Add a configuration option to drop packets from an unexpected source address #77
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Thanks a lot for this patch. |
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If an attacker has the socket id of an existing connection (either through sniffing traffic - the headers aren't encrypted - or guessing, since they're only 32 bit IDs), they can send packets that will be processed as being part of an existing connection.
This could be used to interfere with an existing connection, either adding corrupt data or causing the SRT connection to be terminated, for example.
So, add a configuration option to keep this behaviour (but default it to off because it can be unsafe). If this behaviour isn't wanted (the new default), packets from a different address are dropped.