supervised visitation, the Father was better able to maintain his parental role and exhibited firmness on what he wanted to do with the child for each session, notwithstanding the Grandfather's differing opinion.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">4<sup>th</sup> tranche of supervised visitation orders</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 Parties voluntarily agreed to a 4<sup>th</sup> tranche of supervised visitation being ordered, with the cost of the supervised visitation being borne by the Father solely. It is worth noting that the Mother was amenable to the participation of the paternal grandparents in the second half of all 8 sessions. At the case conference on 10 April 2023, orders were made accordingly with the consent of the parties. The access carried on for about 8 sessions between June to September 2023 (“4<sup>th</sup> tranche of supervised visitation”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 Apart from supervised visitation orders at the DSSA, the Father also filed interim applications for access to the child outside of DSSA.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Order for Chinese New Year Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 On 4 January 2023, the father filed an application in FC/SUM x4/2023 for the following orders, <em>inter alia</em>:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_33-p2_a\"></a>(a) For access to C on Chinese New Year Eve and the 1<sup>st</sup> day of Chinese New Year from 10.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m., together with the Father’s family.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_33-p2_b\"></a>(b) For additional weekly supervised access to C, outside of DSSA, every Wednesday from 4.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. Access to be supervised either by the Father’s two domestic helpers or the Child Representative.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_33-p2_c\"></a>(c) For one-way supervised exchange to take place at noon every Saturday at DSSA, so that the Father may have supervised access to C outside of DSSA. Access to be supervised either by the Father’s two domestic helpers or the Child Representative.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 Given the short time frame between the Father’s application and the Chinese New Year period, I heard parties on the application for supervised access during Chinese New Year first. On 13 January 2023, after hearing parties, I gave orders for the Father to have supervised access to C on Chinese New Year Eve at the DSSA from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m. I also allowed the paternal grandparents to be present during the access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 As for the 1<sup>st</sup> day of the Chinese New Year, the following orders were made with the consent of parties:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_a\"></a>(a) the Father shall be granted access to C on the 1<sup>st</sup> day of Chinese New Year from 10.00 am to 1.00 pm at Hillion Mall located at 17 Petir Road, Singapore 678278 (“Hillion Mall") as follows:-</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_a-p3_i\"></a>(i) The Defendant shall handover the Child to the Plaintiff outside the premises of McDonald's located at level B1 of Hillion Mall;</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_a-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) The access shall take place in accordance to the Schedule of Itinerary appended to the Order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_a-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) In the event of any unforeseen changes to the itinerary proposed in the Schedule of Itinerary hereinabove, the Plaintiff shall keep the Defendant informed of any changes to the itinerary before proceeding to the venue of access in accordance with the amended itinerary.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Father's parents may be present at all times during the Plaintiff's access to the Child as stated above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Mother is at liberty to observe the Father's access on the 1<sup>st</sup> day of Chinese New Year from a distance as long as the Mother's presence does not interfere with the Father's interactions with C during the said access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_d\"></a>(d) At the end of the Father’s access, the Father shall hand over C to the Mother outside the premises of McDonald's.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_e\"></a>(e) The orders made above are without prejudice to any application by the Mother for the Father to have supervised access to C at the hearing of the main application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_f\"></a>(f) All other prayers in this Summons to be adjourned for further hearing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_36\"></a>36 There was no appeal filed against the Orders made.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Orders for additional weekly access and appointment of parent coordinator</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_37\"></a>37 As mentioned earlier, FC/SUM x4/2023 was filed on 4 January 2023. After making the relevant orders in relation to Chinese New Year access, the remaining prayers were adjourned to be heard at a later date. This was to give the Mother time to file her affidavit in reply to the rest of the orders sought by the Father and for parties to file their submissions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_38\"></a>38 As C was only three years of age at the time of the Father’s application, I indicated to parties that the appointment of a child representative may not be suitable, given her young and tender age. There was a real concern as to whether C was of the developmental age to be able to express her wishes to a child representative effectively in relation to the care and access arrangements sought by parties. The Court further queried if the appointment of a parent coordinator would be more appropriate in the circumstances to facilitate parties in their co-parenting efforts.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_39\"></a>39 In view of the Court’s indications above, the Father subsequently amended his application for the appointment of a parent coordinator to assist in the access arrangements with C. I noted that the main intention of the Father was to have a neutral party (i.e. someone other than the Mother or a person from the Father’s household) to supervise the interim access to C. This was because of the Mother’s insistence on supervised interim access pending the hearing of the main application and the submission of the Custody Evaluation Report (see paragraph 45 below).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_40\"></a>40 The main purpose of a parent coordinator is to assist parties in their co-parenting arrangements and to help parties communicate better and grow in their co-parenting skills. The hope at the end of the day is enable parties to function effectively, without the need of a parent coordinator, in their roles as co-parents. Given the tensions between parties in the present case, it was clear that if the Father was to have access to C outside of DSSA, parties would benefit from the appointment of a parent coordinator. It is unusual however for a parent coordinator to supervise access. Nevertheless, I note in the present case that the Father had obtained the consents of the proposed parent coordinators, Mr T and Ms X, both experienced and established family lawyers, to assist in the supervision of interim access to C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_41\"></a>41 On 23 September 2023, the Father and the Mother attended the hearing together with their counsel. After hearing parties and taking note in particular of the Mother’s financial constraints and parties’ submissions in relation to the apportionment of the fees payable to the parenting coordinator, I made the following orders:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_a\"></a>(a) Mr T is appointed parenting coordinator in this matter (the “Parenting Coordinator”) for an initial duration of 4 months from the date of this order, which may be extended by further order or agreement between the Father, the Mother and the Parenting Coordinator.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Parenting Coordinator shall accept or decline the appointment by filling up and returning to the Court the “Notice of Acceptance / Non-Acceptance”. In the event that the Parenting Coordinator does not submit the “Notice of Acceptance / Non-Acceptance” within 3 days of the Court notifying the Parenting Coordinator of the order, the Parenting Coordinator is deemed to have declined the appointment. Ms X or another parenting co-ordinator will be appointed in place of the Parenting Coordinator.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Parties shall pay their share of the parenting coordination fees directly to the Parenting Coordinator.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_d\"></a>(d) The Court allocates payment of fees for parenting coordination as follows:-</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_d-p3_i\"></a>(i) The Father will bear 100% cost of the first 1-hour joint session and 80% of any joint session thereafter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_d-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) The Mother will bear 20% of the joint sessions thereafter, with the Father bearing 80%.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_d-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) Any solo sessions with the parent coordinator is to be borne by the parties respectively and the parties are at liberty to decline such solo sessions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_e\"></a>(e) The parties must, as far as practicable, provide to the parenting coordinator copies of all pleadings, documents and/or orders as may be requested by the parenting coordinator.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_f\"></a>(f) The parenting coordinator may meet with the parties and/or C together or separately, in person or by any electronic means for a total number of 16 hours including the 1<sup>st</sup> joint 1 hour session held by the parenting coordinator, unless otherwise agreed in writing between Parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_g\"></a>(g) Parties agree that they shall not hold the parenting coordinator liable for any damage or loss that they may incur in the course of or arising from the parenting coordination process.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_42\"></a>42 With regard to the Father’s application for additional weekly access, the following orders were also made at the hearing:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_a\"></a>(a) In addition to the supervised access at the DSSA, the Father shall be granted interim access to the Child in the presence of the Parenting Coordinator on alternate Wednesdays from 4.30 p.m. to 6.30 p.m. at any one of the following locations:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_a-p3_i\"></a>(i) Bukit Timah Plaza</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_a-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Bukit Panjang Plaza</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_a-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) West Mall Public Park</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_a-p3_iv\"></a>(iv) Hillion Mall</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_b\"></a>(b) Subject to the consent of the Parenting Coordinator, parties agree that the interim access shall take place at all times in the presence of the Parenting Coordinator.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Father and, subject to the consent of the Parenting Coordinator, the Parenting Coordinator shall pick up C from C’s childcare centre and return C thereafter to the Mother's residence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_d\"></a>(d) The Father's parents, sister and helpers are not to be present during the interim supervised access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_e\"></a>(e) Parties are at liberty to change the terms of access by mutual agreement.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_43\"></a>43 In making the above orders, I took into consideration the fact that there were times when access at the DSSA had to be rescheduled as C and the Mother were unavailable (e.g. due to illness). This resulted in the Father having irregular access to C. As such, I granted the Father an additional supervised weekly access day to C outside of the DSSA. Parties did not appeal against the orders made.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Order for Custody Evaluation Report</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_44\"></a>44 On 31 March 2023, the Father filed FC/SUM xxx1/2023 for an order that a Custody Evaluation Report be submitted to address the suitability of parties being granted shared custody and shared care and control of C, or alternatively, that the Father has unsupervised and overnight access to C. I heard the application on 19 June 2023 and granted the orders sought. The Mother did not appeal against my decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_45\"></a>45 The Custody Evaluation Report was subsequently submitted to the Court on 4 October 2023, recommending that joint custody and shared care and control of C be granted to parties. In particular, that the Father be granted unsupervised overnight access from Mondays 17:00 hours to Thursdays 09:00 hours every alternate weeks, and from Thursdays 17:00 to Monday 09:00 hours every other week. It further recommended, <em>inter alia</em>, that both parties be at liberty to take C overseas for recreational purposes from age 5 onwards.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_46\"></a>46 Parties were promptly informed briefly of the findings and recommendations of the Custody Evaluation Report at the next case conference.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Orders for Supervised Exchange at DSSA</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_47\"></a>47 Pursuant to the 4<sup>th</sup> tranche of supervised visitation, a report was submitted to the court by the DSSA recommending, <em>inter alia</em>, for the Father to have supervised exchange to C, subject to the following conditions:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_47-p2_a\"></a>(a) First two supervised exchange sessions between the Father and C to take place for 3 hours. The Father is to pick C from the Mother at the DSSA and return C to the Mother at a mall near the Mother's house.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_47-p2_b\"></a>(b) The subsequent six sessions between the Father and the child to take place for up to 4 hours, with liberty for the paternal grandparents to be present. The Father is to pick C from the Mother at the DSSA and return C to the Mother at a mall near the Mother's house.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_47-p2_c\"></a>(c) During the supervised exchange sessions, the Father is to spend time with C at either his house, a mall, a library, a playground or a mutually agreeable venue near the Mother's house.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_47-p2_d\"></a>(d) Photographs and videos during the supervised exchange time to be taken by the Father and sent via the WhatsApp GroupChat (set up between parties and the caseworker/counsellor) to keep the Mother updated and to ensure C's safety.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_47-p2_e\"></a>(e) If there were signs of physical exhaustion in Child, Father is to inform Mother to pick up Child earlier than 3-4 hours.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_47-p2_f\"></a>(f) If the first three supervised exchange sessions were successful, the next five sessions can be done without the Mother having to bring Child to the DSSA for drop-off. Father and Mother can exchange the Child near their houses and inform the caseworker/ counsellor via WhatsApp GroupChat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_48\"></a>48 Although parties were largely agreeable with the recommendations made by the DSSA, the Mother objected to the Father bringing C back to his home during access as she was still concerned about the paternal grandparents influence on the Father and C, particularly the Grandfather, given her past experience and interactions with him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_49\"></a>49 On 7 November 2023, after hearing counsels’ submissions on behalf of parties and considering the recommendations of the DSSA reports, the following orders were made:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_a\"></a>(a) Parties to attend 8 sessions of supervised exchange, to take place at the DSSA as in accordance with the recommendations stated in the report, subject to the following variation to the recommendations: that at least the first three sessions of supervised exchange and access is to take place with the father and child alone for 3 hours. With regard to the venue for access, the counsellor is to work this out with the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Mother to attend Family Transition-Positive Parentings Programme (FT-Trip P). Parties to attend any other therapy or counselling session or programme as recommended by the caseworker/counsellor.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Father shall have access to the child on Christmas Day from 11.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. with liberty to the paternal grandparents to join the access session.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_50\"></a>50 Given that this was the 5<sup>th</sup> tranche of orders to be made, costs were payable by parties. The Grandfather volunteered to bear the costs for the supervised exchange sessions. As parties had no objections to the same, orders were made accordingly with the Grandfather’s consent. The supervised exchange sessions took place from December 2023 to April 2024. A further order for another 8 sessions of supervised exchange was subsequently made with the consent of parties on 11 April 2024. The 8 sessions took place from May to July 2024, which overlapped with the hearings of the main application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Applicable Legal Principles</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_51\"></a>51 Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122) states that:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">" Where in any proceedings before any court, the custody or upbringing of an infant or administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income thereof is in question, the court, in deciding that question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration and save insofar as such welfare otherwise requires, the father of an infant shall not be deemed to have any right superior to that of the mother in respect of such custody, administration or application nor shall the mother be deemed to have any claim superior to that of the father."</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_52\"></a>52 It is clear that the overriding and paramount principle is the welfare of the child. In <em>Wong Phila Mae v Shaw Harold</em> [1991] SLR 93, the Court of Appeal made the following observations in relation to the ‘welfare principle’ when custody is fought for:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">“Obviously the court has to take all relevant factors into account in considering the welfare of the children… We agree with counsel for the appellant that some of the relevant factors are these:</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(i) the conduct of the parties;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(ii) the wishes of the parents and the wishes of the child where he or she is of an age to be able to express an independent opinion;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(iii) a young child would be best look after by its mother;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(iv) which party can offer better security and stability; and,</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(v) that siblings should not be separated.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">We also agree that the fact that one parent is more capable of providing material comfort for a child does not necessarily render that parent a better parent and thus entitles him or her to the custody of the child. In the final analysis it is an exercise in weighing the relevant factors which often conflicts.”</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Shared Care and Control</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_53\"></a>53 In considering whether shared care and control would be in the child's welfare, it was held in <em>TAU v TAT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22070-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGHCF 11</a>, that the court has to consider factors such as that particular child's needs at that stage of life, the extent to which the parents are able to co-operate within such an arrangement and whether it is easy for the child, bearing in mind his or her age and personality, to live in two homes within one week. The court should also be concerned with whether both parents can support a two-home arrangement with sufficient co-operation so that there is minimal conflict over issues that ordinarily arise from daily living.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Supervised Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_54\"></a>54 With regard to whether a parent's access to a child ought to be supervised, it was held in <em>APE v APF</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/16869-SSP.xml')\">[2015] SGHC 17</a> that:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">“…unsupervised access should be awarded, unless the following exceptional circumstances are present:</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(a) there are serious welfare concerns regarding the noncustodial parent such as violence or inappropriate parenting if the child were left unattended with the noncustodial parent;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(b) on an examination of the state of the relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child before the commencement of the divorce proceedings and after the commencement of the divorce proceedings, it is found that the child has been estranged from the noncustodial parent such that the parental-child relationship is in need of serious repair (for instance, if the child is fearful in meeting the non-custodial parent); or</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(c) factors exist such that it is difficult for unsupervised access to be effectively implemented (eg, where the relationship between both parents is so acrimonious that the custodial parent frustrates the effectiveness of unsupervised access orders and unsupervised access is not possible without detriment to the child)."</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_55\"></a>55 The Court in the above case went further to state at [33] that even if the child should view the non-custodial parent in a fearful or negative light, the Courts should nevertheless seek to repair the parent-child relationship where the circumstances permit.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_56\"></a>56 With regard to whether there are serious welfare concerns in relation to the non-custodial parent, it was noted by the Court in <em>BKJ v BKK</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2013] SGDC 0261.xml')\">[2013] SGDC 261</a> at [23]-[25] that there must be a reasonable basis for the allegations of abuse or danger, and a mere unsubstantiated fear or suspicion is insufficient to justify supervised access. In that case, the Court found that while the Defendant Mother did not think much of the Plaintiff Father’s parenting skills, there was no evidence that the Plaintiff’s parenting skills were so very bad that the child would be in danger of them.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Applying the Law to the Facts of the Case</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Issue of Care and Control</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_57\"></a>57 As parties agreed on joint custody, the issue in relation to care and control was whether the Court should grant sole care and control of C to the Mother, or shared care and control to parties in the present case. Although no appeal is made against my decision for sole care and control to be granted to the Mother, for totality I briefly set out my reasons why I did not grant shared care and control in the present case despite the recommendations of the custody evaluation report set out at paragraph 45 above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_58\"></a>58 Applying the law as set out in <em>TAU v TAT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22070-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGHCF 11</a> to the facts, I found that C was still of a tender young age. At the time of the hearing, she had turned 4 years of age only recently, on 13 June 2024. It is not disputed that the Mother has been the primary caregiver of C since birth. Uprooting a young child, like C, every 3-4 days to live in two different households would be overly disruptive for her development since young children require a familiar and secure environment to grow in and seek refuge in when confronted with the challenges of growing up. To exacerbate matters, given the differences between parties in their values and approaches to parenting, if shared care and control is ordered, a sense of dislocation may result where C is torn between two households where there are competing primary caregivers and approaches to her upbringing. (<em>AQL v AQM</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2011] SGHC 0264.xml')\">[2011] SGHC 264</a> at paragraphs [17] to [19].)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_59\"></a>59 Regarding the Father's concern about sending the wrong signal to the Mother if shared care and control was not granted, I did not agree with the Father’s submissions that the effect of not granting such an order would be the Court acceding and condoning the Defendant's alleged selfish acts of wilful assertion of her authority over the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_60\"></a>60 As highlighted in <em>BNS v BNT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/20688-SSP.xml')\">[2017] 4 SLR 213</a> at [75], the court would not give much weight to any potential signalling effect of a shared care and control order. Any signalling effect is dealt with by the custody order. In this case, the granting of joint custody will signal the important role that both parents play as persons with parental authority in making decisions in relation to the child. On the other hand, care and control orders are mainly concerned with the practicalities of day-to-day care of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Issue of Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_61\"></a>61 In relation to the issue of access, I note that the Mother did not appeal against my decision to grant the Father unsupervised access. It was clear from the evidence provided before the Court and the various reports submitted, that there were no issues of serious welfare concerns regarding the Father, such as violence or inappropriate parenting if C was left unsupervised in his care. I note furthermore that the relationship between C and the Father was not estranged, such that it needed reparation and supervision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_62\"></a>62 The Mother’s main contention pertains to specific orders relating to weekly overnight access and public holiday access (excluding access during Chinese New Year, Christmas and New Year) as per the orders made on 23 July 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Parties’ submissions on overnight and public holiday access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_63\"></a>63 At the hearing on 17 July 2024, the Mother objected to the Father’s application for overnight access as C was still of a young age - she had just turned 4 years old. C has also been sleeping with the Mother since birth and latches to the Mother at night before she sleeps. Further, whenever C wakes up in the middle of the night, she is soothed back to sleep by the Mother. Thus, it would be traumatic for C to spend the night alone with the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_64\"></a>64 The Father on the other hand submitted that notwithstanding the above, he believed that C, who attends childcare, would be able to adjust easily to spending overnight access with him at his family home. He noted that C displayed no signs of upset or distress during the supervised exchange sessions that took place at his family home. Evidence was also provided by the Father to show that he had taken steps to make the family home suitable for overnight access to take place, such as by preparing a room for C, complete with a child’s bed, toys and a toddler-sized table with chairs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_65\"></a>65 In relation to Public Holiday access, I note from the Mother’s affidavits filed and both written and oral submissions made to the Court that, apart from the major public holidays like Chinese New Year, Christmas and New Year, no specific orders in relation to Public Holiday access were sought.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_66\"></a>66 The Father sought for Public Holiday access to be specified so as to avoid conflict between parties in terms of the access arrangements. Excluding Chinese New Year, Christmas and New Year, the Father specifically sought for access to be granted to him on the following Public Holidays:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_66-p2_a\"></a>(a) National Day;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_66-p2_b\"></a>(b) Good Friday;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_66-p2_c\"></a>(c) Deepavali and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_66-p2_d\"></a>(d) Vesak Day</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">The Court’s Findings</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_67\"></a>67 I commend the Mother and Father for their efforts in encouraging C to build and maintain her relationship with both parents. I noted from the reports that C is a happy child who is comfortable spending time with the Mother, Father and her extended family. There are no signs of triangulation of the child between parties, notwithstanding the breakdown in the relationship of parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_68\"></a>68 In view of the above, although I did not grant the Father shared care and control of the child, I allowed him overnight access to C upon C turning 5 years of age. I noted from the evidence and the reports that the Father was able to care for and bond with C independently in the absence of the Mother. I noted further from the case authorities provided by parties that overnight access was usually granted upon the child turning 5 years of age. There was no reason in the present case not to grant the Father overnight access to C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_69\"></a>69 I was not persuaded by the Mother’s submission that overnight access would disrupt C’s breastfeeding routine or that such an order would be traumatic to C. Since the order for overnight access was to begin only upon C reaching the age of five, I did not find the order for overnight access to be disruptive to C’s current breastfeeding routine. Time was factored in for the Mother to assist in the adjustment of C to the overnight access arrangements. Furthermore, I noted from the evidence of parties and the reports submitted that C was comfortable being alone with the Father. There was no evidence in the affidavits of C exhibiting any separation anxiety from the Mother. As such, I did not think that an order for overnight access upon C turning 5 years of age would cause the child unwarranted trauma.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_70\"></a>70 From the Mother’s affidavit and submissions against shared care and control, it was clear that the Mother was also concerned about the overbearingness of the Grandfather and the impact it would have on the Father and C, if C was to live at the Fathers’ family home. These concerns would apply as well if overnight access was to be ordered. However, I found these concerns to be speculative. While the Grandfather may have exhibited domineering behaviours towards the Mother, there is no evidence of such behaviour being exhibited towards the child. More importantly, I note that the Father is now better able to hold his ground and parent the child confidently.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_71\"></a>71 Since C would have regular weekly access to the Father on Wednesday (4.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.) and Friday (4.30 p.m. to 8.00 p.m.) and almost the entire day Saturday from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m., to allow parties to transition smoothly to overnight access, I allowed the Father to have overnight access to C from Friday, 4.30 p.m. to Sunday 9.30 a.m. This would ensure regularity for C and allow the Mother to have one day as well on the weekend with C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_72\"></a>72 In relation to the orders for Public Holiday access, I noted that there were no objections from the Mother to the Father’s request at the hearings. As such, given that C would be with the Mother on the remaining three Public Holidays (namely Labour Day, Hari Raya Puasa and Hari Raya Haji) as understood by parties at the hearing, orders were made accordingly for the Father to have access to C on the requested Public Holidays.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Concluding Remarks</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_73\"></a>73 This is a case where the relationship between parties unfortunately broke down due to the tension in the relationship between a newly established family unit and the extended family members. It is clear from the incidents set out in the affidavits that, while all involved had good intentions towards the child, the differences in values and approach in parenting amongst them resulted in hostility and acrimony.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_74\"></a>74 While it is true that the Mother and Father are the main persons responsible for their co-parental relationship, it is undeniable that the co-parental relationship is subject to challenges especially in situations where one party may be inextricably dependent on the emotional and psychological support provided by the extended family, unfortunately to the exclusion of the other party. For the co-parental relationship to be effective, it is therefore necessary for all parties involved to learn the importance of boundaries and equip themselves with the skills necessary to help build and support the co-parental relationship for the benefit of C.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_75\"></a>75 Nevertheless, I commend parties in the present case for their continued efforts in working on their co-parental relationship and I would like to encourage both parties to continue to create an environment where C may be able to benefit from having access to the love and support of both the maternal and paternal families in her life.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_76\"></a>76 I would also like to commend both counsels who represented parties in this matter for working tirelessly to help parties work out the care and access arrangements throughout the duration of this matter for the benefit of C.</p> </div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family law – Ancillary Matters – Care and control – Access"],"date":"2024-12-05","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 2441 of 2023","title":"XCP v XCQ","citation":"[2024] SGFC 107","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32627-SSP.xml","counsel":["Mr Huang Junli, Christopher and Mr Dilys H Chua (CHP LAW LLC) for the plaintiff","Ms Hoon Shu Mei, Mr Goh Wei Sien Alex and Ms Tan Jia Yi (Drew & Napier LLC) for the defendant"],"timestamp":"2024-12-24T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kenneth Yap","html":"<root><head><title>XCP v XCQ</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XCP <em>v</em> XCQ </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32627-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 107</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 2441 of 2023</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">05 December 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kenneth Yap </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Mr Huang Junli, Christopher and Mr Dilys H Chua (CHP LAW LLC) for the plaintiff; Ms Hoon Shu Mei, Mr Goh Wei Sien Alex and Ms Tan Jia Yi (Drew & Napier LLC) for the defendant </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XCP — XCQ </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Ancillary Matters</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Care and control</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Access</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">5 December 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kenneth Yap:</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 This was an ancillary matters hearing involving care and control and access to the single child of the marriage, who was four years of age. The parties had agreed to all financial matters (including maintenance), and had settled on joint custody by the time of the hearing. Both parties sought sole care and control of the child, with the Mother in particular resisting any overnight or overseas access by the Defendant Father on account of his alleged addiction to alcohol, gaming and pornography, as well as perceived inadequacies in his ability to care for the child. At the court’s behest, the Father underwent psychological assessment, which eventually ruled out safety concerns from alcohol consumption. I granted the Mother sole care and control as she has been the primary caregiver, and granted the Father one session of weekend overnight access and two sessions of weekday access, with overseas travel to be allowed from the age of six years. Additional safeguards and conditions were also imposed to address the Mother’s residual concerns.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The Father is dissatisfied with my decision and has filed this appeal.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Background Facts</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The Father and Mother married on 24 October 2014. The marriage lasted about nine years. Their daughter arrived on 9 May 2020, and they moved into their matrimonial home in December 2021, after which the relationship progressively broke down. Interim judgment was granted on 9 November 2023 by consent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 At the time of the hearing, the parties still resided together in their matrimonial home, although the Father had moved out of the master bedroom since the breakdown of the marriage in late September 2022<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span>. They still managed to co-parent and exercised shared care over the child, with the Mother having private time with the child on Saturdays and the Father on Sundays. They had also agreed that each would have access to the child on alternating public holidays<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 Both parents are working full-time. The Father’s job affords flexibility to work-from-home, whereas the Mother has to work full-time from the office.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Hearing</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 A total of 14 affidavits were filed in the present matter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 The parties each filed two Affidavits of Assets and Means (“AOM”), with leave granted for both to file a supplementary affidavit with regard to the Father’s alleged drinking habits during the observation period with the psychologist. The parties’ six affidavits are marked as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Mother’s 1st AOM filed on 13 December 2023 (“MA-1”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Father’s 1st AOM filed on 13 December 2023 (“FA-1”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Mother’s 2<sup>nd</sup> AOM filed on 14 February 2024 (“MA-2”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_d\"></a>(d) The Father’s 2<sup>nd</sup> AOM filed on 14 February 2024 (“FA-2”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_e\"></a>(e) The Mother’s Supplementary Affidavit filed on 3 July 2024 (“MA-3”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_f\"></a>(f) The Father’s Supplementary Affidavit filed on 10 July 2024 (“FA-3”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 In addition, both parties sought to bolster their cases with affidavits filed by their immediate family:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Paternal Grandmother, KBL, filed two affidavits, on 13 December 2023 and 14 February 2024 (“PGM-1” and “PGM-2” respectively)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Paternal Grandfather, LKH, filed two affidavits, on 13 December 2023 and 14 February 2024 (“PGF-1” and “PGF-2” respectively)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Paternal Uncle, LHB, filed two affidavits, on 14 December 2023 and 14 February 2024 (“PU-1” and “PU-1” respectively)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_d\"></a>(d) The Mother’s eldest sister, CWCY, filed an affidavit on 14 February 2024 (“MS-1”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_e\"></a>(e) The Mother’s younger sister, JWQL, filed an affidavit on 14 February 2024 (“MS-2”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 I first heard parties on 11 April 2024. Given the safety concerns raised by the Mother about the Father’s alleged addiction to alcohol, I suggested and the Father agreed to attend before a psychologist appointed under the Panel of Therapeutic Specialists scheme to assess whether such concerns were founded. The psychologist was directed to tender a report thereafter, which would be open to the parties. I gave the Mother the liberty to file a supplementary affidavit restricted solely to her observations on the Father’s drinking habits from that point forward, and for the Father to have a right to reply. I also directed that no further audio or video recordings were to be made during this period, save for any incidents of loss of control due to the alleged intake of alcohol, and for parties to abstain from disparaging each other in the presence of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 At the next hearing on 15 July 2024, parties made further oral submissions of the psychologist’s report and their supplementary affidavits. I rendered decision with brief grounds at the hearing. Parties subsequently wrote in with further clarifications, and after a third hearing on 23 August 2024 (“the clarificatory hearing”), adjustments were made to some of the access orders. I gave leave for the time for appeal to run from this latest hearing, and the Father filed his appeal on 5 September 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The parties’ cases</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 The Mother’s position was that:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_a\"></a>(a) She should have sole care and control to the child; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Father should have daytime access only until the child reached the age of 12 or after her Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), whichever is the later, and with overnight and/or overseas access to commence thereafter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 For ease of exposition, I have grouped the Mother’s arguments under eight broad headings as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_a\"></a>(a) <b>Preservation of Status Quo.</b> The Mother claims she has been the primary caregiver since the child’s birth, and has maintained sole care and control over the child since the commencement of the divorce<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span>, with the Father effectively having only daytime access to the child. Apart from a change in the residence expected in November 2024 when the matrimonial home would be sold, there would be no material change to the child’s life if she was under the Mother’s sole care, as the Mother would continue to oversee her usual schooling, enrichment and weekend routines<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span>. The Mother therefore submits that sole care under her would best preserve the current status quo.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_b\"></a>(b) <b>Young child best placed in Mother’s care</b>. The Mother argues that a young child at the tender age of four would typically be dependent on the Mother for her welfare and psychological needs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_c\"></a>(c) <b>Mother has a sound parenting plan and has secondary care arrangements.</b> The Mother submits that her handling of the daily routines with the child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> render her best placed to take into consideration all aspects of her well-being. The Mother’s preliminary plan is to move into her family home in Punggol, where the child has spent significant time<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span>, has an established space for herself<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span>, and where the Mother’s two sisters are able to provide active support if needed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span>. The Mother has also taken care to encourage the child’s holistic development, enrolling her in Sunday school at their Church, and also enrolling her for Chinese enrichment classes. In contrast, the Mother points out that the Father’s proposed parenting plan is premised on a heavy reliance on his aged parents and brother, whose family does not have as much recent contact with the child. She claims he has never independently cared for the child overnight on his own, being relatively uninvolved in her life so far<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span>. She also takes the view that the Father’s interest are on his own needs and questions his commitment to caring for the child, as borne out in his messages to the Mother<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_d\"></a>(d) <b>Denial of allegations of alienation and abrasive parenting.</b> The Mother denies the Father’s allegations that she exercises abrasive parenting, claiming that he had taken conversations between the Mother and the child out of context<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span>. The Mother also denies alienation on her part, pointing out that the child has not demonstrated any reluctance to spending time with the Father or his family during his weekend access time. In fact, the Mother points out that she has been taking a Therapeutic Justice approach despite the acrimonious relationship between the parties, continuing to stay in the matrimonial home and co-parenting for the sake of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_e\"></a>(e) <b>Lax and Hands-off Parenting.</b> According to the Mother, the Father has all along been uninvolved in the child’s daily life, and handles the child with a hands-off parenting approach, choosing to occupy the Child with the iPad or the television, instead of engaging her in more healthy activities<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span>. The Mother also claims the Father exercises a laxer standard of parenting, being overly permissive of the child’s behaviour, and being unaware that the child needs boundaries and discipline at her young age<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span>. She submits that it would not be in the child’s interest to have such double standards in parenting at a young age.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_f\"></a>(f) <b>Concern about the Father’s alcoholic addiction.</b> The Mother’s primary concern is the child’s safety and wellbeing during the Father’s access while she is at a tender age. She documented incidents where the Father had demonstrated a clear lack of control over his emotions and behaviour due to excessive drinking<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span>, and claimed that he is incapable of sober supervision over the child when he indulges himself. According to the Mother, the Father would drink multiple times a week to excess, both at home and externally<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span>, and would go on drinking sessions with his friends at least two to three times a month<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span>. When drinking at home, she observed that he would start with beer, progressing to wine and thereafter hard liquor over the course of the night, making excessive noise until he falls asleep or passes out late in the night<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span>. On occasions when he drank to excess, the Mother claimed that the Father was unable to coordinate his movements, and would often barge into the bedroom while inebriated to check on the child or to kiss or hug the child who was already asleep<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_18\" id=\"Ftn_18_1\"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span>. She also claimed he becomes aggressive and would slam things in the house whilst drunk, resulting to an incident on 22 July 2022 when she called the police<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_19\" id=\"Ftn_19_1\"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span>, as well as an earlier incident on 31 December 2020 when the Father returned home in a drunk and agitated state and tried to snatch the child from her, which caused her to leave the home to stay with her sister<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_20\" id=\"Ftn_20_1\"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span>. Due to his drinking habits, the Mother views him as an unsafe and inappropriate caregiver for the child. She highlights for example that on 8 May 2022, she found the child sipping from an open can of beer on the Father’s study table which he had left unattended<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_21\" id=\"Ftn_21_1\"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_g\"></a>(g) <b>Concern about the Father’s pornography addiction.</b> The Mother expresses concern about the Father’s addiction to pornography and his masturbatory habits. She exhibited photographs of his sex paraphernalia in a drawer and suggestive figurines which were left in accessible locations, and expressed her concern on the impact on the child should she come to view these items<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_22\" id=\"Ftn_22_1\"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_h\"></a>(h) <b>Concern about the Father’s gaming habits.</b> The Mother alleges that the Father spends excessive time gaming on a console connected to the living room television, in full view of the entire household. She observes that he plays games rated for “mature” audiences, which may contain graphic violence, gore, sex and nudity, as well as profanity<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_23\" id=\"Ftn_23_1\"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 On the Father’s part, he sought sole care and control of the child, or in the alternative, at least shared care and control with the Mother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 I briefly summarise the Father’s arguments as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_a\"></a>(a) <b>Active and hands-on father.</b> The Father claims he has been actively involved in the child’s care, including bathing, feeding, cleaning her, taking her to swimming lessons, medical and specialist appointments, as well as playing with and teaching her<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_24\" id=\"Ftn_24_1\"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span>. By his account, he has attended all parent-teacher conferences as well as other major activities at her pre-school<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_25\" id=\"Ftn_25_1\"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span>, picks her up from pre-school and communicates directly with her teachers<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_26\" id=\"Ftn_26_1\"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span>. He also points out that he has flexible work-from-home arrangements, allowing him to work from home most of the time<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_27\" id=\"Ftn_27_1\"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span>, as compared to the Mother who is a full-time office worker, and has to outsource the child’s daytime care.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b\"></a>(b) <b>The Mother’s parenting is not in the child’s best interests.</b> The Father points to instances of what he calls aggressive parenting on the part of the Mother, for example, shouting and screaming at the child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_28\" id=\"Ftn_28_1\"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span>, or even confining her on one occasion when the child failed to finish her food<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_29\" id=\"Ftn_29_1\"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span>. On another instance, he described how the Mother had pinned the child on the bed, and thereafter heard two slaps which he suspected were the Mother slapping the child twice<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_30\" id=\"Ftn_30_1\"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span> (the Mother’s version was that the child had hit her twice<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_31\" id=\"Ftn_31_1\"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span>). On 14 October 2023, the Father heard what he believed were the sounds of the Mother hitting the child, and the child repeatedly asking the Mother to say sorry to her<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_32\" id=\"Ftn_32_1\"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span>, although the Mother’s explanation was that it was the child who was throwing a tantrum and hitting her.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_33\" id=\"Ftn_33_1\"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span> The Father also claims that the Mother has a tendency to taunt the child when she is misbehaving<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_34\" id=\"Ftn_34_1\"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span>, which only makes the child more confused and distressed. He also disagrees with the Mother’s practice of imposing long time-outs as a punishment to correct the child.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_35\" id=\"Ftn_35_1\"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_c\"></a>(c) <b>Only the Father is committed to safeguarding the relationship with the other parent.</b> The Father claims that while he is committed to ensuring that the child maintains a close relationship with her Mother, he believes that the Mother would seek to diminish his relationship with the child. He raises several points in this regard.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_c-p3_i\"></a>(i) First, in his view, the Mother has sought to restrict his bonding time with the child, by bringing her into the master bedroom to take her morning milk<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_36\" id=\"Ftn_36_1\"><sup>[note: 36]</sup></a></span>, offering the child to watch an iPad in the master bedroom instead of interacting with the Father outside, and taking her into the master bedroom after school and shutting the door<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_37\" id=\"Ftn_37_1\"><sup>[note: 37]</sup></a></span>, thereby denying the Father the chance to partake in the child’s night time routine. He also points out that the Mother takes the child out for the entire Sunday instead of spending the weekend together<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_38\" id=\"Ftn_38_1\"><sup>[note: 38]</sup></a></span>. The Father also alleged that the Mother would question the child repeatedly after she had spent time with the Father and nitpick about how he looked after the child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_39\" id=\"Ftn_39_1\"><sup>[note: 39]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_c-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Second, the Father claims the Mother excludes him from important decisions concerning the child, such as enrolment in pre-school, enrichment classes and applying for a passport<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_40\" id=\"Ftn_40_1\"><sup>[note: 40]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_c-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) Third, he claims the Mother discourages bonding between father and child by making sarcastic and disparaging remarks on his efforts, for example when he reads bedtime stories to the child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_41\" id=\"Ftn_41_1\"><sup>[note: 41]</sup></a></span> or buys toys for the child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_42\" id=\"Ftn_42_1\"><sup>[note: 42]</sup></a></span>, or interrupting them when they were watching television<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_43\" id=\"Ftn_43_1\"><sup>[note: 43]</sup></a></span> or reading bedtime stories<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_44\" id=\"Ftn_44_1\"><sup>[note: 44]</sup></a></span>. He also finds bizarre her view that his giving of hugs and kisses to the child might eventually be considered inappropriate<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_45\" id=\"Ftn_45_1\"><sup>[note: 45]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_c-p3_iv\"></a>(iv) Fourth, he claims the Mother has on various occasions badmouthed him in the child’s presence<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_46\" id=\"Ftn_46_1\"><sup>[note: 46]</sup></a></span>. In contrast, the Father claims that there are multiple instances where he corrects the child for bad behaviour toward the Mother, such as when the child hit the mother, scratched the mother, bit the Mother, clawed the Mother, and poked the Mother in the eye<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_47\" id=\"Ftn_47_1\"><sup>[note: 47]</sup></a></span>. In 2023, the Father had even bought a birthday gift for the child to pass to her Mother, and reminded her to wish the Mother a happy birthday<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_48\" id=\"Ftn_48_1\"><sup>[note: 48]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_d\"></a>(d) <b>The Mother falsely paints the Father as violent and a pornography addict.</b> The Father claims the Mother falsely alleges that he has committed domestic violence. For example, he cites that her allegation that he had physically forced the child to brush her teeth was not borne out<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_49\" id=\"Ftn_49_1\"><sup>[note: 49]</sup></a></span>, and points out that her police report on 22 July 2022 alleging that he had committed domestic violence toward her was false, as she had declined to undergo a medical examination and no further action was taken by the police. Next, he claims the Mother relied on false evidence to portray him as a pornography addict, by alleging that he left his sex paraphernalia in easily accessible locations<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_50\" id=\"Ftn_50_1\"><sup>[note: 50]</sup></a></span>. The Father claimed that these items were stored in a locked drawer and that she had unlocked the drawer in order to take photographs of the paraphernalia<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_51\" id=\"Ftn_51_1\"><sup>[note: 51]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_e\"></a>(e) <b>The Father has a strong familial support network compared to the Mother.</b> According to the Father, prior to the breakdown of the marriage, the paternal grandparents would drop off groceries for the child, visit at the matrimonial home on Friday and Sunday evenings and on an ad-hoc basis, and pick the child from her pre-school daily<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_52\" id=\"Ftn_52_1\"><sup>[note: 52]</sup></a></span>. This interaction was only stopped at the Mother’s request around September to October 2022, with the paternal grandparents seeing the child on Sunday evenings during the Father’s access time. The Father adds that the child is familiar with her paternal uncle and aunt (his brother)<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_53\" id=\"Ftn_53_1\"><sup>[note: 53]</sup></a></span>, joining them for outings and occasionally being fetched from pre-school by her aunt. Given the Father’s intention to live with the child at his parents’ residence, where two bedrooms have been earmarked for the child and himself<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_54\" id=\"Ftn_54_1\"><sup>[note: 54]</sup></a></span>, he submits that the living arrangement in his parents’ house would foster bonds within the larger family and provide additional support for the child. The Father also points out that it may not be appropriate for the Mother to rely on her two sisters for the care of the child, given that the elder sister is a habitual smoker and has an older romantic partner<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_55\" id=\"Ftn_55_1\"><sup>[note: 55]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_f\"></a>(f) <b>The Father is receptive of feedback and the Mother’s parenting concerns.</b> The Father claims that since the birth of the child, he has materially cut down his alcohol consumption and effectively stopped smoking<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_56\" id=\"Ftn_56_1\"><sup>[note: 56]</sup></a></span>. He disputes the Mother’s claims that he continued his lifestyle of drinking and hanging out with his friends to the wee hours of the morning<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_57\" id=\"Ftn_57_1\"><sup>[note: 57]</sup></a></span>. He also claims to have drastically cut down the time he spends playing video games<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_58\" id=\"Ftn_58_1\"><sup>[note: 58]</sup></a></span>, denies that he is addicted to gaming, and assures he would not expose the child to any inappropriate video game content<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_59\" id=\"Ftn_59_1\"><sup>[note: 59]</sup></a></span>. In any case, the Father was willing to propose a mutual undertaking that (1) there would be no consumption of alcohol in the child’s presence, (2) any sex paraphernalia would be kept out of sight from the child, (3) there would be no playing of inappropriate video games in the child’s presence, and (4) that no family violence would be committed against the child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_60\" id=\"Ftn_60_1\"><sup>[note: 60]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 In the alternative, the Father submits that if the Court is not minded to grant him sole care and control, he would request for shared care and control. He argues that it would be in the best interest of a young child to have the benefit of care from two loving parents, ensuring that both parents would fully engage in the child’s care without excluding the other. The Father points out that even after the breakdown of the marriage, the living arrangements were akin to shared care and control, and it would be in the best interests of the child to preserve the status quo in their living arrangements (see <em>Wong Phila Mae v Shaw Harold</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1991] 1 SLR(R) 0680.xml')\">[1991] 1 SLR(R) 680</a> [F2BOA Tab 26]). In particular, on weekday mornings, the Father would participate in the child’s morning routine, after the Mother takes her to pre-school. Upon the child’s return, the parties would take turns to care for the child, including bathing her, playing with her and reading bedtime stories<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_61\" id=\"Ftn_61_1\"><sup>[note: 61]</sup></a></span>. On weekends, while the child is at home in the morning or after dinner at night, both parties would take turn to care for her and participate in her bedtime routines<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_62\" id=\"Ftn_62_1\"><sup>[note: 62]</sup></a></span>. Furthermore, the Father points out that this is not a case where the parties hold intractable hostility against each other, as they could continue to live together and managed to agree on the reasons for divorce as well as the financial issues in the Ancillary Matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 Should the Father fail to obtain sole or shared care, he proposes access over two weekdays, with an additional weekday when the child turns six years of age. He also took the view that he should be granted weekend overnight access immediately when parties move out of the matrimonial home. He reiterates he is a hands-on and involved parent, and has drastically reduced his alcohol consumption and intends to be in good health so he can provide for his child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_63\" id=\"Ftn_63_1\"><sup>[note: 63]</sup></a></span>. In any event, even if the Mother still had concerns, overnight access would take place in the paternal grandparents’ residence where there were additional hands to support the Father as needed.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 The Father also submitted for half of school holiday access, and for overseas access to commence immediately, with permission to take two short trips of up to seven days each year. After entering primary school, he wishes to have overseas access during his half of the school holidays, subject to the usual orders in relation to the provision of travel itinerary, accommodation and flight details, contact numbers and the handing over of the passport.