chore: shorten mdx samples further

tests/mocks/data/development.mdx

@@ -45,33 +45,6 @@ In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not unequal
 with respect to another; it has no difference within it, nor any outwardly.
 ```
 
-The terms equality and inequality here are used to establish difference
-vis-à-vis being and something else. However, _no difference can_ be established
-since being is positively not something different from an other. Considered
-otherwise, there is nothing with respect to being that can be differentiated
-from it. The thought of `being` in this sense extends in all directions. One
-might say that everything is being and being is everything, but this view
-presupposes something that is non-being against which being is differentiated;
-but this is inadequate, for, as Hegel emphasizes, there is no difference
-inwardly or _outwardly_. Viewed internally according to its conception then
-there is _simply_ being.
-
-```md
-If any determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were
-posited by this determination or content as distinct from an other, it would
-thereby fail to hold fast to its purity.
-```
-
-Paradoxically, the first positive thing said about `being` other than repeating
-it or its purity, is that it _is_ indeterminate and empty. This is perhaps
-already transitioning the logic beyond being, since the focus shifts towards
-indeterminateness and emptiness.
-
-```md
-– There is _nothing_ to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of
-intuiting; or, it is only this pure empty intuiting itself.
-```
-
 The en dash (–) is often used by Hegel to inline a quick comment. It
 serves to swiftly elaborate on a logical passage and provide additional
 guidance. Importantly, in these mini-commentaries, Hegel steps out of the
@@ -134,15 +107,6 @@ that introduces a contrast with mediation. Instead, it simply _is_.
 > comprehensive relation that is immediately common to all things or ideas
 > (Burbidge 1981, 38).
 
-> _Being_ is equivalent only to itself. This positive assertion, though, does
-> not distinguish it from anything to which it is unequal, for all specific
-> determinations have been excluded. When it considers this, its most primitive
-> category, then, thought finds nothing there to think. It is pure thinking
-> without any content. But _nothing_ certainly is not the same thing as _being_.
-> In thinking the concept _being_, then, a new concept, _nothing_, has emerged.
-> There has been no explicit inference here. The second thought simply and
-> immediately comes to mind (Burbidge 1981, 39).
-
 ### Houlgate
 
 Stephen Houlgate emphasizes that the start of Hegel's _Logic_ is both a logic
@@ -166,11 +130,6 @@ that matter). As Houlgate writes,
 > – a limit that preserves being as being and keeps it apart from nothing
 > (Houlgate 2022, 136).
 
-Hegel, in contrast to Parmenides, does not distinguish being from nothing, or
-essence, things, entities, worlds or anything else for that matter. Any such
-distinction would render being determinate, and being would not be understood in
-its utter indeterminacy.
-
 Moreover, Houlgate points out that `being` is not to be understood in terms of
 the negation of immediacy ("im-mediacy") or the negation of determinacy
 ("in-determinate"). This line of thinking would also render `being` something

tests/mocks/data/first-paragraph.mdx

@@ -34,30 +34,6 @@ kind of relation - the relation of the `mechanical object` that is now an
 immediate identity [*unmittelbare Identität*]. The moments of the `mechanical object`
 are immediately identical to each other, and not mediated.
 
-The immediacy of their identity points to the fact that there is no moment of
-mediation to establish their identity, they just are identical. One way to
-understand immediacy is to think of how someone might theorise about perception:
-one might think that what we perceive is the raw sense-data of what is out there
-and that there is nothing more or less in our perception of the world. What we
-perceive is immediately identical to what is actually out there. In this sense,
-there is no moment in-between the moments of the `mechanical object` that
-conceptually mediate their identity to each other - they simply and immediately
-are identical to each other. Their identity is, in turn, explained by their
-immediacy. If one moment is immediately the other moment then there is no
-distinguishing them from each other. Let's go back to our example of a
-philosophical theory of perception that treats perception as an unmediated
-activity whereby the perceiver receives the raw sense-data as it is in reality.
-In this theory, there is an implicit identity between the perceiver and the
-perceived because if the perceiver does nothing to the sense-date upon
-perceiving it (such as, say, mediating it through certain concepts) then the
-perceiver is, in a sense, ontologically the same as the sense-data being
-perceived. Now, obviously, the moments of the `mechanical object` do not
-perceive each other but they do relate to each other, and they relate to each
-other immediately and, as such, they relate to each other as identical moments.
