In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubifs: authentication: Fix use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit
After an insertion in TNC, the tree might split and cause a node to
change its znode->parent
. A further deletion of other nodes in the
tree (which also could free the nodes), the aforementioned node's
znode->cparent
could still point to a freed node. This
znode->cparent
may not be updated when getting nodes to commit in
ubifs_tnc_start_commit()
. This could then trigger a use-after-free
when accessing the znode->cparent
in write_index()
in
ubifs_tnc_end_commit()
.
This can be triggered by running
rm -f /etc/test-file.bin
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/etc/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync
in a loop, and with CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION
. KASAN then
reports:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
Write of size 32 at addr ffffff800a3af86c by task ubifs_bgt0_20/153
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x340
show_stack+0x18/0x24
dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xbc
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b0
kasan_report+0x1d8/0x1f0
kasan_check_range+0xf8/0x1a0
memcpy+0x84/0xf4
ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
do_commit+0x4e0/0x1340
ubifs_bg_thread+0x234/0x2e0
kthread+0x36c/0x410
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Allocated by task 401:
kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8c/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x34c/0x5bc
tnc_insert+0x140/0x16a4
ubifs_tnc_add+0x370/0x52c
ubifs_jnl_write_data+0x5d8/0x870
do_writepage+0x36c/0x510
ubifs_writepage+0x190/0x4dc
__writepage+0x58/0x154
write_cache_pages+0x394/0x830
do_writepages+0x1f0/0x5b0
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x170/0x25c
file_write_and_wait_range+0x140/0x190
ubifs_fsync+0xe8/0x290
vfs_fsync_range+0xc0/0x1e4
do_fsync+0x40/0x90
__arm64_sys_fsync+0x34/0x50
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
el0_svc+0x34/0x70
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
Freed by task 403:
kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40
kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
__kasan_slab_free+0xd4/0x13c
kfree+0xc4/0x3a0
tnc_delete+0x3f4/0xe40
ubifs_tnc_remove_range+0x368/0x73c
ubifs_tnc_remove_ino+0x29c/0x2e0
ubifs_jnl_delete_inode+0x150/0x260
ubifs_evict_inode+0x1d4/0x2e4
evict+0x1c8/0x450
iput+0x2a0/0x3c4
do_unlinkat+0x2cc/0x490
__arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x90/0x100
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
el0_svc+0x34/0x70
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
The offending memcpy()
in ubifs_copy_hash()
has a use-after-free
when a node becomes root in TNC but still has a cparent
to an already
freed node. More specifically, consider the following TNC:
zroot
/
/
zp1
/
/
zn
Inserting a new node zn_new
with a key smaller then zn
will trigger
a split in tnc_insert()
if zp1
is full:
zroot
/ \
/ \
zp1 zp2
/ \
/ \
zn_new zn
zn->parent
has now been moved to zp2
, but zn->cparent
still
points to zp1
.
Now, consider a removal of all the nodes except zn
. Just when
tnc_delete()
is about to delete zroot
and zp2
:
zroot
\
\
zp2
\
\
zn
zroot
and zp2
get freed and the tree collapses:
zn
zn
now becomes the new zroot
.
get_znodes_to_commit()
will now only find zn
, the new zroot
, and
write_index()
will check its znode->cparent
that wrongly points to
the already freed zp1
. ubifs_copy_hash()
thus gets wrongly called
with znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->iip].hash
that triggers the
use-after-free!
Fix this by explicitly setting znode->cparent
to NULL
in
get_znodes_to_commit()
for the root node. The search for the dirty
nodes
---truncated---
References
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubifs: authentication: Fix use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit
After an insertion in TNC, the tree might split and cause a node to
change its
znode->parent
. A further deletion of other nodes in thetree (which also could free the nodes), the aforementioned node's
znode->cparent
could still point to a freed node. Thisznode->cparent
may not be updated when getting nodes to commit inubifs_tnc_start_commit()
. This could then trigger a use-after-freewhen accessing the
znode->cparent
inwrite_index()
inubifs_tnc_end_commit()
.This can be triggered by running
rm -f /etc/test-file.bin
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/etc/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync
in a loop, and with
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION
. KASAN thenreports:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
Write of size 32 at addr ffffff800a3af86c by task ubifs_bgt0_20/153
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x340
show_stack+0x18/0x24
dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xbc
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b0
kasan_report+0x1d8/0x1f0
kasan_check_range+0xf8/0x1a0
memcpy+0x84/0xf4
ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
do_commit+0x4e0/0x1340
ubifs_bg_thread+0x234/0x2e0
kthread+0x36c/0x410
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Allocated by task 401:
kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8c/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x34c/0x5bc
tnc_insert+0x140/0x16a4
ubifs_tnc_add+0x370/0x52c
ubifs_jnl_write_data+0x5d8/0x870
do_writepage+0x36c/0x510
ubifs_writepage+0x190/0x4dc
__writepage+0x58/0x154
write_cache_pages+0x394/0x830
do_writepages+0x1f0/0x5b0
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x170/0x25c
file_write_and_wait_range+0x140/0x190
ubifs_fsync+0xe8/0x290
vfs_fsync_range+0xc0/0x1e4
do_fsync+0x40/0x90
__arm64_sys_fsync+0x34/0x50
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
el0_svc+0x34/0x70
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
Freed by task 403:
kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40
kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
__kasan_slab_free+0xd4/0x13c
kfree+0xc4/0x3a0
tnc_delete+0x3f4/0xe40
ubifs_tnc_remove_range+0x368/0x73c
ubifs_tnc_remove_ino+0x29c/0x2e0
ubifs_jnl_delete_inode+0x150/0x260
ubifs_evict_inode+0x1d4/0x2e4
evict+0x1c8/0x450
iput+0x2a0/0x3c4
do_unlinkat+0x2cc/0x490
__arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x90/0x100
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
el0_svc+0x34/0x70
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
The offending
memcpy()
inubifs_copy_hash()
has a use-after-freewhen a node becomes root in TNC but still has a
cparent
to an alreadyfreed node. More specifically, consider the following TNC:
Inserting a new node
zn_new
with a key smaller thenzn
will triggera split in
tnc_insert()
ifzp1
is full:zn_new zn
zn->parent
has now been moved tozp2
, butzn->cparent
stillpoints to
zp1
.Now, consider a removal of all the nodes except
zn
. Just whentnc_delete()
is about to deletezroot
andzp2
:zroot
andzp2
get freed and the tree collapses:zn
now becomes the newzroot
.get_znodes_to_commit()
will now only findzn
, the newzroot
, andwrite_index()
will check itsznode->cparent
that wrongly points tothe already freed
zp1
.ubifs_copy_hash()
thus gets wrongly calledwith
znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->iip].hash
that triggers theuse-after-free!
Fix this by explicitly setting
znode->cparent
toNULL
inget_znodes_to_commit()
for the root node. The search for the dirtynodes
---truncated---
References