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Allegations of Alcohol, Pornography and Gaming Addictions</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 The primary objection that the Mother raised against the Father’s care was her view that his alleged addictions presented a safety threat to the child. While I appreciated the Mother’s protective instincts in relation to the child, I will explain why I did not find sufficient evidence of safety risks that would justify a restriction of only daytime access between the Father and the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 To address the concern about alcoholic addiction, at the suggestion of the Court, the Father voluntarily underwent a series of sessions with a psychologist appointed under the Panel of Therapeutic Specialists scheme. Dr Matthew Woo, a private psychologist of 20 years’ experience who was previously the lead psychologist at the Department of Forensic Psychiatry under the Institute of Mental Health, saw the Father over seven sessions from 26 April 2024 to 21 June 2024 (“the observation period”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 In Dr Woo’s report dated 15 July 204, he noted that the Father admitted that he consumed alcohol an average of three times a week, with two to three glasses of alcohol per session, over the previous three years. Dr Woo noted that this was at the borderline of the minimum criteria set by the Health Promotion Board of no more than two standard drinks a day for men. Crucially, Dr Woo observed that over the observation period, the Father had not shown any signs of alcohol use, let alone alcohol dependence. He noted that the Father had taken alcohol-free beer as a substitute for alcohol, and attained very healthy breath analyser readings of 0.000% BAC in his self-conducted tests after psychological treatment began on 26 April 2024. In the course of therapy, the Father had reported four trigger situations which would give him the urge to drink alcohol, namely taking meals which included sashimi, salmon or cheese, as well as stressful situations at the workplace which would give him headaches. Dr Woo shared that these urges were processed with Eye Movement Desensitisation Reprocessing (EMDR), and noted the Father’s persistence in reducing or desensitising his urges to drink to a zero rating for these triggers. At the end of the observation period, Dr Woo therefore concluded that the Father’s behaviour at home was not under any influence of alcohol, and that there “is simply no evidence of safety issues with respect to child custody”<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_64\" id=\"Ftn_64_1\"><sup>[note: 64]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 In her supplementary affidavit, the Mother nevertheless expressed the view that the Father’s dependency on non-alcoholic substitute drinks belied his persistent emotional association with alcohol, and opined that he may not be able to resist such cravings beyond the observation period<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_65\" id=\"Ftn_65_1\"><sup>[note: 65]</sup></a></span>. She also voiced her suspicion that the Father had disposed of glass bottles and cans furtively in the night, and suggests that he could have consumed alcohol outside of the home on the 14 nights during the observation period where was either staying at his parents’ home or on an overseas trip<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_66\" id=\"Ftn_66_1\"><sup>[note: 66]</sup></a></span>. She also notes that the Father had repeatedly attempted to moderate his drinking throughout the marriage, but would fail and lapse into uncontrollable alcoholic binges<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_67\" id=\"Ftn_67_1\"><sup>[note: 67]</sup></a></span>. She thus had serious doubts about the sustainability of his efforts during the observation period, and feared that once the scrutiny of court proceedings was over, he would revert to his long-held drinking habits.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 In his supplementary affidavit, the Father explained that after the first hearing on 11 April 2024, he had disposed of whatever alcohol was in the home and had turned off his wine chiller. He had also started taking frequent breathalyser tests with accompanying video footage, the results of which showed he had zero alcohol content on his breath<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_68\" id=\"Ftn_68_1\"><sup>[note: 68]</sup></a></span>. He submitted that his switch to non-alcoholic beers was testament to his determination to change his behaviour, and he denied the Mother’s accusations that he was hiding his drinking habits during the observation period<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_69\" id=\"Ftn_69_1\"><sup>[note: 69]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 On balance, I accepted Dr Woo’s opinion that the Father had not shown signs of alcohol consumption, and certainly did not present any safety risk over the course of the observation period. The Mother’s doubts as to whether the Father was still consuming alcohol over this period are speculatory and I am unable to ascribe weight to her views. As to whether there may be safety risks that may arise after the scrutiny of therapy and court proceedings is over, I do note that even when the Father had drunk to excess in the past and exhibited allegedly aggressive behaviour at home, there was never any proof that such aggression was directed against the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 To allay this residual concern on the Mother’s part, I directed that the Father take a breath analyser test before each session of access for the next six months and to preserve a photo record of such test results with the appropriate date and time stamp. These records need not be shared with the Mother and should be retained by the Father for a further six months from the point of the test. The purpose of this procedure is to assure parties that in the event of any future incident or further court proceeding, these records may be made available as evidence. This was intended to provide practical deterrence to ensure the Father abstains from alcohol, without presenting an unreasonable imposition on his privacy and dignity. With the Father’s recent efforts and this practical safeguard in place, I did not think the issue of his past alcoholic consumption would detract from his ability to care for the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 Turning to the concern about the Father’s possession of sexual paraphernalia, I note that there was no actual incident where the child had been exposed to the Father’s collection of objects. There was also no suggestion that the Father had behaved inappropriately in any way with his daughter. With regard to the Mother’s expressed concern about the Father hugging and kissing the child, I did not find these to be anything other than normal expressions of parental love towards a young child. I accordingly think that an undertaking as proposed by the father to keep any sexual paraphernalia away from the view of the child would sufficiently address the Mother’s concerns.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 Finally, on the issue of gaming addiction, I likewise took the view that an undertaking that no age-inappropriate gaming would take place in the presence of the child would address this concern. The Father would be well aware that any breach of this undertaking would be easily shared by the child with the Mother, which should provide sufficient deterrence against such behaviour.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 For these reasons, I did not find the allegations relating to various addictions to be sufficient cause to restrict the Father to only daytime access with the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Care and Control</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Sole Care and Control</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 I turn next to the opposing positions on which parent should be granted sole care and control over the child. It is axiomatic that when exercising the power under s 125 of the Women’s Charter 1961 to place the child in the care and control of either or both parents, the paramount consideration must be the welfare of the child (per s 125(2)).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 It is also trite that where all factors are equal between the parties, greater weight is ascribed to the maternal bond between a mother and an infant child. In the oft-cited case of <em>Soon Peck Wah v Woon Che Chye</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1997] 3 SLR(R) 0430.xml')\">[1997] 3 SLR(R) 430</a>, the Court of Appeal held, in regard to a four-year old child, that a child at a tender young age would be most dependent on his mother for his physical and psychological needs, at [45]:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">All other things being equal, a very important factor to bear in mind was that we were dealing with an extremely young infant. We felt that the maternal bond between the appellant and the infant was a pivotal consideration here. The bond between the natural mother and her child is one of the most unexplainable wonders of human nature. It should never be taken for granted or slighted…</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">In <em>Chan Kah Cheong Kenneth v Teoh Kheng Yau</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1994] 2 SLR(R) 0595.xml')\">[1994] 2 SLR(R) 595</a>, MPH Rubin J held that, if all the factors were equal between the parties, then probably it was right for a child of tender years to be brought up by his natural mother. We should not be mistaken as reviving the old presumption of “maternal custody” of all young infants. It is only a natural conclusion that, by reason of his very tender, young age, the infant would be most dependent on his mother for his physical and psychological needs. In the best interest of the child’s welfare, we should not deprive him of his mother’s love and care.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 The significance of the maternal bond was earlier highlighted as a relevant factor in determining the issue of care and control in <em>Wong Phila Mae v Shaw Harold</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1991] 1 SLR(R) 0680.xml')\">[1991] 1 SLR(R) 680</a>, where the Court of Appeal held at [22] and [23]:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">22. We agree with counsel for the appellant that some of the relevant factors are these: (a) the conduct of the parties; (b) the wishes of the parents and the wishes of the child where he or she is of an age to be able to express an independent opinion; <b>(c) a young child would be best looked after by its mother</b>; (d) which party can offer better security and stability; and (e) that siblings should not be separated.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[Emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 The significant weight to be given to the maternal bond is bolstered in this case by the fact that the Mother has been and remains the primary caregiver of the child. While the Father has made effort to participate actively in the child’s daily routine, it is clear that he is not the parent in charge of the child’s daily welfare. The notion of primary caregiving is not just one of effort or contribution, but rather which parent places the greatest time, energy and priority of the child over and above his or her own personal needs. There is no doubt in my mind that the Mother places the greatest priority on and has the closer bond with the child, and ranks the welfare and developmental needs of the child above her own. Coupled with the importance of preserving the maternal bond for a young child, this factor clearly shifts the issue of sole care in the Mother’s favour.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 The next factor I considered in deciding the issue of care and control is which party offers better stability and security for the child. Both residential arrangements put forth by the parents, i.e. the Mother’s family home and the home of the paternal grandparents, provide familiarity and continuity to the child. Both households also have family members able to support and step in to assist with the management of the child. Despite certain aspersions cast against each parents’ family members, I did not find there to be any negative factors which militated against the choice of either household. Accordingly, I considered this to be an equally balanced factor.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 I turn next to parenting style and capability. Much ink has been spilled in a running diatribe between the parties on how the other’s parenting techniques are deficient or even dangerous. Such disagreements are not uncommon even in healthy marriages, where fathers are sometimes perceived to be overly permissive, hands-off and insufficiently attentive, while mothers are critiqued for being overly strict, over-protective or overbearing in relation to the upbringing of the child. I say this not to trivialise the validity of such differences of opinion, but to highlight that differing parenting methods and approaches are par for the course, and that it is incumbent for parties to come to terms on a course best suited to the particular characteristics of their child. By all accounts, the child in this case does appear to have some issues with discipline, and acts out against the controlling parent when she does not get her way. While the Father critiques the Mother for being high-handed in disciplining the child, the reality is that parenting can be exasperating even for the most temperate of parents, and I did not find that the Mother had reacted out of line whenever the child acted up against her. On the other hand, I did not agree with the Mother that the Father’s permissive parenting style was necessarily deficient. In truth, a combination of differing parenting styles may be workable and even beneficial in the co-parenting process. It is not uncommon that a child abides by the disciplinary parent and seeks levity and respite with the relaxed parent. Accordingly, despite the minutiae of criticisms levied between the parties, I did not find either parenting style to be detrimental to the welfare of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 As for parenting capability, it is clear in my view that the Mother is more involved and committed to the care of the child than the Father, having been the primary caregiver since the birth of the child. While the Father has contributed significantly to and has been actively involved in the child’s care, he has never been <em>solely</em> responsible for the child’s welfare for protracted periods of time. In this regard it is clear that the Mother is the far stronger candidate for sole care and control as compared to the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 Finally, the Father also argued that care should devolve to him due to significant gatekeeping behaviour on the part of the Mother, which would undermine the viability of any terms of access. While it is true that care and control may go to the parent who was more facilitative and reasonable about access (per <em>ABW v ABV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2014] 2 SLR 0769.xml')\">[2014] 2 SLR 769</a> at [45]), I did not find the Mother guilty of alienation or gatekeeping in any true sense of the word. Quite to the contrary, the very fact that the Mother continued to stay in the matrimonial home until it was sold, and was willing to allow the Father a full day of weekend access to the child in the interim, was telling of her willingness to cooperate with the Father for the sake of the child. This factor was accordingly not helpful to the Father’s case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_36\"></a>36 Having considered all the above factors, I was of the view that the decision on sole care and control should weigh heavily in favour of the Mother, given the significance of the maternal bond and her role as the primary caregiver of the child since birth.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Shared Care and Control</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_37\"></a>37 Before coming to a final decision, I also considered the Father’s alternative proposition for shared care and control. In considering whether an order for shared care and control would be in the best interest of the child, the court would consider factors such as that particular child’s needs at that stage of life, the extent to which the parents are able to co-operate within such an arrangement, and whether it is easy for that child, bearing in mind her age and personality, to live in two homes (see <em>TAU v TAT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22070-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGHCF 11</a> at [12]).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_38\"></a>38 The Father points out that the parties are able to effectively co-parent at present, and that shared care would essentially be a preservation of the status quo, which would in the usual circumstance be the best choice for preserving the stability of the welfare of the child (per <em>ALJ v ALK</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2010] SGHC 0255.xml')\">[2010] SGHC 255</a>, at [34]). However, I would point out that the current arrangement where the child lives with both parents cannot be continued because the matrimonial home is due for sale. A regime of shared care would therefore not be a preservation of the status quo. With shared care, the child would need to transition to an arrangement where she spent equal time between two homes, one in Punggol and the other in River Valley. She would also have to alternate between two different extended families, with wholly different parenting values, habits and expectations, which may only diverge more markedly over time as the parents lead their separate lives.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_39\"></a>39 While it is true that a young child who has yet to commence formal education may be more suited to a shared care and control arrangement (per <em>ATZ v AUA</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/17530-SSP.xml')\">[2015] SGHC 161</a> at [109], and <em>UPK v UPL <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22321-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGFC 92</a></em> at [26]), the reality is that it would be a significant adjustment for the child to spend equal time between two extended families which would have equal control and influence over her life. I am not convinced how this would be beneficial rather than disruptive to the child’s life. On the other hand, maintaining the Mother as the sole caregiver would provide a measure of stability and security to the child that would mitigate the disruption brought about by the divorce. The child would still preserve her bond with her Father if sufficient latitude is given to him for access. I therefore declined to order shared care and control as proposed by the Father, and granted the Mother sole care and control over the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Overnight Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_40\"></a>40 Given my earlier reasoning that the Mother’s concerns of safety regarding the Father’s alleged addictions was not borne out, I did not find any reason to deny the Father overnight access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_41\"></a>41 Indeed, the Court should be slow to deny a parent overnight access, given the benefits that extended access brings to the development of the parent-child bond (see <b><em>BKJ v BKK</em></b> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2013] SGDC 0261.xml')\">[2013] SGDC 261</a> at [29]-[30]). I note too that the age of the child in itself is not a strong reason for allowing or denying the other parent overnight access (see <b><em>BKJ v BKK</em></b> at [32]). The importance of overnight access was succinctly explained by District Judge Jason Gabriel Chiang in <b><em>VZP v VZQ</em></b> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27068-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGFC 8</a> at [25] in the following terms:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The Child should be equally entitled to overnight access with the father as he is with the mother, unless there is evidence to disprove either party’s eligibility, such as a history of abusive or negligent parenting. Even though the Children are asleep during a part of the overnight access, there is an intangible value of building up familiarity, being able to say good morning to or to have a particular storybook read by the parent before the Children go to bed, these are important opportunities to build bonds.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_42\"></a>42 I was therefore minded to allow one session of overnight weekend access to the Father each week, from 9 pm on Saturday to 9 pm on Sunday. This would enable both parents to have an equal share of weekend time, while ensuring that the child returned home with sufficient leeway to settle down before the weekday routine began.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_43\"></a>43 To ensure that the child receives the best care possible, and also mindful that the Father has not been in sole care of the child for an extended period of time, I added the condition that the child is to reside at the home of the Father’s parents during such overnight access, as their support would be especially helpful in the management of a child at a tender age.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_44\"></a>44 At the clarificatory hearing, the Father requested for the Mother to drop off the child for his weekend access on Saturday 9 pm at the paternal grandparents’ house in River Valley. The Mother objected as her routine involved attending church at Suntec City in the evening followed by dinner nearby from 7.30 pm to 8.30 pm, which would either be at the same location or near Raffles City or Dhoby Ghaut MRT. As the Mother did not drive, it would be difficult for her to send the child to River Valley thereafter. Given that the Father drives and for the benefit of the young child’s welfare, I directed that the child be picked up for handover at Suntec City (save where there are road closures in any part of town), Dhoby Ghaut MRT or Raffles City, and for the Mother to inform the Father of the exact location at least one hour beforehand. The Mother then sought the limitation that the pickup be done by the Father alone, as the grandparents were elderly and may be unable to handle the child’s temper tantrums. I did not think it necessary to impose this limitation on the Father, when there was no evidence of inability to manage the child on the part of the paternal grandparents. I did however refine the direction to specify that the pickup of the child should be restricted to immediate family members only (i.e. excluding a domestic helper or some other third party), given the young age of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_45\"></a>45 Finally, to forestall future disputes regarding the use of weekend time for external activities, I directed that the allocation of time for co-curricular and enrichment activities should fall equally between each parent’s period of weekend access, with any excess allocation to be subject to agreement by both parents.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Overnight Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_46\"></a>46 Turning to weekday access, I granted the Father access to the child over two weekday evenings on Wednesday and Thursday, from the time the child is picked up from childcare or school to 8:30 pm. At the clarificatory hearing, the Mother requested for a change of days to Tuesday and Thursday, as she wished to undertake volunteering activities for the purposes of future primary school application on Tuesday. The Father objected to this as he would be tied up with work on Tuesday. As the Father’s commitment appeared more immutable, I declined the Mother’s request to amend the order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_47\"></a>47 Finally, to afford flexibility, I directed that should access not be practicable on any given session, the Father should in the alternative be granted video access to the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_48\"></a>48 As agreed by parties, the sessions of access would also be subject to the undertakings of both parties not to consume alcohol, play age-inappropriate video games or expose the child to any sexually inappropriate objects during the period of care over the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Overseas Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_49\"></a>49 As for overseas access, I repeat my earlier observation that the Father had hitherto not taken sole charge of the child for a protracted period of time. I was of the view that overseas access should be introduced in a staggered fashion, with a requirement of accompaniment by either the paternal grandparents or the paternal aunt from the age of six to nine years of age. After the age of nine years, the Father should be able to take the child for overseas access alone, as the child would be more mature and the Father would have more experienced in the exclusive care of the child. Accordingly, the following directions were made regarding overseas access by the Father:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_a\"></a>(a) Overseas access with the Father commences when the child reaches 6 years of age.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_b\"></a>(b) Such access should be for no more than 7 days at a time, and shall not exceed two times a year without the consent of the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_c\"></a>(c) Any overseas access should also be in the company of either parent of the Father or the sister-in-law of the Father, until the child reaches the age of 9.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_d\"></a>(d) The exact dates of such overseas access should be notified no less than one month in advance to the other parent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_e\"></a>(e) The passport of the child is to be handed over seven days before the commencement of travel and returned seven days after the conclusion of travel. At the clarificatory hearing, an additional condition was added that neither party should withhold consent to renew the passport without reasonable cause.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_f\"></a>(f) Each parent should have daily video access to the child when the child is travelling with the other parent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_49-p2_g\"></a>(g) For the avoidance of doubt, overseas trips take priority over regular access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_50\"></a>50 The Father also sought clarification whether a staycation would be allowed for his overnight access prior to the child turning six years of age. Mindful that overnight access was ordered to be at the paternal grandparent’s residence to ensure that the Father was well-supported while the child was young, I declined to allow staycations prior to the age of six years old. I would however leave it to parties to exercise reason within the spirit of the order, for e.g. if the paternal grandparents were to join the overnight staycation, I would not see any reason why such a variation should not be acceded to.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Other Access Orders</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_51\"></a>51 With regard to school holidays, a similar stepped-up approach was applied. Once the child commences primary school, the Father would have additional daytime access from 10 am to 8.30 pm, with the school holidays equally shared once the child turns nine years of age. This accords with the earlier reasoning that the Father should enjoy greater access once there was greater familiarity over the child’s care, at an age when the child is more mature and independent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_52\"></a>52 The following is a summary of the orders made regarding public and school holidays:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_52-p2_a\"></a>(a) Public holiday access is to alternate between the parents.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_52-p2_b\"></a>(b) During school holidays when the child commences primary school, the Father shall additionally have access on Weds and Thurs from 10 am to 8.30 pm.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_52-p2_c\"></a>(c) When the child turns nine years of age, school holiday access is to be equally shared (which will include overnight access). The Father will be granted access for the first half of any school holiday in the first and odd years of every calendar year, and will be granted the second half of the school holiday in even years.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_52-p2_d\"></a>(d) At the clarificatory hearing, parties suggested that there be video call access every other evening from 5.30 to 6.00 pm during uninterrupted periods of access. I agreed and so directed.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_52-p2_e\"></a>(e) For each parent’s birthday, as well as Mother’s and Father’s Day, the respective parent would have access from 10 am to 8.30 pm, and this would supersede any other direction on regular access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_52-p2_f\"></a>(f) On the child’s birthday access, the parent without access on that day would be granted two hours of access with the child, with the exact hours of access to be agreed between the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_52-p2_g\"></a>(g) At the clarificatory hearing, parties also agreed that if for any reason a period of access would fall under one hour, there would be no need for the other parent to hand over the child for this short period.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_53\"></a>53 On the issue of costs, I considered that while both sides did not fully prevail in their arguments before the Court, the final outcome was more aligned with what counsel revealed to be the Father’s without prejudice offer. Accordingly, I directed that costs of $1,500 (all-in) be paid by the Mother to the Father.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>FA-1 at [46].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>FA-1 at [43].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>MA-2, at [22] and [176].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>MA-2, at [179(d) to (f)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>MA-2, pages 19 to 34.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>MS-1, at [10], [14] to [28].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>MA-2, at [32] and [180(a)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>MS-1, at [18] and MA-2, at [179(f)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(g) and (ll)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>MA-2, at pages 237 and238.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>MA-2, at [49], [50], [66], [76], [77].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(jj)-(kk)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>MA-2, [106], [113], [131]-[135].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>MA-1, Tab 6, Exhibit CWYQ-1.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(l)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>MA-1, at [26(c)] and [33(o)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(m)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_18_1\" id=\"Ftn_18\">[note: 18]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(p), (q) and [w]].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_19_1\" id=\"Ftn_19\">[note: 19]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(u)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_20_1\" id=\"Ftn_20\">[note: 20]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(z)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_21_1\" id=\"Ftn_21\">[note: 21]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(cc)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_22_1\" id=\"Ftn_22\">[note: 22]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(ff)-(ii)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_23_1\" id=\"Ftn_23\">[note: 23]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33 (ss)-(uu)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_24_1\" id=\"Ftn_24\">[note: 24]</a></sup>FA-1, at [12].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_25_1\" id=\"Ftn_25\">[note: 25]</a></sup>FA-1, at [17.3].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_26_1\" id=\"Ftn_26\">[note: 26]</a></sup>FA2, at [14.3] and [14.6].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_27_1\" id=\"Ftn_27\">[note: 27]</a></sup>FA-1, at [127.1].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_28_1\" id=\"Ftn_28\">[note: 28]</a></sup>FA-1, at [78] and [84].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_29_1\" id=\"Ftn_29\">[note: 29]</a></sup>FA-1, at [81].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_30_1\" id=\"Ftn_30\">[note: 30]</a></sup>FA-1 at [86].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_31_1\" id=\"Ftn_31\">[note: 31]</a></sup>MA-2, at [133].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_32_1\" id=\"Ftn_32\">[note: 32]</a></sup>FA-1 at [92]-[94].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_33_1\" id=\"Ftn_33\">[note: 33]</a></sup>MA-2, at [138]-[141].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_34_1\" id=\"Ftn_34\">[note: 34]</a></sup>FA-1, at [91].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_35_1\" id=\"Ftn_35\">[note: 35]</a></sup>FA-1 at [82] and [83].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_36_1\" id=\"Ftn_36\">[note: 36]</a></sup>FA-1 at [42].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_37_1\" id=\"Ftn_37\">[note: 37]</a></sup>FA-1 at [41].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_38_1\" id=\"Ftn_38\">[note: 38]</a></sup>FA-1 at [43].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_39_1\" id=\"Ftn_39\">[note: 39]</a></sup>FA-1 at [45].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_40_1\" id=\"Ftn_40\">[note: 40]</a></sup>FA-1 at [118] and [119].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_41_1\" id=\"Ftn_41\">[note: 41]</a></sup>FA-1 at [59].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_42_1\" id=\"Ftn_42\">[note: 42]</a></sup>FA-1 at [55].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_43_1\" id=\"Ftn_43\">[note: 43]</a></sup>FA-1 at [57], [72].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_44_1\" id=\"Ftn_44\">[note: 44]</a></sup>FA-1 at [74].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_45_1\" id=\"Ftn_45\">[note: 45]</a></sup>MA-2 at [33(q)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_46_1\" id=\"Ftn_46\">[note: 46]</a></sup>FA-1 at [27], [61]-[69].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_47_1\" id=\"Ftn_47\">[note: 47]</a></sup>FA-1 at [88], [99.1], [99.2], [99.3] and FA-2 at [20].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_48_1\" id=\"Ftn_48\">[note: 48]</a></sup>FA-2 at [30].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_49_1\" id=\"Ftn_49\">[note: 49]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(b)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_50_1\" id=\"Ftn_50\">[note: 50]</a></sup>MA-1, at [33(hh)] and Tab 15, Exhibit CWYQ-1.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_51_1\" id=\"Ftn_51\">[note: 51]</a></sup>FA-2, at [64].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_52_1\" id=\"Ftn_52\">[note: 52]</a></sup>FA-1 at [19] and [20.1], [20.2].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_53_1\" id=\"Ftn_53\">[note: 53]</a></sup>FA-1 at [22] and [23].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_54_1\" id=\"Ftn_54\">[note: 54]</a></sup>FA-2 at [77].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_55_1\" id=\"Ftn_55\">[note: 55]</a></sup>FA-2, at [28.2].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_56_1\" id=\"Ftn_56\">[note: 56]</a></sup>FA-1, at [114] and [115].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_57_1\" id=\"Ftn_57\">[note: 57]</a></sup>MA-1, at [26(c)].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_58_1\" id=\"Ftn_58\">[note: 58]</a></sup>FA-2, at [78].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_59_1\" id=\"Ftn_59\">[note: 59]</a></sup>FA-2, at [82].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_60_1\" id=\"Ftn_60\">[note: 60]</a></sup>FA-2, at [76].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_61_1\" id=\"Ftn_61\">[note: 61]</a></sup>FA-1, at [17.1].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_62_1\" id=\"Ftn_62\">[note: 62]</a></sup>FA-1, at [17.2] and [17.3].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_63_1\" id=\"Ftn_63\">[note: 63]</a></sup>FA-2 at [42].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_64_1\" id=\"Ftn_64\">[note: 64]</a></sup>Psychological Report by Dr Matthew Woo dated 15 July 2024, at [8].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_65_1\" id=\"Ftn_65\">[note: 65]</a></sup>MA-3, at [19].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_66_1\" id=\"Ftn_66\">[note: 66]</a></sup>MA-3, at [21]-[23].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_67_1\" id=\"Ftn_67\">[note: 67]</a></sup>MA-3, at [26].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_68_1\" id=\"Ftn_68\">[note: 68]</a></sup>FA-3, at [21].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_69_1\" id=\"Ftn_69\">[note: 69]</a></sup>FA-3, at [17].</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Children and Young Persons Act – Care and Protection Orders"],"date":"2024-11-13","court":"Youth Court","case-number":"YA 0002/2024/01, CASE NO. CPO 000034-2022","title":"Father of XGK v Child Protector","citation":"[2024] SGYC 3","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32630-SSP.xml","counsel":["Parent in person for the Child Protector"],"timestamp":"2024-12-24T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Wendy Yu","html":"<root><head><title>Father of XGK v Child Protector</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> Father of XGK <em>v</em> Child Protector </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32630-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGYC 3</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">YA 0002/2024/01, CASE NO. CPO 000034-2022</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">13 November 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Youth Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Wendy Yu </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Parent in person for the Child Protector </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Father of XGK — Child Protector </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Children and Young Persons Act</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Care and Protection Orders</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">13 November 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Wendy Yu:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 This appeal is brought by the Father, Mr Cyrus Adam (“the Father”) of the child, XGK, female, born on 27 July 2009 (“the Child”) against the interim orders made on 13 November 2024 pursuant to an application brought by Child Protective Service (“CPS”), Ministry of Social and Family Development, Singapore (“MSF”) under Section 54 of the Children and Young Persons Act, Cap 38 (“CYPA”) for a review of an existing care and protection order (“the Application”). The mother of the Child, Mdm B (“the Mother”), had expressed her agreement on 16 August 2024 to the making of orders as per the recommendations.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The interim orders that I have made on 13 November 2024 (“the Interim Orders”) are set out as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_1\"></a>(1) [The Child] is to be placed under the supervision of an Approved Welfare Officer, under the care of Mr C and Mdm D, until 20 February 2025, with effect from 13 November 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2\"></a>(2) [The Father] is to comply with the following conditions, under section 54(8) of the CYPA:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2-p3_i\"></a>(i) (a)[The Child’s] contacts with [The Father] and any significant others to be subject to the approval and review of the Approved Welfare Officer;</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2-p3_b\"></a>(b) [The Father] is not to do any act that will compromise the safety and well-being of [the Child];</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2-p3_c\"></a>(c) [The Father] shall immediately take down the relevant website and social media posts, and not to re-publish any of the contents of those posts through any means, including on social media or the Internet;</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2-p3_d\"></a>(d) [The Father] shall not publish or broadcast, through any means including on social media or the Internet, anything which directly or indirectly relates to or is the subject of the proceedings before the Youth Court;</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2-p3_e\"></a>(e) [The Child], [the Father] and any significant others to attend and participate in individual interviews, discuss safety plans and caregiving arrangements with the Approved Welfare Officer to ensure the safety and well-being of [the Child].</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2-p3_f\"></a>(f) Professionals to release the medical, psychological, counselling and/or relevant reports of [the Child] and [the Father] to the Approved Welfare Officer.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_2-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) CPS is to arrange for [the Child] to undergo psychological and/or psychiatric assessment from the Institute of Mental Health and to furnish a copy of the report to the Court and Parents before the next Court Hearing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_3\"></a>(3) [The Father] and [the Child] are to be required to undergo any counselling/psychotherapy/assessment/programme/treatment as deemed necessary by the Approved Welfare Officer, and [the Father] shall execute a bond of $1,000.00 to comply with the order under Section 60(2), in accordance with Section 60(5) of the CYPA.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_2-p2_4\"></a>(4) The Matter is to be fixed for a review hearing on 20 February 2025.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 I will now set out the grounds for the Interim Orders.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 CPS first took out an application on 4 December 2022, for a care and protection order after invoking Section 11(1) of the CYPA. The basis of their application was on Section 5(1)(d)(i) and Section 5(1)(f)(i) of the CYPA, that the Child has been, or is at risk of being ill-treated by the Father and that the Child behaves in a manner that is, or is likely to be, harmful to herself and the Father is unwilling to take necessary measures to remedy the situation.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The Social Report hearing was fixed on 9 May 2022, and CPS had recommended for, <em>inter alia</em>, an order for the Child to be committed to the care of the Fit Persons, namely her paternal grandparents, Mr C and Mdm D (“the paternal grandparents”), for a period of 12 months, with a review in 6 months. Besides the grounds set out in paragraph 4 above, CPS had added an additional ground in the social report, under Section 5(1)(g), that the Child was likely to suffer from emotional harm due to emotional or psychological abuse by the Father. The Mother had agreed to CPS’s recommendations on 5 May 2022. The Father disagreed with the recommendations and so the Court had fixed the matter for a Family Conference to allow a Family Court Specialist to facilitate the conversation between CPS and the Father and to address the Father’s concerns. After the Family Conference on 31 May 2022, the matter was resolved as CPS and the Father agreed for the Child to be placed under a statutory supervision order, under the care of the paternal grandparents for a period of 12 months, with a review in 6 months.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 At the review hearing on 30 December 2022, CPS had recommended for the Child to be committed to the care of the Fit Persons, namely, the paternal grandparents, for a period of 12 months as they were of the view that the Child continues to be in need of care and protection. The Father contested the recommendations. The matter was fixed for hearing on 6 July 2023 before me.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 After hearing the matter on 6 July 2023, I had directed for a child interview on 4 August 2023 to be arranged for me to speak to the Child to ascertain her views, with the support of a Family Court Specialist, as she was already 14 years old and would be mature enough to express her views about her living arrangements and her relationship with her Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 After considering the Child’s views at the interview (which remained confidential) and the parties’ submissions, I had ordered, on 30 August 2023, for the Child to be placed under the statutory supervision of the Approved Welfare Officer, under the care of her paternal grandparents, for a period of 12 months (“the August 2023 orders”). I had also expressed to parties at the hearing that the August 2023 orders will give time for professionals to help mend the Father-daughter relationship and that CPS should work with the Father towards the ultimate goal of reintegration to the Father, as the Father continues to receive services from the professionals.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Current Application for Review and CPS’s position</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 CPS had subsequently requested for a review hearing on 30 August 2024 (“the Review Hearing”). The Child is now 15 years old. CPS had recommended for the current order for statutory supervision to be extended for another 12 months. The matter was fixed for a contested hearing on 13 November 2024 (“the 13 November Hearing”) before me as the Father had objected to the recommendations. The Mother did not attend the 13 November Hearing as she had given her consent to the recommendations on 16 August 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 For the 13 November Hearing, CPS had filed 2 affidavits, namely, the Affidavit of CPO Mr E dated 4 October 2024 and the Affidavit of CPO Ms F dated 30 October 2024. CPS had also filed their submissions dated 6 November 2024. The Father had filed 2 affidavits dated 11 September 2024 and 16 October 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">CPS’s Position at 13 November Hearing</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 CPS submits<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> that there has been no material change in circumstances since the August 2023 orders and that the Child remains in need of care and protection under section 5(1)(g) read with sections 5(2)(a) of the CYPA. CPS is of the view that the Child has suffered and continues to be likely to suffer from emotional harm because she has been subjected to emotional and psychological abuse by the Father, as the Father has subjected the Child to persistent acts of rejection or degradation that are harmful to her well-being or sense of self-worth.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 CPS contends that there remains a significant risk that the Father may subject the Child to further acts of emotional or psychological abuse if she is returned to his care at this stage<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span>, which is shown by the Father’s confrontational behaviour during the access sessions between the Child and him, as well as the Father’s persistent acts of exposing the Child’s identity online.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 CPS has informed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> the Court that two of the six access sessions (on 27 February 2024 and 26 March 2024) had to be terminated early at the Child’s request. CPS has added<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> that since the August 2023 orders, the Father had persistently compromised the Child’s well-being by revealing her identity as being subject of CPS’s investigations and of previous care and protection orders, both online and in public<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span>. In particular, the Father had recorded the six access sessions between January and March 2024 without permission and uploaded them on YouTube and/or his website and uploaded a full, unredacted copy of his affidavit filed in previous Youth Court proceedings which contained various references to the Child’s name. The Father had contravened Section 111 of the CYPA by recording and uploading photos of his access sessions with the Child onto social media platforms and was given a 24-months conditional warning by the Police<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 According to CPS, the Child’s “emotions became very unstable, and that she felt nauseous and experienced chest tightness, after [the Child] had learnt of [the Father’s] uploading of videos.”<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> On 25 August 2024, it was also brought to CPS’s attention that the Father had uploaded online screenshots of text messages exchange with CPS. The Child could be identified in these messages<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Father’s position at the 13 November Hearing </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 The Father objected to the recommendations at the Review Hearing and at the 13 November hearing. The Father alleges<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> that he had “discovered corrupt practices (unmerited/excessive referrals to Social Service Agencies (SSAs) by CPS and bribery arrangements between them, enabled and protected by the Family Justice Courts)”. The Father argues<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> that CPS did not adhere to the principles of the CYPA with a “corrupt intent” so that the Child Protection Order in this matter could be “extended for as long as possible to generate fraudulent counselling fees”. The Father contends that CPS “did nothing to facilitate the reintegration process with a ‘corrupt intent’ to generate fraudulent counselling fees (paid by public monies) for SSAs”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 The Father contends<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> that the existing child protection order was “voided” on 13 March 2024 because CPS “did nothing” to facilitate the reintegration process when the Child agreed to move in and live with him during the access session on 12 March 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 The Father had submitted at the 13 November Hearing<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> that the existing orders must be discharged and that the Child must return to live with him immediately. The Father had informed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> the Court that he had moved from a 1-room rental flat in Choa Chu Kang to a 3-room flat in Bukit Batok which means he is able to provide a more stable and comfortable home environment for the Child. The Father has stated that the Child’s paternal grandparents currently live in a “short-lease 2 room Flexi flat” where the Child does not have her own room.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 When the Court asked the Father at the 13 November Hearing whether he had removed the online content identifying the Child as someone being involved in these Child Protection Proceedings (as directed by the Court by DJ Amy Tung at the Review Hearing), the Father had informed the Court that he did not intend to remove the online content.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 After hearing both parties, I had then decided to direct CPS to arrange for the Child to undergo psychological and/or psychiatric assessment by IMH and for IMH to furnish a copy of the report to the Court and Parents before the next hearing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Applicable Law</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 In a review of existing care and protection orders, the legal test that is to be applied is as stated at BHR (Natural Mother of B) v Child Protector <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/16760-SSP.xml')\">[2014] SGJC 1</a> (“BHR”) at [15]:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">“…whether there exist any change in circumstances…to warrant/justify the cancellation/rescission [of the Previous Orders]. In this regard [the Court] will have to consider whether the child is still in need of care and protection under [the relevant sections of the CYPA] given the welfare and best interests of the child as of paramount interest.”</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 In the unreported decision of the High Court in Youth Court Appeal No. YA 004 of 2018/01<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span>, which was an appeal from Child Protector v Parents of GCQ v GCB <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22225-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGYC 4</a> (“GCQ”), Debbie Ong J had opined<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> that the Court needed to consider at a review hearing “whether the Parents are now in a different position such that they are sufficiently fit to have the children returned to them”. In determining this, the Court could consider whether the parents have complied with counselling and other interventions, whether they are committed to a safety plan, and whether there have been breaches in safety plans.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Reasons for calling for a fresh psychological and/or psychiatric report on the Child from IMH</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 Under Section 54(13) of the CYPA, the Court, when deciding what order is to be made, is to treat the welfare of the child or young person as the paramount consideration and is to endeavour to obtain such information as to the family background, general conduct, home environment, school record, medical history and state of development of the child or young person to enable the Court to deal with the case in the best interests of the child or young person. Section 54(14)(d) of the CYPA empowers the Court to require the child or young person to undergo such medical, psychiatric, psychological or other assessment as the Court thinks necessary.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 I was of the view that a fresh psychiatric/ psychological assessment of the Child was necessary for me to consider whether she is still in need of care and protection. The report will also help me to find out more about the Child’s current mental and emotional state in order to decide whether the Child is ready to return to live with the Father. In particular, I wanted an objective assessment on whether CPS’s assertion that the Father’s recent actions have added to the Child’s distress and anxiety, resulting in placing her at continued risk of suffering from emotional harm<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span>, can be substantiated.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 I did note that the last report by IMH on the Child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_18\" id=\"Ftn_18_1\"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span> was dated 24 May 2022, which is more than 2 years ago. In this last report by IMH, the Child was first seen at the Emergency Room on 28 March 2021 after she was brought in by her family for self-harm and suicidal thoughts following a conflict with her family. As stated in the report, there was another instance where the Child was brought back to the Emergency Room on 22 December 2021 by the police for having suicidal thoughts following a scolding by her father. She was once again brought back to the Emergency Room at IMH on 28 March 2022 by the police for self-harm following a scolding by her father. The Psychiatrist, Dr G, was under the impression then that the Child was suffering from Acute Situational Reaction<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_19\" id=\"Ftn_19_1\"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 The Father had acknowledged that the Child has had a history of self-harm “back to 2018” and that she had “committed self-harm under the charge of her non-biological grandparents.”<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_20\" id=\"Ftn_20_1\"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> I was of the view that a fresh assessment would assist the Court in deciding whether the Child still suffers from such self- harm tendencies before I decide whether she is ready to be reintegrated to the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 I had also wanted to find out how the Child is responding to the access sessions that she has had with the Father, as well as the impact that the Father’s act of revealing her identity online, as someone who is involved in child protection proceedings, would have on her. The Father had, at the 13 November Hearing, argued that he did not think that his act of revealing the Child’s identity online would affect her adversely, and he had explained that his need to “expose corruption” in publishing the videos will “outweigh the side effects”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 I did note that there has been a relatively recent Psychological Therapy Report (“PTR”) dated 23 May 2024 prepared by Ms H, Senior Clinical Psychologist of the Clinical and Forensic Psychology Service (“CFPS”)(under MSF), which was presented to the Court attached with the Review Report. However, the PTR was focused on the therapy progress of the Child for the period from 6 January 2023 to 7 July 2023. There was no assessment or information of her current mental and emotional condition, especially after the August 2023 orders or after the recent events in 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 The Father has responded in his affidavit<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_21\" id=\"Ftn_21_1\"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span> to the contents of the PTR and had referred to Ms H as a “corrupt psychologist”. In view of the Father’s immense distrust of CFPS and MSF, I was of the view that a report should be obtained from IMH instead of CFPS.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">What are the interim care and protection orders that would be in the best interest and welfare of the Child?</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 The next issue that I had to decide was, what were the interim care and protection orders that would be made while the IMH report was being prepared. I was mindful that we will need to give IMH sufficient time to assess the Child and to prepare the report- and I had therefore adjourned the hearing to 20 February 2025 for me to consider the contents of the report and to make my final orders after that.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 CPS had submitted at the 13 November Hearing that the existing orders should be extended while the Father was of the view that the existing orders should be discharged and that the Child should be ordered to return to live with him immediately.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 When I was making my decision on whether to extend the interim orders, I was guided by Section 4(b) of the CYPA, which states that “in all matters relating to the administration or application of this Act, the welfare and best interests of the child or young person must be the first and paramount consideration<em>”.</em> Under Section 54(14)(e), the Court is empowered to adjourn the case for such period as it thinks necessary as an interim order having effect only during the period of the adjournment.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 It was necessary to extend the existing orders which mandate the Father to immediately take down the relevant website and social media posts, and not to re-publish any of the contents of those posts through any means, including on social media or the Internet and that he shall not publish or broadcast, through any means including on social media or the Internet, anything which directly or indirectly relates to or is the subject of the proceedings before the Youth Court, given his expressed refusal to do so at the 13 November Hearing. The identity of the Child has to be protected.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 I was of the view it is in the interest of the Child that the status quo should remain in order not to destabilise her and I had therefore extended the existing orders. It is premature for the Court discharge the existing orders without first obtaining the further information that is required from the report to enable the Court to deal with the case in the best interests of the Child. The statutory supervision order, with the Child being under the care of her paternal grandparents, should remain, until the next hearing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 For the above reasons, I made the orders as stated at [2] above.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>[14] of CPS’s Written Submissions dated 6 November 2024 (“CPS’s Submissions”)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>[19] of CPS’s Submissions</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>[26] of Mr Benjamin Leow’s Affidavit of 4 October 2024 (“BLA”)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Page 93 of BLA</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>[19c] of CPS’s Submissions</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>[27(g)] of BLA</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Page 94 of BLA</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>Page 95 of BLA</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>[3] of Father’s Affidavit dated 11 September 2024 (“FA1”)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>[10] of FA1</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>[12] of FA1</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>[12] of Father’s Affidavit dated 16 October 2024 (“FA2”)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>[24] of FA1</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>Page 4 of FA2</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>[13] of CPS’s Submissions</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>Page 11 of the Notes of Argument dated 22 November 2018, at page 50 of CPS’s Bundle of Authorities</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>[29] of BLA</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_18_1\" id=\"Ftn_18\">[note: 18]</a></sup>Page 82 of BLA</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_19_1\" id=\"Ftn_19\">[note: 19]</a></sup>Page 82-83 of BLA</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_20_1\" id=\"Ftn_20\">[note: 20]</a></sup>Page 8 of FA1</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_21_1\" id=\"Ftn_21\">[note: 21]</a></sup>[19] of FA-1</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Family violence – Orders for protection – Application to revoke a personal protection order – Whether the alleged abuse of a personal protection order by a protected person is a ground to revoke the order – Approach where an applicant is alleged to have breached the order","Evidence – Burden of proof – Whether an applicant has proved his case for revoking a personal protection order – Factual findings of “proved”, “disproved”, and “not proved” under s 3(3) to s 3(5) of the Evidence Act 1893"],"date":"2024-12-13","court":"Family Court","case-number":"SS No. 1031 of 2024","title":"XGG v XGH","citation":"[2024] SGFC 111","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32623-SSP.xml","counsel":["Gurdaib Kumar Singh and Ms Divya Durai (M/s Regal Law LLC) for the Applicant","Respondent in person."],"timestamp":"2024-12-20T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kow Keng Siong","html":"<root><head><title>XGG v XGH</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XGG <em>v</em> XGH </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32623-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 111</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">SS No. 1031 of 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">13 December 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kow Keng Siong </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Gurdaib Kumar Singh and Ms Divya Durai (M/s Regal Law LLC) for the Applicant; Respondent in person. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XGG — XGH </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Orders for protection</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Application to revoke a personal protection order</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Whether the alleged abuse of a personal protection order by a protected person is a ground to revoke the order</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Approach where an applicant is alleged to have breached the order</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Evidence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Burden of proof</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Whether an applicant has proved his case for revoking a personal protection order</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Factual findings of “proved”, “disproved”, and “not proved” under s 3(3) to s 3(5) of the Evidence Act 1893</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">13 December 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kow Keng Siong:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 A personal protection order (“<b>PPO</b>”) is intended to protect a family member from family violence. Can a PPO be revoked on the sole basis that the person it seeks to protect (“<b>protected person</b>”) has allegedly abused the order? How should a court deal with an application to revoke a PPO where the applicant is alleged to have breached the order? These are some of the issues raised in SS 1031 of 2024 (“<b>SS 1031</b>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 SS 1031 is the Applicant’s request to revoke a PPO made against him. The PPO was imposed in 2018 pursuant to an application by his ex-wife (“<b>Respondent</b>”). Under the PPO, the Applicant is not to commit family violence against the Respondent and her son (his stepson).