crypto_campaign

detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion
 id: 773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122
-version: '5'
-date: '2024-11-28'
+version: '6'
+date: '2024-12-17'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
@@ -55,14 +55,15 @@ drilldown_searches:
   latest_offset: $info_max_time$
 tags:
   analytic_story:
-  - WhisperGate
-  - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
+  - CISA AA22-320A
+  - AgentTesla
   - Remcos
   - Data Destruction
-  - CISA AA22-320A
-  - ValleyRAT
   - Compromised Windows Host
-  - AgentTesla
+  - ValleyRAT
+  - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
+  - WhisperGate
+  - Crypto Stealer
   asset_type: Endpoint
   confidence: 80
   impact: 80

detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml

@@ -1,18 +1,40 @@
 name: Any Powershell DownloadFile
 id: 1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122
-version: 7
-date: '2024-09-30'
+version: '8'
+date: '2024-12-17'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
-description: The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadFile` method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in malicious frameworks to download and execute additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system. Analysts should investigate the source and destination of the download and review AMSI or PowerShell transaction logs for additional context.
+description: The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadFile`
+  method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response
+  (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as
+  it is commonly used in malicious frameworks to download and execute additional payloads.
+  If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration,
+  or further compromise of the system. Analysts should investigate the source and
+  destination of the download and review AMSI or PowerShell transaction logs for additional
+  context.
 data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
 - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`'
-how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
-known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile*
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
+  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
+  and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
+  telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
+  you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
+  Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
+  be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
+  the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
+  data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
+  names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur
+  by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query
+  to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
 references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
@@ -23,26 +45,34 @@ drilldown_searches:
   earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
   latest_offset: $info_max_time$
 - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
-  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$",
+    "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+    as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk
+    Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
+    as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
+    by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
   earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
   latest_offset: $info_max_time$
 tags:
   analytic_story:
-  - DarkCrystal RAT
-  - Ingress Tool Transfer
   - Hermetic Wiper
-  - Malicious PowerShell
-  - Data Destruction
   - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
   - Phemedrone Stealer
-  - Braodo Stealer
+  - Data Destruction
   - PXA Stealer
+  - Ingress Tool Transfer
+  - Malicious PowerShell
+  - DarkCrystal RAT
+  - Crypto Stealer
+  - Braodo Stealer
   asset_type: Endpoint
   confidence: 70
   cve:
   - CVE-2021-44228
   impact: 80
-  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile
+    within PowerShell.
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1059
   - T1059.001

detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml

@@ -1,18 +1,42 @@
 name: Attempt To Stop Security Service
 id: c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910
-version: 7
-date: '2024-09-30'
+version: '8'
+date: '2024-12-17'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
-description: The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the "sc.exe" command with the "stop" parameter. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.
+description: The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services
+  on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint
+  Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving
+  the "sc.exe" command with the "stop" parameter. This activity is significant because
+  disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially
+  leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware
+  installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could
+  compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation
+  and response.
 data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
 - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR  Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process="* stop *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`'
-how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
-known_false_positives: None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
+  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  where `process_net` OR  Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process="* stop
+  *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name
+  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
+  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as
+  process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
+  and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
+  telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
+  you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
+  Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
+  be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
+  the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
+  data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
+  names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services
+  should be identified and understood.
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service
 - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
@@ -22,21 +46,28 @@ drilldown_searches:
   earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
   latest_offset: $info_max_time$
 - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
-  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$",
+    "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+    as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk
+    Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
+    as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
+    by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
   earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
   latest_offset: $info_max_time$
 tags:
   analytic_story:
-  - WhisperGate
-  - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
-  - Disabling Security Tools
-  - Data Destruction
   - Azorult
+  - Data Destruction
+  - Disabling Security Tools
   - Trickbot
+  - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
+  - WhisperGate
+  - Crypto Stealer
   asset_type: Endpoint
   confidence: 50
   impact: 40
-  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1562.001
   - T1562