existence

[Firgrep]

Author's Note

• article on existence
• split out stuff about "inline comment" into its own article in a new "Annotations" folder that is at the bottom of the Logic section; fixed article links referring to it.

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[mrtcn25]

it seems to me that Hegel has to look ahead because the matter at hand (existence as the whole, by the whole, we could understand the determinateness of being) projects what it will come next. Hegel here warns us that if we call existence as the one-sided determinateness, more complicated and explicit form has to come later. Because the one-sidedness can only be true when the determinateness is made explicit in detail.

[Firgrep]

Doesn't that seem circular to you (in a bad, incoherent way)?

[mrtcn25]

I think I articulated badly. Let me put it one more time.
If we are aware of the fact that the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is the one-sided determination, this awareness requires us to know the other determinations why we call the whole as the one-sided determination (Knowing other reasons makes us look head—in this case Hegel (21.97) looks ahead and lists negation, something and other etc. where the whole will transpire fully as it gets posited). In other words, to identify a concept as one-sided, we should already know more than the one-sidedness of the concept. Since what will come has not yet made explicit (posited), we can only talk about this one-sidedness as if it is for us, in our reflection.

[Firgrep]

Ok, I'm with you (and very well put, by the way!), so it seems to me that the problem begins with calling something (determining) as a "whole", which is really an essence category, and that presupposes parts.

Do you think this is what is transpiring here? Thinking in terms of "whole" forces us to think in "parts", but that is a false move because there are strictly no parts to speak of here at this level in the Logic (or of existence for that matter)?

So how then did we move from thinking in terms of "oneness" of being and nothing to the "whole" of being and nothing?

[mrtcn25]

Good catch on external reflection! and thoughtful questions. My take on this issue:

Hegel is aware of the fact that the unity of being and non-being amounts to determinateness. Determinateness includes the moment of being "negatively determined"(21.98) but in the immediacy of the unity of being and non-being, there cannot be any negativity since it is simple unity, immediacy (21.97). So the problem here is that we happen to talk about a thing (determinateness) that is not posited in the concept of existence yet. In order to tackle with the problem, Hegel suggestion is like: “we happen to talk about it but be careful it is not yet derived properly.” “Any determinateness not yet posited in the concept itself belongs instead to our reflection […]” (21.97).

The following statement indicates the coming-up problem regarding immediacy and determinateness: “Non-being thus taken up into being with the result that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such” (21.97). This determinateness, which is stated as the result of the simple unity, can only be the work of external reflection because the logic, so far, can only be concerned with the simple unity. In the same paragraph Hegel states: “That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of being is an external reflection but in negation, in something and other, and so forth, it will become posited.” The determinateness is the work of external reflection only here in the immediacy of existence. So it can only give us the one-sided form of being. Of course, this does not mean that all and every determinateness of being is the work of external reflection.

The problem seems neither with the immediacy of existence nor with the simple unity (immediacy) of being and non-being but with developing a result (determinateness) from the immediacy of this unity.

[Firgrep]

Hegel suggestion is like: “we happen to talk about it but be careful it is not yet derived properly.” “Any determinateness not yet posited in the concept itself belongs instead to our reflection […]” (21.97).

But then, how about we just don't? How about we just describe what is posited, then? It seems to me that this attempt to avoid external reflection actually pits us deeper into it.

Is the problem that we have determinateness (or seem to have it) at the immediacy of existence? Because the immediacy is incongruent or incompatible with determinateness (which cannot be merely immediate)?

Trying to wrap my head around this. Your comments are very helpful and any anger in my questions aren't directed at you but at Hegel (or the logic).

[mrtcn25]

You are right. Once one adopts an undesired way of thinking, it is hard to get rid of. At these points, Hegel or the Logic seems to follow the undesired way. The good thing is that he is really cautious at distinguishing the work of external reflection from the immanent derivation. Possibly, he sees some sort of necessity in the emergence of the external reflection. But I cannot see as vivid as he does. My provisional explanation for his remarks on external reflection is to take them as a warning to find a correct reasoning. In the end, it is a logical project that should show us the ways in which we could avoid pitfalls in reasoning.

The problem you suggest is the right one! On a general scale, it is a persistent problem in pretty much every category starting from a sort of immediacy. Here it seems extremely more problematic because there is literally no determination we could attach to the immediacy of existence. In other categories, we at least know that the immediacy of a concept is a mediated immediacy.

[mrtcn25]

I think Houlgate might be right in relating the one-sided determinateness to external reflection and you are right that negation becomes explicit later.

Considering Houlgate's and your points, Hegel's note on external reflection becomes more understandable. Hegel puts a note on external reflection at the moment one-sided determinateness becomes the case. Determinateness comes from the external reflection not from the immediacy of the unity being and non-being "because we do not see as much non-being in it as being", we rather see it only as a form of being.

[Firgrep]

"because we do not see as much non-being in it as being", we rather see it only as a form of being.

But this is what I struggle with. Do we see it as a form of being or the logic?

What does it mean to see something as much non-being as being? It's like that would require us to leap ahead into the category of limit but even there the limit also has being.

Would it be right to say that, posited, there is only the immediacy of the unity of being and non-being -- but nothing more? The problem is injecting a determinateness at this stage where there really is none, or at least not made explicit?

[mrtcn25]

1-) It is a tough question. Do you see any reason to set a difference between we and the logic? I see no persistent contrast between them. I think that the logic accepts the possible reasonable predictions of external thinking (we) and puts them on the right track by sparing it a proper place. If we permanently distinguish “we” from the logic, our ordinary thinking should get stuck in the moment of external reflection, not making the matter-at-hand explicit, or posited.

2-) If the unity of being and nothing, the whole, constitutes the determinateness of being. There remains something not explicitly put. That remaining implicit moment is non-being(or nothing). Non-being is supposed to be made explicit too. But it is not yet explicit in “a. Existence in General”. I think this is left implicit because what Hegel understands by existence is this unity of explicit being and implicit non-being. For now, we can only do a projection as to the source of determinateness, namely, the unity of explicit being and explicit non-being. But non-being cannot be explicit at this stage because we take it in the form of being. You are right that this would require us to go into the limit. But this leap would be illegitimate within the domain of the existence section. I think for this reason Hegel puts a note: “That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of being is an external reflection; but in negation, in something and other, and so forth, it will become posited” (21.97). For instance, we could see a type of the unity of explicit being and explicit non-being in something with a limit. “The limit is the mediation in virtue of which something and other each both is and is not.” (21.114)

3-) I think, even if we accept that “posited, there is only the immediacy of the unity of being and non-being, nothing more–no determinateness”, this immediacy produces determinateness according to Hegel. “… the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such.” It is supposed to be not a matter of random injection but is a necessary result of the immediacy which will be made explicit later on in negation, something-other, and limit.

[Firgrep]

Great points! Both this and the comment above.

I've added a new section that takes up a lot of the things you mention and tries to describe the problem and offer a possible solution. I've also added your name in credit of this section since its the result of this exchange as well as taking a few great phrases from you 🙂