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The parties’ marriage was dissolved in February 2024. Following the divorce –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_3-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Respondent has care and control of her daughter (D.O.B.: January 2016) that she bore with the Applicant.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_3-p2_b\"></a>(b) She resides with her daughter and her son (now 21 years old) in the matrimonial flat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_3-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Applicant resides with his mother in the next block of flat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 At the time of this judgement, the Respondent has a fiancé. They are due to be married in December 2024. The Applicant, on the other hand, has a girlfriend.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Parties’ position </p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Applicant’s position</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The Applicant provides two reasons to support his application to revoke the PPO.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, he alleges that the Respondent has “abused” the PPO – namely, (i) by making false complaints to the Police that he had breached the order,<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> (ii) by picking arguments with him so that she could play the “victim”,<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> and (iii) by harassing and slandering him on social media.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_5-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, the Applicant submits that the PPO is no longer necessary. It was granted six years ago. The parties are now residing in different households and there has been no recent incident of family violence.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Respondent’s position</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 The Respondent strong denies the Applicant’s allegations and objects to his application. According to the Respondent, the PPO is still necessary for the protection of her son and herself.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">My decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Summary of decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 After considering the evidence and submissions, I dismiss the application. These are my reasons.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Alleged abuse of PPO not proved</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 I begin with the Applicant’s first reason as to why the PPO ought to be revoked – namely that the Respondent has allegedly “abused” the order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Requirement for revocation</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 At the outset, it should be noted that the mere fact that a protected person may have “abused” a PPO is not a sufficient basis to revoke the order. This is because the test for revocation is <em>whether a PPO is still necessary</em> to protect that person. To succeed in a revocation application, the applicant must thus prove that he/she “is unlikely” to commit family violence in future: s 65(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“<b>Charter</b>”). This position is well settled: see e.g., <em>Joycelyn Toh Hui Yu v Toh Siew Luan Bette</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2013] SGDC 0275.xml')\">[2013] SGDC 275</a> at [17(d)].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 To be clear, the above position does not mean that a protected person can use a PPO as an instrument of oppression. Depending on the circumstances, a person who has been victimised by a protected person can apply for a PPO against the latter. Additionally, the protected person may also be criminally liable, e.g., under s 182 of the Penal Code 1871 if he/she makes a false police report that a PPO has been breached.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Allegations of abuse</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 In his affidavit, the Applicant referred to several incidents where the Respondent had allegedly “abused” the PPO. During the hearing, he agreed to focus on four of them. I will now address each of these allegations, <em>first</em>, whether the Applicant has proved these four incidents of “abuse”, and <em>second</em>, whether the PPO is no longer necessary.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">2 June 2024 incident – Applicant checking on his daughter</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 I begin with an incident on 2 June 2024. (This incident occurred just <em>one day before</em> the Applicant filed his application to revoke the PPO.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span>) His account of this incident is as follows.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_a\"></a>(a) On that day at about 2.00 am, while in the carpark, the Applicant noticed that the light in the matrimonial flat’s master-bedroom was switched on. The Applicant decided to check on his daughter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_b\"></a>(b) On entering the flat unit, the Applicant saw that nobody was at home. Anxious at being unable to find his daughter, the Applicant phoned the Respondent to check. The Respondent responded with vulgarities and told him to wait with his girlfriend at the void deck for her to come over. The Applicant made a police report.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_c\"></a>(c) When the Applicant returned to the matrimonial flat, the Respondent refused to let him enter, claiming that she had been advised to do so by the Investigation Officer (“<b>IO</b>”). The Applicant called the IO. The latter denied having given such advice.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 The Respondent’s account of the incident is as follows.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_a\"></a>(a) She was in fact at home with her children at the material time. At about 2.39 am, she received a phone call from an unknown woman who screamed and used vulgarities at her. The woman also asked her to go to the void deck. When the Respondent looked over the parapet, she saw the Applicant and another man downstairs. They were walking towards her block in an unsteady manner – apparently under the influence of alcohol.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_b\"></a>(b) Soon thereafter, the Applicant was outside the matrimonial flat. He scolded the Respondent and threatened to bash her up. He did not request to speak to the daughter at all material times.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_c\"></a>(c) A few minutes later, the Respondent heard the Applicant shouting from the carpark and asking her to come down. (According to the Respondent, she has a <em>voice recording</em> of this. She however did not tender the recording as evidence because it was not transcribed.) The Applicant stopped shouting on being alerted by his girlfriend and his male companion that the Respondent was recording the incident. The Respondent tendered a video recording of the incident as evidence.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_d\"></a>(d) Later, the Applicant, his girlfriend, and his male companion took turns to call the Respondent’s handphone. In these calls, they scolded her and threatened to beat her up. The Respondent hung up the phone and called the Police. During the trial, she tendered her call log to prove that she had received numerous phone calls from the Applicant, his girlfriend and an unidentified number at the material time.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_e\"></a>(e) The Police eventually arrived at the scene. Police officer(s) told the Respondent that the Applicant had been drinking under her block of flats. According to her, the Police could confirm that her daughter was in the flat unit at the material time.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 The Respondent believes that the 2 June incident was triggered by a video that she had posted regarding the Applicant’s girlfriend on 30 May 2024. According to the Respondent, this posting irritated the Applicant. Since then, he had started to threaten her over the phone. Before posting the video, the Applicant was fine. The Respondent understands from the IO that the police investigations into the 2 June incident have been completed, and that the matter is now with the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“<b>AGC</b>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 I find that the Applicant has “not proved” his case regarding the 2 June incident on a balance of probabilities. My reasons for this finding are as follows.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, it is unusual that a right-thinking father would choose to visit his eight-year-old daughter in the middle of the night <em>at 2.00 am</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, there is an <em>inexplicable gap</em> in the Applicant’s evidence. Based on his account, he had gone to the matrimonial flat twice. On the first occasion, he had entered the flat unit and found that no one was at home. On the second occasion, the Respondent was in the flat unit and refused to let him enter. The duration between these two occasions would have been brief. Based on the Applicant’s evidence, the Respondent had mysteriously turned up at the unit. (This is despite she having told him to wait at the void deck for her.) The Applicant did not explain how this was possible.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Third</em>, I find the Respondent’s evidence that she and her children were resting at home at about 2.00 am to be inherently more credible. Furthermore, her evidence that the Applicant, his girlfriend, and another man had called her phone at the material time is also supported by her call log.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_d\"></a>(d) For clarity, in coming to the finding in [15(c)], I did not rely on the video recording tendered by the Respondent. I find this recording to be a neutral piece of evidence. As the Applicant had rightly submitted, the recording does not contain any audio and thus does not prove that the Applicant was shouting at the material time. In any event, the Applicant does not dispute the fact that he was in the vicinity of the matrimonial flat at the time of the recording.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 To be clear, the finding in [15] above does not mean that I have found any of the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_16-p2_a\"></a>(a) That the Applicant has lied about the 2 June incident,</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_16-p2_b\"></a>(b) That the Respondent has “disproved” the Applicant’s case about the incident, or</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_16-p2_c\"></a>(c) That she has “proved” her own account of the incident to be true.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a>(For a discussion on the concepts of “proved”, “disproved”, and “not proved”, see s 3(3) to s 3(5) of the Evidence Act 1893; <em>Loo Chay Sit v Estate of Loo Chay Loo</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2010] 1 SLR 0286.xml')\">[2010] 1 SLR 286</a> at [18] to [21]; <em>R Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA (trading as Rabobank International), Singapore Branch v Motorola Electronics Pte Ltd</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2011] 2 SLR 0063.xml')\">[2011] 2 SLR 63</a> at [35].)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 I emphatically decline to make the affirmative findings in [16] above. Such findings would have been based purely on the <em>testimonial</em> evidence by the Applicant and the Respondent only. I do not think that this is appropriate in the present case. Let me explain.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, I do not have the benefit of important pieces of evidence that can shed light on what really happened during the 2 June incident. Such evidence includes the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_a-p3_i\"></a>(i) A voice recording of the Applicant asking the Respondent to come down from the matrimonial flat: see [13(c)] above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_a-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Evidence (e.g., from police officers present at the scene) on (1) whether the daughter was in the flat at the material time (see [12(b)] and [13(a)] above), (2) whether the Applicant appeared to intoxicated (see [13(e)] above), (3) whether he was in the company of his girlfriend and another male person (see [13(c)] and [13(d)] above), and (4) the Applicant’s and Respondent’s contemporaneous accounts to the police officers of what had transpired during the incident.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, the Police have completed their investigations into the 2 June incident. The matter is now before AGC, presumably for a decision on whether there is any offence disclosed against the Applicant and/or the Respondent, and if so, whether to prosecute the relevant party. An affirmative finding by me, such as those in [16] above, (i) can potentially engage the principle of <em>res judicata</em> on some of the relevant factual issues, and (ii) can have implications on the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion and subsequent criminal proceedings, if any. Given the limitations of fact finding in [17(a)] above, it is best that I exercise judicial modesty and refrain from making affirmative findings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 To sum-up, I am not satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the 2 June incident had occurred in the manner described by the Applicant. Furthermore, even on his account, I fail to see in what way the Respondent’s actions amount to an “abuse” of the PPO.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">29 June 2024 incident – Respondent’s visit to the mother’s flat</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 I now turn to another incident which, according to the Applicant, demonstrates that the Respondent had “abused” the PPO. His account of this incident is as follows.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_a\"></a>(a) On 29 June 2024, together with her son and other person(s), the Respondent “trespassed” into his mother’s flat unit. At the material time, his mother was alone. The Applicant came to know of this “trespass” when the Respondent’s son, and later the Respondent herself, made threatening calls to him and told him to go down to the mother’s flat. The Police was eventually summoned and the incident was defused thereafter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Applicant tendered a video recording of the events at the flat unit as evidence. According to him, the recording showed the Respondent to be have snatched his mother’s handphone and to be behaving aggressively in the flat. The Applicant submitted that if the Respondent had been fearful of him, she would not have behaved in such a manner and demanded to see him at the material time.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_c\"></a>(c) According to the Applicant, his mother was deeply disturbed by the Respondent’s actions on that day.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 The Respondent’s account of the incident is as follows:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Respondent was troubled by the 2 June incident. On 29 June 2024, she had gone to seek the mother’s help to stop the Applicant and his girlfriend from creating problems for her and her children. The Respondent knew that the Applicant was not at home at the material time.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Respondent had entered the mother’s flat unit with her son and a female relative. While in the unit, the Respondent admitted that she had taken the mother’s phone. According to her, she merely wanted the mother to call the Applicant and to tell him to stop the harassment.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_c\"></a>(c) After the visit, the Respondent saw the mother at the market on 5 August 2024. The mother called out to her, and they spoke normally. Later that same day, the mother phoned the Respondent. (This call is reflected in the Respondent’s call log.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span>) She submitted that if the mother had felt threatened by her due to the 29 June incident, the mother would not have spoken to her. The Respondent recorded her conversation with the mother on 5 August 2024. She however did not tender the recording in evidence because she could not afford the transcription fees.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 In my view, the Applicant has failed to prove his case that the 29 June incident was an example of the Respondent having “abused” the PPO. Specifically, the Applicant has failed to show how the Respondent had used the PPO to legitimise or excuse her conduct at his mother’s flat unit. I accept the Respondent’s reasons for going to the mother’s flat and that she was not there to create trouble.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, it is clear from the recording that the Respondent was emotional at certain points during the visit. For instance, she broke down when she spoke to the Applicant’s mother – at times, telling her son that it was not the mother’s fault.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> This is consistent with the Respondent’s evidence that she was genuinely concerned and stressed by what the Applicant had done during the 2 June incident, and that she had gone to the flat to seek the mother’s help.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, it appears from the videos<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> that the Respondent’s son was also crying/sobbing when he spoke to the Applicant’s mother. At times, he was rubbing his eyes with what appears to be white tissue paper. There was also a moment when the son told the Respondent that he loved the Applicant’s mother, and the Respondent acknowledged this.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Third</em>, throughout her interaction with the Respondent and her son, the Applicant’s mother appears to be calm.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_d\"></a>(d) <em>Finally</em>, and importantly, the only other person who can discredit the Respondent’s evidence regarding the purpose of her visit on 29 June is the Applicant’s mother. She would have been able to testify, for instance, what had transpired during the visit and what the Respondent and her son had said to her. The Applicant did not call his mother to rebut the Respondent’s evidence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 Given the above, I find that the 29<sup></sup>June incident does not prove that the Respondent had “abused” the PPO.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">16 September 2024 incident – Applicant’s visit to the matrimonial flat</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 I now come to next incident which the Applicant relies on to prove that the Respondent had “abused” the PPO. His account of this incident is as follows.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_23-p2_a\"></a>(a) On 16 September 2024, the Applicant visited the matrimonial flat intending to see his daughter. On arriving at the flat unit, the Respondent’s fiancé, who was shirtless at the material time, came out from one of the rooms and started to provoke him. The Respondent and her son stood nearby, supporting the fiancé.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_23-p2_b\"></a>(b) The fiancé challenged the Applicant to a fight, and the ensuing argument continued out into the corridor. The Applicant remained calm throughout as his daughter was present.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_23-p2_c\"></a>(c) The fiancé and the Respondent later returned to the flat unit. The latter locked the gate, claiming that the IO had told her not to open the gate for him. The Applicant called the Police.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_23-p2_d\"></a>(d) After the Police arrived at the scene, the fiancé eventually left the flat unit angrily and reluctantly, on the Police’s request. The Applicant tendered a video recording of the incident to support his evidence.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 The Respondent’s evidence regarding the incident is as follows:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Applicant had gone to the matrimonial flat to look for his daughter. The visit was unexpected as 16 September 2024 was not his child access day.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_b\"></a>(b) According to the Respondent, the Applicant was under the influence of alcohol at the material time and had behaved in an abusive and provocative manner towards her fiancé. When her son tried to intervene because the Applicant was standing too close to her, the Applicant smacked his chest and verbally abused him. When the Respondent intervened, the Applicant grabbed her hand tightly. She managed to pull her hand away and her fiancé stepped in to de-escalate the matter. The Respondent called the Police.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Respondent understood from the IO that the Police have completed their investigations into the 16 September incident, and that the matter is now with AGC.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 It is the Applicant’s case that the Respondent is using the PPO to prevent him from visiting the matrimonial flat to see his daughter. According to him, the Respondent is doing this so that she can cohabit with her fiancé in the matrimonial flat without any interference from the Applicant.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 I find that the events during the 16 September incident do not support the Applicant’s case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_26-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, the Applicant’s case assumes that he had the right to see his daughter on 16 September 2024 and that the Respondent had wrongfully prevented him from doing so. This assumption is not correct. According to the Respondent, (i) 16 September 2024 was not the Applicant’s child access day, and (ii) he had turned up at the matrimonial flat without giving any prior notice. The Applicant did not dispute this aspect of the Respondent’s evidence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_26-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, it is evident from the video that the Applicant was unhappy with the fiancé’s presence in the flat and had taunted the Respondent, her son, and her fiancé. Given the tension at the material time, there could be safety issues if the Applicant was allowed into the flat. In the circumstances, the Respondent’s decision not to let the Applicant into the flat is understandable.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_18\" id=\"Ftn_18_1\"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_26-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Finally</em>, I find the Applicant’s claim that the Respondent has an ulterior motive to prevent him from seeing his daughter to be highly speculative. He has offered no evidence to prove that the fiancé was cohabiting with the Respondent in the matrimonial flat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 Given the above, I find that the Applicant has failed to prove that the 29<sup></sup>June incident is an example where the Respondent had “abused” the PPO for an alleged ulterior motive.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">May to December 2023 – Respondent’s messages</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 Finally, according to the Applicant, between May to December 2023, the Respondent (a) had made repeated phone calls and sent numerous messages to harass him and his girlfriend and (b) had posted libellous comments on social media against him.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_19\" id=\"Ftn_19_1\"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 The Respondent denied making some of the relevant posts.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_20\" id=\"Ftn_20_1\"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> She explained that her (Facebook) account had been hacked at the material time.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 I have difficulty accepting the Respondent’s explanation. For instance, there is no reason why the alleged hacker would send the relevant posts – e.g., new year greetings, and vitriolic comments on the affair between the Applicant and his girlfriend. Additionally, some of the posts contain information that is personal to the Respondent. That said, a determination of whether the Respondent’s Facebook account had been hacked is best made after forensic analysis has been done on the account.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 In any event, assuming that the relevant messages, phone calls, and posts were by the Respondent, I fail to see how they would amount to be an “abuse” of the PPO that warrants its revocation. For instance, there is no evidence that the Respondent had used the PPO as a shield for sending the objectionable messages, phone calls and posts.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 The Applicant submits that the PPO should be revoked because the Respondent is not afraid of him or to do things which offends him. In my view, this argument does not take his case far. The central issue remains whether the Respondent and her son require the PPO for their protection.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">PPO is still necessary</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 This neatly brings me to the Applicant’s second reason for his application. According to him, the PPO is no longer necessary because the parties are now living apart and there has been no recent incident of family violence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Applicant is likely to commit family violence</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 It is well settled that the mere fact that parties have divorced and are no longer residing together do not constitute sufficient grounds for revoking a PPO: see e.g., <em>IS v IT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/46932-M.xml')\">[2005] SGDC 66</a>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 In the present case, even though the parties are now living in separate households, I cannot rule out the possibility that the Applicant is likely to commit family violence in future. These are my reasons for coming to this view.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, the parties will still need to interact with each other when the Applicant exercises his child access rights at the Respondent’s place of residence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, there is still tension in the parties’ relationship. One of the causes for this tension is the Applicant’s unhappiness and concern that the fiancé is in contact with his daughter. This sentiment is one of the triggers for the 16 September incident – which occurred just three months before the date of this judgement. The Applicant’s unhappiness and concern will only increase when the Respondent and her fiancé live together after their marriage in December 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Third</em>, there is also evidence to suggest that the Applicant may have triggered the 2 June incident, created a scene, and threatened the Respondent with physical violence: see [13(b)] and [13(d)] above. The Police has completed their investigations into this incident and the matter is now with AGC.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">26 September 2024 incident – Applicant allegedly assaulted the Respondent</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_36\"></a>36 <em>Finally</em>, and disturbingly, the Respondent has accused the Applicant of having committed yet another act of family violence just about two weeks before the hearing was due to start. According to her, the Applicant punched her face and kicked her leg in the evening of 26 September 2024. The alleged assault occurred when she was walking down her block of flats. After the assault, the Applicant allegedly told her that this was a “trial” and threatened to “whack” her again “soon”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_21\" id=\"Ftn_21_1\"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span> During the trial, the Respondent tendered photographs and a medical form to show that she had a bruise on her right chin and bruise/abrasion on her right thigh one day after the alleged assault.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_22\" id=\"Ftn_22_1\"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span> According to the Respondent, police investigations into this incident are ongoing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_37\"></a>37 The Applicant strongly denied the Respondent’s allegations. While he admitted to being in the vicinity of the matrimonial flat at the material time (to exercise at an area downstairs), he denied meeting her. The Applicant submitted that her evidence should be disbelieved for the following reasons:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_a\"></a>(a) There was no witness to the alleged assault, despite it having occurred during “peak hour”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Respondent had made a police report about the assault only one day after the alleged incident.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_c\"></a>(c) According to the medical form, the Respondent “updated” that an e-scooter had also collided into her from the front.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_23\" id=\"Ftn_23_1\"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span> The Applicant submitted that the Respondent’s thigh injury is consistent with such a collision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_d\"></a>(d) One day after the alleged assault, there were text messages between the Respondent and the Applicant. She did not mention anything about the assault in those messages. During the hearing, the Applicant tendered the relevant messages to support his evidence.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_24\" id=\"Ftn_24_1\"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_e\"></a>(e) The Applicant was not arrested in connection with the alleged assault. The IO apparently told him that this was because the Police believed that he was innocent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_38\"></a>38 I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s submissions. In my view, it is not appropriate for me to reject the Respondent’s allegation of the assault outright.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_a\"></a>(a) Regarding [37(a)] – The mere absence of eyewitnesses is equivocal and does not disprove the alleged assault. This fact is equally consistent with the possibility that the assault may have been <em>premediated</em> – i.e., the Applicant might have <em>chosen</em> a moment or a location to assault the Respondent away from public eye.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_b\"></a>(b) Regarding [37(b)] –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) During her examination-in-chief, the Respondent had explained that soon after the alleged assault, she called the IO. The IO returned her call only <em>the next day.</em> He told her to lodge a police report and that he would follow-up thereafter. The Respondent promptly made the report.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) In any event, I am of the view there is no undue delay in the Respondent lodging the police report. The report was lodged just one day after the alleged assault.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_c\"></a>(c) Regarding [37(c)] –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_c-p3_i\"></a>(i) According to the Respondent, the collision was a minor one and had merely caused her to fall.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_c-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Furthermore, the Applicant’s submission fails to account for the undisputed bruise on the Respondent’s right chin. The Applicant conceded during cross-examination that such an injury is more consistent with it having been caused by a punch than an e-scooter collision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_d\"></a>(d) Regarding [37(d)] –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_d-p3_i\"></a>(i) It is not correct to say that the Respondent had failed to mention anything in her text messages about the alleged assault one day after the incident. In one of these messages, the Respondent did ask the Applicant why he had transferred $316 to her, and whether it was “Doc fees for what u did”. The Respondent explained during the hearing that in this message, she was trying to clarify with the Applicant whether he had transferred the money to cover her medical expenses arising from the assault.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_d-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) In his text message, the Applicant replied that the $136 was an “instalment” payment of the daughter’s maintenance. I find this reply to be puzzling. <em>First</em>, the Respondent testified that the Applicant had not paid maintenance by instalment before. The Applicant did not dispute this evidence. <em>Second</em>, it is strange why the Applicant chose to make an instalment payment of $136 – considering that the maintenance amount is $950. The Applicant did not explain how he had computed such an odd number for an instalment payment.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_25\" id=\"Ftn_25_1\"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_e\"></a>(e) Regarding [37(e)] – I do not give any weight to the opinion allegedly expressed by the IO. <em>First</em>, the IO’s identity is unknown. <em>Second</em>, the alleged opinion is inadmissible hearsay evidence. <em>Third</em>, the basis for the alleged opinion is unclear.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_39\"></a>39 In my view, there is basis to believe the Respondent’s evidence that the Applicant had punched her face: see [37(c)] above. That said, I decline to make an affirmative finding on this. The matter is still under investigations, and the Police has the resources to uncover the relevant evidence that can prove/disprove whether the alleged assault had indeed taken place.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_40\"></a>40 Given the above, the Applicant has failed to prove his case that (a) the Respondent has “abused” the PPO and (b) there has been no recent incident of family violence: see [5] above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_41\"></a>41 It is prudent for the PPO to remain in force. Minimally, it will remind the Applicant (a) to avoid high conflict situations with the Respondent and her son, and (b) not to use family violence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_42\"></a>42 Accordingly, I dismiss SS 1031.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at [10] to [16].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at [17].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at [17] and [18].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at [28] and [32].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Applicant’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at [21] and [22].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>Respondent’s statement dated 11 October 2024 at page 1 (last paragraph) to page 2 (2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Exhibit R2.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>Call log is attached to the Respondent’s statement dated 11 October 2024 at pages 21 and 22.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Applicant’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at [23] to [25] and pages 41 and 42; Applicant’s affidavit dated 2 October 2024 at [4] to [9]; Oral evidence on 19 November 2024.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>Respondent’s statement dated 11 October 2024 at page 2 (last paragraph) to page 3 (1<sup>st</sup> paragraph).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>Respondent’s statement dated 11 October 2024 at page 10.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>Exhibit C3, Video 12 under Tab A.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>Exhibit C3, Videos 1 to 5 under Tab A.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>Exhibit C3, Video 10 under Tab A.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>Applicant’s affidavit dated 2 October 2024 at [14] to [19]; Oral evidence on 11 November 2024.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>Exhibit C3, Tab F.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>Respondent’s police report attached to her statement dated 11 October 2024 at pages 16 and 17.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_18_1\" id=\"Ftn_18\">[note: 18]</a></sup>Exhibit C3, Tab H.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_19_1\" id=\"Ftn_19\">[note: 19]</a></sup>Applicant’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at [17] to [20].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_20_1\" id=\"Ftn_20\">[note: 20]</a></sup>These posts are in the Applicant’s affidavit dated 31 July 2024 at Tab B.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_21_1\" id=\"Ftn_21\">[note: 21]</a></sup>Respondent’s police report of the incident is attached to her statement dated 11 October 2024 at pages 14 and 15.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_22_1\" id=\"Ftn_22\">[note: 22]</a></sup>The photographs and medical form are attached to the Respondent’s statement dated 11 October 2024 at pages 36, 37 and 39 to 42.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_23_1\" id=\"Ftn_23\">[note: 23]</a></sup>Respondent’s statement dated 11 October 2024 at page 39.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_24_1\" id=\"Ftn_24\">[note: 24]</a></sup>The messages are contained in exhibit C6 at pages 1 and 2.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_25_1\" id=\"Ftn_25\">[note: 25]</a></sup>See messages in exhibit C6 at page 1, at date stamps 27/09/2024 from “12:49” to “14:02”.</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Procedure – Leave for a Third Party to file an affidavit for the hearing of ancillary matters"],"date":"2024-12-12","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 4676 of 2023 (Summons No 3168 of 2024)","title":"XGI v XGJ","citation":"[2024] SGFC 110","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32622-SSP.xml","counsel":["Gurmeet Kaur d/o Amar Singh (Harjeet Singh & Co) for the plaintiff","Arul Suppiah Thevar (APL Law Corporation) for the defendant."],"timestamp":"2024-12-20T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Soh Kian Peng","html":"<root><head><title>XGI v XGJ</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XGI <em>v</em> XGJ </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32622-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 110</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 4676 of 2023 (Summons No 3168 of 2024)</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">12 December 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Soh Kian Peng </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Gurmeet Kaur d/o Amar Singh (Harjeet Singh & Co) for the plaintiff; Arul Suppiah Thevar (APL Law Corporation) for the defendant. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XGI — XGJ </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Procedure</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Leave for a Third Party to file an affidavit for the hearing of ancillary matters</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">12 December 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\">Judgment reserved</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> Assistant Registrar Soh Kian Peng:</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 Parties were married on 29 October 1987. They had four daughters. As to why the marriage had broken down, that is set out in some detail in the Statement of Particulars (“SOP”). The SOP states that the Husband had been abusive towards the Wife and the children.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The Wife filed for divorce on 28 September 2023. Interim judgment was granted on 13 June 2024. Thereafter, parties set course for a hearing of the ancillary matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 After parties had filed their first set of affidavit of assets and means (“AOMs”), the Wife took out an application in SUM 3168/2024 (“SUM 3168”). She sought leave for her four daughters to file a joint affidavit. The purpose of this joint affidavit was to respond to a point which the Husband had made in his AOM. The Husband had, according to the Wife, falsely alleged that certain pieces of jewellery acquired during the marriage were all his financial contributions. On this basis, the Wife states that it was necessary for the four daughters to “affirm their respective knowledge about the gold jewel[l]eries” which she had purchased.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 SUM 3168 came up for hearing before me. I reserved judgment after hearing arguments from both parties. This is my decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 Where a party to divorce proceeding seeks to file an affidavit by a third party, leave of the court must be sought. That was a point made clear in the recent decision of the Family Division of the High Court in <em>WWM v WWN and another appeal</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31911-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGHCF 27</a> (“<em>WWM</em>”) at [4]:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">4 First, I agree with counsel for the Husband that the plain wording of rr 89(2) and 89(3) FJR provides for a total of two AM affidavits by each party and any further affidavits beyond the two require leave of court. Nothing in the wording of r 89 FJR supports the Wife’s interpretation for two rounds of affidavits. Second, had the Wife exhibited the Children’s Affidavits in her second affidavit, the court could have likewise expunged those exhibits. <b>I thus do not accept the Wife’s interpretation of r 89 FJR. The affidavits of means envisaged under that rule are intended to be those of the parties themselves. </b><b><u>Any others may be filed only with leave.</u></b></p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <u>[</u>emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 In deciding whether leave should be granted, a key consideration is the relevance and necessity of the affidavit of the third-party to the hearing of the ancillary matters hearing (see <em>WWM</em> (at [5]).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 To assess the relevance and necessity of the joint affidavit which the Wife is seeking leave to file, I take, as the starting point, what each party had set out in their first AOM.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 This was what the Husband had said:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Just and equitable division of the jewelleries in the possession of the Plaintiff and other household items removed from the flat. During one of my hospitalisations, the Plaintiff who was then briefly staying at my daughter’s place came over to remove all the jewelleries from the flat. These are jewelleries acquired during the marriage which were all my financial contributions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 This was what the Wife had said in relation to the gold jewellery:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">I own other assets as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">(a) I had received the sum of $43,000.00 being my Dependent Protection Sum monies from XX in December 2017…</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">(b) I purchased 916 gold jewellery items for the total value of $32,519.64 namely:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">3 necklace</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">8 chains (including 2 young children ones)</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">6 pair bangles</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">1 bangle</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">8 pendants</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">5 adult rings</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">2 children rings</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">8 earrings</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">1 bracelet</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">1 chain with pendant</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">1 ring</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">(c) all my said gold jewellery items are in the [Husband’s] possession as my 3 younger daughters and I left the matrimonial Flat in November 2022.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 Based on what the Husband and the Wife had set out in their respective first AOMs, the relevance of the proposed joint affidavit cannot be seriously disputed. It deals with the issue of who had bought the jewellery, and whether that jewellery had indeed been taken from the matrimonial home.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 As to the necessity of the proposed joint affidavit, counsel for the Husband, Mr Arul Suppiah (“Mr Arul”), had, during the hearing, pointed out that the court hearing the ancillary matters was well placed to draw its own inferences from what had been set out in the affidavits that had been filed by both the Husband and the Wife. Following this line of logic, there was no need for the proposed joint affidavit to be filed. This was especially since the four daughters were already biased against the Husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 Counsel for the Wife, Ms Gurmeet Kaur (“Ms Kaur”), however, argued that the daughters’ evidence was needed to corroborate the Wife’s version of events – namely, that it was the Wife who had purchased the jewellery with her own money.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 As to whether the daughters are indeed biased against the Husband, that is not a matter which can be decided at this juncture. That is for the judge hearing the ancillary matters to consider, in weighing up the evidence given by the four daughters in the proposed joint affidavit.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 In my judgment, the proposed joint affidavit is indeed necessary in that it would cast light on whether it was the Husband or the Wife who had bought the jewellery, and the source of funds used to purchase the jewellery. The proposed joint affidavit may corroborate either the Husband or the Wife’s account as to how the jewellery was acquired, and whether the jewellery is still in the matrimonial flat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 Leave is therefore granted to the Wife to file the proposed joint affidavit. That affidavit shall be filed by 19 December 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 Parties shall write in, by way of letter to court, with their submissions on costs. The submissions shall not exceed 3 pages, and must be filed no later than 27 December 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 For the avoidance of doubt, nothing I have said here should be taken as binding the hands of the judge hearing the ancillary matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 It remains for me to thank Ms Kaur and Mr Arul for their able assistance.</p> </div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Procedure – Costs"],"date":"2024-12-04","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 2861 of 2023 (Summons No 2758 of 2024)","title":"XEH v XEI","citation":"[2024] SGFC 108","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32608-SSP.xml","counsel":["The plaintiff in person and unrepresented","Michael Han Hean Juan (Han & Lu Law Chambers LLP) for the defendant."],"timestamp":"2024-12-14T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Soh Kian Peng","html":"<root><head><title>XEH v XEI</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XEH <em>v</em> XEI </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32608-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 108</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 2861 of 2023 (Summons No 2758 of 2024)</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">04 December 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Soh Kian Peng </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> The plaintiff in person and unrepresented; Michael Han Hean Juan (Han & Lu Law Chambers LLP) for the defendant. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XEH — XEI </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Procedure</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Costs</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">4 December 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\">Judgment reserved</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> Assistant Registrar Soh Kian Peng:</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 This is my decision on the costs of SUM 2758/2024 (“SUM 2758”) which was the Husband’s application for discovery and interrogatories. I had earlier made orders in respect of SUM 2758: see <em>XEH v XEI</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32433-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 93</a>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 Counsel for the Husband, Mr Han, argues that costs should be fixed at $2500 (all-in), to be paid by the Wife to the Husband. The reason for this is that the Husband, having succeeded in SUM 2758, was therefore entitled to costs. As to the quantum of such costs, Mr Han justifies the sum the Husband is seeking on the basis of the work done for SUM 2758.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> In addition, Mr Han also refers to the State Court Practice Directions 2021 Appendix H: <em>Guidelines for Party-and-Party Costs Awards in District Court Cases in the State Courts of Singapore</em> to show that the quantum of $2500 was not a wholly unreasonable sum to seek.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The Wife, on the other hand, filed her submissions on costs late in the day. I had directed parties to file their submissions on costs by 25 October 2024. On 1 November 2024, a Registrar’s Notice was sent to the Wife, informing her that these submissions on costs were to be filed by 8 November 2024, failing which, the court would proceed to make costs orders in respect of SUM 2758.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 On 12 November 2024, the Wife sent an email to the Family Court Registry enclosing a number of documents. This appeared to be an attempt to comply with the orders I had made in SUM 2758.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 Also contained in that email was the Wife’s written submissions on the costs of SUM 2758. In those set of submissions, the Wife argues that she should not have to pay costs of $2500 to the Husband. She gives two reasons. First, that the Husband had filed his voluntary request for discovery and interrogatories late.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> Second, that the Husband had, in taking out SUM 2758, caused further delays in the hearing of the ancillary matters.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 Where costs are concerned, the starting point is that costs shall follow the event – in other words, the successful party is entitled to costs. The court, however, can depart from this starting point: <em>WXE v WXF</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31618-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 40</a> at [7] citing Rules 852 and 854 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR 2014”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 In the present case, the Husband is the successful party in that he had obtained orders in respect of the majority of the items he had sought in SUM 2758.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 He is therefore entitled to costs. I see no reason to depart from the starting point that costs shall follow the event. While it is true that the Husband had only served his voluntary request for discovery and interrogatories 13 days after the deadline set by the court, this was, in my judgment, not such a lengthy delay which justified departing from the starting point that costs shall follow the event: see Rule 852 of the FJR 2014.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 As to the quantum of such costs, that shall be fixed at $1600 (all-in). In fixing the quantum of costs, I considered the number of items sought as well as the fact that SUM 2758 did not involve any novel points of law.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 In particular, I took into account the Wife’s conduct. I note from the minutes of the previous case conferences<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> that the Wife had told the court that she was not going to respond to any voluntary request for discovery and interrogatories that the Husband might serve on her.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> She had also told the court that she would not file a reply affidavit to SUM 2758 because it was a “waste of time” and that she had neither the time nor the energy to do so.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 The voluntary disclosure regime in the context of discovery and interrogatories provides parties the opportunity to ask for documents and information that may have a bearing on the issues in dispute without having to take out a formal application to court. This, of course, can only work if the party on whom the voluntary request is served takes a sensible approach, and does not unreasonably object, or refuse to provide documents sought or give responses to interrogatories. If that party chooses to not respond to the voluntary request, they must then accept that the requesting party is then entitled to, as a matter of procedure, take out the relevant application: see Rule 63(4) FJR 2014. This would, naturally, result in a delay to the hearing of the ancillary matters whilst the application for discovery and/or interrogatories is heard.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 Had the Wife made an attempt to respond to the Husband’s voluntary request for discovery and interrogatories, there may not have been a need for SUM 2758, or that the items sought in SUM 2758 could have been reduced. She chose to not engage with the Husband’s voluntary request, or his application in SUM 2758 (see above at [10]). Such conduct, in my judgment, must be accounted for in the award of costs: Rule 854 of the FJR 2014.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 For the reasons set out above, I order that the Wife shall pay the Husband the sum of $1600, being the costs of SUM 2758, by 15 January 2025.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>Husband’s Skeletal Submissions on Costs at [3].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Husband’s Skeletal Submissions on Costs at [4].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Wife’s Skeletal Submissions on Costs at p 1.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Wife’s Skeletal Submissions on Costs at p 2.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Minutes of the Case Conferences held on 7 August 2024 and 12 September 2024 respectively.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>Minutes of the Case Conference held on 7 August 2024.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Minutes of the Case Conference held on 12 September 2024.</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Custody care control and access of children","Committal"],"date":"2024-12-04","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No FC/D 6089/2016, FC/SUM 3312/2023","title":"UUQ v UUR","citation":"[2024] SGFC 106","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32559-SSP.xml","counsel":["The Father (Represents himself): D Ganaselvarani (D Rani & Co) for the Mother"],"timestamp":"2024-12-12T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Sheik Mustafa Abu Hassan","html":"<root><head><title>UUQ v UUR</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> UUQ<font style=\"text-transform: uppercase;\"> v</font> UUR </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32559-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 106</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No FC/D 6089/2016, FC/SUM 3312/2023</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">04 December 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Sheik Mustafa Abu Hassan </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> The Father (Represents himself): D Ganaselvarani (D Rani & Co) for the Mother </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> UUQ — UUR </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Custody care control and access of children</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Committal</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">4 December 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Sheik Mustafa Abu Hassan:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 The Father of a 10-year-old child applies to commit the Mother for breaching an order giving the Father access to the child. I heard the parties and granted the Father’s application. The Mother appeals against my decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The child’s Mother is the Plaintiff, and the child’s Father is the Defendant in the principal case, which was a divorce proceeding. The parents had married in June 2011 in Norway. At all material times, the Mother is a Singaporean and the Father a Norwegian. They lived in Norway for a few years and then moved to Singapore. Their relationship broke down, and by consent, they were divorced by an interim judgment in May 2017. The ancillary issues were not agreed upon. I heard and decided the ancillary issues in December 2018. The relevant part of my order stated as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The parents shall have Joint Custody of the child with care and control to the Mother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The Father shall have access as follows:-</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(a) Every Tuesdays and Thursdays from 6.30 p.m. to 8.45 p.m. (“Weekday access”); and</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(b) Every Saturdays from 10 a.m. to 8.45 p.m. (“Weekend Access”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(c) From 1 June 2019, the Weekday access shall remain or adjusted to different days if agreed to by parties, or else shall remain the same; and weekend access shall be on alternate weekends Saturday 10 a.m. overnight to Sunday 2 p.m.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The Father is permitted to bring the child to Norway for temporary visits not exceeding 15 days every December starting from 2019. The Defendant shall ensure that the child is returned to Singapore to the Plaintiff no later than 30 December immediately thereafter. The Plaintiff shall release the child’s passport to the Defendant for this purpose. The Plaintiff shall also furnish the passport details of the child to the Defendant to enable travel arrangements to be made. The Defendant shall furnish the details of the visit including the travel documents and the addresses where the child shall be at to the Plaintiff in exchange for the child’s passport.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The Mother appealed against my whole decision. Her appeal was heard in December 2019. The appeal was heard by the learned Judicial Commissioner Tan Puay Boon who made the following orders on the issue of the child (“the Order”):</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <em>1</em>. <em>Custody, care and control</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">For the avoidance of doubt, as ordered by the District Judge in FC/ORC 1115/2019, the parties shall have Joint Custody of the child of the marriage, B ("the Child"), with care and control to the Plaintiff/Mother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <em>2</em>. <em>Access</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The orders of the District Judge for access in FC/ORC 1115/2019 are upheld, save as shown to be varied below:</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\"> <em>a</em>. <em>Weekday access</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Defendant/Father shall have access to the Child every Tuesday and Thursday from 6.30 pm to 8.45 pm.</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\"> <em>b</em>. <em>Weekend access</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Defendant/Father shall have access to the Child on alternative weekends from 10.00 am on Saturdays to 2.00 pm on Sundays.</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\"> <em>c</em>. <em>Overseas access</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Defendant/Father shall be permitted to bring the Child to Norway for temporary visits not exceeding 15 days every December starting from December 2020.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Defendant/Father shall ensure that the Child is returned to the Plaintiff/Mother in Singapore no later than 30th day of that December immediately after the temporary visit.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Plaintiff/Mother is to keep the Child’s passport and maintain its validity for travels. She shall furnish the details of the Child’s passport to the Defendant/Father to enable travel arrangements to be made.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Defendant/Father shall furnish to the Plaintiff/Mother the details of the visits, including the travel documents and the addresses of places where the Child will be at no later than 21 days before the trip, and the Plaintiff/Mother shall release the Child’s passport to the Defendant/Father no later than 7 days before the trip.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Child’s passport shall be handed back to the Plaintiff/Mother together with the Child after the visits.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">The Plaintiff/Mother shall inform the Defendant/Father whenever the Child travels overseas before such trips. Save for travels due to family emergencies and day trips outside of Singapore, the Plaintiff/Mother shall provide to the Defendant/Father this information no later than 21 days before the trips. For travels due to family emergencies and day trips outside of Singapore, the information shall be provided to the Defendant/Father once the trip is confirmed.</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\"> <em>d</em>. <em>Increase in length of overnight access sessions</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">Parties are to endeavour to agree on having overnight access sessions for the Defendant/Father of longer durations, in particular during the Child’s school holidays, between now and December 2020. In the event that there is no agreement by the end of January 2020, either party may file an application to the Family Court to formalise the arrangements.</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\"> <em>e</em>. <em>Pick-up point</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">For the access, the Defendant/Father shall pick-up and return the Child to the condominium where the Child resides, and the Plaintiff/Mother shall provide to the Defendant/Father an access card key to the entrance of the condominium to facilitate the pick-up and return of the Child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 The Father had access to the child from after December 2018 when I made my order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 In August 2022, due to an altercation between the Father and the Mother regarding access, both parents filed applications for personal protections orders against each other. In the course of those proceedings, the Father agreed to undergo a POTS (Panel of Therapeutic Specialists) programme, but the Mother did not agree.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 Before the protection cases were concluded, however, in November 2022 the Mother filed an application to vary the Order. She did not seek to disturb the orders on custody care and control of the Child, but she sought changes regarding access, as well as to remove a penal notice that had been attached to it. The Father objected to these requests and filed a cross application to vary the care and control of the Child to him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 On 7 December 2022, after 3 days of hearing, the learned District Judge Amy Tung dismissed both the protection applications by the parents.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 The Mother’s and Father’s variation applications were then heard by me in May 2023. I heard the parents. I interviewed the Child. In July 2023, I dismissed both applications. The Mother appealed.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 Pending the hearing of the appeal, in August 2023, the Father applied for 2 weeks of additional access during the end-of-year school holidays in lieu of more than 117 breaches of access, and for the Mother to produce the Child’s passport and personal documents for 15 days of overseas travel as provided for in the Order. Again, I heard both parties and I interviewed the Child. I dismissed the Father’s application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 On 27 October 2023, the Father filed the present application for an order of committal against the Mother. On 6 February 2024, the case came for hearing before me. The hearing had to be adjourned as the Mother could not attend due to a bereavement overseas.