-It is for these reasons that Hegel begins his account of the `mechanical object`
-by stating that its moments have “become an immediate identity” (Hegel 1991,
-711).
-
 What exactly are these moments of the `mechanical object` that have become an
 immediate identity? Hegel clarifies this in the following sentence:
 
@@ -74,11 +50,4 @@ finds its essence instantiated in particular and individual objects. It is not,
 for example, like the universal concept of a chair that states that a chair must
 be "so and so" and that serves as the essence of armchairs and swivel chairs,
 alike. It is not, as Hegel writes, a universal “in the sense of a community of
-properties” (Hegel 1991, 711). Rather, it is a universal that is immediately
-identical to the particular and the individual. In other words, the general
-concept of a chair is identical to all particular and individual chairs - there
-are not some chairs that are short and some that are long, or some chairs that
-offer good lumbar support and others that do not, rather, all chairs are
-identical to each other. The moments of the `mechanical object`, then, are
-treated as identical to each other, there is no distinction in conceiving of the
-`mechanical object` as universal or as individual.
+properties” (Hegel 1991, 711).

tests/mocks/data/science-of-logic-introduction.mdx

@@ -29,26 +29,6 @@ with the following statement:
 > absolute beginning but is dependent on other concepts and is connected on all
 > sides with other material (Hegel 2010, 23/21.27).
 
-This sense of _absolute beginning_ requires one to think of logic not as
-relative to its subject matter, or as a certain form that merely structures some
-other content, but _being both at once_. At the outset of its inquiry, logic
-cannot be distinguished from its matter and it cannot be dependent on anything
-else but itself.
-
-This finally crumbles the initial edifice established by the familiar notion. In
-this [presuppositionless thinking](/hegel/guides/presuppositionless-thinking)
-about logic, the decision has been taken to suspend the customary meanings of
-rules and laws of thinking, and thus upend the usual procedures and
-methodologies. With no established idea, category, method or notion, one
-strictly cannot declare in advance of its thinking what logic is or will be.
-Strictly speaking then, as Hegel says: "Logic, therefore, cannot say what it is
-in advance, rather does this knowledge of itself only emerge as the final result
-and completion of its whole treatment. ...its concept is generated in the course
-of this elaboration and cannot therefore be given in advance" (Hegel 2010,
-23/21.27). No idea or concept can be pinned, established or simply put before
-us. Our blocks and their patterns melt away. Indeed, the very sense of logic
-vanishes.
-
 ### At the Beginning
 
 > Only after a more profound acquaintance with the other sciences does logic
@@ -139,24 +119,6 @@ more technical vocabulary, it is _the conflict of determinations_ (see also Kant
 > discord is the great negative step on the way to the true concept of reason
 > (Hegel 2010, 26/21.30).
 
-Hegel notes a further error in the case where one is discouraged by a
-contradiction in the understanding and resolves to find accord and stability in
-sensuous reality. But, and here Hegel criticizes the Kantian transcendental
-standpoint once more, if one resolves to look to sensuous reality as the
-criterion of truth, in the same instance one cannot determine the thing in
-question to have _any_ independent truth since the truth of the matter is
-settled _only_ as it appears. "This is like attributing right insight to
-someone," Hegel writes, "with the stipulation, however, that he is not fit to
-see what is true but only what is false" (Hegel 2010, 26/21.30). To put this
-another way, if by truth one understands an independent standard, then this
-immediately clashes with the knowledge that one acquires through appearances,
-since knowing here is totally dependent on appearances and cannot make _any_
-independent claims about the matter at hand. To emphasize this point further, if
-the transcendental arrangement is actually granted, then one cannot truly speak
-of laws of nature or even state that the sky is there the moment one turns one's
-gaze towards the ground. This is why, if Hegel is right, this claim that
-sensuous reality is the sole arbiter of truth leads to absurdity.
-
 Finally, Hegel then points out that as the understanding (according to
 transcendental idealism) cannot apply its determinations or concepts to things
 in themselves, it must therefore mean that these determinations are in