diff --git a/content/hegel/reference/existence/development.mdx b/content/hegel/reference/existence/development.mdx
index 7a1d7ca..81f43ba 100644
--- a/content/hegel/reference/existence/development.mdx
+++ b/content/hegel/reference/existence/development.mdx
@@ -112,11 +112,11 @@ the glimmers, as it were, of a movement amidst this static determinacy.
 
 Hegel notes that "The _whole_ is likewise in the form or _determinateness_ of
 being [is such] _for us, in our reflection_ (Hegel 2010, 84/21.97). Stephen Houlgate
-[elaborates](#houlgate) that this difference is between, on the one hand, regarding
-`existence` as _immediate_ and therefore containing `being` and `non-being` as its
-moments but where `being` predominates, as it appears _for us_ in our reflection;
-against, on the other hand, `existence` as simply the unity of `being` and `non-being`
-where neither one has the greater emphasis.
+[elaborates](#houlgate) that this difference is between, on the one hand, `existence`
+as _immediate_ and therefore containing `being` and `non-being` as its moments but
+where `being` predominates, in contrast to, on the other hand, `existence` as simply
+the unity of `being` and `non-being` where neither one has the greater emphasis.
+The former is that way because it appears _for us_ in our reflection.
 
 It is puzzling why Hegel should have to raise a problem of external reflection
 here. If the issue appears to stem from over-emphasizing `being` over
@@ -127,10 +127,61 @@ available of `existence` that does _not_ determine that the unity of `being` and
 the root cause—namely, the immediacy of `existence`—must also be
 problematic, but then the issue is no longer that of an external reflection.
 
-There seems to be three approaches one could explore. Either the oneness, or
-unity, of `being` and `non-being` is or is not. Or the matter with the external
-reflection is itself an external reflection that is unwarranted. Or, the logical
-development here needs to be revised.
+There seems to be at least four avenues one could explore from here. Either the
+oneness, or unity, of `being` and `non-being` is or is not. Or the matter with
+the external reflection is itself an external reflection that is unwarranted. Or
+an external reflection really has taken place on erroneous grounds and it not
+yet clear as to why, or if it follows necessarily from the logic. Or, finally,
+the logical development here needs to be revised.
+
+#### Immediacy and Determinateness (Niklas, Yirmibes)
+
+Further to the issue of why an one-sided determination and an external
+reflection arises in the first Existence section. First, does oneness imply
+wholeness? The term `whole` is a category of Essence, which is later developed
+in the _Logic_, and, as the movement roughly is explicated there, the `whole`
+presupposes `parts`. Insofar as the `whole` is here evoked, it may simply imply
+`parts`, and that gets thought into the mire of one-sided determination. Put
+simply, to identify a concept as one-sided (a whole), one should already know
+more than the one-sidedness of the concept. Since what will come has not yet
+been made explicit (posited), one can only determine this one-sidedness as if it
+is _for us_, in our reflection. This is exactly what Hegel attempts to prevent
+in the development here by alerting us to the fact that there is no
+one-sidedness of `existence`; that this thinking is an external imputation upon
+the matter by us and that it does not follow immanently. This external
+reflection can possibly be traced back to the very notion of a `whole`.
+
+However, why does the `whole` become relevant here in the first place? What
+triggers the external reflection as such?
+
+Is the problem that there is an appearance of determinateness (or a seeming of
+it) at the _immediacy_ of `existence`? Because _immediacy_ as such, were it
+pure, is incongruent or incompatible with determinateness, which cannot be
+merely immediate. On some level, every category in the _Logic_ faces this
+problem since they are each initially _immediate_ or have `being`. But here,
+however, the problematic is taken to its extreme since there is no determination
+that could be attached to the _immediacy_ of `existence`. In other categories,
+it is more readily known that the immediacy of a concept is a mediated
+immediacy.
+
+One could claim that `existence`, initially posited, just is the immediacy of
+the unity of `being` and `non-being`, and there is nothing more to the
+matter—no determinateness. However, Hegel's argument in this section is
+that this precise immediacy necessarily produces determinateness. It produces
+determinateness in virtue of both `being` and `non-being`, and, `being` _and_
+`non-being`. In the immediacy, the emphasis falls on the simple oneness of these
+categories. But, this immediacy of oneness vanishes in favor for a mediated
+togetherness. However, these two phases contradict each other, since `existence`
+apparently cannot be both one and many. It is in _this_ transition from one to
+the other that external reflection may interdict and impose an unwarranted
+resolution to the contradiction, namely, by mapping unto the matter a
+syllogistic form whereby the difference is governed by an identity. This
+reflection loses sight of the fact that `existence` just is both a simple
+oneness _and_ a mediated togetherness of `being` and `non-being`, whose implied
+contradiction is what produces its movement of one to the other through
+sublation. It is sublation because `being`, or the oneness, does not entirely
+vanish in the transition, but is made an equal moment together with another,
+namely, `non-being`. This subsequently turns out to qualify `existence`.
 
 ### Textual Note
 
diff --git a/cspell.json b/cspell.json
index 3d318cf..74f9d61 100644
--- a/cspell.json
+++ b/cspell.json
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
         "vanishedness",
         "webp",
         "Wissenschaft",
+        "Yirmibes",
         "Zusätze"
     ],
     "enableFiletypes": [