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 On 13 March 2024, the High Court dismissed the Mother’s appeal.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 On 20 March 2024, the committal hearing before me commenced.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Father’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a>The Father lists the following dates of when he did not get access to the Child:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_1\"></a>1. 2 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_2\"></a>2. 4 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_3\"></a>3. 9 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_4\"></a>4. 11 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_5\"></a>5. 13 Aug 2022</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_6\"></a>6. 16 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_7\"></a>7. 18 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_8\"></a>8. 23 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_9\"></a>9. 25 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_10\"></a>10. 27 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_11\"></a>11. 30 Aug 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_12\"></a>12. 1 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_13\"></a>13. 6 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_14\"></a>14. 8 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_15\"></a>15. 10 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_16\"></a>16. 13 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_17\"></a>17. 15 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_18\"></a>18. 20 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_19\"></a>19. 22 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_20\"></a>20. 24 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_21\"></a>21. 27 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_22\"></a>22. 29 Sep 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_23\"></a>23. 1 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_24\"></a>24. 4 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_25\"></a>25. 6 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_26\"></a>26. 8 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_27\"></a>27. 11 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_28\"></a>28. 13 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_29\"></a>29. 15 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_30\"></a>30. 18 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_31\"></a>31. 20 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_32\"></a>32. 22 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_33\"></a>33. 25 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_34\"></a>34. 27 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_35\"></a>35. 29 Oct 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_36\"></a>36. 1 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_37\"></a>37. 3 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_38\"></a>38. 5 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_39\"></a>39. 8 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_40\"></a>40. 10 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_41\"></a>41. 12 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_42\"></a>42. 15 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_43\"></a>43. 17 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_44\"></a>44. 19 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_45\"></a>45. 20 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_46\"></a>46. 22 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_47\"></a>47. 24 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_48\"></a>48. 26 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_49\"></a>49. 29 Nov 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_50\"></a>50. 1 Dec 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_51\"></a>51. 3 Dec 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_52\"></a>52. 6 Dec 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_53\"></a>53. 8 Dec 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_54\"></a>54. 10 Dec 22</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_55\"></a>55. 13 Dec 22 - 9 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_56\"></a>56. 10 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_57\"></a>57. 12 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_58\"></a>58. 15 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_59\"></a>59. 17 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_60\"></a>60. 19 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_61\"></a>61. 22 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_62\"></a>62. 24 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_63\"></a>63. 26 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_64\"></a>64. 31 Jan 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_65\"></a>65. 2 Feb 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_66\"></a>66. 28 Feb – 19 Mar 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_67\"></a>67. 21 Mar 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_68\"></a>68. 23 Mar 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_69\"></a>69. 26 Mar 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_70\"></a>70. 28 Mar 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_71\"></a>71. 30 Mar 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_72\"></a>72. 4 Apr 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_73\"></a>73. 11 Apr 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_74\"></a>74. 13 Apr 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_75\"></a>75. 23 Apr 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_76\"></a>76. 24 Apr 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_77\"></a>77. 25 Apr 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_78\"></a>78. 27 Apr 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_79\"></a>79. 2 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_80\"></a>80. 4 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_81\"></a>81. 9 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_82\"></a>82. 11 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_83\"></a>83. 16 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_84\"></a>84. 18 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_85\"></a>85. 23 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_86\"></a>86. 25 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_87\"></a>87. 30 May 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_88\"></a>88. 1 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_89\"></a>89. 3 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_90\"></a>90. 4 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_91\"></a>91. 6 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_92\"></a>92. 8 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_93\"></a>93. 13 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_94\"></a>94. 15 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_95\"></a>95. 17 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_96\"></a>96. 18 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_97\"></a>97. 20 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_98\"></a>98. 22 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_99\"></a>99. 27 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_100\"></a>100. 19 Jun 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_101\"></a>101. 1 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_102\"></a>102. 2 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_103\"></a>103. 3 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_104\"></a>104. 4 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_105\"></a>105. 6 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_106\"></a>106. 11 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_107\"></a>107. 13 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_108\"></a>108. 15 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_109\"></a>109. 18 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_110\"></a>110. 20 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_111\"></a>111. 25 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_112\"></a>112. 27 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_113\"></a>113. 29 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_114\"></a>114. 30 Jul 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_115\"></a>115. 1 Aug 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_116\"></a>116. 3 Aug 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1-p2_117\"></a>117. 5 Aug 23</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Mother’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 The Mother does not deny that the Father did not have access to the Child on the above dates. She explains that on a few occasions the Child was unwell, or had contracted COVID, on 11, 13 & 16 August 2022. During 28 February – 19 March 2023 the Child was in India with her, and so the Father could not have had access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 As for the rest of the occasions, her position is simply that the Child did not want to see the Father nor to spend overnight with him, and she could not force the Child to do so.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 The Mother confirms that the Child loved the Father. She claims that the Child has not gotten used to overnight access with the Father, and he still complains about it.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 She says that the Child is a seeing a counsellor to help him handle his feelings. She adduces a copy of a report by the counsellor. The report shows that the counsellor arrived at some conclusions without having interviewed the Father. I find that this examination of the Child had been conducted without leave of the Court as required under Rule 35 of the Family Justice Rules:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <b>Examination of child with leave of Court</b> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">35.—(1) Where a child is a party to or a subject of any action or proceedings, or where any action or proceedings involve the welfare or custody of a child, a party must not, without the leave of the Court, cause the child to be examined or assessed by any registered medical practitioner, psychologist, counsellor, social worker or mental health professional for the purpose of preparing expert evidence for use in those proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 I therefore placed no reliance on its contents. In any event, the examination of the child was conducted not only without leave of the Court, but without notice to the Father or with his involvement. In any event, I find that the report is of no probative value to the issues at hand.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Findings</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 I find that of the 117 occasions of breach alleged by the Father, 4 of them took place because the Child was ill, on 11, 13 & 16 August 2022, and on 20 October 2022. I find that on those occasions, the Mother had reasonable cause to refuse the access, and therefore she did not breach the Order on those occasions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 Of the remaining 113, the Father had partial access albeit not strictly according to the terms of the Order, on 9 & 18 August 2022, 22 October 2022, 10 & 22 November 2022, and 22 January 2023. I give the benefit of these partial compliances to the Mother, and therefore find that for those occasions she is not liable to be committed.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 As for the remaining 107 times when the Father did not get access to the Child, I find that the Mother has no reasonable excuse. I do not accept that the blame lays with the Child. It is not disputed that there were no issues with access until suddenly in August 2022. This was when the Mother and the Father had an altercation that resulted in the PPO applications. The circumstances of that altercation was itself caused by the Mother’s refusal to give the Father access to the Child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 I find that the Mother’s defence, that the Child does not want to spend overnight with the Father, does not explain the lack of weekday access that did not include overnighting.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 In cases of access, occasional defaults due to reasons such as scheduling issues is understandable, but the sheer number of times that the access was not given in the present case show that this could not have been the case here. The extended and continuous length of the non-compliance over a period of a year displaces such reasonable excuses. It is irresistible to conclude that the non-compliance was nothing other than intentional and deliberate. I am not convinced that it is solely because the Child refused to see the Father. Throughout the trial, there was little before me to say why the Child would refuse to see his father. More stark is the fact that the Mother did not take steps to address the Child’s alleged reluctance. Even if I were to accept that there was reluctance on the part of the Child, the Mother had refused to have the issue referred to a therapist under the POTS scheme when the opportunity arose during the PPO proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 I find it to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, that the Mother is guilty of contempt of court in that she did not comply with the Order in a total of 107 times.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Mitigation</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 In mitigation, the Mother’s learned counsel argues that the Child had indicated to the Mother that he did not wish to go for the overnight and overseas access, and that it was not possible to force the Child to go for the access against his wishes. She argues that the Child was no longer small enough to be carried off to access against his will. Therefore, Counsel argues, the Mother had done all that was needed on her part. The Child is of age that he is able to speak what he wants. She argues that as such, the Mother should not be penalised. She suggested that counselling to be ordered so her client can attend instead of committing her for the breaches. Alternatively, she asked for any committal order to be suspended, for the parents to attend counselling on how to deal with the issue.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 The Father, who represents himself, argues that the breaches were significant. The Mother has not shown any remorse or take responsibility. She has had opportunities to address the issue. The Father agrees to a suspension of committal, but he says he believes that things will not change unless there is a significant risk imposed on the Mother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 I note that provision for punishment for contempt of court is found in the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016, in particular, in subsection 12 (c):</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <b>Punishment for contempt of court</b> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <em>“12.—(1</em>) <em>Except as otherwise provided in any other written law, a person who commits contempt of court shall be liable to be punished —</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(b) where the power to punish for contempt is exercised by the General Division of the High Court in relation to contempt in the face of or in connection with any proceedings in a State Court, Family Court or Youth Court (as the case may be), with a fine not exceeding $20,000 or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or with both; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(<em>c</em>) <em>where the power to punish for contempt is exercised by any other court, with a fine not exceeding $20,000 or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or with both.</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Orders</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 I take into account that this is the first time that the Mother is guilty of contempt. I take into account that she does not have a job.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 I also take into account that she contested the case against her. I take into account that she does not contest that the Father had not had access to the Child for a year preceding his application. I take into account that the Mother committed these breaches even after her application to vary the terms of access had been dismissed by me, and also by the High Court. I take into account that if indeed the Child was unwilling to see the Father for reasons beyond her control, the Mother had refused to address the issue by accepting therapy under the POTS scheme. These factors weigh against her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 It is in the best interest of every child to have relationships with both parents. Relationships can only be built upon a strong foundation of contact and time spent together. Access orders are issued to meet this goal. It follows that such orders must be carried out. It is the basic duty of parents to ensure that access arrangements are followed through, to and come to mutual adjustments to deal with issues when they arise, but always with the intent to ensure that access is provided, so that the child has full space and time to build and maintain a relationship with the access parent. When there is a difficulty in complying, then it is a parental duty to address it. The Mother had failed to meet this duty.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 I find that it is fair and just that the Mother be fined $8,000.00 which is to be paid within 1 month, in default of which she be imprisoned for 4 days.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 I find it appropriate and just to I suspend this Committal Order provided the Mother does not commit any further breach of the 3 December 2019 Order of Court for a period of 1 year. If she fails to comply with the terms on which this Committal Order is suspended, the Father shall be at liberty to apply inter partes to the Court to consider whether the Committal Order should be enforced or discharged [<em>Tan Beow Hiong v Tan Boon Aik <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2010] 4 SLR 0870.xml')\">[2010] 4 SLR 870</a></em>].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 I urge the Mother to come to arrangements with the Father and with the Child to undergo therapy to address the access issues. With sincerity and effort, I hope the Child will enjoy a happy and positive relationship with the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Costs</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 On costs, the Mother says that she is not able to pay any costs. She had not paid costs for the appeal. She does not have a job.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 The Father argues that the case had been going on 12 months. He had to serve a penal notice, file a leave application, filed 3 affidavits, attend case conferences, and several hearings. He sought $25,000 as costs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 As an order of costs follow the event, so the Father is entitled to costs. However, he is a litigant acting in person and did not incur lawyers’ fees. I order that the Mother pay costs to the Father in the fixed sum of $1,000.00, with disbursements to be agreed to or taxed.</p> </div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Costs"],"date":"2024-11-15","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 388 of 2023 (Summons No 2244 of 2024)","title":"XEF v XEG","citation":"[2024] SGFC 105","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32558-SSP.xml","counsel":["Amelia Ang Yu Wen and Samantha Ee Hui Ying (Lee & Lee) for the plaintiff","Michael Chang (Sincera Law Practice LLC) for the defendant."],"timestamp":"2024-12-12T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Soh Kian Peng","html":"<root><head><title>XEF v XEG</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XEF <em>v</em> XEG </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32558-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 105</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 388 of 2023 (Summons No 2244 of 2024)</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">15 November 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Soh Kian Peng </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Amelia Ang Yu Wen and Samantha Ee Hui Ying (Lee & Lee) for the plaintiff; Michael Chang (Sincera Law Practice LLC) for the defendant. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XEF — XEG </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Costs</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">15 November 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\">Judgment reserved</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> Assistant Registrar Soh Kian Peng:</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 SUM 2244/2024 (“SUM 2244”) was the Husband’s application for discovery. I had earlier given my decision and made orders for discovery: <em>XEF v XEG</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32457-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 92</a> (“<em>XEF</em>”). This is my decision on the costs of SUM 2244.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 Counsel for the Husband, Mr Michael Chang (“Mr Chang”) argues that the Husband should be entitled to costs fixed at $2000 (all-in). Mr Chang makes the point that the Wife had: <b>a)</b> consistently refused to disclose her documents throughout the proceedings, <b>b)</b> refused to comply with the court’s directions. This had all resulted in the wastage of resources and caused undue delay which should be reflected in the award of costs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 Counsel for the Wife, Ms Samantha Ee (“Ms Ee”), on the other hand, argues that no costs should be awarded. She gives two reasons. First, the Husband was not successful in his application and the Wife had already been prejudiced by the delay in the proceedings occasioned by the Husband’s actions. Second, that the need to minimise acrimony between the parties weighs in favour of making no order as to costs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 As a starting point, costs follow the event, though the court can, in the exercise of its discretion, depart from this starting point: see <em>WXE v WXF</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31618-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 40</a> at [7] citing Rules 852 and 854 of the Family Justice Rules 2014. One other point which bears noting is that while the Husband is legally-aided, in my assessment of costs, he is not to be treated differently from a litigant who is not legally-aided: see s 16(1) of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1995.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 In the present case, the Husband had only succeeded in obtaining orders in respect of two out of the four items sought in discovery. While he could not be said to have succeeded in his application, he is, in my judgment, still entitled to costs on the basis that these documents could have, and should have, been disclosed when he had made his voluntary request.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 In this connection, it is apparent to me that the Wife does not have any good reasons for failing to disclose the documents sought at the voluntary stage. The Wife explains that she redacted certain transactions in her bank statement because she was concerned that the Husband would engage in an exercise in forensic accounting to make her account for every dollar that had been spent and that this would only serve to further protract matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 This is not a good reason for refusing to disclose the unredacted bank statement. The law is clear that the court will not be inclined to grant orders for discovery or interrogatories where the applicant clearly wants these documents to make the other party account for every single transaction: <em>WXE v WXF</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31617-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 29</a> at [14] – [15]; <em>XDD v XDE</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32212-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 79</a> at [9] – [10].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 In relation to the Wife’s IRAS Notice of Assessment (“NOA”), the Wife claims that she did not intend to employ a “tit-for-tat” approach in stating that she would only disclose her IRAS statements if the Husband provided his latest IRAS NOA as well. She says that she was troubled by the Husband’s refusal to exchange his IRAS NOA even when she had suggested that both parties exchange their respective IRAS NOAs. She suggests that this demonstrates that the Husband would not provide his IRAS NOA even if she had issued a “formal request for discovery”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 The Wife’s decision to not disclose these documents appears to be a purely strategic one calculated at, hopefully, expediting proceedings by reducing opportunities for the Husband to file further summons for discovery or interrogatories. What the Wife had left out of the equation was the additional time that would be incurred if the Husband had to file his own summons to compel her to disclose documents which she could have produced in the first place.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 In that vein, the Wife also points the finger at the Husband for filing SUM 2244 so late in the day. She says that by doing so, he had prolonged matters by more than six months (from April to October 2024).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 This is not an entirely fair characterisation of what had transpired. I note from the minutes of the case conference on 20 June 2024 that the court had granted the Wife an extension of time of 1 week to provide her voluntary disclosure. Had the Wife provided the documents sought, that might have been the end of the matter and timelines could have possibly been brought forwards by three months at the very least.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 Although Ms Ee rightly points out that the court may make no order as to costs to minimise acrimony between the parties, the Wife’s conduct in this matter must also be taken into account. First, as I have noted, the Wife had a role in prolonging matters as the documents which the Husband had obtained orders for discovery could have been disclosed earlier. This was certainly not conducive to reducing acrimony between parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 Second, there is also the position which the Wife had taken at the hearing of SUM 2244. She had argued that the Husband could have avoided the need to ask for the Wife’s NOA in discovery had he agreed to her “reasonable proposal” to exchange the documents on a mutual basis.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 This was, as I had noted in my judgment (<em>XEF</em> at [14]), not a basis on which disclosure could be resisted. In any event, the better approach, which the Wife could have taken, was to disclose her NOA, and to ask the Husband for the same if she thought that the Husband’s NOA was also relevant to the issues in dispute.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 In short, the Wife could have taken a course of action which would minimise or eliminate further avenues for conflict. She did not seize that opportunity. Given this, I did not think it open to her to now argue that no order of costs should be made in the interests of reducing or minimising acrimony between the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 In the circumstances, I find that the Wife should have to pay costs for SUM 2244. Taking into account the factors I have highlighted above, these costs are fixed at $1100 (all-in). Parties are in agreement that these costs should be paid to the Director of Legal Aid. I therefore order that the Wife pay this sum of $1100 to the Director of Legal Aid. This is to be done by 31 December 2024.</p> </div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family law – Variation of Ancillary Matters Orders – Maintenance"],"date":"2024-11-26","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 3897 of 2013","title":"XFU v XFV","citation":"[2024] SGFC 104","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32491-SSP.xml","counsel":["Mr Mohamed Fazal bin Abdul Hamid & Mr Muhammad Aadil bin Dafir (I.R.B. Law LLP) for the Father","Mr Aridas Vytilingam (Aridas & Associates) for the Mother."],"timestamp":"2024-11-27T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Michelle Elias Solomon","html":"<root><head><title>XFU v XFV</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XFU <em>v</em> XFV </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32491-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 104</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 3897 of 2013</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">26 November 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Michelle Elias Solomon </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Mr Mohamed Fazal bin Abdul Hamid & Mr Muhammad Aadil bin Dafir (I.R.B. Law LLP) for the Father; Mr Aridas Vytilingam (Aridas & Associates) for the Mother. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XFU — XFV </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Variation of Ancillary Matters Orders</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Maintenance</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">26 November 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Michelle Elias Solomon:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 This is an application to vary maintenance for children which was commenced by the plaintiff father (“the Father”). The defendant mother (“the Mother”) disagreed to the variation sought by the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The Father and Mother (“the Parties”) were married in December 2004 and have three children, S, a girl, who was born in 2007 (“S”), M, a boy, who was born in 2009 (“M”) and R, a boy, who was born in 2012 (“R”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 In August 2013, the Father commenced divorce proceedings citing the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The Interim Judgment was granted, on an uncontested basis, in April 2014 with the ancillary matters adjourned to be heard in chambers. The court delivered its final orders in respect of the ancillary matters on 5 August 2015 (“the 2015 Order”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 The orders in respect of maintenance for the S, M and R (“the children”), which was the central issue before me in the current application, read as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_a\"></a>a) The Father shall pay the Mother monthly maintenance of $6,000 for the maintenance of the Mother and three children, namely S, M and R, for 18 months beginning 31 August 2015 and thereafter on the last day of each month until the last day of January 2017;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_b\"></a>b) Commencing 28 February 2017, the Father shall pay the Mother (i) monthly maintenance of $4,000 for the maintenance of their three children and (ii) nominal maintenance of $1 per month for the Mother’s maintenance;</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The 2015 Order essentially fixed maintenance at the initial sum of $6,000 per month, which decreased to $4,000 per month in 2017; this mechanism was in-built into the 2015 Order. The Final Judgment was issued on 14 August 2015. The Father remarried in 2016 and has two children<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> from his current marriage.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The current application for variation of maintenance</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 The Father filed the current application to vary the children’s maintenance under the 2015 Order in the following terms:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_a\"></a>a) Maintenance of $4,000 be temporarily varied to $0 and backdated from 1 Jan 2023 until such time the Father obtains new employment paying him at least S$15,000.00 each month<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span>; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_b\"></a>b) Further and/or in the alternative in the event the Father obtains new employment paying him at least S$8,000.00 each month, the Father shall pay the Mother monthly maintenance of S$1,200.00 for the maintenance of their three children<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 The Parties subsequently attended mediation to amicably resolve the variation application; their efforts, however, were unsuccessful. The variation application thereafter came up before me for a hearing, at which both parties were represented by counsel. On 22 August 2024, I delivered my decision<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span>, allowing the Father’s application and varying the children’s maintenance downwards, but not to the extent sought by the Father. The Father appealed against the whole of my decision, and I now provide the grounds.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The evidence and orders</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 A total of five affidavits were filed by the Parties for the variation application:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_a\"></a>a) The Father’s affidavit filed on 26 June 2023 (“<b>F1</b>”);</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_b\"></a>b) The Father’s affidavit filed on 13 May 2024 (“<b>F2</b>”);</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_c\"></a>c) The Father’s affidavit filed on 6 Jun 2024 (“<b>F3</b>”);</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_d\"></a>d) The Mother’s affidavit filed on 30 Nov 2023 (“<b>M1</b>”);</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_e\"></a>e) The Mother’s affidavit filed on 14 Jun 2024 (“<b>M2</b>”);</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 After considering the evidence and submissions, I made the following orders:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_a\"></a>a) Maintenance for the children under the 2015 Order was varied in that the Father shall pay the Mother the monthly sum of $3,500 as maintenance for the children, S, M and R, with effect from 26 June 2023 and thereafter on the 26<sup>th</sup> day of each subsequent month.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_b\"></a>b) No order as to costs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_c\"></a>c) Liberty to apply.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Issues to be determined and the applicable law</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 The starting point in determining variations to maintenance orders made under the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the Charter”) is s.118 read together with s.72<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> which read:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <b>Rescission and variation of order</b> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">72.—(1) On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly allowance under this Part and on proof of a change in the circumstances of that person, or that person’s wife, incapacitated husband or child, or for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court, the court by which the order was made may rescind the order or may vary it as it thinks fit..</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <b>Power of court to vary orders for maintenance</b> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">118.— The court may at any time vary or rescind any subsisting order for maintenance, whether secured or unsecured, on the application of the person in whose favour or of the person against whom the order was made, or, in respect of secured maintenance, of the legal personal representatives of the latter, where it is satisfied that the order was based on any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstance.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 The sole question before me was whether there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a downward variation of the children’s maintenance. In answering this question, I considered it appropriate to consider the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_a\"></a>a) The children’s expenses, including any change(s);</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_b\"></a>b) The parties’ income, including any change(s).</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_c\"></a>c) Any other factors evidencing a material change in circumstances that would justify a downward variation of the children’s maintenance.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 In dealing with each issue in turn, I begin with the Parties’ cases.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Father’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 In support of his case to lower the children’s maintenance, the Father raised the following –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_a\"></a>a) From 1 Jan 2023 to 31 Jul 2023, the Father was unemployed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_b\"></a>b) From Aug 2023 to May 2024, he worked as project manager earning S$12,000 per month<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> but had been unemployed since May 2024 and his attempts to look for another job had been futile so far, as evidenced by his numerous applications to prospective employers<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_c\"></a>c) He had trouble maintaining a job paying him a good salary<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> and struggled to make ends meet even when he was earning S$16,000<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_d\"></a>d) The Father incurred $20,332 monthly for his family’s financial needs<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span>. He had to take out multiple personal loans and lines of credit amounting to S$248,507.39.13<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> to cover living expenses and financial commitments; he was very close to running into bankruptcy if he did not secure employment very soon<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_e\"></a>e) Although his last employment earned him S$12,000 per month, it only lasted 8 months and there was no guarantee that he might be able to earn the same amount given today’s loose labour market; he had to take a pay cut just to be able to secure a job<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span>. The Father was unable to make maintenance payments per the 2015 Order, but not one for his lack of effort; he had tried sending his resumes and would continue to do so<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_f\"></a>f) The Mother, who had been residing in Australia since November 2022<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span>, received welfare payments from the Australian government for the children and subsidies for the children’s health and medical needs<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_g\"></a>g) The Mother’s position that she was unable to work because she had to care for the children was just a façade<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_18\" id=\"Ftn_18_1\"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span>. The Mother was a university graduate and able to find employment as a banker, which was her previous job prior to the marriage. She had chosen not to work and was hiding behind the children’s alleged medical needs just to assign him more financial responsibility vis-à-vis the children<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_19\" id=\"Ftn_19_1\"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_h\"></a>h) The Mother’s position that she spent S$4,000 for the children was the entirety of the current maintenance amount; the Mother was therefore absolved of any financial responsibility to provide maintenance to the children. It was unfair that the Father contributed solely to the children without any financial contribution by the Mother whatsoever<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_20\" id=\"Ftn_20_1\"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_i\"></a>i) The Mother’s and children’s expenses were exaggerated and that their collective financial expenses did not exceed AUD $3,000 each month because otherwise, the Mother would not have been able to afford the alleged expenses<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_21\" id=\"Ftn_21_1\"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span>. Applying a percentage to the children’s expenses of AUD $2,000, then he ought to provide AUD $1,200 (60%)<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_22\" id=\"Ftn_22_1\"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_j\"></a>j) Given his current unfortunate situation, any order for him to provide maintenance was akin to squeezing water from a stone and would only likely cause him to incur more debts. This was unjust and inequitable considering he had his own expenses and debts<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_23\" id=\"Ftn_23_1\"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 For all these reasons, the Father contended that he was unable to continue his obligations under the 2015 Order and the children’s maintenance should be decreased<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_24\" id=\"Ftn_24_1\"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Mother’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 The Mother objected to the Father’s application to vary the 2015 Order, contending that there should no variation<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_25\" id=\"Ftn_25_1\"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span> or backdating of outstanding maintenance<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_26\" id=\"Ftn_26_1\"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span>. In support of her case, she raised the following –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_a\"></a>a) The children were not living a lavish lifestyle<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_27\" id=\"Ftn_27_1\"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span>; despite the Mother’s difficulties in caring for them, she had not sought an upward revision of maintenance<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_28\" id=\"Ftn_28_1\"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_b\"></a>b) The Father had been in arrears of maintenance amounting to $74,000<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_29\" id=\"Ftn_29_1\"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span> and done everything possible to deny the children the lifestyle they were enjoying prior to the end of the marriage<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_30\" id=\"Ftn_30_1\"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c\"></a>c) A major portion of the AUD4,000 received monthly from the Australian authorities was to support S’s medical rehabilitation needs<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_31\" id=\"Ftn_31_1\"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span>. These family assistance payments did not amount to a material change of circumstances because if the Father had paid maintenance of $4,000 every month and settled all arrears, the Mother would not have relied on the social assistance payments from the Australian authorities<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_32\" id=\"Ftn_32_1\"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span>. Once the Father paid the arrears and maintenance, the authorities would seek to recalculate and obtain payment from the Mother<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_33\" id=\"Ftn_33_1\"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span>. The Mother also had to bear the balance of $2,077 for the household<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_34\" id=\"Ftn_34_1\"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_d\"></a>d) The Father had the ability to pay the sum of $4,000 for the children; he had an earning capacity of $12,000, a wealth of experience and was still young<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_35\" id=\"Ftn_35_1\"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_e\"></a>e) The current application was filed when he was still employed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_36\" id=\"Ftn_36_1\"><sup>[note: 36]</sup></a></span> and the Father’s expenses were unsupported by documentary evidence<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_37\" id=\"Ftn_37_1\"><sup>[note: 37]</sup></a></span>. His children’s<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_38\" id=\"Ftn_38_1\"><sup>[note: 38]</sup></a></span> expenses of $3,181 were not accurate since they lived in the Philippines, where the cost of living was much lower<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_39\" id=\"Ftn_39_1\"><sup>[note: 39]</sup></a></span>. The court should disregard all the Father’s expenses including that of the children of his new family<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_40\" id=\"Ftn_40_1\"><sup>[note: 40]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_f\"></a>f) The Father’s income increased tremendously in 2023 and his ability to pay had improved<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_41\" id=\"Ftn_41_1\"><sup>[note: 41]</sup></a></span>; other than a spell of about six months, the Father was able to be gainfully employed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_42\" id=\"Ftn_42_1\"><sup>[note: 42]</sup></a></span>. On the other hand, there had been no change in the Mother’s financial position and she relied on the Australian social assistance to support herself and the children, together with her savings<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_43\" id=\"Ftn_43_1\"><sup>[note: 43]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_g\"></a>g) The Mother was not seeking a meal ticket for life and may have to seek employment to obtain some level of financial self-sufficiency<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_44\" id=\"Ftn_44_1\"><sup>[note: 44]</sup></a></span>. According to the Mother, she was in no position to be gainfully employed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_45\" id=\"Ftn_45_1\"><sup>[note: 45]</sup></a></span> for several reasons –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_g-p3_i\"></a>(i) Since 2022, S had episodes of self-harm and was admitted for acute suicidal ideation<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_46\" id=\"Ftn_46_1\"><sup>[note: 46]</sup></a></span>. The Father had not attempted to be involved in S’s rehabilitation and the Mother needed to be involved in S’s care<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_47\" id=\"Ftn_47_1\"><sup>[note: 47]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_g-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) M suffered from severe muscle weakness from his two COVID injections and hardly attended school; he needed care and attention<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_48\" id=\"Ftn_48_1\"><sup>[note: 48]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_g-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) The welfare of the children were paramount and based on their emotional and physical trauma, the Mother could not be gainfully employed<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_49\" id=\"Ftn_49_1\"><sup>[note: 49]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_h\"></a>h) She currently received about $2,000<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_50\" id=\"Ftn_50_1\"><sup>[note: 50]</sup></a></span> per month as rental from the HDB flat she owned.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 For all these reasons, the Mother disagreed that the maintenance ought to be decreased.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Whether to decrease maintenance: the considerations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 In considering the Father’s application to vary the children’s maintenance downwards, I considered it necessary to assess the reasonableness of the children’s expenses, as set out by the Mother<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_51\" id=\"Ftn_51_1\"><sup>[note: 51]</sup></a></span>:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>Household Expenses:</u> </p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"0\"><colgroup><col width=\"9.68%\"><col width=\"19.36%\"><col width=\"12.9%\"><col width=\"58.06%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">S/No</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expense</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Court’s figure [$]</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Explanation</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">1</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Mortgage</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expense excluded; these were payments towards acquisition of an asset. In any event, the children were not currently receiving the benefit of living in the matrimonial home, which was being rented out.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Rental (Australian Rental home)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">1,738</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I accepted the amount of $1,738 to be housing / roofing costs for four people, as listed by the Mother. In this regard, I noted that the Father had pegged is own monthly rental expense at $2,900<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_52\" id=\"Ftn_52_1\"><sup>[note: 52]</sup></a></span>.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">3</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Telephone</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I found the Mother’s estimate of $200 for this item of expense to be excessive. Such items of expense were also subject to affordability and should correctly be budgeted under “Cable TV / internet”.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">4</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Utilities (SG + Australia) </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">350</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I was unable to agree with the Mother’s figure of $700 which included utilities for both the Singapore and Australian homes. There should only be one claim for utilities; the one <em>actually</em> incurred by the family. I therefore halved this expense.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">5</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Conservancy </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expense of $67.50 excluded. The Mother and children were currently not residing in the flat; they were therefore not <em>actually</em> benefitting from the Conservancy services. Moreover, this sum was covered by the monthly rental received from the flat, and the tenants were currently benefitting from its use.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">6</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Cable TV / internet</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">120</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Mother’s figure accepted; this was a reasonable sum.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">7</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Food / groceries</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expense excluded. This was budgeted separately under children’s expenses (“Food/groceries”).</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">8</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Eating out </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expense excluded. This was budgeted separately under children’s expenses (“Tour and family outings”).</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">9</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Clothing</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">These items of expense were excluded from the household expenses as they were the Mother’s personal expenses.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">10</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Personal insurance</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">11</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Medical </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">12</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Public transport</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">13</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Domestic helper levy </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expenses excluded; there was no evidence of a domestic helper.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">14</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Entertainment</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">These items of expense were excluded from the household expenses as they were the Mother’s personal expenses.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">15</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Hobbies and sports</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">16</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Tour and family outings</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expense excluded. This was budgeted separately under children’s expenses (“Tour and family outings”).</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total (for 4 people)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>2,208</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total (each person)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>552</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total (for 3 children)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>1656</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 This was how I arrived at the sum of $1,656 as the reasonable monthly household expenses for three children. I move on to the children’s personal expenses.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>Children’s Expenses</u> </p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"0\"><colgroup><col width=\"9.68193638727746%\"><col width=\"20.9641928385677%\"><col width=\"11.2822564512903%\"><col width=\"58.0716143228646%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">S/No</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Expense</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Court’s figure [$]</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Explanation</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">1</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Food/ groceries</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">990</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I found the sum of $330 per child to be reasonable for this expense; this worked out to $990 for three children.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Clothing</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">100</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Mother’s figure accepted; I found these to be reasonable.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">3</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Medical </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">100</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">4</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">School expenses</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">100</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">5</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Transport</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">200</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">6</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Pocket money</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">450</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I found the Mother’s estimate of $1,000 for this item of expense to be excessive; $150 per child was a more reasonable sum, which worked out to $450 for three children.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">7</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Entertainment</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I found the Mother’s estimate of $350 for this item of expense to be excessive. Such items of expense were also subject to affordability and should correctly be budgeted out of “Pocket Money”, having regard to the ages of the children.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">8</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Hobbies and sports</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">240</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I found the Mother’s estimate of $500 for each of these items of expense to be excessive. I found the sum of $80 per child to be reasonable for such expenses; this worked out to $240 for three children.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">9</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Tour and family outings</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">240</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>2,420</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 This was how I arrived at the sum of $2,420 as the reasonable monthly personal expenses for three children. Based on my assessment above, the total reasonable expenses for the children, including their share of reasonable household expenses, was $4,076 per month [$1,656 + $2,420], or about $1,358 per child. I considered this sum reasonable, observing that the Father’s own monthly estimates for his children from his current marriage were higher, at about $1,590.50 per child<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_53\" id=\"Ftn_53_1\"><sup>[note: 53]</sup></a></span>. I now move on to the parties’ income.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The Parties’ income, including any changes</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 I considered it important to review the Father’s income since the 2015 Order, for that is when the assessment of material change in circumstances commenced. The table below shows his yearly income, as set out in his Notices of Assessment (NOA) since 2015.</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"0\"><colgroup><col width=\"9.62%\"><col width=\"18.42%\"><col width=\"71.96%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>S/no.</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Year of Assessment</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Total income</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">1</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2016</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">While I had directed the Father to produce this document, he explained that he was only able to locate his IRAS documents from 2017 to 2020 on his computer and hoped that I would consider it sufficient for the purposes of his income as he did not wish to pay for a copy of his 2016 NOA. I accepted this; I therefore had no information on the Father’s income earned in 2015 and assessed the changes from the year following the 2015 Order, which I considered reasonable due to the passage of time. In short, I took the view that I had sufficient data to assess the Father’s income since the 2015 Order was made.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2017<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_54\" id=\"Ftn_54_1\"><sup>[note: 54]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">205,443</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">3</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2018<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_55\" id=\"Ftn_55_1\"><sup>[note: 55]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">214,191</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">4</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2019<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_56\" id=\"Ftn_56_1\"><sup>[note: 56]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">222,245</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">5</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2020<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_57\" id=\"Ftn_57_1\"><sup>[note: 57]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">243,216</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">6</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2021<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_58\" id=\"Ftn_58_1\"><sup>[note: 58]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">190,589</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">7</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2022<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_59\" id=\"Ftn_59_1\"><sup>[note: 59]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">160,000</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">8</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2023<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_60\" id=\"Ftn_60_1\"><sup>[note: 60]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">231,329</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">9</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2024<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_61\" id=\"Ftn_61_1\"><sup>[note: 61]</sup></a></span></p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">76,375</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 I observed from the data that while there had been some variations with the Father’s income over the years, he generally earned a good income and was consistently able to command salaries in excess of $200,000 per year. In fact, for five out of the last eight years, the Father earned between $205,000 and $243,000 per year. I also noted Father’s evidence indicating that he had significant work experience<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_62\" id=\"Ftn_62_1\"><sup>[note: 62]</sup></a></span>. For all these reasons, I did not consider his income of $76,375, in the Year of Assessment 2024, reflective of his true income or earning capacity, and was confident that he would find suitable employment in short order. In this regard, I also noted that while he was unemployed from 1 January 2023 to 31 July 2023<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_63\" id=\"Ftn_63_1\"><sup>[note: 63]</sup></a></span>, he eventually found employment; there was nothing to suggest that the same would not happen now.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 On the Mother’s income, I noted that she received monthly rental income from renting out rooms in her flat. To understand the nature and extent of this rental income, I had made the following directions at the conclusion of the hearing before me:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Mother to state on affidavit how much she receives from each tenant per month, including the total rent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 In her subsequent affidavit, she failed to address this content directly, instead making the following statements –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">I have rented out rooms at $600 per month<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_64\" id=\"Ftn_64_1\"><sup>[note: 64]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Rent transfer from a tenant: $1,500<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_65\" id=\"Ftn_65_1\"><sup>[note: 65]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 Nevertheless, I understood from the Mother’s evidence that –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_a\"></a>a) She had three separate tenants renting rooms in her flat. Copies of the identification cards of these tenants were provided<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_66\" id=\"Ftn_66_1\"><sup>[note: 66]</sup></a></span> and reflected in HDB’s printout of the Enquiry on Rental Records<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_67\" id=\"Ftn_67_1\"><sup>[note: 67]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_b\"></a>b) Each room was rented out for the sum of $600 per month; this was reflected in the copies of the three Lease Agreements<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_68\" id=\"Ftn_68_1\"><sup>[note: 68]</sup></a></span> provided by the Mother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_c\"></a>c) The rental arrangements commenced on 10 March 2023<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_69\" id=\"Ftn_69_1\"><sup>[note: 69]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_d\"></a>d) Based on (a) and (b), I was satisfied that the Mother received monthly rental income of $1,800 per month from the rent of the flat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_24-p2_e\"></a>e) Based on (c), this meant that she earned a total of $18,000 in rental income from March 2023 to Dec 2023 [$1,800 x 10 months].