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In the past two decades, there has been a significant shift in naval missions toward operations other than war. 
Maritime security operations such as counter-piracy, maritime interdiction, maritime patrol, and naval escort are the main focus of most fleets today; however, the vessels that are currently being used in such operations were mainly built for other purposes. 
For instance, in August 2009, the North Atlantic Council approved “Operation Ocean Shield” to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden. 
Among ships that were assigned in the rotations of this NATO mission, many were destroyers and frigates. 
Although those warships can be used in such missions, how reasonable is it to risk a destroyer or a frigate to fight with terrorist boats or pirates?
Capable Warships vs. Smaller Combatants
Many surface vessels that perform maritime security operations, as in the NATO Task Force example, are sophisticated warships capable of anti-surface warfare (ASUW), anti-air warfare (AAW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). 
Although these sophisticated multi-mission capable fleets are able to achieve good results in expeditionary warfare against a strong enemy [1], the capabilities of those ships will probably be used in less than 1% of their total lifetime. 
It seems a sound reason to build capable ships in case of a conventional war, and one can claim that capable ships are built to be used in that small period of their lifetime; nevertheless, navies should optimize their efforts and resources in some way to find a better mix of vessel types and systems that constitute the vessels.