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 For the purposes of assessing parties’ income and earning capacity vis-à-vis each other in the current application, I relied on the parties respective NOAs/ income earned for the last three years. For the Mother, this would include her rental income earned in 2023. I considered this to be the fairest approach in the circumstances of this case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 I therefore reviewed the parties’ respective NOAs for the Years of Assessment (YA) 2022, 2023 and 2024 (that is, income earned in 2021, 2022 and 2023). The table below sets out the particulars:</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"0\"><colgroup><col width=\"12.9225845169034%\"><col width=\"18.5637127425485%\"><col width=\"18.5237047409482%\"><col width=\"20.3640728145629%\"><col width=\"29.625925185037%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>YA 2022</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>[$]</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>YA 2023</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>[$]</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>YA 2024</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>[$]</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>3-year average</b> </p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>[$]</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Mother</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total income<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_70\" id=\"Ftn_70_1\"><sup>[note: 70]</sup></a></span>:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">39,000</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total income<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_71\" id=\"Ftn_71_1\"><sup>[note: 71]</sup></a></span>:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">21,000</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total rental income for 2023:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">18,000</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total income:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">78,000</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Average yearly:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">26,000</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Father</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total income<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_72\" id=\"Ftn_72_1\"><sup>[note: 72]</sup></a></span>:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">160,000</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total income<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_73\" id=\"Ftn_73_1\"><sup>[note: 73]</sup></a></span>:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">231,329</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total income<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_74\" id=\"Ftn_74_1\"><sup>[note: 74]</sup></a></span>:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">76,375</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total income:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">467,704</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Average yearly:</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">155,901</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 Based on the above data, the average ratio of parties’ income was 14%:86% [26,000: 155,901].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 On the issue of the Mother’s employment, of relevance was the Mother’s <em>reasons</em> for not seeking employment. According to the Mother, she was unable to find employment due to the children’s needs. On the other hand, the Father contended that this was just a façade to apportion more financial responsibility to him<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_75\" id=\"Ftn_75_1\"><sup>[note: 75]</sup></a></span>. I noted the Mother’s concerns over the children’s health challenges; however, they were not reasons, <em>in and of themselves</em>, not to find employment <em>at all</em>. The Mother must make meaningful efforts which result in her employment. That being said, I could only rely on the parties’ recent income and expenses in making orders in the current application. In my view, it would be incorrect to <em>lower</em> the Father’s current contributions to the children’s maintenance by <em>guessing</em> the Mother’s future income; the children’s expenses remained the joint responsibility of both parents and they must both try harder for the sake of their children. The Father’s “squeezing water from stone<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_76\" id=\"Ftn_76_1\"><sup>[note: 76]</sup></a></span>” argument, therefore, cut both ways.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 Based on the children’s total current reasonable expenses of $4,076, the Father’s 86% contribution was therefore about $3,500<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_77\" id=\"Ftn_77_1\"><sup>[note: 77]</sup></a></span>. This was how I arrived at the sum of $3,500 as the children’s maintenance.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 Finally, the Father also asked me to consider his remarriage and two children<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_78\" id=\"Ftn_78_1\"><sup>[note: 78]</sup></a></span> from his current marriage as a factor. My view was this: it was incorrect for the Father to assert that he could not afford to pay reasonable maintenance for the children when he had <em>voluntarily</em> taken on additional financial obligations for his new family; the decision to take on any additional financial obligations must have regard to the existing ones - I therefore trust that the Father could afford to do both. I was accordingly unable to place much weight on this factor.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Commencement date of the new maintenance </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 As the Father’s application to lower the children’s maintenance was filed on 26 June 2023, I considered it appropriate to order that the new maintenance amount take effect on this date.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 Based on the evidence and for the reasons stated above, I was satisfied that the Father had met the burden of proving that there had been a material change in circumstances since the 2015 Order warranting a downward variation of the children’s monthly maintenance, and I made orders accordingly. After hearing parties on costs, I made no order as to costs.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.7.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>FC/SUM 2022/2023, prayer 1.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>FC/SUM 2022/2023, prayer 2.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Written decision rendered pursuant to Rule 670 of the Family Justice Rules via Registrar’s Notice dated 21 February 2023.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 4.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.6.4.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.6.5.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.6.6.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.6.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 8.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 6.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 7.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 7.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 11.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 23.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.5.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.8.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_18_1\" id=\"Ftn_18\">[note: 18]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 14.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_19_1\" id=\"Ftn_19\">[note: 19]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 18.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_20_1\" id=\"Ftn_20\">[note: 20]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 15.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_21_1\" id=\"Ftn_21\">[note: 21]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 16.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_22_1\" id=\"Ftn_22\">[note: 22]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 22.3.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_23_1\" id=\"Ftn_23\">[note: 23]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 24.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_24_1\" id=\"Ftn_24\">[note: 24]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 25.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_25_1\" id=\"Ftn_25\">[note: 25]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para L (at page 11).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_26_1\" id=\"Ftn_26\">[note: 26]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para 1 (at page 7).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_27_1\" id=\"Ftn_27\">[note: 27]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para H (at page 9).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_28_1\" id=\"Ftn_28\">[note: 28]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para H (at page 9).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_29_1\" id=\"Ftn_29\">[note: 29]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para I (at page 9).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_30_1\" id=\"Ftn_30\">[note: 30]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para I(b) (at page 9).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_31_1\" id=\"Ftn_31\">[note: 31]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para J (at page 10).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_32_1\" id=\"Ftn_32\">[note: 32]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para J (at page 10).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_33_1\" id=\"Ftn_33\">[note: 33]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para O(a) (at page 15).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_34_1\" id=\"Ftn_34\">[note: 34]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para L (at page 11).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_35_1\" id=\"Ftn_35\">[note: 35]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para M (at page 12).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_36_1\" id=\"Ftn_36\">[note: 36]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para M (at page 12).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_37_1\" id=\"Ftn_37\">[note: 37]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para N (at page 13).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_38_1\" id=\"Ftn_38\">[note: 38]</a></sup>From his current marriage.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_39_1\" id=\"Ftn_39\">[note: 39]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para P(e) (at page 16).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_40_1\" id=\"Ftn_40\">[note: 40]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para N(c) (at page 13).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_41_1\" id=\"Ftn_41\">[note: 41]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para N(d)(iii) (at page 14).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_42_1\" id=\"Ftn_42\">[note: 42]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para N(d)(iii) (at page 14).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_43_1\" id=\"Ftn_43\">[note: 43]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para O (at page 15).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_44_1\" id=\"Ftn_44\">[note: 44]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para P(d) (at page 16).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_45_1\" id=\"Ftn_45\">[note: 45]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para 1(a)(i) (at page 7).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_46_1\" id=\"Ftn_46\">[note: 46]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para 1(a)(i) (at page 7).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_47_1\" id=\"Ftn_47\">[note: 47]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para 1(a)(i) (at page 7).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_48_1\" id=\"Ftn_48\">[note: 48]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para 1(b) (at page 8).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_49_1\" id=\"Ftn_49\">[note: 49]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para 1(b) (at page 8).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_50_1\" id=\"Ftn_50\">[note: 50]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, para P(f) (at page 16).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_51_1\" id=\"Ftn_51\">[note: 51]</a></sup>M1, page 30.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_52_1\" id=\"Ftn_52\">[note: 52]</a></sup>F1, page 59.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_53_1\" id=\"Ftn_53\">[note: 53]</a></sup>$3,181 for two children; F1, page 57.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_54_1\" id=\"Ftn_54\">[note: 54]</a></sup>F3, page 13.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_55_1\" id=\"Ftn_55\">[note: 55]</a></sup>F3, page 12.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_56_1\" id=\"Ftn_56\">[note: 56]</a></sup>F3, page 11.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_57_1\" id=\"Ftn_57\">[note: 57]</a></sup>F3, page 10.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_58_1\" id=\"Ftn_58\">[note: 58]</a></sup>F3, page 9.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_59_1\" id=\"Ftn_59\">[note: 59]</a></sup>F3, page 8.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_60_1\" id=\"Ftn_60\">[note: 60]</a></sup>F3, page 7.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_61_1\" id=\"Ftn_61\">[note: 61]</a></sup>F3, page 6.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_62_1\" id=\"Ftn_62\">[note: 62]</a></sup>F3, page 46.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_63_1\" id=\"Ftn_63\">[note: 63]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.6.4.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_64_1\" id=\"Ftn_64\">[note: 64]</a></sup>M2, para 2(F).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_65_1\" id=\"Ftn_65\">[note: 65]</a></sup>M2, para 2(F).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_66_1\" id=\"Ftn_66\">[note: 66]</a></sup>M2, page 31 to 36.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_67_1\" id=\"Ftn_67\">[note: 67]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, page 120.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_68_1\" id=\"Ftn_68\">[note: 68]</a></sup>M2, page 31 to 36.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_69_1\" id=\"Ftn_69\">[note: 69]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions, page 120.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_70_1\" id=\"Ftn_70\">[note: 70]</a></sup>M2, page 28.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_71_1\" id=\"Ftn_71\">[note: 71]</a></sup>M2, page 29.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_72_1\" id=\"Ftn_72\">[note: 72]</a></sup>F3, page 8.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_73_1\" id=\"Ftn_73\">[note: 73]</a></sup>F3, page 7.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_74_1\" id=\"Ftn_74\">[note: 74]</a></sup>F3, page 6.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_75_1\" id=\"Ftn_75\">[note: 75]</a></sup>F2, para 6.6.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_76_1\" id=\"Ftn_76\">[note: 76]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 24.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_77_1\" id=\"Ftn_77\">[note: 77]</a></sup>Rounded off from $3,503.50.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_78_1\" id=\"Ftn_78\">[note: 78]</a></sup>Father’s written submissions, para 5.7.</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Child maintenance – Enforcement of maintenance arrears"],"date":"2024-11-14","court":"Family Court","case-number":"MSS 1081 of 2024","title":"XET v XEU","citation":"[2024] SGFC 101","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32470-SSP.xml","counsel":["Applicant in Person","Gan Guo Bin (Winston Quek & Company) for the Respondent"],"timestamp":"2024-11-20T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Suzanne Chin","html":"<root><head><title>XET v XEU</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XET <em>v</em> XEU </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32470-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 101</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">MSS 1081 of 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">14 November 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Suzanne Chin </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Applicant in Person; Gan Guo Bin (Winston Quek & Company) for the Respondent </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XET — XEU </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Child maintenance</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Enforcement of maintenance arrears</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">14 November 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Suzanne Chin:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 On 7 May 2024, the Mother filed an application to enforce the maintenance order made in respect of the child of the marriage in FC/IJ xx/2019. The matter came before me for hearing on 3 September 2024 and after hearing from the parties, I allowed the Mother’s application and determined that arrears amounted to a sum of $4,711 as at 3 September 2024. I then ordered that the respondent father (“Father”) pay this amount in 2 instalments on 1 October 2024 and 1 November 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The Father has filed an appeal against my decision, and I set forth below the reasons for my decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The parties in this case had filed for divorce in November 2015. Interim Judgement was granted on 7 March 2019 and various consent orders were recorded at the same time. These included orders granting joint custody of the then 3-year-old child of the marriage to both parents with sole care and control of the child to the Mother as well as orders relating to the child maintenance that was to be paid by the Father to the Mother. In relation to the maintenance for the child, the orders provided as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <em>“MAINTENANCE FOR THE CHILD</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">j. <em><u>Monthly maintenance payments</u></em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <em>For the month of February 2019, the Defendant shall pay maintenance of $2,314, which shall be deposited directly into the Plaintiff’s designated bank account by 8 February 2019 (Friday).</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <em>k</em>. <em>Thereafter, the Defendant shall pay maintenance of $3,350 per month, which shall be deposited via GIRO or standing instructions into the Plaintiff’s designated bank account by 1 March 2019 and thereafter on or before the 1st day of each subsequent month, regardless of whether the 1st day of the month falls on a weekday or a weekend day.</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <em>l</em>. <em>For avoidance of doubt, the sum of $3,350 at subparagraph (k) above comprises $1,807.85 being the child’s monthly school fees at LV for 2019 and $1,542.15 being the Defendant’s contribution towards the child’s share of household and maid expenses, and the child’s personal expenses excluding those items specifically mentioned below. In the event the school fees at LV increase beyond $1,807.85, the Defendant shall bear 60% of the increase and this amount shall be added to the Defendant’s monthly maintenance payments accordingly (i.e. if the child’s school fees increase from $1,807.85 to $1,907.85 per month, the Defendant shall add $60 to his monthly maintenance payments).”</em> </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a>The above orders relating to child maintenance also went on to list other items of the child’s expenses including health insurance, medical and medication, dental costs, international school fees, transportation to and from international school etc and specified that these would be shared equally between the parties (“Original Maintenance Order”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 Five (5) years have passed since the consent orders were recorded and the child is now 8 years of age. While there have been formal applications to vary the orders relating to some of the child issues, to date, no applications have been made to vary the Original Maintenance Order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Law and issues to be determined</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The Mother’s application for enforcement of child maintenance was filed under section 71 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“Charter”) which provides that where a maintenance order has been made under section 69 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“Charter”), and the person ordered to pay maintenance has failed to make one or more payments required, an application may be made for the court to enforce the maintenance order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 In determining whether to make an enforcement order, it is necessary for the following issues to be considered:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_a\"></a>(a) Whether the Father has failed to pay maintenance in accordance with the terms of the prevailing maintenance order and, if so what is the amount in arrears;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_b\"></a>(b) Where it has been determined that maintenance payments are in arrears, whether the Father has explained i.e. “shown cause” as to why he has not complied with the maintenance order; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_c\"></a>(c) Depending on whether the Father has “shown cause”, what is the appropriate enforcement order to be made having regard to the circumstances of the case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 Where the parties mutually agree to vary the terms of a maintenance order, the courts have accepted that this should be considered even where no formal application to vary the court order has been made. In <em>Lai Ching Kin v Ng Chin Chye</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/7316-M.xml')\">[2001] SGDC 228</a> the Court found on the evidence that the Complainant had agreed to the Respondent’s request for a reduction of maintenance for a period of time due to his financial difficulty. Although there was no court ordered variation, taking into consideration the agreement mutually reached by the parties, the District Court accepted that the arrears which had accrued during that period of time where parties agreed to the payment of a lower amount of maintenance, should not be enforced.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Parties’ positions</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 The Mother claimed maintenance arrears of $4,711. It was her position that although the Original Maintenance Order had provided for child maintenance of $3,350 per month, the parties had sometime in October 2022 when the child was changing schools reached agreement for the child’s maintenance to be varied to an amount of $2,485 per month excluding school fees which was to be shared by the parties equally outside of this amount. Accordingly, she was only looking to enforce the maintenance arrears in relation to this amount. She informed the court that since October 2022, the Father had paid this agreed amount of $2,485 per month to her and had only stopped paying this amount in May 2024. From May 2024 to September 2024, he failed to pay a sum of $2,485 per month and only paid a sum of $1,543 save that for June 2024, he paid a sum of $1,542. Accordingly, she maintained that the amount of arrears stood at $4,711. as at the 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2024 calculated as follows:</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"25.16%\"><col width=\"26.04%\"><col width=\"25.08%\"><col width=\"23.72%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Month </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Amount of child maintenance payable</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Amount paid by the Respondent</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Arrears</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">May 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$2,485</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$1,543</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$942</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">June 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$2,485</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$1,542</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$943</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">July 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$2,485</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$1,543</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$942</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">August 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$2,485</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$1,543</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$942</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">September 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$2,485</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$1,543</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$942</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Total</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$12,425</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$7,714</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">$4,711</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 The Father did not dispute the fact that in October 2022, he had emailed the Mother and both had reached agreement that the child maintenance would be revised from $3,350 to a sum of $2,845. He also did not dispute the fact that he had paid this monthly sum of $2,845 to the Mother as the child’s expenses from October 2022 to May 2024, a period of 18 months. His position was that he had misinterpreted and miscalculated the child maintenance amount set out in the Original Maintenance Order when he had written to the Mother in October 2022. It was his position that the amount of $3,350 per month had included the child’s kindergarten school fees of $1,807.85 and since the child’s school fees were now being paid separately by the parties in equal shares, based on the Original Maintenance Order, the balance amount of $1,542.15 should be what he should have been paying as child maintenance. He explained that he had only recently realised that he had been overpaying all this time and accordingly, since May 2024, he has started paying the amount of $1,543 to the Mother as child maintenance.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 The Respondent argued that under section 71 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“Charter”), the court is only empowered to enforce a court ordered maintenance order and since no order had been recorded when the parties had varied the child maintenance amount from $3,350 per month to $2,485 per month, the Complainant should not be allowed to bring an enforcement application against him in reliance of a mutual agreement as this had not been officially recorded as a court order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Whether the respondent has failed to pay maintenance </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 The Original Maintenance Orders had provided that the monthly child maintenance was $3,350 and clarified that this comprised of $1,807.85 being the child’s monthly school fees at the time and $1,542.15 being the Father’s contribution towards the child’s expenses which included household expenses, maid expenses as well as the child’s personal expenses<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span>. The Original Maintenance Order also detailed how other expenses were to be shared between the parties and this included international school fees and charges which were to be borne by the parties equally<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 In October 2022 parties exchanged emails discussing various amounts and expenses that had been incurred for the child as well as on the issue of school fees<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span>. On 13 October 2022, the Father wrote to the Mother by email and stated in the third paragraph under the heading of “School Fees” as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">“LV October: The calculation is wrong.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">According to the agreement, we both pay SGD 1,807.85.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">LV increased the fee to SGD 1,870, there is a difference of SGD 63.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Of those SGD 63, I contribute 60% and you 40%.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">That means that my contribution is: SGD 37.80 (60% of the increment) + SGD 903.925 (50% of LV) – SGD 941.725.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">October fee for LV was: SGD 1000.45/2: SGD 500.225 (each).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">It would appear from the above that the Father had acknowledged that there had been an error in the Original Maintenance Order where the school fees for the child’s kindergarten appears to have been a total of $1,807.85 but that his share of the school fees should have only been $941.725.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">I noted further that in that same email, under the heading of “Child maintenance moving forward”, the Father went on to state as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">“Current Maintenance (CM) is: SGD 3,427 – LV SGD 951.70 = SGD 2,485.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a>Taking into consideration the above, I determined that the parties had agreed that there had been a miscalculation in the Original Maintenance Order and this email exchange sought to correct that error.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 Following the email exchange referred to above, the parties operated on the premise that an agreement had been reached to vary the child maintenance from $3,350 to $2,485. This was evidenced by the fact that the Father paid to the Mother a sum of $2,485 per month as child maintenance for a period 18 months from October 2022 to April 2024. The Father did not dispute that there had been an agreement between the parties to vary the Original Maintenance Order nor did he dispute that he had made the payments during the abovementioned period. It was also not disputed that the above amounts excluded the child’s school fees which had been paid by the parties in equal shares separately. Accordingly, I accepted that parties had mutually agreed that the child maintenance would be reduced to a sum of $2,485 (excluding school fees). Additionally, even though no formal application had been made to vary the Original Maintenance Order, since October 2022 the parties had operated on the basis that the current applicable child maintenance amount was $2,845.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 The Father argued that in enforcement proceedings, the court can only enforce a recorded order of court. I did not agree with this as this would clearly lead to an overly technical and unjust result. It should be noted that the courts have in various circumstances recognised agreements reached by the parties in the context of considering if a respondent in a suit had shown sufficient cause not to have certain amounts of arrears enforced against him (see <em>VSP v VSQ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26200-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 71</a>, at [21]; <em>VUJ v VUK</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26500-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 87</a>, at [20] – [22] ) and have allowed reliance on such a mutual agreement. There would be no good reason why a complainant should likewise not be allowed to rely on such a mutual agreement arrived at between the parties especially since the parties had both operated on the basis of this mutual agreement over a prolonged period of time. Accordingly, I considered the Original Maintenance Order but took into consideration the subsequent mutual agreement between the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 The Mother explained that she had not sought to bring a formal application to court to vary the consent order previously recorded as her understanding was:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">“Because it was, .. … we were able to agree with the Respondent and that’s why we have it written on email with the corrected breakdown and as established practice for 2 years. ….. my understanding is that….. with the Respondent we can agree on something without needing to go through the Court. ……. It’s accepted.”<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 I wholeheartedly agreed with the Mother. In line with the philosophy of Therapeutic Justice (“TJ”) adopted by the Family Justice Courts on 21 October 2024, a key objective of TJ is to encourage parties to move forward, enabled and equipped to resolve any future disagreements. Not enforcing what the parties had mutually agreed to and operated on, would go against the essence of the philosophy of TJ.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 In light of the above, I arrived at the conclusion that the relevant amount of monthly child maintenance that should be paid by the Father to the Mother was $2,485 and as it was not disputed that the Father had from May 2024 to September 2024 only paid a sum $1,543 per month save that in June 2024, he paid a sum of $1,542, I determined that he had failed to pay the full amount of child maintenance which he was obligated to pay and that the arrears of child maintenance totalled a sum of $4,711.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Whether the Father has shown cause</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 The question to be determined is whether the Father had provided good reason why he had not paid the arrears of child maintenance i.e. shown cause. Apart from maintaining that he had been mistaken in his calculations and should have followed what had been stated in the Original Maintenance Order strictly (which has already been addressed above), the Father brought no other evidence and provided no other explanation as to why he had not paid the agreed maintenance.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 On the issue of his mistake, I would note that based on the evidence before me, it was clear that the Father had spotted the mistake in the Original Maintenance Order in October 2022 and had taken steps to rectify the calculations which had thereafter been mutually agreed upon. After operating in this manner for 18 months and with the Mother having relied on this for the same period, I did not think that he should now be allowed to renege on his position and argue that he had misunderstood the Original Maintenance Order. In the circumstances, I did not find that he had provided good reason to explain why he had not paid the maintenance arrears of $4,711.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">What is the appropriate enforcement order</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 During the trial, the Father indicated that he currently worked part time in the advertising industry and earned a net salary of $5,200. His expenses totalled an amount above $6,000 including a sum of $1,543 per month for the child’s maintenance. He admitted during cross-examination that he had previously been a creative director of a big advertising agency and had at some point in his career earned a salary of more than $200,000 per annum without bonus and benefits. This was borne out by his Notice of Assessment for 2022 to 2024<sup>4</sup>, where he earned an average annual income of $231,896. The Father provided no explanation as to why he had left his previous advertising jobs to take on a part time role where he earned roughly a quarter of what he had previously earned. In addition, he admitted that he had a savings plan life insurance with more than $4,000 in that account. Taking into consideration all of the evidence before me, I determined that it would be appropriate for the Father to pay the arrears of $4,711 in two (2) instalments.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 The court’s participation and intervention is required where parties are unable to see eye to eye and to reach agreement on their own. Notwithstanding, especially in line with the philosophy of TJ, parties are encouraged to learn to work together as co-parents and to resolve issues between themselves without having to come to court on every occasion.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>FC/IJ xx/2019, paragraph 3(l)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>FC/IJ xx/2019, paragraph 3(m) and (n)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Complainant bundle of documents marked as C1 on page 20 and 21</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Transcript of proceedings on Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2024 on page 10 of 39, lines 16 to 21</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Family violence – Orders for protection – Considerations for determining whether conduct amounts to family violence under the “continual harassment” limb in s 64 of the Women’s Charter 1961","Family Law – Family violence – Orders for protection – Considerations for making personal protection orders","Family Law – Family violence – Orders for protection – Considerations for determining the duration of personal protection orders"],"date":"2024-10-18","court":"Family Court","case-number":"SS No. 864 of 2024","title":"XFL v XFM","citation":"[2024] SGFC 103","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32471-SSP.xml","counsel":["Rajwin Singh Sandhu (M/s Rajwin & Yong LLP) for the Wife","Patrick Fernandez (M/s Fernandez LLC) for the Husband."],"timestamp":"2024-11-20T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kow Keng Siong","html":"<root><head><title>XFL v XFM</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XFL <em>v</em> XFM </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32471-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 103</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">SS No. 864 of 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">18 October 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kow Keng Siong </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Rajwin Singh Sandhu (M/s Rajwin & Yong LLP) for the Wife; Patrick Fernandez (M/s Fernandez LLC) for the Husband. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XFL — XFM </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Orders for protection</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Considerations for determining whether conduct amounts to family violence under the “continual harassment” limb in s 64 of the Women’s Charter 1961</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Orders for protection</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Considerations for making personal protection orders</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Orders for protection</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Considerations for determining the duration of personal protection orders</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">18 October 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kow Keng Siong:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 SS No. 864 of 2024 is an application by the Wife for a personal protection order (“<b>PPO</b>”) for her 2½-year-old Son (D.O.B: 12 January 2022) and herself. The Respondent is the Husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 After a trial, I granted the Wife’s application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 These are the reasons for my decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Wife’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 The Wife’s PPO application is based on the following claims:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_a\"></a>(a) First, the Husband had committed acts which came within <em>limb (a)</em> of the definition of “family violence” in s 64 of Women’s Charter 1961 (“<b>Charter</b>”) – i.e., he had wilfully or knowingly placed her in fear of hurt through the commission of the relevant acts. (“<b>1<sup>st</sup> Claim</b>”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_b\"></a>(b) Second, the Husband had also committed acts which came within <em>limb (d)</em> of the definition of “family violence” in s 64 – i.e., he had committed acts of continual harassment with intent to cause or knowing that the harassment was likely to cause anguish to her. (“<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Claim</b>”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The Wife gave the following evidence in support of her claims.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">1<sup>st</sup> Claim<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 On 6 May 2024, while in their matrimonial home (“<b>Flat</b>”), the Husband became extremely upset with the Wife and her father over how they were feeding and managing the Son (“<b>feeding issues</b>”). When the Wife eventually called the Police for assistance to manage the Husband, he became even more upset. After the Police left the Flat, the Husband continued to vent his anger – by picking up the Son and pushing the Wife’s father out of the Flat.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> The Wife decided to leave the Flat with the Son and her father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 The Wife tendered two audio recordings – “C2” (“<b>long audio recording</b>”) and “C3” (“<b>short audio recording</b>”) – to show that the Husband had behaved aggressively during the above incident (“<b>6 May incident</b>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_a\"></a>(a) The long audio recording lasted about 30 mins. It recorded events <em>before and including</em> the time the Police arrived at the Flat.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> The following can be heard from the recording:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_a-p3_i\"></a>(i) For about 20 mins, before the Police arrived, the Husband berated the Wife over the feeding issues and her decision to call the Police. Additionally, he (1) hurled vulgarities at her<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> and (2) threatened to “go crazy” and to evict her father “straight away” if she insisted on reporting him to the Police.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_a-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) In the midst of the shouting and scolding, there was a loud crash. According to the Wife, this was the sound of toys falling to the floor after the Husband had kicked a table (in anger) where the toys were placed.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_a-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) After the Police arrived at the Flat, the Wife told them that she had called for them because she was “scared” that the Husband might beat her.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_b\"></a>(b) The short audio recording lasted about 4½ mins. It recorded events <em>after</em> the Police had left the Flat. In the recording, the Husband could be heard raising his voice and using vulgarities.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 According to the Wife, the 6 May incident was not the first time that the Husband had “acted aggressively and roughly”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_a\"></a>(a) Prior to the incident, the Husband had scolded her on other occasions. He had also pulled her hair and dragged her for a distance. On one occasion, the Husband slapped her face so forcefully that her lips bled. The Wife used to have recordings of these incidents of family violence. However, sometime on or around 2018, the Husband smashed her handphone, tablet, and laptop which contained these recordings.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_b\"></a>(b) Prior to the 6 May incident, the Husband had also hit the Son. The child was only 18 months’ old when the violence first began.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> The Husband would put the dog leash on the table and beat the Son if he did not eat properly.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> At times, he would also slap the Son out of frustration and anger.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_c\"></a>(c) On 14 April 2024, the Husband had “very violently slapped” the Son and whipped him with the leash (“<b>14 April incident</b>”). To prove this, the Wife tendered photos which showed bruises on the Son’s face and arm.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">2<sup>nd</sup> Claim</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 According to the Wife, throughout the marriage, the Husband had frequently shouted at her, spoke to her in a demeaning manner, and used vulgarities at her. The Husband knew that she was uncomfortable with such behaviour.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Husband’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 The Husband denied the Wife’s claims.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 Regarding the 6 May incident, the Husband admitted to having uttered expletives. However, he explained that this was done out of frustration at the Wife’s failure to cooperate with him in “compelling” the Son to finish his food. The Husband did not intend to hurt her emotionally.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 As for the 14 April incident, the Husband explained that he had difficulty coaxing the Son to eat at the material time. Out of anger, he picked up a dog leash and showed it to the Son – merely to “scare” him into completing his meal. The Husband denied having hit the child’s face and arm.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> According to the Husband, the red marks on the Son (as shown in the photos) could have been caused by other factors, such as, redness from heat, the child scratching himself, mosquito bites, etc.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Applicable principles</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Requirements for PPO</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 Before I proceed to analyse the parties’ case and evidence, it is useful to set out the requirements for issuing a PPO. In this regard, s 65(1) of the Charter states that –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The court may, upon satisfaction on a balance of probabilities that <em>family violence has been committed </em><b><em>or </em></b><em>is likely to be committed against a family member</em> and that <em>it is necessary for the protection of the family member</em>, make a protection order restraining the person against whom the order is made from using family violence against the family member.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis in bold and italics added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 On a plain reading of s 65(1), the Wife must prove two things to succeed in her PPO application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, the Wife must prove that the Husband had committed or “is likely” to commit family violence against the Son and herself.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, she must also prove that a PPO “is necessary” to protect the Son and herself from future violence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 I have some general observations regarding these requirements.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">First requirement – Observations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 It is clear from s 65(1) that there is <em>no need</em> for an applicant to prove that family violence has been committed to satisfy the first requirement. It is sufficient for the applicant to show – on a balance of probabilities – that such violence “is likely to be committed against a family member”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 This reading is in line with –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_a\"></a>(a) First, the <em>“pre-emptive”</em> purpose of a PPO – i.e., to protect an applicant from family violence, and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_b\"></a>(b) Second, the settled principle that a PPO is <em>not intended to punish</em> a respondent for past violence: <em>Lai Kwok Kin v Teo Zien Jackson</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/25309-SSP.xml')\">[2020] 5 SLR 389</a> (“<b><em>Lai Kwok Kin</em></b>”) at [38]; <em>Yue Tock Him v Yee Ee Lim</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2011] SGDC 0099.xml')\">[2011] SGDC 99</a> at [10]; <em>WSD v WSE</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30956-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 1</a> (“<b><em>WSD</em></b>”) at [1].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Second requirement – Observations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 I now come to the second requirement.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Risk assessment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 Clearly, the question of whether a PPO is necessary or not involves a risk assessment – i.e., <em>how likely will the respondent commit family violence against the applicant in future?</em></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 If there is little or no risk of such violence, then the applicant does not require protection, and a PPO will thus be unnecessary. Factors that are relevant to this risk assessment include the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_a\"></a>(a) <b>What are the reasons/circumstances for the family violence</b>: <em>XDV v XDW</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32454-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 87</a> at [15] and [17]. For instance, the fact that a respondent tries to walk away from the applicant’s abusive and relentless taunting but eventually succumbs to the continual provocation is a relevant consideration. This is because the family violence is self-induced.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_b\"></a>(b) <b>Whether the family violence is a recent occurrence</b>. Courts have declined to issue a PPO where a significant amount of time had passed (since the family violence) by the time of the hearing: <em>UNQ v UNR</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25291-SSP.xml')\">[2020] SGHCF 21</a> at [38] (more than two years had lapsed); <em>GFS v GFT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/29939-SSP.xml')\">[2023] SGFC 21</a> (“<b><em>GFS</em></b>”) at [113] (between one to 17 years had lapsed); <em>VFM v VFN</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26547-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 91</a> (“<b><em>VFM</em></b>”) (more than two years had lapsed) at [79].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_c\"></a>(c) <b>Whether the family violence is a one-off occurrence</b>. For examples where this was found to be a relevant consideration, see <em>TED v TEE</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/17809-SSP.xml')\">[2015] SGFC 88</a> at [35]; <em>VFM</em> at [79]-[81].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_20-p2_d\"></a>(d) <b>Whether there has been a material change in the circumstances</b>. Courts have declined to issue PPO where the parties have (since the family violence) ceased physical interactions or are no longer residing together. See <em>XDL v XDM</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32241-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 83</a> at [9] to [12]; <em>WSD</em> at [38]; <em>GFS</em> at [115]; <em>CSW v CSX</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27616-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGFC 47</a> (“<b><em>CSW</em></b>”) at [72].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 On the other hand, if there is a real risk of future family violence, then a PPO will be appropriate. Factors that may be indicative of such a risk include the following.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_a\"></a>(a) <b>The underlying cause for family violence remains unresolved</b>. For an example of this, see <em>VKW v VKX</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24914-SSP.xml')\">[2020] SGFC 70</a> (“<b><em>VKW</em></b>”) at [2] and [27(b)].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_b\"></a>(b) <b>The parties are likely to have future interactions</b>. Examples of this include the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) The parties are still living in the same household: <em>TJH v TJI</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/18339-SSP.xml')\">[2015] SGFC 160</a> at [51] and [52] (the parties were siblings); <em>UFD v UFC</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/20754-SSP.xml')\">[2017] SGFC 106</a> at [3], [19] and [20] (the parties were siblings).</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) The parties need to interact because of child access: <em>TQY v TQZ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/19299-SSP.xml')\">[2016] SGFC 100</a> at [38] and [39] (divorce proceedings pending); <em>WKZ v WKY</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/29504-SSP.xml')\">[2023] SGFC 7</a> at [40] and [42] (divorce proceedings pending); <em>AMT v AMV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2011] SGDC 0114.xml')\">[2011] SGDC 114</a> at [64] and [65] (parties were divorced); <em>VMW v VMX</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25341-SSP.xml')\">[2020] SGFC 97</a> at [4], [5] and [26] (parties were divorced).</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_b-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) There is a need for one party to visit the other party’s residence to see a close relative: <em>VPK v VPJ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25668-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 18</a> at [22] and [23] (parties were siblings and their mother resided with one of them); <em>VDL v VDM</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23972-SSP.xml')\">[2019] SGFC 138</a> at [44]-[46] (parties were father and son, and the latter’s mother was residing with the father);</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c\"></a>(c) <b>The respondent is deeply antagonistic towards the applicant</b>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_d\"></a>(d) <b>The respondent has a propensity for violence.</b> Such a propensity –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_d-p3_i\"></a>(i) may be due to, e.g., a personality trait or mental condition: see <em>WVK v WVJ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30973-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 5</a> at [22] (where the respondent had difficulty regulating her emotions around the applicant), or</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_d-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) may be inferred, e.g., from the fact that his criminal antecedents for violence or that PPO has been previously ordered against him/her: <em>VKW</em> at [27(c)].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_e\"></a>(e) <b>The respondent is unapologetic for the family violence committed</b>. For instance, the respondent –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_e-p3_i\"></a>(i) shows no remorse for the violence that he/she has committed: <em>WSD</em> at [55] and [56]; <em>WDR v WDQ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27586-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGFC 46</a> at [89] and [91],</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_e-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) seeks to minimise the seriousness or impact of his/her acts of family violence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_f\"></a>(f) <b>There is an escalation in the family violence</b>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_g\"></a>(g) <b>Further violence is committed after the PPO application</b>. Evidence of such post-complaint violence may be considered so long as the respondent (i) is not taken by surprise and (ii) has been given sufficient opportunity to respond to the evidence at the trial: <em>Teng Cheng Sin v Law Fay Yuen</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2003] 3 SLR(R) 0356.xml')\">[2003] 3 SLR(R) 356</a> at [19] and [20]; <em>Lai Kwok Kin</em> at [57] – [60]; <em>VFM v VFN</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26547-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 91</a> at [44]-[47]; <em>VAW v VAX</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25988-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 50</a> at [52] and [55]; <em>VYW v VYV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27025-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGFC 2</a> at [32] – [39]; <em>BCY v BCZ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2012] SGDC 0360.xml')\">[2012] SGDC 360</a> at [6] – [9].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Collateral purposes</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 It bears emphasis that PPOs will not be issued where they are sought to serve a collateral purpose. Courts have dismissed such applications where they are sought –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_22-p2_a\"></a>(a) To bolster an applicant’s request for the care and control of her children: <em>CSW</em> at [13]-[17];</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_22-p2_b\"></a>(b) To indirectly challenge a child handover order: <em>CSW</em> at [18] and [19];</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_22-p2_c\"></a>(c) To resolve a dispute regarding (i) child access (<em>UNQ</em> at [39]) or (ii) trivial matters (<em>VKW</em> at [15]).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Need for deterrence</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 Finally, it is also relevant to consider whether there is a need for a PPO to <em>deter</em> future family violence. Let me explain.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_23-p2_a\"></a>(a) The possibility of arrest and being investigated by the Police can be a powerful deterrent against the commission of family violence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_23-p2_b\"></a>(b) However, such a possibility may not be available if the offence arising from such violence is a “non-arrestable offence” in law. Examples include family violence which involve (i) assault / using criminal force under s 352 and (ii) voluntarily causing hurt under s 323 of the Penal Code 1871. What this means is that the perpetrators of such offences cannot be arrested without a warrant.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_23-p2_c\"></a>(c) A PPO can address this issue. This is because the breach of a PPO is itself an arrestable offence: s 65(11) of the Charter. Thus, a respondent who voluntarily causes hurt to an applicant after the latter has been given a PPO may be arrested for breaching the order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">My Decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 I will now apply the above principles to the present case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The Husband has committed family violence</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 I find that the Husband had committed family violence. My reasons for this finding are as follows.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Family violence on 14 April 2024</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 <em>First</em>, there is the Wife’s evidence that the Husband had slapped the 2½-year-old Son and whipped him with a dog leash on 14 April 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 The Husband did not dispute that such an act, if true, would constitute family violence. Indeed, during the trial, it was put to the Wife that whipping the Son with a leash was a serious and cruel act.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 The only factual matter that had to be decided is whether the Husband did in fact whip and slap the Son. In my view, the answer is yes.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_a\"></a>(a) There is no evidence to show why the Wife would want to falsely accuse the Husband of having whipped the Son.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_b\"></a>(b) Furthermore, the fact that such an act had taken place is supported by objective evidence. There are photos that show injuries on the Son’s left cheek and left forearm.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_18\" id=\"Ftn_18_1\"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span> I found the Husband’s evidence that these injuries might have been caused by heat rash, mosquito bites, or the Son scratching himself to defy belief.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Wife’s claim that the Husband had whipped the Son with a dog leash is also supported by the Husband’s own admission to having used the dog leash to force the Son to eat. I disbelieve his evidence that the leash was used merely as a “scare tactic”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 The Husband submitted that I should disbelieve the Wife’s evidence regarding the 14 April incident because there is no medical report of the Son’s injuries or police report regarding the incident.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_19\" id=\"Ftn_19_1\"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span> I was not persuaded by the Husband’s submission.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_29-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Wife had explained that she was afraid that if she had brought the Son to see a doctor or lodged a police report, this could cause the Husband to lose his job and thus cause the family to suffer.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_20\" id=\"Ftn_20_1\"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> I found this explanation to be inherently credible.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_29-p2_b\"></a>(b) Furthermore, the Wife’s explanation is supported by the long audio recording. In the recording, the Husband could be heard <em>repeatedly</em> warning the Wife not to complain to the police as doing so would “destroy” his life and the family.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Family violence on 6 May 2024</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 <em>Second</em>, there is the Wife’s evidence regarding the 6 May incident.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 The Husband submitted that he did not commit family violence during the incident because he did cause hurt to either the Wife or the Son.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_21\" id=\"Ftn_21_1\"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 I am unable to accept the Husband’s submission.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_a\"></a>(a) Given [16] above and the nature of the Wife’s case (see [4] to [9] above), to make out the first requirement, it is sufficient if the Wife could prove –</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_a-p3_i\"></a>(i) That the Husband had wilfully or knowingly placed her in fear of hurt,</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_a-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) That he had committed acts of continual harassment with intent to cause or knowing that the harassment was likely to cause anguish to her, or</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_a-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) That he was likely to commit family violence in future.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_b\"></a>(b) It is evident from the audio recordings that the Husband had a violent temperament.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) For about 20 mins, the Husband “went crazy” (to borrow his own words) – he repeatedly shouted, used expletives, and even kicked a table – all because of (1) how he had perceived the Wife to have mis-managed the Son’s feeding and (2) her decision to call the Police.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) During the entire episode, the Wife did not do anything that could reasonably be said to be provocative.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_32-p2_b-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) From the audio recordings, the Husband’s tone and words to the Wife were clearly threatening. He must have known that such aggression had affected the Wife – she repeatedly told him not to speak harshly.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Family violence on other occasions </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 <em>Third</em>, the Wife had also alleged that there were other incidents where the Husband was physically violent towards the Son and her: see [8(a)] above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 In my view, the Wife is probably telling the truth regarding these incidents.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_34-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Wife struck me an honest witness who gave evidence in a straightforward manner.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_34-p2_b\"></a>(b) If the Wife’s complaints of family violence were motivated by malice, she could easily have embellished her evidence – e.g., by claiming that the Husband had inflicted <em>physical</em> harm on the Son during the 6 May incident, or by testifying he had committed <em>more</em> incidents of family violence. She did not do so – despite having been specifically questioned on these matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 In contrast, there is evidence that the Husband could be manipulative. For instance –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_a\"></a>(a) During the trial, the Husband tried to portray the Wife as someone who was aggressive and who used vulgarities. However, this is not borne out by both the audio recordings and the Wife’s conduct during the trial. She spoke calmly and was soft-spoken in the audio recordings and in court.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_b\"></a>(b) During the trial, the Husband had also explained that the loud crash heard in the long audio recording was the sound of a passing motorcycle. I found this explanation to be incredible – as the sound did not resemble what the Husband had described.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_c\"></a>(c) From the long audio recording, the Husband could be heard (a) trying to dissuade the Wife from reporting him to the Police because it would “destroy” the family, and (b) threatening to “go crazy” and to evict the Wife’s father “straight away” if she insisted on reporting him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Whether there had been continual harassment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_36\"></a>36 <em>Finally</em>, there is the Wife’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Claim – i.e., the Husband had “continually harassed” her intending to cause or knowing that it was likely to cause her “anguish”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_37\"></a>37 To prove family violence under the “continual harassment” limb, the following must be established:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_a\"></a>(a) The respondent has committed “harassment” – i.e., an act of annoying or worrying the applicant by putting pressure on him/her or saying or doing unpleasant things to him/her.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_22\" id=\"Ftn_22_1\"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_b\"></a>(b) The harassment is “continual” – i.e., repeated, repetitive. <span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_23\" id=\"Ftn_23_1\"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_37-p2_c\"></a>(c) The respondent has carried out the continual harassment with the intention or the knowledge that it is likely to cause “anguish” – i.e., severe pain, mental suffering, or unhappiness – to the applicant.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_24\" id=\"Ftn_24_1\"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"\"></a>Courts have recognised repetitive conduct that causes worry, emotional distress or annoyance as coming within the scope of “continual harassment” under limb (d): see e.g., <em>Yue Tock Him v Yee Ee Lim</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2011] SGDC 0099.xml')\">[2011] SGDC 99</a> at [33].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_38\"></a>38 In my view, the Husband had committed family violence under the “continual harassment” limb.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_a\"></a>(a) During the 6 May incident, the Husband could be heard in the audio recordings repeatedly (i) berating the Wife and (ii) using vulgar and demeaning language towards her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_b\"></a>(b) According to the Wife, the 6 May incident was not the only time that the Husband had treated her in such a manner. For the reasons stated in [34] above, I believed her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_38-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Husband must have known that his repeated use of vulgar and demeaning language towards the Wife would cause her emotional distress. In the long audio recording, the Wife could be heard repeatedly telling him to stop using such offensive language.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">PPO is necessary</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_39\"></a>39 Having found that the first requirement for PPO has been proved, I now come to the issue of whether a PPO is necessary to protect the Wife and the Son (i.e., the second requirement for a PPO).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_40\"></a>40 I am mindful that the Wife and Son are no longer staying in the Flat with the Husband. This can support an argument that they do not need any protection from the Husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_41\"></a>41 In my view however, a PPO is still necessary. These are my reasons.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, it is clear to me that the Husband resented the Wife for (i) having left the Flat with the Son, (ii) how she had been caring for the child, and (ii) having deprived him of access to the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, at the time of the PPO hearing, the issue of which party is to have care, control, and access to the child had not been conclusively resolved with a court order on ancillary matters yet.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Third</em>, the parties will need to interact to facilitate the Husband’s access to the Son. The evidence shows that the Husband was prepared to resort to force to get back the Son. According to the Wife, after 6 May 2024, there was an occasion when she facilitated a meeting between the Husband and the Son. On that occasion, the Husband had attempted to run away with the child. The Husband did not dispute this aspect of the Wife’s evidence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_d\"></a>(d) <em>Finally</em>, the Husband seemed to have little insight into his violent temperament. For instance, he claimed that it was normal for couples to use vulgar language at each other. Additionally, the Husband alleged that he was agitated during the 6 May incident because the Wife had used profanities against him. This claim is not supported by the audio recordings. Even if the Wife had provoked the Husband, his continual verbal abusive of her is wholly disproportionate. The Husband’s explanations for his behaviour during the 6 May incident show two things: either (i) he had little insight into his anger management issues, or (ii) he was not remorseful for his behaviour. This is a matter of concern given [41(a)] to [41(c)] above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The order</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_42\"></a>42 Given the above, I order that the Husband is not to use family violence in any form against the Wife and the Son. I wish to emphasise to the Husband two things. <em>First</em>, it is an offence to contravene the order that I have made. <em>Second</em>, if the Husband were to intentionally contravene the order, he can be arrested and be punished with a fine and/or imprisonment.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_43\"></a>43 The PPO shall take immediate effect and last for a period of 24 months. (In other words, the order will expire on 17 October 2026.) In determining the duration of the PPO, I have considered the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_43-p2_a\"></a>(a) It is settled law that the reach of a judicial decision or order should not be excessive.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_43-p2_b\"></a>(b) When this principle is applied to s 65, what this means is that a PPO should not extend beyond the duration necessary to protect an applicant. In determining the duration, the following are relevant: (i) The nature of the parties’ relationship. (ii) The nature of underlying issue that gave rise to the family violence and whether this can be resolved. (iii) If the answer is yes, then the likely duration for resolving the issue.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_43-p2_c\"></a>(c) For instance, if there is evidence that the parties’ relationship can be restored and rebuilt, e.g. with the concurrent order of a counselling order, then a PPO with a fixed duration may be appropriate. For examples, see e.g., <em>XBC v XBD</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32020-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 63</a> at [62] and [63]; <em>WVK v WVJ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31177-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 15</a> at [1] and [24]; <em>VKW v VKX</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24914-SSP.xml')\">[2020] SGFC 70</a> at [2], [27] and [28]; <em>VDL v VDM</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23972-SSP.xml')\">[2019] SGFC 138</a> at [46].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_43-p2_d\"></a>(d) In the present case, there is no evidence to suggest that the Wife and Son need protection from the Husband for an indefinite period. The parties have been living apart since the 6 May incident and appear to be taking steps to end their marriage and go their separate ways.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_43-p2_e\"></a>(e) At the end of the divorce process, care, control and access relating to the Child – issues which have been the cause of conflict between the parties – will have been resolved.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_43-p2_f\"></a>(f) Depending on whether the divorce and ancillary matters are contested or not, the process may take months to one/two years to complete.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_44\"></a>44 Hopefully, by the end of two years, a PPO is no longer needed. However, if I am wrong, then the Wife can either apply to extend the PPO (under s 67 of the Charter) or apply for a fresh PPO, whichever is appropriate.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Costs</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_45\"></a>45 Finally, I come to the issue of costs. The Wife had asked for costs at $8,000.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_46\"></a>46 In my view, costs order at $5,000 (in favour of the Wife) is more appropriate. My reasons are as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_46-p2_a\"></a>(a) The trial is straightforward and lasted for only half a day.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_46-p2_b\"></a>(b) There were only two witnesses (i.e., the parties themselves).</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_46-p2_c\"></a>(c) The evidence and submissions are not voluminous.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_46-p2_d\"></a>(d) The Wife’s counsel appeared only at the 3<sup>rd</sup> (last) mention and the trial.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_46-p2_e\"></a>(e) The Husband would have asked for $5,000 in costs if he had succeeded in the trial.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>Complainant’s Written Submissions dated 8 October 2024 at [4].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at pages 19 and 20.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>The arrival of the Police is recorded in C2 at about 19:20.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>The vulgarities are recorded in C2 at, e.g., (1) 00.08, (2) 00.27, (3) 00.36, (4) 06:34, (5) 06.51, (6) 07:01, (7) 08:15, (8) 09:44, (9) 10:16, (10) 14:36, (11) 15:21, (12) 15:58, (13), 17:05, (14)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>The threats are recorded in C2 at, e.g., (1) 07:51, (2) 08:02, (3) 16:40, (4) 16:57, (5)</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>This is recorded in C2 at 13:19.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>This is recorded in C2 at 26:22.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>This is recorded in C3 at (1) 00:22, (2) 01:06, (3) 02:18, (4) 02:45,</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [3] and [4].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [24].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [4].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [21].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [20].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [23].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>Complainant’s Written Submissions dated 8 October 2024 at [5] and [23].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 21 May 2024 at [27] and [28].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>Father’s Submissions dated4 October 2024 at [11].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_18_1\" id=\"Ftn_18\">[note: 18]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [23].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_19_1\" id=\"Ftn_19\">[note: 19]</a></sup>Father’s Submissions at [10].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_20_1\" id=\"Ftn_20\">[note: 20]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 20 July 2024 at [4].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_21_1\" id=\"Ftn_21\">[note: 21]</a></sup>Father’s Submissions at [12] and [15].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_22_1\" id=\"Ftn_22\">[note: 22]</a></sup>See definition of “harassment” in the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries online, accessible at – https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_23_1\" id=\"Ftn_23\">[note: 23]</a></sup>See definition of “continual” in the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries online, accessible at – https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_24_1\" id=\"Ftn_24\">[note: 24]</a></sup>See definition of “anguish” in the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries online, accessible at – https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Maintenance – Child – Whether it is reasonable to order a father to start paying his son $1,000/month for an educational course that his son intends to apply for only about two years later"],"date":"2024-10-30","court":"Family Court","case-number":"MSS No. 1404 of 2024","title":"XFP v XFQ","citation":"[2024] SGFC 97","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32408-SSP.xml","counsel":["Son and Father in person."],"timestamp":"2024-11-15T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kow Keng Siong","html":"<root><head><title>XFP v XFQ</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XFP <em>v</em> XFQ </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32408-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 97</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">MSS No. 1404 of 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">30 October 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kow Keng Siong </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Son and Father in person. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XFP — XFQ </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Maintenance</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Child</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Whether it is reasonable to order a father to start paying his son $1,000/month for an educational course that his son intends to apply for only about two years later</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">30 October 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kow Keng Siong:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 Under the Women’s Charter 1961 (“<b>Charter</b>”), a parent may be ordered to maintain his/her adult child if the latter “<em>would be</em> receiving instruction at an educational establishment”. S, a young adult, <em>plans to apply</em> for a course in a local university after his National Service (“<b>NS</b>”) ends in about two years’ time. Should S’s father be ordered to make payments to S, while he is still in NS, so that S can save up the money for the course? This is the issue in MSS No. 1404 of 2024 (“<b>MSS 1404</b>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The application</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 At the time of the hearing, the applicant (“<b>Son</b>”) (D.O.B.: 8 November 2002) was serving his NS. He planned to apply in February/March 2025 for a course run by the Singapore Institute of Technology (“<b>SIT</b>”). The outcome of such an application would only be made known in June/July 2025. If successful, the Son would commence the course only around August 2026.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The Son initiated MSS 1404 to compel the respondent (“<b>Father</b>”) to start paying $1,000/month<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> while he is still in NS. The Son planned to use these payments to fund the SIT course (estimated at $30,000+). He commenced MSS 1404 because he believed that the Father had the funds and was concerned that they might be depleted when the course was due to start.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The Father’s position</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 During the hearing, the Father stated that he was surprised and “confused” by MSS 1404 – as the Son did not inform him of his plans to apply for an SIT course prior to the application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 That said, the Father made it clear that he was fully prepared to pay the course fees. However, he was facing financial hardship at the material time, and he could start making the payments only from 2026 – i.e., when the course was expected to begin. The Father was prepared to tap into his monies in the Central Provident Fund (“<b>CPF</b>”) to pay the course fees. In this regard, he had about $240,000 in his CPF Ordinary Account – which would be more than enough to cover the fees. While he was prepared to pay the fees, the Father felt that his ex-wife (“<b>Mother</b>”) should be making contributions as well.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Governing provisions</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Section 69(2)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 The Son initiated MSS 1404 pursuant to s 69(2) of the Charter. According to this provision –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">(2) The court <em>may</em>, on due proof that a parent <em>has neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance</em> for his or her child who is unable to maintain himself or herself, order that parent to pay monthly sums or a lump sum <em>for the maintenance of that child</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Section 69(5)(c)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 When applying s 69(2) to MSS 1404, it is essential to also consider s 69(5)(c) of the Charter. The latter provision states that –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">(5) The court <em>shall not make</em> an order under subsection (2) for the benefit of a child <em>who has attained 21 years of age</em> or for a period that extends beyond the day on which the child will attain that age <em>unless</em> the court is satisfied that the provision of the maintenance is <em>necessary</em> because –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">…</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(c) the child is or will be or (if an order were made under subsection (2)) <em>would be</em> receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment,</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-2\">…</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Observations</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 I pause to make a few observations.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_a\"></a>(a) For MSS 1404 to succeed, the Son must prove two things. <em>First</em>, that the payments which he is seeking qualify as “reasonable maintenance”. <em>Second</em>, that the Father has “neglected or refused” to provide the maintenance sought: s 69(2).</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_b\"></a>(b) As the Son “has attained 21 years of age”, a court may order the payments sought <em>only if</em> he “would be receiving instruction at an educational establishment”: s 69(5)(c).</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_c\"></a>(c) In applying s 69(5)(c), the following bears highlighting. <em>First</em>, the Charter does not specifically oblige a parent to fund his/her child’s tertiary education. <em>Second</em>, the obligation to provide maintenance under s 69(2) does not require a parent to pay for all the expenses of a child’s tertiary education: <em>UYT v UYU</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/25733-SSP.xml')\">[2021] 3 SLR 539</a> at [12] and [13].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_8-p2_d\"></a>(d) Ultimately, a court retains the discretion under s 69(2) (“may”) whether to order a parent to pay for his/her child’s tertiary education expenses – and if so, (i) <em>how much</em> of such expenses the parent should bear and (ii) <em>when</em> the payments ought to begin.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">My decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 In my view, the Son had failed to prove that the payments sought are both “reasonable” (s 69(2)) and “necessary” (s 69(5)(c)). These are my reasons.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Requested payments are neither “necessary” nor “reasonable”</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 <em>First</em>, the Son had failed to satisfy the legal requirement that he “<em>would be</em> receiving instruction at an educational establishment” in due course. At the time of the hearing, he had not even applied for the SIT course yet. In deciding whether to allow MSS 1404, I cannot assume (a) that the Son will apply for the course in 2025, or (b) that he will be admitted into the course in 2026 (if the application is made). Clearly, if the Son does not make the application or is unsuccessful, then it is <em>not necessary</em> to pay the course fees at all.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 <em>Second</em>, MSS 1404 is in effect a request for maintenance to be paid <em>in advance</em>. I am unable to locate a precedent where such maintenance has been ordered. In my view, it is wrong in principle to allow the Son’s request.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_a\"></a>(a) Courts order child maintenance base on what a child <em>needs</em> and not what the child (or his/her parents) <em>wants</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_b\"></a>(b) MSS 1404 is contrary to the above well-established principle. This is because its purpose is <em>not</em> to secure funds to meet the Son’s <em>current financial needs</em>. Instead, the purpose of MSS 1404 is to advance his <em>aspirational goal</em> – by establishing an education fund that he can tap on sometime in the <em>future</em>, if he is admitted into the SIT course.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_11-p2_c\"></a>(c) The situation in the present case is similar to <em>UAP v UAQ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/21471-SSP.xml')\">[2018] 3 SLR 319</a>. In that case, the High Court wisely declined to order maintenance to cover the son’s tertiary fees. This is because at the time of judgement, the son “had not yet decided on his college choice”. In the circumstances, the High Court found that to order “a specific sum for [a child’s] tertiary education was too remote”: judgement at [98].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 <em>Third</em>, ordering the Father to pay maintenance in advance will create raise a host of issues – given that there is no certainty that the Son will be admitted into the SIT course. For instance, if his application for the 2026 enrolment is unsuccessful, what will happen to the payments already made? Is the Son supposed to hold onto them until he is admitted into the course? What if he is not admitted any time soon – or at all? There can still be complications even if the Son is admitted into the course. For instance, if the course fees turn out to be higher than expected, will the Son have to make another application to increase the amount of payable?</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 <em>Fourth</em>, it bears highlighting that child maintenance is a <em>shared</em> parental duty. In other words, both the Father <em>and the Mother</em> have a joint responsibility in supporting the Son’s course fees. In this case, the Mother was apparently working as a freelance renovation contractor. To determine what their respective contribution towards the fees should be, it is necessary for me to consider, among others, the Father’s and Mothers’ relative income, earning capacity and assets (“<b>financial position</b>”). In this case, while I had the Father’s financial position,<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> I did not know the Mother’s position. In the absence of such information, I have no basis to find that the Father should be solely responsible for funding the Son’s course fees – without any financial contribution from the Mother whatsoever.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The Father’s financial circumstances</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 I now come to the Son’s submission that the Father has the available funds to make the requested payments. This submission is based photos posted online by the Father’s second wife (“<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Wife</b>”). They were apparently posted in June/July 2024 and show that she had a branded watch and bag, and was counting stacks of cash.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 I am not persuaded by the Son’s submission.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, as shown in [10] above, the Son was unable to cross the legal threshold for ordering maintenance. He was also unable to show that his application for maintenance in advance is consistent with settled jurisprudence. In the circumstances, the Son’s belief that the Father had sufficient funds is neither here nor there.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, and in any event, the Son did not adduce any evidence to show that the Father had the relevant funds at the time of the hearing. His belief that the Father had such funds was based on speculation – namely a watch, a bag and cash in the possession <em>of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Wife</em>. According to the Father, the watch and bag were bought several years ago – the watch in 2018 (by him) and the bag in 2019 (by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Wife). The Father added that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Wife and him kept their finances separate.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Finally</em>, the following evidence – which was not disputed by the Son – in fact shows that the Father was in dire financial straits.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c-p3_i\"></a>(i) At the time of the hearing, the Father was indebted to five banks and was on various repayment plans to discharge these debts.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> According to the Father, these debts were incurred while running his construction business.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) About one year before the hearing (i.e., in September 2023), the Father had traded in his 2021 Mercedes E Class (valued at about $400,000) for a 15-year-old Mercedes S Class (valued at about $50,000).</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) The Father had not been timely in paying child maintenance (total: $2,500) for the Son and daughter, and would pay the arrears in sums of $3,000 and $5,000 when he could.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_d\"></a>(d) Given the above, I accepted the Father’s submission that allowing MSS 1404 will add to his current financial hardship.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 For the above reasons, I dismissed MSS 1404.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 Before concluding, I wish to make a few observations.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_a\"></a>(a) During the hearing, the Father did not express any anger towards the Son for having hauled him to court over MSS 1404. At all material times, he spoke tenderly to the Son. At the beginning of the hearing, the Father had in fact addressed the Son as “Dear” – before he quickly corrected himself and addressed the Son by his English name. From my observation of the Father, it is clear to me that he loved the Son dearly.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_b\"></a>(b) At the end of the hearing, the Father was visibly and genuinely sad that the Son had turned to the law to compel him to fund the SIT course. According to the Father, the Son had not called him for a long time, and the first time that he came to know of the latter’s intention to pursue an SIT course was on receiving MSS 1404. The Father teared when he stressed that he was prepared to help the Son – “not because the law says so” – but as a parent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Son should remember the Father’s love and words. The law is a blunt tool and has its limits. Experience has shown that issues achieve better outcomes through honest and direct communication. Whatever may have been the reasons for the apparent lack of communication between the Son and Father, it is never too late to press the reset button.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_d\"></a>(d) In this regard, the Son’s aspiration to pursue tertiary education can be a good opportunity for him to reconnect with the Father. In my view, the Father sincerely wants to make the Son to be a better man than he is – including by providing the latter a tertiary education that he (the Father) did not have. I urge the parties to start communicating directly with each other.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>During the hearing, the Son stated that he was open to receiving a lower amount – at least $500/month to $600/month – if this is deemed more appropriate.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>This information is in the Father’s statement dated 10 September 2024 (exhibit R1).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>The Son’s statement dated 17 August 2024 at pages 127 to 131.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>For details, see Father’s statement dated 10 September 2024 (exhibit R1) at pages 24 to 34.</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Variation of ancillary matters orders – Care and control – Section 128 of the Women’s Charter 1961 – Material change in circumstances – Applicable considerations","Family Law – Variation of ancillary matters orders – Access – Drafting of clause that prohibits access being conducted in the presence of non-family members"],"date":"2024-10-29","court":"Family Court","case-number":"FC/D No. 1721 of 2023 (FC/SUM No. 2056 of 2024)","title":"XER v XES","citation":"[2024] SGFC 98","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32423-SSP.xml","counsel":["Pang Khin Wee (M/s I.R.B. Law LLP) for the Father","Dylan Han Yong Ding & Angela Hing Wei Yuen (M/s Integro Law Chambers) for the Mother."],"timestamp":"2024-11-07T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kow Keng Siong","html":"<root><head><title>XER v XES</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XER <em>v</em> XES </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32423-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 98</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">FC/D No. 1721 of 2023 (FC/SUM No. 2056 of 2024)</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">29 October 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kow Keng Siong </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Pang Khin Wee (M/s I.R.B. Law LLP) for the Father; Dylan Han Yong Ding & Angela Hing Wei Yuen (M/s Integro Law Chambers) for the Mother. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XER — XES </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Variation of ancillary matters orders</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Care and control</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Section 128 of the Women’s Charter 1961</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Material change in circumstances</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Applicable considerations</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Variation of ancillary matters orders</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Access</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Drafting of clause that prohibits access being conducted in the presence of non-family members</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">29 October 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kow Keng Siong:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 Does the “discovery” of a fact – which has existed for years <em>before</em> a care and control order is made by consent – <em>after</em> the order is made qualify as a “material change in circumstances” for the purpose of varying the order? When drafting a clause to prohibit child access from being conducted in the presence of non-family members, how can a balance be struck between the needs for <em>practicality</em> and <em>child safety</em>? These are some of the issues to be addressed in this judgement.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The Plaintiff (“<b>Father</b>”) and Defendant (“<b>Mother</b>”) were married in 2015 and have an eight-year-old daughter (D.O.B. 6 June 2016) (“<b>Daughter</b>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 In 2023, the Father commenced divorce proceedings. In the same year, interim judgement for divorce was entered and ancillary matters orders were made by consent in FC/ORC 5452/2023 (“<b>AM Order</b>”). Under the AM Order, the Mother was given care and control of the Daughter with access granted to the Father. The dissolution of the marriage was made final in 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">The application</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 About seven months after the AM Order was made, the Father sought to vary it in the following manner:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_a\"></a>(a) First, to allow the Father to be the Daughter’s caregiver instead of the Mother. (“<b>Prayer 3</b>”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_4-p2_b\"></a>(b) If Prayer 3 was disallowed – then to vary the terms of the child access. <em>First</em>, by allowing the Father to carry out the access in the presence of non-family members. (“<b>Prayers 4 and 5</b>”) <em>Second</em>, by increasing the number of ways in which the Daughter was to be handed over to him for access. (“<b>Prayer 6</b>”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 For completeness, the Father had also sought to vary the terms of the sale of the matrimonial flat under the AM Order (“<b>Prayers 1 and 2</b>”). However, by the time application came before me, the matrimonial flat had already been sold. As such, Prayers 1 and 2 were rendered moot.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Governing provisions</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 Prayers 3 to 6 are governed by s 128 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“<b>Charter</b>”). That provision prescribes three circumstances in which orders on care and control as well as access may be varied. According to s 128 –</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The Court may at any time vary or rescind any order for the custody of a child on the application of any interested person, (1) where it is satisfied that <em>the order was based on (a) misrepresentation or (b) mistake of fact or (2) where there has been any material change in circumstances</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis and text in round brackets added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 The Father relied on a “material change in circumstances” as the legal basis for Prayers 3 to 6.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 When applying s 128, it is essential to also note s 125(2) of the Charter. This provision sets out the <em>overriding</em> consideration when assessing whether a variation is appropriate:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">In deciding in whose custody, or in whose care and control, a child should be placed, <em>the paramount consideration</em> is to be <em>the welfare of the child</em> …</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">What the Father must prove</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 Given the above, the Father must prove the following for his application to succeed:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, there had been a “change in circumstances” since the AM Order was made in December 2023.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, the change in circumstances is “material”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Third</em>, Prayers 3 to 6, whichever is applicable, would better serve the Daughter’s welfare and interests than what had been provided in the AM Order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Outcome</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 I made the following decision after considering the evidence and submissions:</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"14.6%\"><col width=\"65.36%\"><col width=\"20.04%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Prayer</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Nature of application</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Outcome</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">3</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">To switch the Daughter’s caregiver from the Mother to the Father.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Dismissed</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">4 and 5</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">To allow the Father to carry out the access in the presence of non-family members.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Allowed in part</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">6</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">To increase the number of ways in which the Daughter was to be handed over to the Father for access.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Allowed in part</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 These are the reasons for my decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Prayer 3</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Father’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 I begin with Prayer 3. The Father submitted that there had been two material changes in circumstances since the AM Order was made, and that these changes necessitated the switch of the Daughter’s caregiver from the Mother to him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 The first material change involved his discovery of certain photos of the Daughter posted on social media.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_a\"></a>(a) According to the Father, sometime in the last week of June 2024, he discovered on the Twitter feed of one “Anushka De Melo” a photo showing the Daughter “with her legs spread towards the camera and a suggestive ‘kiss’ emoji” covering her groin area (“<b>Offensive Photo</b>”). According to the Father, there were other photos showing the Daughter “lying in the arms of strangers including a man”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_13-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Father submitted that the Mother had failed to protect the Daughter’s interests – <em>first</em>, by allowing others to take her photos in an inappropriate pose, and <em>second</em>, by failing to have these photos removed from online posts. According to the Father, “[t]here are many paedophiles and predators in the world and on internet, who will undoubtedly download and abuse these photographs”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 The Father submitted that the second material change in circumstances was the Mother’s efforts to frustrate his child access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Father alleged that the Mother had handed the Daughter to his sister (“<b>Sister</b>”) as purported compliance with the access order. (This was despite the Mother knowing that the Father and the Sister were not on speaking terms.) As a result, he had to spend an additional 30 mins to travel to his parents’ house (where the Sister had brought the Daughter to) to see the child. Without consulting the Father, the Mother would also communicate directly with the Sister to make plans for the Daughter during the access times and to swap access dates.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Father submitted that he should be made the Daughter’s caregiver since the Mother had deliberately interfered with his child access. He relied on <em>ABW v ABV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2014] 2 SLR 0769.xml')\">[2014] 2 SLR 769</a> (“<b><em>ABW</em></b>”)<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> to support this submission. In that case, the High Court affirmed the district judge’s decision to make the mother the caregiver because the children had grown estranged from her while under the father’s care.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Mother’s case</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 The Mother submitted that there had <em>not</em> been any material change in circumstances since the AM Order was made in 2023. Her responses to the Father’s specific allegations were as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>The photos</u> <span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> </p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_a\"></a>(a) The photos were taken in 2020/2021. The Father had failed to prove that he had discovered them after the AM Order was made.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_b\"></a>(b) There was nothing sinister with the photos and online postings – (i) “Anushka De Melo” is a female relative, (ii) The photos were taken with the Mother’s family members, (iii) The Mother was present during the photo-taking, and (iv) The Daughter was comfortable with her photos being taken.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"\"></a> <u>Frustration of child access</u> <span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> </p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Mother did not act improperly in letting the Sister and other members of the Father’s family pick the Daughter up for child access. This was in accordance with a “long standing practice” between the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_d\"></a>(d) There were occasions when the Father was late for – and even missed – contact time with the Daughter. The Mother was the one who reminded him about the access periods and events that he should be attending with the Daughter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 The Mother submitted that it would not be in the Daughter’s interests for the Father to be the caregiver:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_16-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Mother had all along been the Daughter’s primary caregiver. The Father, on the other hand, had never taken care of the child for extended periods of time by himself.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_16-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Father was an unreliable parent. After the divorce, he had entrusted the responsibility of caring for the Daughter during access times to his parents and the Sister. Furthermore, the Father was often late for his contact times. Sometimes, he even missed them altogether. Additionally, the Father had breached the AM Order by leaving the Daughter alone with non-family members on two occasions while he attended to other matters.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_16-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Father had failed to disclose his plans for caring the Daughter if he were made her caregiver. For instance, he did not provide any information on (i) whether the Daughter would be staying with other tenants at his premises, (ii) whether she would continue to attend her current primary school, (iii) how the child would commute to school, and (iv) who would care for her if he was unavailable.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_16-p2_d\"></a>(d) If the Father were made the caregiver, he would likely cut off the Daughter from her. This was because he had proposed only “reasonable access” to the Mother – without stating the details of such access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 To address the purported access issues raised by the Father, the Mother submitted that the proper approach should be to vary the <em>terms of child access</em> – not the care and control order. In support of this submission, she referred to the case of <em>VSL v VSM</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26653-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGHCF 33</a> at [20].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">My decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 Prayer 3 turned on whether the grounds raised by the Father come within the phrase “material change in circumstances” under s 128 of the Charter. As stated in [9] above, there are two parts to this phrase. <em>First</em>, that there has been a “change in circumstances”. <em>Second</em>, that the change is “material”. At this juncture, I pause to make some observations regarding these two parts of the phrase.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Change in circumstances</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 On its plain meaning, “change in circumstances” can be understood as referring to a change in the conditions and facts that relate to and affect a situation.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> A review of the cases shows that such a change typically involves –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_a\"></a>(a) A change in the circumstances <em>of the parents or the child</em>. For examples, see <em>DDN v DDO</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30869-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGHC(A) 2</a> at [26] and [27]; <em>AZB v AZC</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/18367-SSP.xml')\">[2016] SGHCF 1</a> (“<b><em>AZB</em></b>”) at [35].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b\"></a>(b) A change in the parent-parent and parent-child <em>relationship</em>. For examples, see <em>VDX v VDY</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25522-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGHCF 2</a> at [25]; <em>ABW</em> at [29]; <em>AZB</em> at [32].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_c\"></a>(c) Any other change that affects the workability or practicality of the care and control order. For examples, see <em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 1 SLR 0924.xml')\">[2013] 1 SLR 924</a> at [25]; <em>WCU v WCV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27450-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGFC 38</a> at [13].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Material change</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 Under s 128 of the Charter, the change in circumstances must be “material” before a variation is permissible. The word “material” is synonymous with “significant” and “substantial”. Thus, to qualify as a “<em>material</em> change in circumstances” under s 128, the change must be significant/substantial.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 It bears highlighting that courts have taken a “principled and pragmatic approach” in determining whether there has been a “material change in circumstances”. For instance, it has been held that such a change can be found to exist even if an applicant cannot pin-point “one particular identifiable event” that marks the time when the material change in circumstances has taken place: <em>AZB</em> at [32].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">“Discovery” of the photos</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 Having determined how the phrase “material change in circumstances” is to be understood, I return to the facts in this case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 The Father submitted that the “discovery” of the relevant photos qualified as such a change.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 I am unable to agree.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 <em>First</em>, I accepted the Mother’s submission that there were doubts regarding whether the Father had discovered the photos only after the AM Order was made. For instance, it was unclear whether he was a “follower” of “Anushka de Melo”, the person who had posted most of the photos – including the Offensive Photo. According to the Mother, this person was a relative. If the Father was a follower, then why did he not discover the photos earlier? If the answer is no, then how did he stumble across them? Did the Father discover the photos through a third party? If so, why did he not reveal that person’s identity was so that his evidence could be verified? It bears highlighting that (a) the belated discovery of the photos was an essential basis for Prayer 3, (b) the alleged discovery was mysterious, (c) the Father could easily have cleared the doubts, and (d) he had the burden to prove the alleged “change in circumstances”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 <em>Second</em>, even if the Father did discover the photos after the AM Order, such a discovery did not come within the typical scenarios that have been judicially recognised as being a “change in circumstances”: see [19] above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 <em>Third</em>, the relevant photos were taken about three to four years <em>before</em> the AM Order was made. Put in another way, these photos were already in existence at the time of the order. To constitute a “change in circumstances”, the <em>change</em> must logically be something which had arisen only <em>after</em> the AM Order was made. A fact which had existed when the AM Order was made (i.e., the photos) – but was discovered thereafter – would not logically qualify as a change in circumstances. If authority is needed for this proposition, see <em>VWK v VWL</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27000-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 130</a> at [58]; <em>UKX v UKY</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/21579-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGFC 31</a> at [15] and [16].</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 <em>Finally</em>, and in any event, I disagreed with the Father’s submission that by failing to have the photos removed from the posts of “Anushka De Melo”, the Mother had shown herself to be an irresponsible parent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_a\"></a>(a) I did not find the relevant photos objectionable. They show the Daughter in family/relaxed settings. (According to the Mother, “Anushka De Melo” as well as the persons in the photos were all her relatives. I see no reason to doubt her evidence.) There is nothing sinister or lewd about the Offensive Photo. The person who posted it (a female) had clearly intended to use the emoji to protect the Daughter’s modesty, albeit in a cheeky way.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_b\"></a>(b) Despite the above, the Father submitted that the photos ought to have been removed because “[t]here are many paedophiles and predators in the world and on internet, who will undoubtedly download and abuse these photographs”. I find this submission to be unreasonable. Going by the Father’s reasoning, then parents should not be posting their children’s photos on social media platforms, and those who do would be acting irresponsibly and unfit to be caregivers. This cannot be correct.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_c\"></a>(c) It bears highlighting that the photos were posted <em>years before</em> the Father commenced divorce proceeding. At the time of the AM Order in 2023, he had consented to the Mother being the Daughter’s caregiver. This clearly showed that from the time the photos were posted till the AM Order, there was nothing to suggest to the Father that the Mother was an irresponsible parent. Otherwise, he would not have agreed for her to be the caregiver.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 For the above reasons, I found that the Father’s “discovery” of the relevant photos did not constitute a “material change in circumstances”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Alleged frustration of child access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 I now turn to the Father’s second ground for varying the AM Order – i.e., his allegation that the Mother had been frustrating his child access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 I found this allegation to be utterly devoid of merit.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_31-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Father did not adduce any objective/contemporaneous evidence to support his bare allegation. If the Mother had been frustrating his child access, there would have been evidence of this, e.g., in WhatsApp messages between the Mother and him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_31-p2_b\"></a>(b) On the other hand, the Mother had adduced numerous WhatsApp exchanges between the Father and herself – from 2021 to May 2024 – which showed the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_31-p2_i\"></a>(i) The Mother had been <em>reminding</em> the Father about his contact time with the Daughter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_31-p2_ii\"></a>(ii) The Mother had been <em>proactively</em> informing the Father of the Daughter’s graduation ceremony and parent-teacher meetings and asking if he would be attending.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_31-p2_iii\"></a>(iii) The Mother had been messaging the Father <em>directly</em> to check who would be picking the Daughter from her residence for child access.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_31-p2_iv\"></a>(iv) There were occasions when the Father had arranged for the Sister or other family members to fetch the Daughter.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_31-p2_c\"></a>(c) According to the Sister, the Father had not been exercising his access rights regularly. There were occasions when he had left it to his parents and her to care for the Daughter during the access periods.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 Given my factual finding that the Mother did not frustrate his child access, the Father had failed to prove that there had been a “material change in circumstances”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Switch of caregiver against the Daughter’s interest</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 For completeness, I wish to add that the Father had also failed to prove that he would be a better caregiver for the Daughter than the Mother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 I accepted the Mother’s submissions in [16(a)] to [16(c)] above that making the Father the caregiver would in fact be against the Daughter’s interests. This is because these submissions are supported by contemporaneous WhatsApp messages, the Sister’s evidence, and/or are not disputed by the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 Additionally, I had also considered the following which favoured maintaining the status quo of the Mother being the caregiver.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_a\"></a>(a) From the evidence, the Mother had clearly shown greater concern, interest and responsibility for the Daughter than the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Daughter had been enjoying a stable home environment under the Mother’s care. Despite the divorce, the Daughter had been able to maintain a healthy relationship with her paternal relatives.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_c\"></a>(c) Continuity of living arrangements is an important factor for a child’s emotional well-being: <em>ABW</em> at [20] and [21]. If the Father was made the caregiver, the Daughter would be uprooted from a familiar caregiver and home environment – without any evidence that the Father would (i) be able to take better care of her or (ii) be available when she needs him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_35-p2_d\"></a>(d) Finally, it was clear from the WhatsApp messages that the Mother was committed to ensuring a healthy relationship between the Daughter and the Father. There is no similar evidence from the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_36\"></a>36 For the above reasons, I dismissed Prayer 3.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_37\"></a>37 I now come to the Father’s alternative application, i.e., for the terms of his access in the AM Order be varied. The Father requested two variations to be made.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Prayers 4 and 5 </p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Father’s position<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_38\"></a>38 The first variation involved deleting from the AM Order the following condition to child access:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Plaintiff’s access shall not be in the presence of non-family members.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> (“<b>non-family members clause</b>”)</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_39\"></a>39 The Father submitted that the deletion was needed so that he could get “unfettered access” to the Daughter and to prevent the Mother from interfering with his access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_40\"></a>40 To show that the non-family members clause was unduly restrictive, the Father gave the examples of him bringing the Daughter to a McDonald’s fast-food outlet or to a tuition centre. According to him, such conduct would be in breach of the clause. This was because there would be strangers (non-family members) at these places.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Mother’s position<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_41\"></a>41 The Mother objected to the deletion of the non-family members clause. She submitted that the Father had failed to prove the following:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_a\"></a>(a) <em>First</em>, that there had been a material change in the circumstances since the making of the AM Order.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_b\"></a>(b) <em>Second</em>, that the Mother had used the non-family members clause to refuse to hand over the Daughter to the Father.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_c\"></a>(c) <em>Third</em>, that the deletion of the clause would be in the Daughter’s welfare. The Mother was worried for the Daughter’s safety during access periods. She felt that the non-family members clause would prevent the Father from leaving the child alone with strangers, especially unknown men.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_42\"></a>42 That said, the Mother was prepared to be flexible.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_a\"></a>(a) She recognised that the Father was in a serious relationship with another woman (“<b>partner</b>”) and intended to marry her eventually. In the circumstances, she appreciated that it would be in the Daughter’s interests to have a relationship with the partner.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_42-p2_b\"></a>(b) Additionally, the Mother was prepared to give her consent for other non-family members to be present during the access periods on the condition that the Father (i) informed her of the location of his access, (ii) provided details regarding the other people who would be present, and (iii) allowed her to contact the Daughter during such access period.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_43\"></a>43 Given the above, the Mother counter-proposed that the non-family member clause be varied as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <u>Save for the Plaintiff’s romantic partner</u>, the <del>The Plaintiff’s</del> access shall not be in the presence of non-family members, <u>unless the Plaintiff obtains the Defendant’s prior consent in writing</u>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">My decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Parties have valid concerns</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_44\"></a>44 The Father found the non-family members clause to be unduly restrictive and impractical. The Mother was worried for the Daughter’s safety during access periods. I found these concerns to be genuine and reasonable.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_45\"></a>45 In my view, the Father’s request to delete the non-family members clause entirely – without introducing any safeguards whatsoever – would only heighten the Mother’s concerns.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Mother’s proposed variation </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_46\"></a>46 With a view to an amicable resolution, the Mother had proposed a variation of the non-family members clause to address the Father’s concern. Under her proposed variation –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_46-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Father could conduct the child access in the presence of his partner without seeking her prior consent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_46-p2_b\"></a>(b) If the Father wanted to conduct the child access in the presence on other non-family members, then the Mother’s prior consent in writing must be sought.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_47\"></a>47 The Mother deserved commendation for showing flexibility in coming up with her proposed variation.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Issues with the proposed variation</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_48\"></a>48 That said, I found that the Mother’s proposal did not go far enough. This is because under her proposed variation, the Father must seek her prior consent in writing if he wishes to bring the Daughter to fast-food outlets, playgrounds, shopping malls – and even HDB lifts and female toilets (should the need arises). In my view, it would be impractical for both parties if prior consent in writing had to be sought and provided in such circumstances.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_49\"></a>49 Additionally, the Mother’s proposed variation can also unwittingly create more instances where misunderstanding and friction between the parties could arise – e.g., if the Mother is not able to see the Father’s request for consent, or give her consent, in good time.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Daughter’s safety is the paramount consideration</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_50\"></a>50 It cannot be doubted that the Daughter’s safety is the paramount consideration. In my view, this becomes an issue if the Father were to (a) leave the child unattended, (b) place her in the care of non-family members (especially strangers), or (c) bring the child to places which do not serve her interests or welfare (e.g., a function organised by the Father’s friends/colleagues or a night establishment<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span>).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Variation ordered</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_51\"></a>51 Based on the above considerations, I varied the non-family members clause as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The Plaintiff’s access shall not be in the presence of non-family members <u>save for the following circumstances:</u></p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(<u>i</u>) <u>The non-family member is the Plaintiff’s romantic partner.</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(<u>ii</u>) <u>The presence of the non-family member is incidental to the Child pursuing her recreational, educational, or other needs during the access periods.</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <u>If the Plaintiff wishes to conduct the access in the presence of non-family members in other circumstances, then he must seek the Defendant’s prior consent in writing.</u> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[variation in underscore]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_52\"></a>52 In my view, the above variation would allow the Father to carry out child access in the presence of non-family members in the following circumstances:</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"57.74%\"><col width=\"42.26%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Mother’s prior written consent </b> <b><u>not </u></b> <b>needed</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Mother’s prior written consent needed</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(1) The Father’s partner</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Circumstances that do not fall within (1) and (2)</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(2) Circumstances in [40] and [48] above</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_53\"></a>53 In coming up with the clause in [51] above, I have sought to avoid the dangers of being over prescription. Where doubts arise in the application of the clause, I trust that the parties will use their good judgement and consider [50] above in resolving their differences, if any.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Prayer 6</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Father’s position</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_54\"></a>54 I now come to the Father’s second request for varying the AM Order. This involved adding the following text at the end of clause 1(h) of the AM Order:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">That all of the Plaintiff’s access aforesaid shall be by way of –</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(1) The Child’s arrival at the Plaintiff’s residence;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(2) By the Plaintiff picking up the Child directly; or</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(3) In any other manner as agreed by the Plaintiff personally and conveyed to the Defendant in writing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_55\"></a>55 The Father’s intent behind the variation was to increase the number of ways in which the Daughter was to be handed over to him for access.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Mother’s position</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_56\"></a>56 The Mother’s position regarding the requested variation was as follows:</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"8.27834433113377%\"><col width=\"29.5140971805639%\"><col width=\"62.2075584883023%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Father’s requests</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Mother’s position</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">For the Daughter to “arrive” at the Father’s residential address </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(“<b>Option 1</b>”)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(i) It would not be feasible for the Daughter to expend time and energy to travel to an address specified by the Father for access. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(ii) Instead, it would be more comfortable for the Daughter if the Father picked her up in his car. This had been the arrangement since the Father purchased a car.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">For the Father to pick up the Daughter directly</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(“<b>Option 2</b>”)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The Mother had no objection if the Father wished to pick up and drop off the Daughter at her place of residence.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(c)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">For the handover to be in any other manner to be agreed by the Father personally and conveyed to the Mother in writing</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(“<b>Option 3</b>”)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(i) The Mother was prepared to be flexible on the pick-up and drop off location, subject to the Daughter’s needs and schedule. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(ii) The parties could mutually agree to change the pick-up and drop off location, when required.</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_57\"></a>57 The Mother counter-proposed that the expansion of the manner of handover be formulated as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The Plaintiff shall pick the Child up prior to his access and drop the Child off at the end of his access at the Defendant’s place of residence, unless otherwise mutually agreed by the parties in writing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">My decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_58\"></a>58 The AM Order is silent on the place where the Daughter was to be handed over to the Father for access. It was not disputed that in practice, such handover typically took place at the Mother’s residence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_59\"></a>59 In my view, the Father’s formulation of the requested variation is problematic.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_59-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Mother had objected to Option 1 as being not feasible for the Daughter. I found her objection to be reasonable. Due regard ought to be given to the Mother’s objection given that there was already an established manner of handover (i.e., at the Mother’s residence).</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_59-p2_b\"></a>(b) It bears highlighting that the three options for handover are all in the alternative (“or”). There is <em>no “default” mode</em> of handover among these options.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_59-p2_c\"></a>(c) Furthermore, the Father’s formulation did not specify <em>which party</em> – i.e., whether the Father or the Mother – would be responsible for confirming the applicable mode on each occasion of handover.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_59-p2_d\"></a>(d) Given (b) and (c) above, there will be <em>a lot of uncertainty</em> each time the Daughter is to be handed over to the Father for access. Such uncertainty can result in anxiety and inconvenience to the parties. These concerns are real – especially when that the Father has a history of giving <em>last minute notices</em> to the Mother to delay or cancel the handover due to his work commitments. The uncertainty arising from the Father’s formulation of the requested variation can lead to misunderstanding, frustration and accusations between the parties – which can in turn affect the Daughter. This is not in the child’s interest.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_60\"></a>60 I accepted the Mother’s proposed variation in [57] above. In my view, it covers all the three options of handover requested by the Father – and thus strikes the right balance between flexibility and certainty regarding the manner of the handover.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_61\"></a>61 To sum up, my decision is as follows:</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"25.14%\"><col width=\"74.86%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Application</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Decision</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Prayer 3</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Dismissed</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The Mother shall continue to be the Daughter’s caregiver.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Prayers 4 and 5</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Allowed in part</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The last sentence in clause (1)(a) and clause 1(d)(i) of the AM order are varied as follows:</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The Plaintiff’s access shall not be in the presence of non-family members <u>save for the following circumstances:</u></p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(i) <u>The non-family member is the Plaintiff’s romantic partner.</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(ii) <u>The presence of the non-family member is incidental to the Child pursuing her recreational, educational, or other needs during the access periods.</u> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <u>If the Plaintiff wishes to conduct the access in the presence of non-family members in other circumstances, then he must seek the Defendant’s prior consent in writing</u>.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">[variation in underscore]</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Prayer 6 </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Allowed in part</b> </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The following clause is to be added at the end of clause 1(h) of the AM Order:</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">The Plaintiff shall pick the Child up prior to his access and drop the Child off at the end of his access at the Defendant’s place of residence, unless otherwise mutually agreed by the parties in writing.</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_62\"></a>62 Before concluding, I wish to state that during the proceedings, the Father had largely stuck to his positions and did not make much effort to address the Mother’s concerns arising from his application. In contrast, in line with the spirit of therapeutic justice, the Mother had shown flexibility and reasonableness – e.g., by suggesting suitable language for varying the access orders.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_63\"></a>63 I will hear parties’ submissions on costs.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>Father’s affidavit dated 1 July 2024 at [41] to [57]; [74] to [79]; Plaintiff’s Written Submissions dated 7 September 2024 at [15] to [19].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Father’s affidavit dated 1 July 2024 at [56]; Plaintiff’s Written Submissions dated 7 September 2024 at [30] to [34].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Father’s affidavit dated 1 July 2024 at [30] to [40].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Father’s affidavit dated 1 July 2024 at [80] to [84]; Plaintiff’s Written Submissions dated 7 September 2024 at [8] to [14], [24] to [27], and [35] to [38].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup> Mother’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024 at [56]; Defendant Mother’s Written Submissions dated 27 September 2024 at [56] to [69], [109]. </p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup> Mother’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024 at [20], [71] to [94]. </p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Mother’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024 at [20] to [27], [52] to [68]; Defendant Mother’s Written Submissions dated 27 September 2024 at [54], [89], [95] to [106].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>See Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries online accessible at – www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Mother’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024 at page 99 (January 2024), page 104 (May 2024).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>Mother’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024 at pages 90 to 104.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>Mother’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024 at page 91 (August 2022), page 94 (April 2023), page 95 (August 2023), page 102 (February 2024).</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>Sister’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Written Submissions dated 7 September 2024 at [39] and [45].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>The condition appears in paragraphs 1(a) and 1(d)(i) of the AM Order.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>Mother’s affidavit dated 16 August 2024 at [60] to [72] and [86]; Defendant Mother’s Written Submissions dated 27 September 2024 at [112] to [133].</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>Under the AM Order, the Father has overnight child access once a month and at selected periods during the Chinese New Year holidays and school holidays.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>This formulation of the clause is based on oral submissions on 17 October 2024.</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Divorce"],"date":"2024-10-29","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 3563 of 2022","title":"XDH v XDI","citation":"[2024] SGFC 80","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32401-SSP.xml","counsel":["Thian Wen Yi and Charis Sim Wei Li(Harry Elias Partnership LLP) for the plaintiff","Shen Luda Genesis (Pointer LLC) for the defendant."],"timestamp":"2024-11-05T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Patrick Tay Wei Sheng","html":"<root><head><title>XDH v XDI</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XDH <em>v</em> XDI </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32401-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 80</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 3563 of 2022</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">29 October 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Patrick Tay Wei Sheng </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Thian Wen Yi and Charis Sim Wei Li(Harry Elias Partnership LLP) for the plaintiff; Shen Luda Genesis (Pointer LLC) for the defendant. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XDH — XDI </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Divorce</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">29 October 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Patrick Tay Wei Sheng:</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 The parties were spouses. They had a child, who was nine years of age. They fell out and filed for divorce. Interim judgment of divorce was granted in January 2023. I divided the matrimonial assets 75:25 in favour of the husband, granted the husband the sole care and control of the child, and granted the wife generous access to the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The wife has filed an appeal against these decisions. I now provide my reasons for them.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The husband was a citizen of Romania and a permanent resident of Singapore. The wife was a citizen of Singapore. They married in 2013 and had the child in 2015. Apart from a year between 2017 and 2018, when the family moved to Europe, the family lived in Singapore throughout the marriage. After the family returned to Singapore in 2018, they lived in rented apartments. At the time of these proceedings, the matrimonial home was a rented apartment in the east of Singapore.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 In July 2022, the relationship between the spouses broke down. The spouses began sleeping in separate bedrooms even as they continued to reside in the matrimonial home. They split their time with the child on the weekends, with the husband having the care of the child on Saturdays and the wife having the care of the child on Sundays. But the matrimonial relationship deteriorated further, and the spouses commenced divorce proceedings in August 2022. They split their time with the child further: each parent had the care of the child on alternate days.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 In December 2022, the spouses agreed to share the custody of the child following their divorce. This agreement was recorded as a consent order of the Family Court.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 In January 2023, interim judgment of divorce was granted on the facts that each spouse had behaved in ways that made it unreasonable to expect the other spouse to continue to live with him or her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 In July 2023, the wife moved out of the matrimonial home and took the child with her. They moved into another apartment within the same residential development as the matrimonial home. The husband continued to live in the matrimonial home.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Division of matrimonial assets</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 A court in dividing matrimonial assets was tasked with justly and equitably apportioning the economic fruits of the marriage between the former spouses (see <em>VIG v VIH</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25105-SSP.xml')\">[2020] SGHCF 16</a> at [35]). In discharging that task, the court would first identify the assets (and liabilities) that constituted the pool of matrimonial assets then value those assets (and liabilities) to determine the economic fruits of the marriage. Having done so, the court would divide these economic fruits between the spouses based on their financial and non-financial contributions to the marriage, in line with the philosophy that marriage was an equal partnership (see <em>TNL v TNK and another appeal and another matter</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/20138-SSP.xml')\">[2017] 1 SLR 609</a> (“<em>TNL v TNK</em>”) at [45]). To give effect to that philosophy, “mutual respect must be accorded for spousal contributions, whether in the economic or homemaking spheres, as both roles are equally fundamental to the well-being of a marital partnership” (see <em>ANJ v ANK</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/17925-SSP.xml')\">[2015] 4 SLR 1043</a> (“<em>ANJ v ANK</em>”) at [17]).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Identification of matrimonial assets</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 Here, there were no assets that were held by the spouses jointly. The only relevant assets (and liabilities) were thus those that were held by each spouse solely in his or her name (or jointly with non-parties to the marriage). I list these assets and the positions of each spouse on the values of these assets.</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"61.26%\"><col width=\"19.36%\"><col width=\"19.38%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Husband’s Value</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Wife’s Value</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" colspan=\"3\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Assets in name of Husband</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Central Provident Fund savings</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">313,514</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">313,514</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">DBS account</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">239</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">2,039</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">OCBC (Bonus+) account</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">129,339</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">129,734</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">OCBC (others) account </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">4,830</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">4,830</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">TD Ameritrade account</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">603.66</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">USD450</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Dorman Trading account</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">353</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">USD263</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Interactive Brokers accounts</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">818</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">USD42</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Great Eastern insurance policy</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">5,932</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">5,932</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Sub-Total</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>455,629</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>457,830</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" colspan=\"3\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Assets in name of Wife</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Central Provident Fund savings</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">3,661</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">3,661</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">DBS account </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">55,452</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">39,070</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">DBS account (jointly held with mother)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">7,980</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">0</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Watches</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">4,721</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">0</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Debt (to aunt)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">0</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">-100,000</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Sub-Total</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>71,815</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>-57,269</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Grand Total</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>527,444</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"right\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>400,561</b> </p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 Based on these submissions, there were four main areas of disagreement between the spouses. These were as follow:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_a\"></a>(a) the value of the husband’s DBS and OCBC (Bonus+) accounts and wife’s DBS account that were in each of their sole names;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_b\"></a>(b) the status of the wife’s DBS account that she held jointly with her mother and the value of the account if it was a matrimonial asset;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_c\"></a>(c) the status of the wife’s watches and the value of the watches if they were matrimonial assets; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_10-p2_d\"></a>(d) the status of the wife’s debt to her aunt and the value of the liability if it was a matrimonial liability.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Bank accounts in sole names of husband and wife</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 The divergence between the spouses over the value of the bank accounts concerned the date on which those bank accounts were valued. The husband valued those bank accounts as of the date of the interim judgment (<em>ie</em>, January 2023). The wife valued those bank accounts as of the date of these proceedings on the ancillary matters (<em>ie</em>, April 2024).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 In <em>VQF v VQG</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30984-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGHCF 4</a> at [1], Choo Han Teck J observed that the date for ascertaining the pool of matrimonial assets was the date of the interim judgment, which dissolved the marriage. On the other hand, the date for valuing the assets and liabilities in that pool of matrimonial assets was typically the date of the hearing of the ancillary matters. Nevertheless, bank account balances and Central Provident Fund account balances were be valued as of the date of the interim judgment. For such money accounts, the economic fruits of the marriage were the monies in the accounts rather than the accounts themselves. The quantum of the monies that represented the fruits of the marriage crystallised at the date of the interim judgment, which dissolved the marriage. In consequence, except for run-of-the-mill expenses, sums expended by a spouse from these money accounts between the interim judgment and the hearing of the ancillary matters had to be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets if the other spouse had a putative interest in the monies and had not consented to the expenditure (see <em>TNL v TNK</em> at [24]). Specifically, a spouse was not entitled to use matrimonial money to fund his or her legal costs, which were not daily or run-of-the-mill expenses (see <em>WTS v WTR</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32208-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGHCF 33</a> at [8]).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 I thus preferred the values put forward by the husband on these accounts: $239 for the DBS account in the name of the husband, $129,339 for the OCBC (Bonus+) account in the name of the husband, and $55,452 for the DBS account in the name of the wife. I also agreed with the husband that the matrimonial assets in his name had a value of $455,629.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Joint account between wife and her mother</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 The husband submitted a DBS bank account that the wife owned jointly with her mother and that had a balance of $7,980 as of the date of the interim judgment was a matrimonial asset. The wife did not deny the existence of this bank account but suggested that she had no beneficial interest in the monies therein and/or that her mother was the beneficial owner of those monies.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 As a joint owner of the bank account, the wife was entitled to the undivided whole of the monies in that account. Those monies were thus matrimonial assets. Insofar as the wife asserted that she had no beneficial interest in the account, it was incumbent on her to obtain a determination from the civil courts to that effect because the Family Court was unable to adjudicate on a claim by a third party to a putative matrimonial asset (see <em>UDA v UDB and another</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/21828-SSP.xml')\">[2018] 1 SLR 1015</a> at [44]). But there was no such determination before me. Nor was there any objective evidence to show that, despite her legal interest in the monies in the monies in that account, she had no beneficial interest in the monies in that account. I thus included that account in the pool of matrimonial assets and valued it at $7,980.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Watches of wife</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 The husband submitted that the wife owned two Longines watches and valued them at $4,721 based on their purchase prices. The wife did not dispute her ownership of these watches and did not offer any estimate of the value of these watches. The value of these watches, even if objectively modest, was not insubstantial relative to the value of the other matrimonial assets. I thus included these watches within the pool of matrimonial assets and valued them at $4,721.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">$100,000 debt of wife</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 The wife submitted that she owed $100,000 to her aunt, which debt was a matrimonial liability that had to be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. She claimed that she had been compelled to borrow that sum in November 2022 because the husband had stopped maintaining her since February 2022. The husband disputed these claims.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 The aunt deposed an affidavit in support of the claim that the wife had incurred a $100,000 matrimonial liability by borrowing that sum from her. The aunt added that she had loaned a total of $160,000 to the wife in two tranches: $100,000 on 17 November 2022 and $60,000 on 10 July 2023. The aunt exhibited a document dated 28 July 2023<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> in which the wife “confirm[ed] and acknowledge[d]” a loan of $160,000 from the aunt. The aunt described this document as a “Debt Acknowledgement Note”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 I placed little weight on this affidavit. Although the affidavit exhibited a bank statement that recorded a $100,000 disbursement from the aunt to the wife on 17 November 2022, it contained no contemporaneous documentation of any liability on the part of the wife in respect of that disbursement. The Debt Acknowledgement Note, which was the only document that purported to record an obligation to repay that disbursement, was created only eight months later. This record was belated, convenient, and self-serving. The aunt deposed that she had not procured a formal “loan agreement” on or around 17 November 2022 because there had been a “common understanding” of repayment and because the wife was “family”. But this claim sat uneasily with her procurement of such a formal “loan agreement” after the subsequent $60,000 disbursement. Indeed, up until 10 July 2023, which was the date of that $60,000 disbursement, the correspondence between the wife and the aunt did not reflect any expectation of repayment of the $100,000 disbursement or the $60,000 disbursement.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> Only on 28 July 2023, which was two weeks after the $60,000 disbursement did the wife sign the Debt Acknowledgement Note. It was thus unlikely that the $100,000 disbursement had created a liability on the part of the wife to the aunt. It was more likely that the $100,000 had been disbursed to the wife without any expectation of or obligation for its repayment.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 The absence of detail beyond the Debt Acknowledgement Note on how and when the $100,000 disbursement was to be repaid reinforced this conclusion that it had been made without any obligation for its repayment. Moreover, the Debt Acknowledgement Note itself was equivocal on any such repayment obligation. Therein, the wife simply stated that the monies “will be repaid when my parents sell their current house and manage to get the cash on hand, or a partial repayment may be paid earlier by myself the moment I am able to do so.”<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> Such an equivocal undertaking fell short of establishing a liability of $100,000 on the part of the wife to the aunt. I was thus unable to include any such liability in the pool of matrimonial assets.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Valuation and division of matrimonial assets</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 Given my findings above, the value of the matrimonial assets in the name of the husband was $455,629 while the value of the matrimonial assets in the name of the wife was $71,815. Accordingly, in the aggregate, the value of the pool of matrimonial assets was $527,444.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 There was little dispute that for most of the marriage, the husband was the breadwinner while the wife was the homemaker. Further, the husband had given the wife a monthly allowance of $1,000 up until the wife found employment as a financial advisor in 2021.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 The wife admitted that the husband had financed the bulk of the matrimonial assets but claimed a 30% share of them based on her indirect contributions to their acquisition. She argued that pursuant to the structured approach in <em>ANJ v ANK</em>, the direct contributions were 100:0 in favour of the husband, the indirect contributions were 40:60 in favour of herself, and the final ratio was thus 70:30 in favour of the husband. She submitted in the alternative that insofar as the marriage was a single-income one and <em>ANJ v ANK</em> did not apply, she should receive 25–35% of the matrimonial assets on the authority of <em>TNL v TNK</em> and <em>BOR v BOS and another appeal</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22441-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGCA 78</a> (“<em>BOR v BOS</em>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 The husband submitted that the matrimonial assets should be divided 80:20 in his favour. He explained that he had been more than just a breadwinner and had helped to care for the child while working a full-time job. He added that he had even taken on primary caregiving responsibilities in addition to his breadwinning role in the later years of the marriage, when the wife was focusing on embarking on a career in financial advisory services. He alleged too that the wife had in those later years of the marriage embarked on extra-marital affairs that compromised her homemaking and her care for the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 In my judgment, this marriage was substantially a single-income marriage with the husband as the breadwinner and the wife as the homemaker. Even if the wife had started work as a financial advisor at the time of the divorce, that period of work was insignificant in the context of the nine-year marriage. The approach to the division of matrimonial assets in single-income marriages as set out in <em>TNL v TNK</em> and <em>BOR v BOS</em> was thus the appropriate one to take. Thereunder, the weight to be ascribed to indirect contributions would be proportionate to the length of the marriage. Hence, the final ratios of division ranged from 50:50 (in long single-income marriages of 25–35 years’ duration) to 75:25 in favour of the breadwinner (in shorter single-income marriages of 10–15 years’ duration). I reproduced the observations in <em>BOR</em> at [111]–[113].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">111 … In <em>TNL v TNK</em>, this court observed that the trend in long single-income marriages had tended towards an equal division of matrimonial assets, but different considerations may attach to short single-income marriages (at [48]). To give some context to the terms “long” and “short”, <em>TNL v TNK</em> itself involved a marriage of some 35-years. The cases which the court referred to as relevant precedents involved marriages of between 26 to 30 years.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">112 The marriage in the present case lasted about 11 and a half years, much shorter than the examples which the court discussed in <em>TNL v TNK</em>. Different considerations apply to such mid-length marriages. As we stated in <em>ANJ v ANK</em> at [27] (albeit in the context of discussing the structured approach), as a general rule, the longer the marriage, the more weight is given to the parties’ indirect contributions. Conversely, the shorter the marriage, the less weight will be ascribed to indirect contributions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">113 We find that the precedents are generally consistent with this principle. Thus, in <em>ATT v ATS</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2012] 2 SLR 0859.xml')\">[2012] 2 SLR 859</a> at [18], we observed that the trend in “moderately lengthy marriages” was towards awarding the homemaker wife about 35% to 40% of the matrimonial assets. It would appear from the examples discussed that what was meant by “moderately lengthy” was a period in the range of around 15–18 years. For marriages of shorter duration (around 10–15 years), the trend appears to be towards awarding the non-income earning party about 25% to 35% of the matrimonial pool. Thus in <em>UGG v UGH (m.w.)</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/20908-SSP.xml')\">[2017] SGHCF 25</a>, which involved a marriage of 12 and a half years, a Wife who had made minimal direct financial contributions was awarded 31.35% of the pool of matrimonial assets. In <em>ABX v ABY and others</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2014] 2 SLR 0969.xml')\">[2014] 2 SLR 969</a>, which involved a marriage of nine years, the homemaker wife was awarded 25% of the pool of the matrimonial assets.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 Here, the marriage was a short one of only nine years. For most of it, the husband had been the breadwinner while the wife had been the primary caregiver for the child. Yet the husband had, over and above his breadwinning, made significant indirect contributions to the family especially in the later years of the marriage. In the words of the wife, “Overall, the [husband] had indeed been a supportive spouse during those years prior to the Divorce Proceedings, for which I am grateful and I fully acknowledge”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> By contrast, as the wife recorded in her diary, she sent text messages to her male companion(s) “all the time”<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> and “g[a]ve up my time with my son” for those companion(s).<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 To be clear, I made no finding on the allegation that the wife had embarked upon extra-marital affairs. The grounds of this divorce were that the behaviour of each spouse had made it unreasonable to expect the other to continue to live with him or her (see [6] above). It was thus unnecessary to make any finding on extra-marital affairs here. The diary entries of the wife were relevant only insofar as they showed the time and energy that the wife had spent other than on her role as a full-time homemaker. Still, those expenditures of time and energy were extensive and would have distracted the wife from her homemaking duties. Taking account too that this marriage spanned only nine years, the indirect contributions of the wife were at the lower end of that of homemakers in single-income marriages of 10–15 years’ duration as set out in <em>BOR</em> (see [25] above). A just and equitable division of the matrimonial assets was thus 75% to the husband and 25% to the wife.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Child custody, care and control, and access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 The spouses had since December 2022 agreed to share the custody of the child. They had also agreed to jointly make all applications for “Citizenship, Permanent Residency, Long Term Visa and/or any other immigration-related documents (save for travel visas) in any other jurisdiction on behalf of the Child” (see [5] above). I thus made no further order on the custody of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Care and control</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 Each spouse sought the sole care and control of the child for the immediate future, even as the wife suggested that they could share the care and control of the child when the child was older. The wife submitted that she had been the primary caregiver for the child, particularly in the years after the child was born and in the months after the breakdown of the marriage. The husband agreed that the wife had been the primary caregiver for the child after the child was born but submitted that he had become the primary caregiver in the final years of the marriage when the wife was focused on embarking on a financial advisory career. He added that the fact that the wife was the primary caregiver for the child after the breakdown of the marriage should be disregarded because that was a <em>status quo</em> that the wife had engineered by removing the child from his care and depriving him of access to the child thereafter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_30\"></a>30 In my view, each spouse had played an active role in the upbringing of the child, and the continued involvement of both parents in the care of the child conduced to the best interests of the child. Nevertheless, the spouses were adamant that an order of shared care and control would have been unworkable in the immediate future due to the animosity between them, and I saw no reason to disagree with this position. Hence, the interests of the child were best served by placing the child in the care and control of the parent that would best promote the co-parenting of the child. As the Court of Appeal observed in <em>TSF v TSE</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/22417-SSP.xml')\">[2018] 2 SLR 833</a> at [82], “it is in a child’s best interests post-divorce for him to maintain a good relationship with both his parents.” Accordingly, “[t]he court, in deciding which parent to award care and control to, therefore generally takes into account the extent to which the prospective carer will maintain and facilitate the child’s relationship with the other parent.”</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_31\"></a>31 At the outset, I placed little weight on the <em>status quo</em> that had arisen following the breakdown of the marriage, where the wife had been the primary if not the exclusive caregiver for the child. This was an artificial situation where the husband had been substantially excluded from the care for the child even as he lived in the same residential development as the child. At all times, the husband had been ready and willing to care for the child and would have cared for the child had he been permitted to do so. As the Family Court held in <em>UGO v UGR</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/20965-SSP.xml')\">[2017] SGFC 125</a> at [46], the significance of continuity of care in deciding the care and control of a child was diminished when the <em>de facto</em> non-care parent had been deprived of the opportunity to care for the child, especially when that <em>status quo</em> had been unilaterally created by the <em>de facto</em> care parent.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_32\"></a>32 On the evidence, placing the child in the care and control of the husband would conduce to the co-parenting that promoted the best interests of the child. Even as the wife had cared for the child, she was prone to emotional instability that had hurt the child. In her diary, she lamented: “It’s getting harder to control my frustrations on long days and especially when I’m tired”, “I find myself saying certain things which I know aren’t good for him”, “I need to really ensure that I control my temper … The damage done to his self-esteem just ain’t worth it”, and “Maybe there is something wrong with me after all”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> These laments corroborated the claims of the husband that the wife would, when frustrated, taunt, scream, and hit child. These laments were also not inconsistent with the claims of the husband that the wife would make “racist, xenophobic and other insensitive remarks” about the Romanian heritage of the husband in front of the child that were “harmful for the Child’s esteem and identity since he is half-Romanian himself”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> The husband deposed, and wife did not deny, that she would call him a “gypsy”<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> and a “foreigner” who should “go back home”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> The text messages exchanged between the husband and the wife showed just as much. As much as the laments of the wife about her behaviour revealed her recognition of its adverse impact on the child, it was hardly reassuring for the purpose of care and control that she took few steps beyond such lamenting to improve her management of her emotions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_33\"></a>33 Further, the male companionship that the wife enjoyed alongside her homemaking compromised her time with and care of the child. As she diarised, she communicated with her male companions “all the time”, left the home to meet them “impromptu”, and even had to “give up my time with my son” for them.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">He is back in SG today.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">And texted me at 9am. 9.30am to be precise. Turns out that he wanted to meet me today! omg. I was definitely not expecting to meet him today, and for sure not expecting him to want to meet me either! I think he must really miss me gosh. :) :) :)</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">He was worried he would be tired and hence didn’t dare to commit, and wanted to surprise me instead.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">(Night time now)</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Found out why it was so impromptu that he wanted to meet – he got home and could not sleep. And his requests for me to <em>meet him and give up my time with my son</em> was just because he could not sleep due to jet lag. How disappointing. I had expected better and looks like I will be his social escort and pretend to be happy :)</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[Emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_34\"></a>34 Most worryingly, the wife appeared to have since July 2023 unilaterally removed the child from the care of the husband and neglected to facilitate the co-parenting that would have been in the best interests of the child. Still, she claimed that she had encouraged the child to spend time with the husband. She clarified that the husband had from July to September 2023 accompanied the child to and/or from school three to five times each week and spent “reasonable amount of time” with the child “for breakfast, showering, dinner, showering and settling down”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_15\" id=\"Ftn_15_1\"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span> She added that despite her differences with the husband, she “kept a limited channel open with the Husband via Whats[A]pp for the sake of [the child]” by “unblock[ing] the Husband at specific times of the day to allow for communication on essential matters”.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_16\" id=\"Ftn_16_1\"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> But these clarifications showed that the child had scarce opportunity to spend time with the husband for meaningful durations. These clarifications showed too that the wife had, after seizing the <em>de facto</em> care and control of the child, insisted on parenting the child on only her terms and was unamenable to co-parenting the child with the husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_35\"></a>35 In comparison, the husband had despite his differences with the wife taken steps to ameliorate those differences and to promote the bond between the child and the wife. After discovering the time and energy that the wife had spent on male companionship outside the marriage, the husband went for therapy to manage his emotions and learn to co-parent the child despite the breakdown in the marital relationship.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_17\" id=\"Ftn_17_1\"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span> He maintained good terms with the relatives of the wife and encouraged the child to meet with them. Even after the wife removed the child from the matrimonial home in July 2023, he worked with the wife to ensure that the child was fed, washed, and clothed. The wife painted these interactions as her facilitation of access between the husband and the child. Yet these interactions were equally the product of the husband adjusting his schedule and working around the schedule of the wife to ensure that the needs of the child were not compromised, especially when the work and other commitments of the wife took her away from the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_36\"></a>36 In <em>ABW v ABV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2014] 2 SLR 0769.xml')\">[2014] 2 SLR 769</a>, Judith Prakash J (as she then was) observed: “switching care and control is a remedy that can be adopted if a judge finds that the parent having care and control has been either deliberately or unconsciously interfering with the bond between the child and the other parent.” These observations were apposite here, where the <em>status quo</em> was the wife as the <em>de facto</em> care parent of the child. This <em>status quo</em> complicated the co-parenting of the child by interfering with the bond between the child and the husband. Placing the child in the care and control of the husband, who was a capable parent that placed the interests of the child before his differences with the wife, would facilitate the co-parenting that conduced to the welfare of the child.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_37\"></a>37 I was confident that any ensuing disruption to the <em>status quo</em> here would not prejudice the child for three reasons. First, the duration of the <em>status quo</em> was short: less than a year had elapsed since July 2023. Second, the husband had been immersed in the care of the child up until July 2023 and accompanied the child to and/or from school and over “breakfast, showering, dinner, showering and settling down” up until September 2023. Third, the husband had a viable plan to care for the child from day to day: his flexibility in his job enabled him to take care of the child when the child was not at school while his proposal to rent an apartment with multiple bedrooms near the child’s school would provide the child with a dedicated bedroom, study area, and play area. This would be more conducive for the child, who was a soon-to-be teenager, than sharing a room in an apartment with the wife.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_38\"></a>38 I thus placed the child in the sole care and control of the husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Access</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_39\"></a>39 To preserve the relationship between the wife and the child, I made generous orders for her access to the child. These orders were as follow:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_39-p2_a\"></a>(a) The wife shall have access to the child on one day each weekend, and this day of access will alternate between Saturdays and Sundays;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_39-p2_b\"></a>(b) The wife shall have access to the child on half of the child’s school holidays;</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_39-p2_c\"></a>(c) The wife shall have access to the child on all gazetted public holidays from 0930hrs to 2000hrs, other than on public holidays falling within the husband’s share of the school holidays; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_39-p2_d\"></a>(d) The wife shall have access to the child on the child’s birthday on every alternate year.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_40\"></a>40 To facilitate these access orders, I ordered the wife to pick the child up from and drop the child off at the residence of the husband for each access session. For the avoidance of doubt, I specified that the wife was free to travel with the child during her access sessions during the child’s school holidays. When the wife had communicated her travel plans to the husband, the husband was to provide the passport of the child to the wife seven days in advance of the departure date and the wife was to return the passport of the child to the husband three days after the return date.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_41\"></a>41 To allow each parent to bond with the child when he or she did not have the physical care of the child, I also granted each parent virtual access to the child as follow:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_a\"></a>(a) The wife shall have virtual access to the child three times each week, with the husband to facilitate such access; and</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_41-p2_b\"></a>(b) The husband shall have virtual access to the child three times each week during the wife’s half of the school holidays, with the wife to facilitate such access.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_42\"></a>42 In my view, these orders would grant the wife the space to adjust to her new job as a financial advisor and work on managing her emotions without the responsibility of caring for the child from day to day. To that end, the fact that she had acknowledged that her expressions of frustration at the child had adversely impacted the child (see [32] above) was a good start. After she had settled into her new role as a financial advisor and gained the tools to manage her emotions are frustrations, it was open to her to apply for a variation of these care and control and/or access orders.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Maintenance</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_43\"></a>43 The wife did not seek any order of maintenance for herself. I therefore declined to order the husband to maintain the wife.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_44\"></a>44 Given my decision to place the child in the sole care and control of the husband, I was not inclined to make any order of maintenance in respect of the child. The income of the husband dwarfed that of the wife. Based on their latest Notices of Assessment, the husband earned $174,900 per annum (or $14,575 per month) while the wife earned $34,956 per annum (or $2,913 per month). The husband was well able to maintain the child on his own. It was neither just nor equitable to order the wife to maintain the child, especially when she was finding her feet in her new job.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_45\"></a>45 Speaking extra-judicially, Justice Teh Hwee Hwee, Presiding Judge, Family Justice Courts, recently reiterated that parents working together, and not the court, were the best persons to make decisions and bear responsibility for their child (see “From Confrontation to Collaboration: A Decade in Transforming The Family Justice Paradigm”, Keynote Address and CJ Koh Lecture 2024 delivered at Family Conference 2024 (3 September 2024) at paragraphs 27–28):</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The centrality of parenting obligations was emphasised in <em>CVC v CVB</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30092-SSP.xml')\">[2023] SGHC(A) 28</a>. Citing s 46(1) of the Women’s Charter, the court observed that “parental responsibility [was] one of the most fundamental obligations of a married couple”. The corollary of this is that the court must naturally be the last resort for the resolution of parenting matters. As the Appellate Division of the High Court recently emphasised, “[i]nstead of litigating in the courts for the variation of orders, parents should endeavour to make adjustments by agreement to the care and access orders where necessary… While the court remains accessible to parties who require a resolution to disputes that they are unable to resolve despite their best efforts, we stress that this course of action should be the last resort”</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Parents must therefore intentionally endeavour to make parenting decisions for themselves instead of fighting it out in court. They must work on reducing conflict instead of expending energy and resources to disparage each other. A divorce does not mark the end of one’s parenting obligations. After all, <em>parents know their child best and are the most suitable persons to make decisions and bear responsibility for their child. The court is no substitute for a child’s parent, and the task of making decisions for a child should therefore be undertaken by the parents working together, rather than by the force of a court order.</em></p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[Emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_46\"></a>46 Even as I prescribed detailed care and access orders to give the spouses clarity on their rights and obligations after the divorce, I emphasise that they are always welcome to agree to different care or access arrangements for the child, just as they had agreed to share the custody of the child. Any such amicable agreement would conduce to the best interests of the child more than any formal order of court.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>See Signed Consent Order dated 2/12/2022</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Aunt’s Affidavit at p 25</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Aunt’s Affidavit at [12]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Aunt’s Affidavit at p 23</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Aunt’s Affidavit at [12]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>W’s Subs at [17]–[18]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>2WAOM at [28(g)]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>2HAOM562–563</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>2HAOM565</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>2HAOM551–567</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>H’s Subs at [44]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>1HAOM717–720</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>1HAOM at [218]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>2HAOM565</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_15_1\" id=\"Ftn_15\">[note: 15]</a></sup>W’s Subs at [38(d)]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_16_1\" id=\"Ftn_16\">[note: 16]</a></sup>W’s Subs at [38(e)]</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_17_1\" id=\"Ftn_17\">[note: 17]</a></sup>4HAOM at [11]–[12]</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Family violence – Orders for protection – Cross-applications – Approach to assessing whether family violence under the “continual harassment” limb in s 64 of the Women’s Charter 1961 is likely to be committed","Evidence – Admissibility of evidence – Admission of further evidence during trial for personal protection order","Evidence – Proof of evidence – Both applicants for personal protection orders alleging that the other party has committed multiple acts of family violence – Whether a court must assess the credibility of each of these allegations before determining whether to issue personal protection orders","Evidence – Proof of evidence – Evidential value of police reports in proceedings for personal protection orders"],"date":"2024-10-25","court":"Family Court","case-number":"SS No. 864 of 2024 & SS No. 867 of 2024","title":"XEP v XEQ","citation":"[2024] SGFC 95","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32394-SSP.xml","counsel":["Wife and Husband in person."],"timestamp":"2024-11-01T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kow Keng Siong","html":"<root><head><title>XEP v XEQ</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XEP <em>v</em> XEQ </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32394-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 95</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">SS No. 864 of 2024 & SS No. 867 of 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">25 October 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kow Keng Siong </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Wife and Husband in person. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XEP — XEQ </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Orders for protection</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Cross-applications</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Approach to assessing whether family violence under the “continual harassment” limb in s 64 of the Women’s Charter 1961 is likely to be committed</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Evidence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Admissibility of evidence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Admission of further evidence during trial for personal protection order</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Evidence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Proof of evidence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Both applicants for personal protection orders alleging that the other party has committed multiple acts of family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Whether a court must assess the credibility of each of these allegations before determining whether to issue personal protection orders</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Evidence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Proof of evidence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Evidential value of police reports in proceedings for personal protection orders</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">25 October 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kow Keng Siong:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 A personal protection order (“<b>PPO</b>”) and domestic exclusion order (“<b>DEO</b>”) can be issued if, among others, a person has committed or is likely to commit family violence against a family member. Parties in cross-applications for such orders filed various police reports accusing each other of having committed such violence on multiple occasions. Must the court determine whether family violence has been committed on <em>each</em> of these occasions in considering whether to issue a PPO/DEO?</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 This issue arose in SS No. 843 of 2024 (“<b>Wife’s application</b>”) and SS 867 of 2024 (“<b>Husband’s application</b>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 The Husband and Wife were married in 2007. They have a 15-year-old daughter (D.O.B: 13 July 2009). In April 2024, the Wife commenced divorce proceedings. About one month thereafter, the parties made the following applications:</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"7.43851229754049%\"><col width=\"18.6962607478504%\"><col width=\"33.0333933213357%\"><col width=\"21.9756048790242%\"><col width=\"18.8562287542492%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Application</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Order sought</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Person sought to be protected</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Respondent</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(a)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Wife’s application</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">PPO</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Wife</p> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Daughter</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Husband</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">DEO for Wife’s bedroom<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span></p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(b)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Husband’s application</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">PPO</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Husband</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"middle\"> <p align=\"center\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Wife</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 The incidents of family violence were alleged to have occurred in the parties’ matrimonial home (“<b>Flat</b>”).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Legal requirements</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 Before analysing the evidence, it is useful to summarise the requirements for granting a PPO/DEO.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">1<sup>st</sup> requirement</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 <em>First</em>, the applicant must prove that the respondent has committed or is likely to commit “family violence” against the person(s) sought to be protected. Under s 64 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“<b>Charter</b>”), “family violence” covers the following types of conduct:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_a\"></a>(a) Wilfully or knowingly placing, or attempting to place, a family member in fear of hurt.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_b\"></a>(b) Causing hurt to a family member by such act which is known or ought to have been known would result in hurt.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_c\"></a>(c) Wrongfully confining or restraining a family member against his or her will.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_d\"></a>(d) Causing continual harassment with intent to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause anguish to a family member. To prove family violence under this limb, the following must be established:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_d-p3_i\"></a>(i) The respondent has committed “harassment” – i.e., an act of annoying or worrying the applicant by putting pressure on him/her or saying or doing unpleasant things to him/her.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_d-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) The harassment is “continual” – i.e., repeated, repetitive.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_6-p2_d-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) The respondent has continually harassed the applicant intending or knowing that it is likely to cause the latter to suffer “anguish” – i.e., severe pain, mental suffering, or unhappiness.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> Thus, repetitive conduct that causes worry, emotional distress or annoyance can amount to “continual harassment”: see e.g., <em>Yue Tock Him v Yee Ee Lim</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2011] SGDC 0099.xml')\">[2011] SGDC 99</a> (“<b><em>Yue Tock Lim</em></b>”) at [33].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">2<sup>nd</sup> requirement</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 <em>Second</em>, the applicant must prove that a PPO/DEO “is necessary”. One way of assessing whether this requirement has been proved is to ask the following question – <em>Is family violence likely to occur in future against the person(s) sought to be protected?</em> If the answer is “no”, a PPO/DEO will not be appropriate even if family violence has been committed. An example where a PPO was denied for this reason is <em>XDV v XDW</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32454-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 87</a> at [13] to [18].</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">My decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Orders made</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 I now return to the Wife’s and Husband’s applications.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 At the end of a trial –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_a\"></a>(a) I found that the Wife and Husband were likely to continually harass each other, and that it was necessary to issue a protection order. Accordingly, I allowed (i) the Husband’s application and (ii) the Wife’s application (to protect herself).</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_9-p2_b\"></a>(b) I found that the Wife had failed to satisfy the requirements for a PPO/DEO to protect the Daughter from the Husband. Accordingly, I declined to make any such order against the Husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 I will now explain my decision. For a start, I wish to state that during the trial, the parties had made many accusations of family violence against each other. In this judgement, I will focus only on those accusations that are material to my decision.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">1<sup>st</sup> requirement – Family violence likely to be committed</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">1 May 2024 incident</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 I begin with an incident that occurred on 1 May 2024 (“<b>1 May incident</b>”). Both parties relied on this incident to support their respective application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 The 1 May incident was recorded on video.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> This video revealed that for about 20 mins, <em>each party</em> had knowingly harassed each other. In the video –</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_a\"></a>(a) The Husband and Wife could clearly be seen recording each other during their altercation – while concurrently and repeatedly accusing each other of provocation. This is a highly provocative conduct: <em>VWT v VWS</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26733-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 111</a> at [36].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Wife could be observed raising her voice and repeatedly confronting the Husband – even when the latter walked away from her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_c\"></a>(c) The Husband could be seen entering and remaining in the Wife’s and Daughter’s shared bedroom – despite being repeatedly told that he was invading their privacy and that he was to leave the room.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_d\"></a>(d) The Husband could be seen repeatedly telling the Wife that she was prohibited from entering his bedroom and using its ensuite toilet – despite the latter being upset by this prohibition.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_12-p2_e\"></a>(e) The Husband could also be seen telling the Wife that she was a mere occupier in the Flat and that she had no right to stay there legally.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Other incidents</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 The 1 May incident is not an isolated incident of harassment between the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 It is not disputed that there is <em>deep and long-standing animosity</em> between them. During their marriage, the parties have filed numerous police reports accusing each other of having committed family violence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_a\"></a>(a) Back in 2013, the Wife filed a police report accusing the Husband of hitting her head. In 2018, she accused him of hitting her clavicle. In 2019, the Wife applied for a PPO against the Husband. (This application was subsequently withdrawn.) The evidence showed that the Wife had no qualms in summoning the Police to intervene in her altercations with the Husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_14-p2_b\"></a>(b) Between December 2023 to early October 2024 (11 months), the Husband filed 31 police reports against the Wife for abusive, threatening, and harassing conduct committed against him. The Police had classified the incidents in four of these reports under the Protection from Harassment Act 2014.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 I pause to make a few observations regarding the evidential value of police reports in PPO/DEO proceedings.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_a\"></a>(a) The filing of a police report and the offence classification of the report by the Police do not prove that the act alleged in the report has been committed. This is because a police report is a self-interested statement, and its contents have not been tested in court.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_b\"></a>(b) The filing of a police report <em>per se</em> does not constitute harassment of the person complained against in the report: <em>Yue Tock Lim</em> at [80] to [83]; <em>GFS</em> at [61]. A contrary view can have the undesirable effect of deterring a person from genuinely reporting a wrongdoing or seeking police assistance.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_15-p2_c\"></a>(c) However, where <em>both</em> parties <em>repeatedly</em> file police reports against each other, then one cannot exclude the possibility that they could have done so to improperly cause the other party to be investigated (and thus be harassed) in a game of tit-for-tat.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Wife’s request to admit further evidence</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 At the trial, the parties wanted to refer to some of the allegations of family violence in [14] above. In fact, the Wife had requested to admit <em>further</em> evidence – in the form of three videos – to support her case.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 I disallowed the Wife’s request. My reasons are as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_a\"></a>(a) As a starting point, the evidence in a PPO trial should be confined to those that support or rebut the allegations of family violence contained in an applicant’s complaint.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_b\"></a>(b) If there are good reasons to depart from the starting position, then notice to admit the further evidence must be given as soon as possible. It is important that the other party (i) is not taken by surprise and (ii) has sufficient opportunity to respond to the further evidence: <em>Teng Cheng Sin v Law Fay Yuen</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2003] 3 SLR(R) 0356.xml')\">[2003] 3 SLR(R) 356</a> at [19] and [20]; <em>Lai Kwok Kin v Teo Zien Jackson</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/25309-SSP.xml')\">[2020] 5 SLR 389</a> (“<b><em>Lai Kwok Kin</em></b>”) at [57] – [60]; <em>VFM v VFN</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26547-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 91</a> at [44]-[47]; <em>VAW v VAX</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25988-SSP.xml')\">[2021] SGFC 50</a> at [52] and [55]; <em>VYW v VYV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27025-SSP.xml')\">[2022] SGFC 2</a> at [32] – [39]; <em>BCY v BCZ</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2012] SGDC 0360.xml')\">[2012] SGDC 360</a> at [6] – [9].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_c\"></a>(c) In this case, the Wife’s request to admit the further evidence was belated. It was made (i) more than three months after the matter was fixed for trial, (ii) during the second tranche of the hearing, and (iii) while the Husband was being cross-examined.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_d\"></a>(d) There is no evidence that the Wife had given advance notice of her request to admit further evidence to the Husband. To admit the further evidence in such circumstances is highly prejudicial to him.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_e\"></a>(e) Furthermore, the Husband shared that he had refrained from admitting further video evidence <em>of his own</em> to rebut the Wife’s case (when she testified at the first tranche of hearing about six weeks earlier) and to support his case. This was because he did not want to prolong the trial. However, if the Wife was permitted to admit the three videos, then he should also be allowed to admit his video evidence. In my view, the admission of further evidence by both parties in such haphazard circumstances is not desirable. If discipline is not imposed in the admission of further evidence, then a PPO trial can descend into chaos and end up being protracted. This is not in anyone’s interests.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_17-p2_f\"></a>(f) Finally, my decision to disallow the admission of further evidence did not prejudice the Wife. This is because I had eventually acceded to her request for a PPO and DEO.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Whether there is a need to assess each allegation of family violence</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 I take this opportunity to address a related issue – i.e., in cases where parties in cross-applications for PPO allege that the other party has committed multiple acts of family violence, must a court assess the credibility of <em>each</em> allegation in determining whether the 1<sup>st</sup> requirement for PPO is proved?</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 In my view, the answer is no.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_a\"></a>(a) On a plain reading, all that s 65(1) needs to be proved (for the 1<sup>st</sup> requirement) is that “family violence has been committed <em>or is likely to be committed</em> against a family member”. [emphasis added] In other words, the 1<sup>st</sup> requirement can be met if an applicant can prove that family violence “is likely to be committed” – there is no need for him/her to prove that such violence has in fact been committed prior to the PPO application.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b\"></a>(b) Apart from s 65(1), there are also good reasons why, in principle, a court should not be obliged to make findings as to whether family violence has been committed for every allegation raised by the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b-p3_i\"></a>(i) The purpose of a PPO is <em>not to punish</em> a party for past acts of such violence: <em>Lai Kwok Kin</em> at [38]; <em>Yue Tock Him</em> at [10]; <em>GFS v GFT</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/29939-SSP.xml')\">[2023] SGFC 21</a> (“<b><em>GFS</em></b>”) at [31]; <em>WSD v WSE</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30956-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 1</a> at [1]; <em>UMI v UMK</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/21871-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGFC 53</a> at [37] to [39].</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Instead, a PPO is “<em>pre-emptive</em>” in purpose – i.e., it protects an applicant from <em>future</em> family violence. If there are reasonable grounds to believe that an applicant is in danger of family violence, then a PPO should be issued even if such violence has not been committed on the applicant previously.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_19-p2_b-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) Additionally, in the case of cross-complaints involving parties in a highly acrimonious relationship, there is a real risk of the parties expecting the court to adjudicate on who was “right” or “wrong” regarding their past differences. A PPO trial is not a forum to settle personal scores. There is little utility in expending court resources to scrutinise each allegation of family violence when it is already clear from the evidence or from a party’s conduct in court that he/she is ready to engage in escalatory “tit-for-tat” for the most minor slight perceived from the other party.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 To sum up – in view of [12] to [14] above, I am satisfied that the Husband and Wife are likely to cause continual harassment knowing that it is likely to cause anguish to the other party.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">2<sup>nd</sup> requirement – Protection orders are necessary</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 I now come to the 2<sup>nd</sup> requirement. In my view, a PPO/DEO is “necessary” in the present case. My reasons are as follows.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_a\"></a>(a) Once it is proved that family violence “is likely to be committed”, then it must logically follow that a PPO is necessary to protect an applicant from such violence. In other words, a PPO is <em>presumptively</em> necessary: <em>Lai Kwok Kin</em> at [39].</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_b\"></a>(b) To displace this presumption, a respondent will have the <em>burden</em> of adducing evidence to prove that a PPO is in fact not necessary to protect the applicant. If the respondent fails to discharge this evidential burden, then a PPO ought to be issued.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c\"></a>(c) In the present case, the parties have failed to displace the presumption that a PPO/DEO is necessary. In fact, the evidence shows otherwise:</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c-p3_i\"></a>(i) As stated earlier, there is a deep and long-standing animosity between the parties. They are still living together and the Wife is unemployed. This means that the risk of friction between them is very real.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c-p3_ii\"></a>(ii) Just one month after the Wife commenced divorce proceedings in April 2024, both parties promptly applied for PPO/DEO against each other. <em>After</em> these applications were filed, the Husband had made 10 police reports against the Wife.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c-p3_iii\"></a>(iii) Each party have resorted to recording the other party’s conduct during their arguments. Such acts can escalate the tension between the parties.</p> <p class=\"Judg-3\"><a id=\"p1_21-p2_c-p3_iv\"></a>(iv) The Husband’s conduct in [12(e)] above suggests that he believed that he was entitled to evict the Wife – despite the Flat being their matrimonial home. A DEO is necessary to make it clear that the Husband is not to either (1) intrude into the privacy of the bedroom of his estranged Wife or (2) evict her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 To summarise – I have found that the Wife and Husband are likely to continually harass each other, and that a PPO/DEO is necessary for their protection. Accordingly, I allowed (a) the Husband’s application and (b) the Wife’s application (to protect herself).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">PPO application for the Daughter</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Requirements not met</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 I now come to the Wife’s application for a PPO to protect the Daughter from the Husband. I have declined to make the order. This is because in general, the Wife’s accusations that the Husband had committed family violence against the Daughter (a) are sweeping in nature, (b) lack particulars (such as time and place of the alleged violence), (c) do not fit the definition of “family violence”, and (d) are not borne out by the evidence.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 Let me give an example. During the trial, the Wife alleged that the Husband had “scolded” the Daughter during the 1 May incident. According to her, this scolding is recorded in the video. The Wife’s claim is contradicted by the video.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> It showed that at all material times during the 1 May incident, the Husband did not scold or behave in a threatening manner to the Daughter. On the contrary, whenever he spoke to her, the Husband was gentle – at times calling her “princess”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">Wife’s request for the Daughter to testify</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 During the trial, the Wife requested that the Daughter be allowed to testify that she had felt threatened by the Husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 I rejected this request. My reasons are as follows.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_26-p2_a\"></a>(a) In the video relating to the 1 May incident, the Daughter did not appear to be fearful of the Husband. In fact, she was outspoken and can clearly be seen to be confronting him regarding his decisions that she disagreed with.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_26-p2_b\"></a>(b) The Wife had tendered two handwritten notes from the Daughter dated 13 and 14 June 2024.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> It is also evident from these notes that the Daughter was not fearful of the Husband. In fact, she had levelled several accusations against him, including of him lying and “defaming” the Wife and her. The Daughter even threatened to call the Police if the Husband were to allege that the Wife had instigated her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_26-p2_c\"></a>(c) Based on the tone and contents of her notes, it is not clear to me that the Daughter can be an objective witness. She seems to be siding with the Wife and parroting language that had been used by the latter. (See e.g., the Wife’s statement dated 27 August 2024 where the Wife accused of the Husband of “defaming” her.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span>) It is not disputed that the Daughter occupied the same bedroom with the Wife at all material times. In the circumstances, I cannot discount the possibility that the Wife might have alienated the Daughter against the Husband.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_26-p2_d\"></a>(d) Finally, and in any event, I am of the view that it would not be in the Daughter’s interests to testify. Because of the acrimonious situation at home, she was already seeing a school counsellor. The Daughter should not be placed in a situation where she needs to – as a witness – take sides between her parents at the trial.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 The above are the reasons for my decision in the Wife’s and Husband’s applications.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 Before concluding, I wish to convey the following <em>directly to the parties</em>.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_a\"></a>(a) You should not see the PPO/DEO made against each of you as “punishment” for your past conduct or as a judgement of your character. You should also not view the making of these orders as a sign that you have either “won” or “lost”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_b\"></a>(b) You live in a combined house consisting of two HDB units. You have ample living space. Keep out of each other’s way. Stop turning the home into a battleground for your contest of wills.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_c\"></a>(c) It is an offence to contravene the orders that I have made. In other words, moving forward, you are not to commit any act can comes within the definition of family violence in [6] above.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_d\"></a>(d) If you intentionally or knowingly contravene the order(s), then you can be arrested by the Police and be punished with a fine and/or imprisonment.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_e\"></a>(e) The PPO/DEO is purely a shield for your protection. Do not turn it into a sword by using it to provoke family violence. If you do so, the law will not be sympathetic to your cause.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_28-p2_f\"></a>(f) Finally, your acrimony towards each other affects your daughter. She will be taking her “O” level examinations in about a year. If you truly love your daughter – demonstrate this with concrete actions. Keep the peace in your home. Do not drag her into your domestic fray.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>In her Complaint (exhibit C1), the Wife had requested for the Husband to be excluded from her bedroom and the “kitchen toilet”. By the time of the hearing, the Wife had moved into one of the master-bedrooms which has its own toilet.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>See definition of “harassment” in the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries online, accessible at – https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>See definition of “continual” in the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries online, accessible at – https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>See definition of “anguish” in the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries online, accessible at – https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Exhibit C4.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>The police reports are at exhibits R3.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Exhibit C4.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>Exhibit C3.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Exhibit C2.</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Family Law – Family violence – Orders for protection","Family Law – Family violence – Continual harassment"],"date":"2024-10-24","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Summons No 1061 of 2024","title":"XEN v XEO","citation":"[2024] SGFC 94","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32386-SSP.xml","counsel":["Both parties in person."],"timestamp":"2024-11-01T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Tan Zhi Xiang","html":"<root><head><title>XEN v XEO</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> XEN <em>v</em> XEO </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32386-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 94</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Summons No 1061 of 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">24 October 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Tan Zhi Xiang </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Both parties in person. </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> XEN — XEO </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Orders for protection</span></p> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family Law</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Family violence</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Continual harassment</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">24 October 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Tan Zhi Xiang:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Introduction</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 This was an application for a personal protection order (“PPO”) and a partial domestic exclusion order (“DEO”) covering the complainant’s bedroom. As parties are siblings, I refer to the complainant as the “Brother” and the respondent as the “Sister”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Background and parties’ cases</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The parties came before me with cross applications. The Brother’s chief complaint was that the Sister repeatedly went into his bedroom to clean it. He felt that his privacy was intruded and it had caused him stress such that he was admitted to the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) a few times.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_1\" id=\"Ftn_1_1\"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> The Sister, in her defence, explained that she merely wanted to clean the room as her siblings did not clean their rooms.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_2\" id=\"Ftn_2_1\"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> On the other hand, the Sister’s application related to an incident when tensions erupted over the aforesaid issue and the Brother assaulted her.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 Both parties appeared in person. They were guided through the trial process. Parties were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine each other and make closing submissions. The Sister was in particular afforded multiple opportunities to cross-examine the Brother as she had attempted to state her case in detail instead of putting questions to the Brother during her cross-examination of the Brother.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_3\" id=\"Ftn_3_1\"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 I granted the Sister’s application for a PPO against the Brother as it was not disputed that the Brother had physically assaulted her. The Brother did not appeal against my decision. I also granted the Brother’s application for the reasons stated below.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The law</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The applicable law is clearly set out in the decision of the High Court (Family Division) in <em>UNQ v UNR</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25291-SSP.xml')\">[2020] SGHCF 21</a> and I reproduce the relevant parts in the next few paragraphs.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 The Court is empowered to make a protection order under s 65(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“the Charter”), which states:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <b>Protection order</b> </p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <b>65.</b>—(1) The court may, upon satisfaction on a balance of probabilities that family violence has been committed or is likely to be committed against a family member and that it is necessary for the protection of the family member, make a protection order restraining the person against whom the order is made from using family violence against the family member.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 There are thus two threshold requirements that must be met before a court may grant a PPO:</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_a\"></a>(a) First, the court must be satisfied that family violence has been committed or is likely to be committed.</p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"p1_7-p2_b\"></a>(b) Second, the PPO must be necessary for the protection of the family member.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 Family violence is defined in s 64 of the Charter as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">“family violence” means the commission of any of the following acts:</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(<em>a</em>) wilfully or knowingly placing, or attempting to place, a family member in fear of hurt;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(<em>b</em>) causing hurt to a family member by such act which is known or ought to have been known would result in hurt;</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(<em>c</em>) wrongfully confining or restraining a family member against his will; or</p> <p class=\"Judg-QuoteList-2\">(<em>d</em>) <em>causing continual harassment with intent to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause anguish to a family member</em>,</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">but does not include any force lawfully used in self-defence, or by way of correction towards a child below 21 years of age</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">[emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 The civil standard of proof that is applied in determining whether PPOs ought to be granted.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Decision</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 The sole issue is whether the Sister’s acts in repeatedly entering the Brother’s room to clean it amounted to “continual harassment with intent to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause anguish to [the Brother]”.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 I accept that ordinarily, a sibling cleaning another sibling’s room would be harmless (and indeed a loving act) and most certainly not amount to harassment. However, each case turns on its own facts. What may be harmless under one set of circumstances might be highly distressing in other circumstances. It is important not to make quick judgments without analysing the facts holistically.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 A pertinent point to note is that, according to the Brother, the Sister would enter his room sometime between 10pm or 11pm until 4am.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_4\" id=\"Ftn_4_1\"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> This was corroborated by a witness, who is the parties’ sister (“the Witness”), who shared a bedroom<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_5\" id=\"Ftn_5_1\"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> with the Brother:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_6\" id=\"Ftn_6_1\"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span></p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2\" frame=\"none\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"23.02%\"><col width=\"76.98%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Witness:</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Yah, because she---she choose the wrong timing to clean the room. And she don’t stay here, she keep insisting to ca---she keep coming back every night about night---last time, 9:00 plus, like sometimes may change 11:00 plus---nowadays it’s 11:00 plus,---</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Court:</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Yes.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Witness:</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">she may come back in the middle of the night to clean and clean until the wee hours of the night, then she will go back to her own, uh, residence in the early morning like 6:00 plus or sometimes 3:00 plus or something like that, depending---depending---it depends. But it’s something like that, that’s a general one.</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 The Sister did not dispute that she went into the Brother’s room to clean it late at night:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_7\" id=\"Ftn_7_1\"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2\" frame=\"none\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"16.3%\"><col width=\"83.7%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Court:</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Okay. But why do you feel the need to go to your parents’ house to---at 10:00pm, say---</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">[Sister]:</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Because I need to work, my dear.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">[Court]:</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Work what?</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">[Sister]:</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">I need work, my own schedule. I got to go according to my own schedule, my free time. I cannot say, you want me to come at 8:00am, means 8:00am. I’m not their maid, I’m not their worker. Okay. I can only go and do at my own discretion, my own free time wherever I think I---that is the time for me, I’m able to do the work itself. Because I’m---I’m---I’m having my own tight schedule. My work runs 24 hours itself, basically.</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 Further, according to the Witness, this had been going on for about eight years.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_8\" id=\"Ftn_8_1\"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> The Witness explained the impact of the Sister’s conduct:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_9\" id=\"Ftn_9_1\"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">For someone who keep on like causing us distress---at night, we couldn’t sleep---you know, in the past, right, we have to rush back in---during the weekends just to lock inside our room fast, so that she---to prevent her from entering our room to clean our room.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 It is not difficult to imagine that having someone in one’s bedroom in the wee hours of the night would be disruptive and distressing. The Brother indeed stated that he had been admitted to IMH due to stress (see [2] above). Thus, I accepted that the Sister’s conduct had caused him anguish. Indeed, I note that the tensions erupted one day such that the Brother assaulted the Sister. While this was unacceptable (and was the reason why I granted the PPO for the Sister), it provided further support for the finding that the Sister’s conduct had caused the Brother deep distress.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 The next question is whether the Sister intended to or at least knew that her conduct would cause the Brother anguish. The evidence showed clearly Sister was aware that the Brother did not want her in his room. The Sister confirmed that the Brother had told her the same “numerous” times, which also confirmed that there were many instances of her entering the Brother’s room despite his protests.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_10\" id=\"Ftn_10_1\"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> The Witness also confirmed that the Sister would not take “no” for an answer, and when she (<em>ie</em>, the Witness) tried to lock the bedroom door (as stated at [12], the Witness shared a room with the Brother), the Sister would attempt to enter their room through other means.<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_11\" id=\"Ftn_11_1\"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> In light of the evidence of both the Brother and the Witness, I was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Sister knew that her conduct in entering the Brother’s bedroom against his will would cause him anguish.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 I did not accept the Sister’s case which was essentially that she had to clean the room for the sake of hygiene. For example, she said:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_12\" id=\"Ftn_12_1\"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">No, if the person does housework themselves, clean up their own room themselves, it’s fine. But they don’t even do so at all after 40 years of age. Not even one finger, not---don’t even lift, they---the whole window frame can be black colour. Okay. Because it’s very windy and we---we are on a low floor, and low floor unit, bad thing about that is there’s a lot of pests. They---they can even let a lizards go into the cupboard and stay inside there and---and breed and let cockroach, um, lay eggs all these things. And then---and then the cupboard mood---turned mouldy with yellow dots itself. So, when things is spoil, who is the one who repair? I am the one who repair and pay for everything. Huh? They don’t even pay a cent, they don’t even they---bother. When light is spoil, I repair. Everything I do.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 However, there was no evidence to show that the Brother’s room was in such a squalid state that it had to be cleaned frequently against his will. There was also no evidence of pests in the Brother’s room or the house. To be clear, the photographs tendered by the Sister only showed at most a messy house;<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_13\" id=\"Ftn_13_1\"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> certainly not a house in such a state that she had to clean the Brother’s room in the wee hours of the night against his will. In any event, both parties are adults and it was not necessary for the Sister to impose her own hygiene standards on her Brother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 To sum up, this was a case where the Sister entered the Brother’s room numerous times despite him making it clear many times that this intruded his privacy. The Sister would do so in the wee hours of the night, disrupting his rest. The Brother was so stressed that he was admitted to IMH (see [2] above). All these while, the Sister was aware that the Brother did not like her in his room. I was therefore satisfied that the Sister’s conduct amounted to continual harassment knowing that it was likely to cause anguish to the Brother. I was hence satisfied that the Sister had committed family violence against the Brother.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 I turn to the question of whether it was necessary to grant the orders sought. It was clear from the evidence that the Sister had no insight into the impact of her conduct on her Brother. When queried whether she was willing to stop going into the Brother’s room given his discomfort, she replied:<span class=\"FootnoteRef\"><a href=\"#Ftn_14\" id=\"Ftn_14_1\"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span></p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">No, because---because he---because this unit belongs to my dad, not him. If he’s not comfortable, he can stay out. You ask him to stay out or get his own place. Because literally, he don’t upkeep his room and he’ll breed all the pest. Uh, because 2nd floor got a lot of pest. Whatever pest you name it, we got it. My mum’s ha---my mum’s room even got a cluster cockroach staying, yah.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 As a result of the lack of insight and her clear insistence that she would continue entering the Brother’s room despite knowing the Brother’s distress, I found it necessary to grant both a PPO and a partial DEO (covering the Brother’s bedroom) for the Brother’s protection.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Conclusion</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 For the above reasons, I allowed the Brother’s application for both a PPO and a partial DEO.</p> <hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\"><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_1_1\" id=\"Ftn_1\">[note: 1]</a></sup>Brother’s Complaint Form; Certified Transcript at p 46.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_2_1\" id=\"Ftn_2\">[note: 2]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 9.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_3_1\" id=\"Ftn_3\">[note: 3]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at pp 28 to 33.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_4_1\" id=\"Ftn_4\">[note: 4]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 27.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_5_1\" id=\"Ftn_5\">[note: 5]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 20.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_6_1\" id=\"Ftn_6\">[note: 6]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 38.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_7_1\" id=\"Ftn_7\">[note: 7]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at pp 29 and 30.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_8_1\" id=\"Ftn_8\">[note: 8]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 40.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_9_1\" id=\"Ftn_9\">[note: 9]</a></sup>Ibid.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_10_1\" id=\"Ftn_10\">[note: 10]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 11.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_11_1\" id=\"Ftn_11\">[note: 11]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 39.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_12_1\" id=\"Ftn_12\">[note: 12]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 12.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_13_1\" id=\"Ftn_13\">[note: 13]</a></sup>Sister’s documents at pages 10 to 12.</p><p class=\"Footnote\"><sup><a href=\"#Ftn_14_1\" id=\"Ftn_14\">[note: 14]</a></sup>Certified Transcript at p 15.</p></div></content></root>"},{"tags":["Courts and Jurisdiction – Judges – Recusal"],"date":"2024-10-16","court":"Family Court","case-number":"Divorce No 3557 of 2022 (Summons No 3015 of 2024)","title":"WPF v WPG","citation":"[2024] SGFC 91","url":"https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32334-SSP.xml","counsel":["Plaintiff-in-person","Defendant-in-person"],"timestamp":"2024-10-22T16:00:00Z[GMT]","coram":"Kenneth Yap","html":"<root><head><title>WPF v WPG</title></head><content><div class=\"contentsOfFile\"> <h2 align=\"center\" class=\"title\"><span class=\"caseTitle\"> WPF <em>v</em> WPG </span><br><span class=\"Citation offhyperlink\"><a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32334-SSP.xml')\">[2024] SGFC 91</a></span></h2><table id=\"info-table\"><tbody><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Case Number</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Divorce No 3557 of 2022 (Summons No 3015 of 2024)</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Decision Date</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">16 October 2024</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Tribunal/Court</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\">Family Court</td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Coram</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Kenneth Yap </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> Plaintiff-in-person; Defendant-in-person </td></tr><tr class=\"info-row\"><td class=\"txt-label\" style=\"padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap\" valign=\"top\">Parties</td><td class=\"info-delim1\" style=\"padding: 4px\">:</td><td class=\"txt-body\"> WPF — WPG </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class=\"txt-body\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Courts and Jurisdiction</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Judges</span> – <span style=\"font-style:italic\">Recusal</span></p> <p></p><table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"><tbody><tr><td width=\"80%\"><p class=\"Judg-Hearing-Date\">16 October 2024</p></td><td><p class=\"Judg-Date-Reserved\"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class=\"Judg-Author\"> District Judge Kenneth Yap:</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_1\"></a>1 In the course of a contested divorce hearing before myself, the Defendant Husband filed SUM 3150/2024 (“the recusal summons”) on 20 September 2024 to apply for my recusal in the divorce proceedings, and for such proceedings to be stayed pending the outcome of the recusal application. The Defendant alleged that I had demonstrated bias by refusing his request to adjourn the contested divorce hearing of 9 September 2024 despite his medical condition.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_2\"></a>2 The recusal summons was fixed before me together with an adjourned session of the contested divorce proceedings on 30 September 2024. The Plaintiff Wife had earlier indicated on 26 September 2024 that she would not be filing an affidavit in response to the recusal application. While the Defendant requested at the hearing on 30 September 2024 to be granted leave to file an additional affidavit, I did not think this to be necessary. The basis for his application was sufficiently laid out in his supporting affidavit, and there was no need for a rebuttal as the Plaintiff had chosen not to respond substantively. I therefore proceeded to hear the recusal application and dismissed it, with brief grounds provided later that day. The Defendant has appealed against the recusal application, and my full grounds are provided as follows.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Defendant’s Case for Recusal </p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_3\"></a>3 It is trite that to succeed in a recusal application, the applicant must either show actual bias on the part of the judge, or apparent bias, i.e. that a fair-minded observer with reasonable knowledge of the facts would conclude that the judge was so biased.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_4\"></a>4 There is no evidence raised in the defendant’s affidavit in support of any actual bias on my part with regard to the Defendant. I therefore take it that the applicant’s case is based solely on apparent bias. The thrust of his complaint is that I had ordered him to attend the contested divorce hearing over Zoom on 9 September 2024 despite the existence of a medical certificate from his cardiologist, one Dr Lim Choon Pin, which recommended that he be exempted from attendance at court. The Defendant also complains that I had proceeded with the hearing until the arrival of paramedics (whom the Defendant had pre-arranged to fetch himself to hospital) heralded the end of the session.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">The Threshold for Apparent Bias</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_5\"></a>5 The law on recusal for apparent bias is set out in the case of <em>Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2007] 1 SLR(R) 0085.xml')\">[2007] 1 SLR(R) 85</a>, and was elucidated by Aidan Xu @ Aedit Abdullah J in <em>TOW v TOV</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/19792-SSP.xml')\">[2016] SGHCF 16</a> at [31]:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">The test is whether the circumstances complained of would give rise to a reasonable suspicion or apprehension in a fair-minded reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts that the judge is biased. The assessment is made on an objective basis, but with the actual knowledge of the relevant facts. The fact that the yardstick is the perception of a fair-minded and reasonable person excludes any particular sensitivity or brittleness as to how the judge’s actions or statements should be judged.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_6\"></a>6 The threshold is not passed simply because a judge has made adverse findings or ruled against the interest of the applicant. The learned Judge further observed in <em>TOW v TOV</em>, at [34] that:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">A judge in our adversarial system would be expected to sift through the evidence, choose one side’s version of the facts to the other’s, and normally, in the absence of objective evidence, reach conclusions on credit and credibility. If the judge considers that witnesses have been mistaken, deficient, or untruthful, the judge should make the necessary findings. The judge is not expected to be gingerly or tactful to the point of obscuring necessary findings. The courtroom is certainly not an arena for trial by combat, or for the flagellation of witnesses, but there is no safe zone against adverse findings in the courtroom: the court is concerned with the proof of a case, and will need to evaluate the credit and credibility of the witnesses who testify.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_7\"></a>7 At [42], the court went on to observe that the mere fact that a judge had previously made adverse comments or findings against a litigant is not, on its own, sufficient for a recusal application to succeed. It should also be noted that even if the judge were wrong in his reasons or conclusion, that should not itself be reason to allege prejudice on his or her part (per <em>Werner Samuel Vuillemin v Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited</em> <a class=\"pagecontent\" href=\"javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/21684-SSP.xml')\">[2018] SGHC 92</a> at [67]).</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-1\">Whether Apparent Bias was Established on the Facts</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_8\"></a>8 The litmus test in the present appeal is whether the decision would lead an objective and omniscient onlooker to conclude that the judge was biased in the conduct of the matter. If so, this court should recuse itself of its own accord.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_9\"></a>9 To address the perception of my refusal to adjourn the contested divorce hearing, one needs to have regard to the long-drawn chronology of this matter.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Adjournments granted prior to the contested divorce hearing</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_10\"></a>10 The Plaintiff’s writ of divorce was filed more than two years ago, on 4 August 2022. After the Defendant entered appearance on 20 October 2022, mediation and counselling was conducted from December 2022 to January 2023, but did not prove successful. Directions were then given for the case to proceed to a contested divorce hearing.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_11\"></a>11 The Defendant next filed FC/SUM 734/2023 on 7 March 2023 to strike out the Plaintiff’s reference to a mutual agreement in the divorce proceedings. The summons was heard on 12 June 2023 and dismissed in part. The Defendant appealed against this decision in FC/RA 11/2023, which was heard by the District Judge in chambers and dismissed on 1 August 2023.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_12\"></a>12 The Defendant then filed a further appeal against the dismissal of his striking out application on 4 August 2023, in FC/RAS 14/2023. The appeal hearing was initially fixed for hearing before the High Court Family Division on 20 September 2023, but this was eventually adjourned six times over a period of about ten months to 18 July 2024 on account of the Defendant’s heart condition. The full details of these adjournments are provided to give a flavour of the latitude granted to the Defendant for his medical condition for the interlocutory appeal.</p> <table align=\"left\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"Judg-2-tblr\" frame=\"all\" pgwide=\"1\"><colgroup><col width=\"15.3430686137227%\"><col width=\"16.3432686537307%\"><col width=\"16.9833966793359%\"><col width=\"21.1842368473695%\"><col width=\"30.1460292058412%\"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Case / Type of Hearing</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Date of Hearing</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Correspondence</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Whether Medical Certificate (“MC”) tendered</b> </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\"> <b>Reason for adjournment</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">RAS 14/2023 (Hearing)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">20 September 2023</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">17 September 2023</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">MC dated 17 September 2023 exempting Defendant from court hearing from 16 to 20 September 2023. By Dr Ting (Farrer Park Hospital)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Defendant admitted to Farrer Park Hospital and undergoing treatment and evaluation.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Hearing adjourned to 17 October 2023. </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">RAS 14/2023 (Hearing)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">17 October 2023</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">14 October 2023</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Memo dated 14 October 2023 from</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Dr Lim Choon Pin (Mount Elizabeth)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Defendant admitted to Mount Elizabeth Novena Hospital for</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">recurrent chest pain. He was found to have coronary artery disease and was scheduled to</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">undergo a coronary angiogram on 17 October 2023. He was expected to be hospitalised until</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">19 October 2023, with a period of recuperation thereafter.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Hearing adjourned to 28 November 2023. </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">RAS 14/2023 (Pre-Trial Conference)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">28 November 2023</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">--</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Defendant requested for adjournment on basis that review appointment with heart specialist was on 29 December 2023.</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Hearing adjourned to 25 January 2024. </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">RAS 14/2023 (Hearing)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">25 January 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">27 December 2023</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Memo dated 27 December 2023. Unfit to attend court proceedings on 25 January 2024.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Dr Lim Choon Pin (Mount Elizabeth)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Defendant complained of intermittent chest tightness that was exacerbated during a recent bout of Covid-19 infection. As such he was unfit to attend court proceedings on 25 January 2024. Doctor would be reviewing him in February 2024.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Fixed for Pre-Trial Conference on 27 February 2024. </p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">RAS 14/2023</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(Pre-Trial Conference)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">27 February 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">20 February 2024 </p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"br\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Memo dated 20 February 2024.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Unfit to attend Court till end May 2024</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Dr Lim Choon Pin (Mount Elizabeth)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"b\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Defendant complained of intermittent chest tightness that gets worse when he is emotionally charged. As such, he was certified unfit to attend court proceedings from 20 February 2024 to end May 2024.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Hearing adjourned to 16 April 2024.</p> </td></tr><tr><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">RAS 14/2023</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">(Pre-Trial Conference)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">16 April 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">8 April 2024</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"r\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Memo dated 8 April 2024</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Dr Lim Choon Pin (Mount Elizabeth)</p> </td><td align=\"left\" class=\"\" rowspan=\"1\" valign=\"top\"> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Doctor indicated that Defendant had significant coronary artery stenosis in the mid to distal left anterior descending artery and fractional flow reserve was impaired and has also listed other medical issues. Defendant complained of chest tightness when he gets angry thus the doctor had recommended that he be excused from court proceedings until end of May 2024.</p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">Pre-Trial Conference adjourned to 25 June 2024. </p> <p align=\"justify\" class=\"Table-Para-1\">At the Pre-Trial Conference, hearing date was fixed for 18 July 2024. </p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear=\"left\"><br clear=\"left\"> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_13\"></a>13 Due to the numerous adjournments occasioned by the Defendant’s heart condition, the interlocutory appeal (FC/RAS 14/2023) was finally heard on 18 July 2024, and dismissed on 29 July 2024. This was nearly a year after it had been filed on 4 August 2023.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Adjournments granted in the course of the contested divorce hearing</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_14\"></a>14 The matter first came before me for hearing of the contested divorce on 13 August 2024. It would eventually be adjourned six times over the course of the next ten weeks to accommodate the Defendant’s medical condition.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">The First Adjournment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_15\"></a>15 On the first hearing date of 13 August 2024, the Defendant was absent from court. It transpired that he had sent an e-mail to the Registry fifteen minutes prior to the hearing, informing that he had just undergone an angioplasty procedure that day. The e-mail attached Dr Lim Choon Pin’s memo, which requested the court to adjourn his case for three months until after 30 November 2024. No explanation was given why advance notice was not provided for the Defendant’s absence, given that the hearing date had been fixed since 17 July 2024. The memo also did not comply with the Family Justice Court’s Practice Directions (“the Practice Directions”), as it did not state specifically <em>whether and when</em> the Defendant was unfit to attend court. The court accordingly directed that the matter be adjourned to 27 August 2024, and that the Defendant resubmit a medical certificate which excused his attendance for that day as well as any further date, accompanied by a full medical report explaining his medical history in relation to his heart problems. The Defendant was also instructed to ensure that his medical certificate be in compliance with paragraph 162(3) of the Practice Directions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">The Second Adjournment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_16\"></a>16 The Defendant next wrote in with a medical report from Dr Lim Choon Pin dated 17 August 2024. The doctor observed that the Defendant had had some bruising and swelling at the right groin access site for his recent angioplasty procedure, and was still being monitored to see if his chest pain symptoms had resolved. The doctor recommended that the Defendant was medically unfit to attend court for the period from 13 August 2024 to 30 November 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_17\"></a>17 In response, the court converted the hearing from an open court hearing to a hearing over Zoom, and adjourned the hearing (for a second time) from 27 August 2024 to 9 September 2024. The registry’s reply via email on 26 August 2024 emphasised to the Defendant that the change of mode of hearing was in deference to his medical condition, noting as follows:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">Should you feel concerned about your medical condition, you may locate yourself either in a hospital or in a place where you can be readily assisted should any medical emergency arise. You may wish to consult with your medical doctor on how best to make arrangements for such attendance. As family proceedings are confidential, you are reminded to ensure that you attend the Zoom hearing in a private room, although you are at liberty to call on assistance in the event of any medical need or emergency.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_18\"></a>18 In a further response on 5 September 2024 to the Defendant’s repeated requests to further adjourn the divorce hearing, the Defendant was also offered the option of attending the Zoom proceedings from a room in court, so that ready assistance could be provided in the event of any medical emergency.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">The Third Adjournment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_19\"></a>19 The adjourned hearing was next held on 9 September 2024, with the Defendant choosing to attend the proceedings over Zoom from his residence. He repeated his request for an adjournment, which was denied on the basis that he could call for medical assistance if needed. Over the course of the hearing, the Defendant revealed that he had made a prior arrangement for an ambulance to pick him up from his residence at 10.30 am on the day of the hearing. He admitted that this had been arranged some four to five days prior to the 9 September hearing (i.e. on 4 or 5 September). He also revealed that the ambulance service had contacted him on the night of 8 September and that he had confirmed the appointment. When the paramedics eventually arrived at 11 am during the morning hearing, the court had little choice but to adjourn the hearing (for the third time) to 18 September 2024, 2:30 pm.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">The Fourth Adjournment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_20\"></a>20 The Defendant next wrote in on 10 September 2024 with a medical certificate indicating that he was unfit to attend court from 9 to 22 September 2024. As a result, the hearing was adjourned (for the fourth time) to 26 September 2024, at 2:30 pm.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">The Fifth Adjournment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_21\"></a>21 On the morning of 26 September 2024, the Defendant wrote in at 10:23 am claiming that he had suffered a heart attack in the morning and was currently warded in Mount Elizabeth Novena Hospital. The hearing was adjourned (for the fifth time) to 30 September 2024, with fresh directions given to tender a medical report and medical certificate in compliance with Practice Directions.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_22\"></a>22 The Defendant next submitted a clinical discharge summary, a medical report and medical certificate on 27 September 2024. The clinical discharge revealed that he was admitted and warded at the Mount Elizabeth Novena hospital from 26 to 27 September 2024 for chest pain, right groin pseudoaneurysm and right subconjunctival haemorrhage. No mention was made of him having suffered a heart attack as had been claimed. He was discharged with a medical certificate granting hospitalisation leave and which stated he was not fit for court attendance, for a period of 18 days from 26 September to 13 October 2024. As directed by the court, Dr Lim Choon Pin submitted a medical report dated 27 September 2026 which re-iterated his earlier recommendation that the Defendant was medically unfit to attend court until 30 November 2024 (when his prescription of double blood thinners ends). It is not clear if there was actually a consult conducted by Dr Lim with the Defendant in the course of the latter’s recent admission.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-3\">The Sixth Adjournment</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_23\"></a>23 The hearing next proceeded on 30 September 2024, with the Defendant attending under protest. The recusal summons was mentioned first, with the Defendant seeking leave to file a further affidavit in support of his application. This was declined as the Plaintiff had earlier indicated on the hearing of 26 September 2024 that she was not filing an affidavit. An opportunity was given for the Defendant to orally submit on the recusal application, which he declined to do on the basis that his doctor had advised him that he could not be involved in any argument or hearing. I noted that the Defendant had clearly stated his position in his supporting affidavit, and being satisfied that he had sufficiently put forward his case, proceeded to hear and dismiss the recusal summons.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_24\"></a>24 The court did not proceed thereafter with the contested divorce hearing. Instead, special directions were given on account of the Defendant’s medical condition. Each party was directed to file a list of questions via correspondence by 7 October 2024, with leave to file a final reply affidavit solely restricted to answering the questions posed by 18 October 2024. It was also directed that if no questions were tendered, the court would take it that the party had no questions to be raised in cross-examination. Mindful that the Defendant’s latest medical certificate (dated 27 September 2024) recommended absence from court until 13 October 2024, the hearing of the matter was adjourned to 22 October 2024.</p> <p class=\"Judg-Heading-2\">Whether a reasonable person would have a reasonable suspicion of bias</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_25\"></a>25 As can be seen from the above, the Defendant was given ample latitude since September 2023 due to his medical issues, with six adjournments given over the course of his interlocutory appeal, and another six adjournments over the course of the present contested divorce hearings (two of which were <em>prior</em> to the 9 September 2024 hearing which is the subject matter of the recusal). It is noteworthy that despite being given respite since September 2023 to July 2024 from court proceedings, the Defendant had chosen to put off his angioplasty procedure throughout this period, even though his own doctor had recommended that he undergo this procedure. This was evident from Dr Lim Choon Pin’s medical report dated 8 April 2024, which provided the following assessment:</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\">I first saw [Defendant] on 13 October 2023 in my outpatient cardiac clinic. He reported symptoms of chest tightness and had undergone a CT coronary angiogram at Starmed under Dr Peter Ting that had showed significant blockage in one of his heart arteries (left anterior descending artery). He came to see me for further management of his cardiac condition. He subsequently underwent a coronary angiogram on 17 October 2023 which showed that he indeed has significant coronary artery stenosis in the mid to distal left anterior descending artery and fractional flow reserve was impaired (0.73) with adenosine challenge. <b>He was recommended to undergo angioplasty and stenting of this artery, but chose medical therapy instead.</b></p> <p class=\"Judg-2\"><a id=\"\"></a>…</p> <p class=\"Judg-Quote-1\"> <b>Currently, [Defendant] has decided to postpone his decision for angioplasty and stenting of his narrowed heart artery.</b> He wants to pursue medical therapy, but still complains of chest tightness when he gets angry, hence my recommendation that he be excused from court proceedings until end of May 2024 when I review him again for the effectiveness of his treatment. If his chest pain is better controlled, he can resume attending court. [Emphasis added]</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_26\"></a>26 The Defendant then curiously fixed the angioplasty procedure on the first date of the hearing of the contested divorce hearing on 13 August 2024, with only 15 minutes’ prior notice given to the court. It also bears mention that he had arranged in advance for an ambulance some four to five days before the next proceeded hearing date of 9 September 2024, even before he faced any actual emergency on that day. The recording of the proceedings conducted over Zoom will also show that despite the Defendant’s repeated insistence that he was unable to conduct the proceedings, he appeared calm and was able to advance his case, at least until the pre-arranged arrival of paramedics compelled an adjournment of the session.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_27\"></a>27 Despite the multiple delays occasioned by the Defendant’s medical condition in the interlocutory appeal, this court had adjourned the present hearing six times over a period of ten weeks from 13 August to 22 October 2024. It had also given the Defendant the leeway to attend the hearing on Zoom from a hospital, clinic or any location where he could be assured of medical assistance if needed. These special arrangements were granted because there was a clear and pressing need to move the proceedings forward in this case, given that more than two years had passed since the filing of the divorce writ. It is apposite to remember that justice delayed is also justice denied. This is underscored by the judge-led approach under Rule 22(2) of the Family Justice Rules 2014, which exhorts the court to “make such order or give such direction as it thinks fit, for the just, expeditious and economic disposal of the cause or matter.”</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_28\"></a>28 It should also be remembered that the pith of the recusal application is not the correctness of the directions given by the court. It is whether, from an objective viewpoint, such directions reveal bias or prejudice on the part of the court such that it should remove itself from further conduct of the proceedings. Given the extensive delay occasioned in this case, I did not find the directions made to be unreasonable in the mind of an objective bystander. Quite to the contrary, every latitude had been extended to the Defendant to manage his medical conditions and to proceed with reasonable despatch with the present proceedings. It should be remembered that the court is not bound to abdicate its management of court proceedings at the behest of medical practitioners, no matter how well intentioned. The court remains the master of its own procedure, and is solely responsible for balancing the needs of justice with the demands of efficiency. In the present case, every reasonable accommodation has been made in view of the Defendant’s medical issues, including multiple adjournments and a shift in the modality of hearing, first to a remote hearing, and finally to an exchange of questions and answers by way of affidavit. There is no indication that the Defendant is unable to pen thoughts to paper to further his case, and these special directions have been given to move proceedings along in a manner that minimises any risk posed to the Defendant’s health. It bears noting too that considerable prejudice has already been suffered by the Plaintiff, who has waited two years for the divorce proceedings to move forward. Under the circumstances, I do not think that the directions given in the conduct of this case would give rise to an impression in the mind of an objective bystander that the court had been biased against the Defendant in the conduct of these proceedings. Quite to the contrary, a court which adjourns <em>ad infinitum</em> on medical grounds may be perceived as being unjust to the other party stranded in adjudicative limbo through no fault of their own.</p> <p class=\"Judg-1\"><a id=\"p1_29\"></a>29 I accordingly dismissed the application for recusal, as well as the attendant prayer that the divorce proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of the recusal summons, since this was no longer necessary. As the Plaintiff did not ask for costs, I made no order as to costs.</p> </div></content></root>"}]